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ABSTRACT 
This project argues for the persistence of biblical allegory in eighteenth-century 
Christian thought, contrary to the narrative of allegory’s demise, found, for instance, in 
the work of Peter Harrison and Hans Frei. I demonstrate that two factors in particular, the 
scientific revolution and Christian discourse about Jewish interpretation, shaped the 
content and quality of allegorical interpretations of the Bible in this century. Using the 
case of Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), natural philosopher and biblical 
commentator, the dissertation will consider how allegory functioned amidst 
epistemological shifts brought on by new naturalistic and mechanistic explanations of the 
universe, and amidst tides of anti-Judaism and Christian Kabbalah. 
This project is divided into three parts, which examine the context, content, and 
reception of Swedenborg’s multi-volume biblical commentary, Arcana coelestia. Part 
one lays contextual groundwork with a brief comparative look to the commentaries of 
other eighteenth-century figures, both Jewish and Christian. I survey the discourse about 
allegory, science, and religious identity in the commentaries of William Whiston, Johan 
Kemper, Moses Mendelssohn, and Menahẹm Nahụm. Part two contains a close reading 
vii 
 
of Swedenborg’s interpretation of Genesis 3, revealing a bias against the two 
communities of interpreters he believes incapable of accessing the full depths of biblical 
wisdom: scientists, or the learned skeptics of natural philosophy, and the Jews. Using 
Harold Bloom’s concept of the “anxiety of influence” I point to resemblances in 
Swedenborg’s own hermeneutic to interpretive methods deemed, by either himself or 
those around him, to be Jewish, kabbalistic, or naturalistic. Part three examines 
Swedenborg’s reception, revealing a double ambivalence to Swedenborg and to allegory 
among figures as diverse as Immanuel Kant, John Wesley, Friedrich Oetinger, William 
Blake and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. These men had in common a fascination with 
Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences, but also harbored deep reservations that 
manifested in moments of harsh criticism and even ridicule. Despite such protestations, 
those interested in Swedenborg often produce reformulations of biblical allegory in their 
own terms. This is, therefore, a study of the relationship between texts and contexts, and 
the persistence of allegory even in an age that was supposedly hostile to it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The Demise of Allegory” 
In his book The Bible, Protestantism and the Rise of Natural Science, historian 
Peter Harrison traces the demise of allegorical interpretation of the Bible in early modern 
Europe. Harrison points to the Protestant Reformation and its antiauthoritarian turn to 
sola scriptura as the impetus, not only for the hermeneutical preference for the plain 
sense, but for the scientific revolution itself.1 A new kind of natural history, for instance, 
emerged with the work of John Ray, one that represented an unprecedented, secular 
approach to the subject. Ray’s method would have been impossible in the medieval world 
of Hugh of St. Victor, for example, for whom the book of nature and the book of 
scripture corresponded at every point. Ray, on the other hand, presented his 
classifications of plants without reference to “Hieroglyphics, Emblems, Morals, Fables, 
Presages.”2 A singular focus on the plants themselves was all that was necessary; 
whatever relation they bore to other realities remained the work for another author. The 
effects were evident in astronomy as well, with Galileo, whose mathematical 
understanding of nature replaced a symbolic one. Galileo himself was a devoted reader of 
the Bible and believed that scripture spoke truth on many levels: “nobody will deny that 
it is often very abstruse, and may say things which are quite different from what its bare 
words signify.”3  But as his famous letter to the Grand Duchess Christina demonstrates, 
                                                          
1 Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 8. 
2 From John Ray’s preface to The Ornithology of Francis Willughby, as quoted in Harrison, The Bible, 2. 
3 Galileo Galilei, “Galileo Galilei to the Most Serene Grand Dutchess Mother,” in Discoveries and Opinions 
of Galileo, trans. Stillman Drake (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957), 181. 
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he also believed that scientists needed to be free from the constraints of biblical theology 
in order to do their work. This separation of the study of nature from the study of the 
Bible was a critical moment in the demise of allegory. Harrison writes:  
The new conception of the order of nature was made possible by the collapse 
of the allegorical interpretation of texts, for the denial of the legitimacy of 
allegory is in essence a denial of the capacity of things to act as signs . . . The 
mathematical and taxonomic categories imposed by Galileo and Ray on 
physical objects and living things represent an attempt to reconfigure a 
natural world which had been evacuated of order and meaning.4 
 
With the divorce of the study of nature from the study of scripture, the Bible lost 
something of its symbolic potential.  
 Hans Frei explores this phenomenon, especially with regard to the changing 
methods of biblical interpretation in the eighteenth century, in his seminal work The 
Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. He writes: “Despite the influence of Pietism, the fate of 
‘spiritual’ reading and thus of double meaning in the interpretation of scripture in the 
later eighteenth century was finally as dim as that of the principle of interpretation 
through tradition, evaporating the remnants of whatever mystical-allegorical reading on 
the part of Protestants had survived the seventeenth century.”5 In this period, he argues, 
we find a double iconoclasm. Not only did the typological and spiritual reading of the 
Bible “evaporate,” but the realistic reading as well.  In particular, the creation stories of 
Genesis and the miracle stories of the gospels came under scrutiny. As scientists called 
into question these supernatural claims in the Bible, the text was placed under the critical 
                                                          
4 Harrison, The Bible, 4.  
5 Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 55. 
3 
 
 
eye of German positivism and English deism. Scholars turned their attention to a safer 
form of literal interpretation: philological and historical literalism. Linguists, having 
inherited the venerable tradition of Christian Hebraism, doubled down their efforts to 
study the text objectively, identifying multiple sources and conflicting manuscripts. 
These methods allowed readers of the Bible to engage on terms familiar to the sciences: 
inspection of artifacts, testing of theories. Allegorical interpretation came to be seen as 
naive and simplistic in the face of a new epistemology that sought mathematical certainty 
and mechanistic order. 
 However, such a view of the plight of allegory in the eighteenth century betrays a 
certain selectivity on the part of both Harrison and Frei, in terms of whose interpretations 
speak for the age. In fact, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest more continuity with 
pre-modern interpretive strategies than this narrative allows. Allegory did not die with the 
Enlightenment, but took on different forms and responded to different questions. In his 
conclusion, Harrison points to the Achilles heel of his argument. The stubborn 
persistence of Neoplatonism in the form of Kabbalah, the Great Chain of Being, alchemy 
and the like is present in any number of natural philosophers of the early modern period, 
including Isaac Newton, Robert Fludd, Robert Boyle, and many others. Rather than view 
this trend as “an unconscious reluctance to admit the failure of the old world picture”6 as 
Harrison does, I view it as evidence that symbolic or allegorical thinking was not in fact 
absent after the Reformation. As this dissertation will demonstrate, allegorical biblical 
exegesis, while certainly no less fraught than it had been in the past, survived the 
                                                          
6 Harrison, The Bible, 271. 
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reformation and the scientific revolution and impacted various cultural, philosophical, 
and religious milieux, where the symbolic potential of language, art, and even the human 
psyche would be explored and exploited well into modernity. 
Allegory, Jews, and Kabbalah 
Christian allegorical interpretation of the Bible has relied on narratives about the 
nature of Jewish texts and Jewish interpretations since its first instance in Paul’s Epistle 
to the Galatians. Paul’s allegorical interpretation of the Genesis matriarchs Sarah and 
Hagar, which contrasted slavery, the law, and the flesh on one hand, with freedom from 
the law and the power of the spirit on the other, set the tone for Christian discourse about 
the Bible and about Jews for the ages.7 With the emergence of Jerome’s Latin translation 
of the Bible in the late fourth century, Jews were further characterized as literalists. 
Jerome’s reliance on Jewish interlocutors for this Latin translation brought with it the 
threat of accusations of Judaizing. His defense was to attack, not only the traditions of 
Jews, but most importantly, their ability to properly interpret the Bible. In his view, 
Jewish understanding of scripture was limited to the literal or historical sense, while 
Christians alone had access to the allegorical, spiritual meaning. The success of this 
characterization of Jewish and Christian interpretive abilities can be traced from Jerome, 
through Augustine, to Martin Luther, and in the thought of countless religious and 
political figures in between. The trope became entangled with Christian self-identity and 
claims of doctrinal authority and occupied a central place in Christian definitions of 
                                                          
7 See Galatians 4:21-5:26. 
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Judaism as a carnal, worldly and spiritually deficient tradition. As author Megan Hale 
Williams writes, Jerome’s work “contributed greatly to the emergence of a new Christian 
discourse of the Jew, and to its persistence in the Latin West for at least a millennium.”8 
It is somewhat unexpected, therefore, to find in the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries the emergence of an opinion among certain influential thinkers in Western 
Europe that Christian interpretation of the Bible was associated with literalism while 
rabbinic interpretation was associated with allegory. This was a reversal of the previous 
scheme. This way of characterizing Jewish interpretation was often derisive, as in Robert 
Hooke’s words distancing his work in microscopy from the perceived obsession with 
biblical minutiae on the part of rabbis: “Rabbins find out Caballisms, and Enigmas in the 
figure, and placing of Letters, where no such thing lies hid; whereas in Natural forms 
there are some so small, and so curious, and their design’d business so far removed from 
the reach of our sight, that the more we do magnify the object, the more excellencies and 
mysteries do appear.”9 On the other hand, Christian thinkers often exploited Jewish 
sources out of a perception that they contained an interpretive depth unmatched in the 
Christian commentaries. Many learned experts believed the mystical books of the Jews, 
such as the Zohar, contained ancient wisdom from distant lands, supposing them to be 
much older than we now know them to be. 10 Some even believed them to be the 
                                                          
8 Megan Hale Williams, “Lessons from Jerome’s Jewish Teachers: Exegesis and Cultural Interaction in Late 
Antique Palestine,” in Jewish Biblical Interpretation and Cultural Exchange: Comparative Exegesis in 
Context, ed. Natalie Dormann and David Stern (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 77. 
9 From Robert Hooke’s Micrographia as quoted in Harrison, The Bible, 197.  
10 See footnote in chapter 1 on belief in the antiquity of the Zohar. Guy Stroumsa argues that the 
eighteenth-century fascination with ancient cultures came hand in hand with a fascination with foreign 
cultures. The “savages” of the present day were compared with the prehistoric man. Stroumsa notes that 
the texts, practices, and history of the Jews, as “foreigners within,” became the locus of decoding for 
Christian intellectuals. Cultures of the Far East were often described according to the ways in which they 
were Jew-like. As missionaries moved east, scholars moved back in time, discovering hidden and long 
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foundation upon which the gospels were written, such that free thinker Anthony Collins 
was able to exploit this correlation in his ironic interpretation of the New Testament 
through the wisdom of an anonymous Rabbi, “well skill’d in the Talmud, the Cabbala, 
and the allegorical books of the Jews.”11 Thus, even while Jewish mysticism was derided 
by some for its association with allegory, it was appropriated by others precisely for its 
hermeneutical value, revealing a tension within the intellectual culture of the eighteenth 
century. In the case of those who appropriated, as we will see, the interest in the 
purportedly ancient commentaries of the Jews provided for the circulation of ideas 
between Judaism and Christianity as well as the perpetuation of traditional notions of 
multiple levels of meaning in scripture. We see this, for instance, in the commentaries of 
the Christian kabbalists; among members of the university faculties, such as in Sweden, 
where research into rabbinic and kabbalistic texts informed the study the Bible; and in the 
work of individuals such as Anthony Collins, Isaac Newton, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 
Friedrich Oetinger, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, whose interest in Kabbalah was due in 
part to its value as a venue for allegorical interpretation. 
In certain circles then, what had been thought of as a standard Christian approach 
to scripture up until the sixteenth century, namely allegory, becomes hereafter associated 
with Jewish mysticism. The traditional Christian discourse of the literal and spiritual 
senses in the Bible was, in the eighteenth century, no less tied to the discourse of the Jew 
                                                          
forgotten meaning in the exotic philosophies of the Jews. Guy Stroumsa, A New Science: The Discovery of 
Religion in the Age of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 41. 
11  From Anthony Collins’ A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion, as quoted by 
David Ruderman, Connecting the Covenants: Judaism and the Search for Christian Identity in Eighteenth-
Century England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 63. 
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than it had been previously.12 The early modern version of this discourse did, however, 
bring with it a twist in the plot. The perceived affiliation of Jewish sources with ancient, 
foreign, secret biblical meanings, and the influence of these sources on Christian thought, 
counters notions of allegory’s demise.  
Given all this, the allegorical commentaries of the scientist turned mystic, 
Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), provide insight into the matrix of boundaries and 
boundary crossing between Jews and Christians in the eighteenth century. Swedenborg’s 
reliance on traditional notions of Jewish literalism comes despite (or perhaps because of) 
the manifest resemblances in his biblical commentary to key images, concepts and 
exegetical techniques of Kabbalah. Swedenborg uses the old trope even though he relies 
on sources who are themselves steeped in Kabbalah, such as Leibniz and his beloved 
brother-in-law, Uppsala professor Eric Benzelius. The fact that in his allegorical biblical 
commentaries Swedenborg regularly denounces the interpretive abilities of the 
scientifically learned on one hand, and of the Jews on the other, despite his own scientific 
background and the resemblances between his exegesis and Kabbalah, exposes 
something of the knotted nature of influence, and allows us to explore the contours of the 
discourse and the polemics of early modern biblical interpretation. 
This project will demonstrate the persistence of biblical allegory in eighteenth 
century Christian thought, and its entanglement with both the developments of the 
scientific revolution and the figured discourse of Jewish and Christian religious identity, 
                                                          
12 See, for instance, Deeana Klepper, The Insight of Unbelievers: Nicholas of Lyra and Christian Reading of 
Jewish Text in the Later Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Beryl Smalley, 
The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); and Williams, “Jerome’s 
Jewish Teachers.” 
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via the example of Emanuel Swedenborg. 
The Case of Emanuel Swedenborg  
Emanuel Swedenborg was the son of a prominent Swedish Lutheran Bishop, a 
natural philosopher, inventor, assessor for the Swedish Board of Mines, frequent guest of 
King Charles XII and correspondent with members of the Royal Academies in London 
and Paris. Difficulties with a speech impediment kept him from certain types of public 
engagement, such as university lecturing, but he made up for this by publishing 
prolifically. His scientific writings cover such wide-ranging topics as Stereometry, New 
Arithmetic, Blast Furnaces, Earth’s Revolution, Finding Longitudes, Hydrostatics, 
Swedish Currency and Finance, Large Metallurgical Works, The Cerebrum, and many 
more. Beginning in the 1740’s, after working to build his career in the secular world, 
Swedenborg began experiencing tumultuous dreams and later waking visions of Christ, 
angels, and spirits from other worlds, all of which he recorded in his journals with the 
tone of a curious scientist. His many theological writings, which were the product of 
these experiences, include Divine Love and Wisdom, True Christian Religion, Marriage 
Love, and perhaps his most well-known work, Heaven and Hell. Biographers, historians 
of the European Enlightenment, and scholars of modern esotericism have time and again 
come to the question of what influences of the day may have informed Swedenborg’s 
philosophical and religious positions. The subsequent impact of his thought in the United 
States and Europe was significant. Among the ranks of prominent figures to have been 
formatively shaped by Swedenborg are William Blake, William James, Carl Jung, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, D. T. Suzuki, and Helen Keller. Therefore, the question of how 
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Swedenborg both responded to and contributed to patterns of intellectual history is 
related to broader genealogies of western religious thought. 
Swedenborg is an important case to consider in the context of early modern 
biblical interpretation and Jewish-Christian relations. Firstly, his biblical commentary, the 
multi-volume Arcana coelestia (Heavenly Secrets, 1749-54) presents an intricate, 
allegorical reading of the Biblical text. He opens the commentary with the following line: 
“The Word of the Old Testament contains heavenly arcana [secrets], with every single 
detail focusing on the Lord, His heaven, the Church, faith, and what belongs to faith; but 
no human being grasps this from the letter.”13 The commentary unfolds three senses—the 
natural, the spiritual and the celestial—and works its way painstakingly through a verse 
by verse account of these meanings. Secondly, the commentary responds, by means of 
allegory, to the challenges of the epistemological shifts of the day. Prior to writing 
Arcana coelestia, Swedenborg’s scientific work considered the location and biological 
substance of the soul in the human body. Regnum Animal (The Soul’s Domain, 1744) 
treats, among other things, the functioning of the cerebral cortex and the nervous system, 
in an attempt to establish the existence of the human soul. The project ultimately failed, 
and Swedenborg was forced to the realization that if the soul did in fact exist, it was not 
detectable with scientific instruments. This work on the soul coincided with the 
beginning of his other-worldly visions, and the combination triggered a crisis of faith. 
                                                          
13 Emanuel Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia: Principally a Revelation of the Inner or Spiritual Meaning of 
Genesis and Exodus, trans. John Elliott (London: The Swedenborg Society, 1983-1999), 1. The translation I 
have chosen to quote from in this dissertation, by John Elliott, adopts the spelling caelestia, which follows 
the spelling that accompanied the first English translation of the commentary. I will use the spelling 
coelesita in the body of the dissertation, which follows the spelling of the first Latin editions and the 
majority of other subsequent editions and translations. Following convention, I will cite Swedenborg’s 
theological works using paragraph numbers rather than page numbers. 
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That he turned solely to the Bible and its interpretation for the next ten years of his life, 
as a response to this personal crisis of science and religion, is an interesting point from 
which to consider the confrontation between physics and metaphysics in the eighteenth 
century and its effect on biblical hermeneutics. By articulating an ontological connection 
between what can be seen in the text, and what is hidden within it, a resolution to his 
scientific crisis emerged: “as to the letter alone [the Word] is like the body without a 
soul.”14 A close reading of Arcana coelestia, as well as the extensive biblical indexes he 
prepared alongside the commentary, reveals Swedenborg’s biblically based response to 
the challenges of deism and materialism.  
And finally, we find in Swedenborg’s work certain contradictions regarding his 
perception of Jews that will be relevant to our study of allegory. On the one hand, 
Swedenborg’s conception of the Jews as literalists, that they are limited to the “external 
sense,” draws on stereotypes with deep roots in Christian exegesis, as outlined above. 
Against the background of a rising preference for literalism in many circles, and also a 
growing association between Jews and allegory, Swedenborg’s use of the old trope in the 
context of his allegorical commentary could be simply characterized as old fashioned. 
Yet, as so many of his readers have noticed, the parallels to Kabbalah in his 
commentaries are hard to ignore, especially given the contexts of his intellectual and 
relational orbits, contexts that were heavily indebted to kabbalistic thought. The absence 
of reference to Kabbalah in his vast and all-encompassing corpus of writing is especially 
curious given his context and given his shared horizon with kabbalistic exegetical 
themes, and suggests a conscious or unconscious erasure is at play. A further 
                                                          
14 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 3. 
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contradiction relates to Swedenborg’s descriptions of conversations with Jews in the 
spiritual world, while it appears that his this-worldly contact with Jewish interlocutors is 
heavily mediated through Christians. These celestial dialogues bring to sharp focus the 
“phantom Jews” that populated the European imagination from ancient times. As David 
Nirenberg articulates in his history of anti-Judaism in the West, the figurative, or 
imaginary Jew, has been conjured time and again as a constitutive idea in Christian 
thought, regardless of the presence or absence of actual Jews.15 As was the case in the 
past, Swedenborg’s phantom Jews serve to distinguish Christian interpretive abilities and 
Christian self-identity. 
In considering Swedenborg’s relationship to Jewish sources, I will rely on Harold 
Bloom’s theory of the “anxiety of influence.” According to Bloom, influence, defined as 
“literary love, tempered by defense” 16 moves along labyrinthine rather than linear lines. 
But the difficulty in tracing influence lies principally in the fact that a borrowed tradition 
is misread in transmission. A strong reading is always a creative misreading, a “poetic 
misprision.” Swedenborg’s biblical commentary brings this reading and misreading into 
view. Together, the resemblances to Jewish sources and the accompanying attack on 
Jewish interpretive abilities in Arcana coelestia present a narrative of the patterns of 
accommodation and resistance that reflect the environment in which it was written. 
                                                          
15 Nirenberg further argues that anti-Judaism is a basic tool with which edifice of Western thought was 
constructed. See David Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2013), 1-12. On the idea of the phantom Jew, see also Klepper, Insight of Unbelievers, chapter 
5; and Moshe Goshen-Gottstein, "Foundations of Biblical Philology in the 17th Century: Christian and 
Jewish Dimensions,” in Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century, eds. Isadore Twersky and Bernard 
Septimus, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 81. 
16 Harold Bloom, The Anatomy of Influence: Literature as a Way of Life, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2011), 8. 
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Tracing the anxiety of influence in Swedenborg’s biblical commentary sets it 
against the backdrop of the history of Jewish-Christian relations.  Those who survey the 
contours of the reading and misreading that occurs between Jewish and Christian sources 
over the centuries, discover a discourse that belies any understanding of these as entirely 
distinct traditions. David Stern represents one aspect of this body of literature when he 
notes that differences between Jewish and Christian texts cannot always be traced to an 
essential difference between them, as would be suggested by the familiar “Hebrew” v. 
“Hellenism” refrain.17 The degree of exchange between these communities becomes 
more acute the more we engage this history. One striking example is Israel Jacob Yuval’s 
Two Nations in Your Womb. Yuval’s understanding of the dialectical, and often 
defensive, nature of the exchange is important to this discussion. His challenge to 
prevailing claims concerning the ancient Jewish origins behind the Passover/Easter 
parallels, for example, highlights not only the polemical undertones of these customs, but 
the degree of borrowing that went on at their inception.18 We might also consider, in this 
vein, the work of Yehuda Liebes who explores the evidence for Christian influence on 
the Zohar. In pointing to evidence of a response to trinitarianism in the text, Liebes 
concludes that we should reconsider the interpretive abilities of Christian kabbalists, who 
found the trinity everywhere in the Zohar, even if they failed to grasp the polemical 
elements of the Zohar’s “son.” In fact, Christian kabbalists may have preserved 
                                                          
17 As David Stern notes, the strongest expressions of this binary have gone out of fashion but its specter, 
“the tendency to view the history of Jewish and Christian exegesis as dueling rivals,” still remains. David 
Stern, “Introduction: On Comparative Biblical Exegesis—Interpretation, Influence, Appropriation,” in 
Jewish Biblical Interpretation and Cultural Exchange: Comparative Exegesis in Context, eds. David Stern 
and Natalie Dohrmann (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 12.   
18 Isræl Jacob Yuval, Two Nations in Your Womb: Perceptions of Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and 
the Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). 
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Christological elements in the Zohar that were edited out in Jewish copies.19 Daniel 
Boyarin, Peter Schäfer, David Ruderman and David Biale, to name just a few, likewise 
explore in their work the circulation of ideas and practices between Jews and Christians 
throughout the last two millennia, and this dissertation will build on their insights and 
their methodology.20 
The Trouble with Allegory 
It may, at first, seem unwise to showcase “allegory” in a historical study of a 
century that was decidedly turned off by the term.  Many of the figures featured in this 
dissertation, including Swedenborg, revealed a semantic preference for “representations,” 
“signs,” “emblems,” and “symbols” in their commentaries, and allegory is often enough 
associated with “enthusiasm,” “mysticism,” or any number of supposed heresies of the 
day.21 Such ambivalence results from, as Jon Whitman puts it, “the polemic against 
                                                          
19 Yehuda Liebes, “Christian Influences on the Zohar,” in Studies in the Zohar, trans. Arnold Schwartz, 
Stephanie Nakache, and Penina Peli (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 142-143. 
20 David Biale, Blood and Belief: The Circulation of a Symbol between Jews and Christians (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007); Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); David Ruderman, Connecting the Covenants: 
Judaism and the Search for Christian Identity in Eighteenth-Century England (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Peter Schäfer, Mirror of His Beauty: Feminine Images of God From the Bible to 
the Early Kabbalah (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
21 Swedenborg doesn’t use the term allegory to refer to his own methods, and where he does use the 
term its sense is negative. In Vera Christiana religio (True Christianity 1771), for instance, he disparages 
the sermons of those who preach their own opinions rather than revealed truth. And yet, Swedenborg, 
like Luther quoted below, makes his point using allegory: “Such is their teaching. It was said that as a 
consequence there was no more spirituality in their sermons than in the songs of birds, and that they 
were merely allegorical adornments, like wigs beautifully curled and powdered on bald heads. The 
mysteries of their discourses on justification by faith alone were likened to the quails brought up from the 
sea and strewn about the camps of the children of Israel (Num. 11), because of which several thousand 
persons died; while the theology of charity and faith together were likened to the manna from heaven. I 
once heard their preachers talking together about faith alone; and I saw a kind of image formed by them, 
which represented their faith alone. In their light, which was the light of hallucination, this appeared like a 
great giant; but when light from heaven was let in upon it, it appeared like a monster above and a serpent 
below. Seeing this, they withdrew, and the bystanders threw the image into a pond.” Emanuel 
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speaking ‘otherwise’ that had developed from the late Middle Ages and the Reformation 
to the Romantic period.”22 Yet it is precisely the fact that allegory persists in such an 
environment that interests me. For despite their ambivalence towards allegory, and 
occasionally their well-formulated distinctions between, for instance, allegory and 
symbol,23 many eighteenth century authors demonstrate a meaningful connection to a 
heritage that understands Bible to be saying something else (allos agoria). 
The ambivalence about allegory itself has deep roots in biblical tradition. Often, 
the use of the term allegory has been pejorative, either disparaging the methods of some 
other interpreter, such as Jerome distinguishing his work from “that allegorist” Origen, or 
pointing to the temptation in one’s self to distort the text, as in Martin Luther’s warning 
that allegory is "a beautiful harlot who fondles men in such a way that it is impossible for 
her not to be loved."24  In either case, when used pejoratively, the accusation is usually 
that the allegorist leaves behind the plain sense of scripture and replaces it with 
something of their own, making God’s word disposable, or worse, making God a liar. 
Such a definition of allegory, one that identifies a rejection of the apparent, or literal, 
meaning of the text, is sometimes made by modern historians as well. Elliott Wolfson 
does so in differentiating the interpretations of Nahmanides from those of Maimonides. 
According to Wolfson, due to his reliance on Kabbalah, Nahmanides held to the 
ontological reality of two parallel worlds, and he therefore believed the biblical text to be 
both ontologically and exegetically significant at both levels of meaning. For 
                                                          
Swedenborg, True Christianity, trans. Jonathan Rose (West Chester, PA: Swedenborg Foundation 2006), 
810. 
22 Jon Whitman, Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period (Boston: Brill, 2000), 20. 
23 See discussion of Coleridge’s distinction in chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
24 As quoted in Jon Whitman, Interpretation and Allegory, 3. 
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Maimonides, on the other hand, the distinction between two levels of meaning has 
exegetical or epistemological importance only; it does not represent two levels of 
reality.25 Maimonides’ interpretation is, by Wolfson’s account, merely allegorical in 
places. Such a use of the term allegory, however, wherein the literal sense is dismissed or 
discarded, is especially murky when dealing with biblical interpretation: preservation of 
the text’s sanctity has generally been of foremost concern for the Bible’s commentators, 
even those whose interpretations wander into foreign territory. 
Whitman writes of the history of allegory that in its early iterations in Greek and 
Roman antiquity there was less of a concern for whether the signifying events “really” 
occurred. In this context allegory “indicates primarily a transfer from one word or 
concept to another. Something is said (agoreuein), and something else (allos) is 
signified.”26 Greek allegorists, he argues, were motivated by the search for an underlying 
logic (logos) in the passages of the story (mythos).27 However, Jewish and Christian 
appropriations of allegory, beginning around the turn of the first centuries B.C.E and 
C.E., generally did so while affirming the veracity of the original meaning of the text. 
This was done differently by different communities. Whitman’s edited volume on the 
subject demonstrates, for instance, how the Alexandrian Jews emphasized the 
performative elements, or the behavioral context suggested by the linguistic context of 
scripture. The Midrashic tradition isolated and elaborated on verses or words of scripture, 
not to “expose” or “impose” meaning, but as a kind of “interposition between the words 
                                                          
25 Elliot Wolfson, “By Way of Truth: Aspects of Naḥmanides' Kabbalistic Hermeneutic,” in Association for 
Jewish Studies Review 14, no. 2 (Autumn, 1989): 111, 122. 
26 Jon Whitman, “From the Textual to the Temporal: Early Christian ‘Allegory’ and Early Romantic 
‘Symbol,’” in New Literary History 22, no. 1 (Winter, 1991): 162.  
27 Whitman, Interpretation and Allegory, 35-37. 
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of scripture.”28 Paul’s use of the term allegory in Galatians in the late first century drew 
connections between earlier events and later events, laying the foundation for Christian 
typologists in the millennia to come.29 These, and other Jewish and Christian ways of 
characterizing and reading texts, relied on a preserved connection to an original canon 
and an original community. That is not to say that Jews and Christians have uniformly 
affirmed the truth of biblical accounts: they have not. But it highlights the difficulty in 
defining allegory according to what is rejected or taken away rather than by what is 
added.  
 Borrowing Peter Harrison’s definition, this project broadly understands allegory 
to be the “capacity of things to act as signs” without qualification regarding the integrity 
of the things (sacred texts in this instance) themselves.30 Put another way, an allegorical 
interpretation understands a text to have more than one level of meaning. This study of 
allegory in the long eighteenth century will required us to investigate figures who 
distance their own methods from allegory, begging the question of how and why they did 
so. Allegory’s troubled history is precisely what allows us a pathway into anxieties about 
text and history. As Whitman notes, allegory shouldn’t be thought of as a single “kind” of 
interpretation, but a “series of critical negotiations” between a text and its readers.31 By 
seeking out and uncovering a hidden meaning, the reader is able to either hold on to 
something they are in danger of losing, or introduce innovation into a community that 
would be otherwise suspicious. In addition, at least for those whose commentaries I will 
                                                          
28 Ibid., 41. 
29 Whitman, “From the Textual,” 162-164. 
30 Harrison, The Bible, 4. 
31 Ibid, 5. 
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consider below, it allows for a connection to holy things unseen. 
 In the last half-century, literary critics and philosophers have reversed the 
Romantic distinction between allegory and symbol, and effectively “rehabilitated 
allegory” as a category for understanding hermeneutics, pointing to the subjectivity of 
signs and the figured nature of language more broadly.32 Scholars have also challenged 
the notion that allegory springs from an essentially Greek or Western heritage, as for 
instance, in the work of Zhang Longxi, who studies allegoresis in Chinese poetry, and 
rejects misconceptions of Chinese literature as radically monistic, literal, natural, and 
impersonal.33 This dissertation will build on this scholarly attention to the persistence of 
allegory, not in an attempt to demonstrate that all interpretation is allegory,34 but to argue 
that the political, social and religious utility of allegory explains its presence in even 
those environments that are supposedly hostile to it. Allegory ensures a certain flexibility 
in a textual tradition, allowing connections to contexts foreign to that of the text’s origins. 
As Moshe Idel writes of Kabbalah, allegory brings to life “a whole literary universe, 
mostly a biblical one, compounded of dead persons, destroyed cities [and] shattered 
temples.”35 Early modern readers of the Bible were no less concerned with the question 
                                                          
32 See, for instance, Whitman, Interpretation and Allegory, 15-20, and part 2 “The Late Middle Ages to the 
Modern Period” with notable contributions from Azade Seyhan, Rainer Nägele, and Tobin Siebers; and 
Susanne Knaller, “A Theory of Allegory Beyond Walter Benjamin and Paul de Man” in The Germanic 
Review 77 (Spring 2002): 83-101. Knaller uses the phrase “rehabilitation of allegory” in reference to the 
work of Walter Benjamin. Gadamer also uses the phrase in discussing the direction of aesthetics and 
hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall 
(New York: Continuum, 2004), 79-81.   
33 Longzi argues for a likeness between traditional Chinese interpretations of the Confucian Shi jing and 
Jewish and Christian interpretations of The Song of Songs. Zhang Longxi, Allegoresis: Reading Canonical 
Literature East and West (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
34 See Whitman’s summary of this position, most famously articulated by Northrop Frye, in Interpretation 
and Allegory, 16-17. 
35 Moshe Idel, “Kabbalistic Exegesis,” in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: A History of Its Interpretation I, part 
2, ed. Magne Saebo (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2000), 461. 
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of the relevance of biblical places and characters than their ancestors were.  
Methodology and Structure of the Dissertation 
This is in part a study of context. It will consider the history of the European 
Enlightenment and Haskalah, Deism, pietism, Hermetic undercurrents, the fall of 
Sabbatai Ẓevi, and other social, religious and political forces at play. This is also a study 
of texts, in a very traditional sense of the term. It is a study of written language, of 
narrative, of intertextuality, of terms and techniques. Ultimately, this study will reveal the 
ways that the relationship between text and context is, in a sense, itself typological. We 
will explore the figurative nature of themes and characters in the commentaries of 
Swedenborg and his contemporaries, such as Jews, naturalists, the sciences, and even 
dogmatic formulations such as the trinity or justification by faith, finding that these things 
act as signs, and carry meanings that reflect the world of the commentator. In exploring 
the discourse between text and context, or the discursive nature of such figures, this 
dissertation is indebted the theoretical groundwork of those in the related disciplines of 
history of religion, philosophy of religion, intellectual history, and literary criticism.  
This project will be divided into three parts: on allegory in the eighteenth century 
(or the discourse contiguous with Arcana coelestia), on Swedenborg’s allegory (or the 
discourse within Arcana coelestia), and on various responses by those who read 
Swedenborg to his allegorical interpretations (or the discourse about Arcana coelestia). 
The first part will therefore lay contextual groundwork with a brief comparative look to 
the commentaries of other eighteenth century figures, both Jewish and Christian, whose 
work contributes to our understanding of these themes. The project will take up the 
scientific biblicism of the English William Whiston (1667-1752), a Newtonian 
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mathematician who believed that any obstacle to understanding the literal veracity of the 
Old Testament prophecies was due to their early corruption by allegorizing Jews. It will 
also consider the allegorical, kabbalistic commentaries of Johan Kemper, Professor at 
Uppsala University, close friend of Swedenborg’s brother-in-law and Sabbatean convert 
to Christianity. Thirdly, it will review the exegetical work of Moses Mendelssohn, whose 
rabbinic-inspired theory of language advanced a defense of semiotics. And finally, a 
reading of Ḥasidic biblical commentary from the same time period will highlight a shared 
horizon with the psychologizing, internalizing interpretations found in Arcana coelestia. 
These four commentaries are significant to this study, not because of a direct connection 
to Swedenborg  (though in the case of Kemper this connection is meaningful), but 
because they will help draw the map, so to speak, highlighting the topography of 
eighteenth century discourses about the Bible, science, and Jewish and Christian religious 
identity and interpretive abilities. 
Part two will examine Swedenborg’s own biblical commentary, Arcana coelestia. 
It will introduce and analyze Swedenborg’s iteration of the Bible’s inner senses, and their 
connection to a doctrine of correspondences he developed during his scientific career. A 
close reading of Swedenborg’s interpretation of Genesis 3 will demonstrate how his 
allegorical interpretations work, and will reveal a bias against two communities of 
interpreters he believes to be incapable of accessing the full depths biblical wisdom: 
scientists, or the learned skeptics of natural philosophy, and the Jews. We will consider 
Swedenborg’s relationship to these two communities in separate chapters, arguing that in 
each case his anxiety can be traced to apparent resemblances between his own 
hermeneutic and that of the offending community.  
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Swedenborg’s Arcana coelestia, unsurprisingly given its orientation to “things 
seen and heard” in the spiritual world, received mixed reviews, and its reception will be 
considered at length in part three of this dissertation. Three chapters will take up, in turn, 
Swedenborg’s reception in philosophy, theology and the arts and literature. Where 
Arcana coelestia is received positively we find a split between those who link it to an 
ancient and hallowed spiritual sense tradition and those who claim that Swedenborg’s 
inner sense is entirely unique, marking a new age and a “New Church.” Where the 
reception is mixed or negative, we find evidence of a double ambivalence: toward 
allegory on one hand, and toward Swedenborg on the other. Figures as diverse as 
Immanuel Kant, John Wesley, Friedrich Oetinger, William Blake and Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, had in common a fascination with and in some cases sustained study of 
Swedenborg’s correspondences, while also harboring deep reservations that manifested in 
moments of harsh criticism and even ridicule. We will find, however, that despite their 
protestations, an interest in Swedenborg among these and others comes along with a 
reformulation of biblical allegory in their own terms. While such figures formally 
denounce or diminish allegory, their assertions regarding the Bible’s other meaning or 
true sense is striking. With Swedenborg as a common interlocutor, we will consider 
Kant’s “moral sense,” Coleridge’s poetic “inner sense,” and even Blake’s “Proverbs of 
Hell,” as evidence of allegory’s resilience. Furthermore, a consideration of how each of 
these interpretive moments is colored by the advancements of the sciences on one hand, 
and on views of Jewish and Christian religious identity on the other, will help us analyze 
the variations in allegory’s function and form in each case. 
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Swedenborg rejected the idea of Christ’s bodily return to earth, and believed the 
second coming to be a new understanding of the spiritual sense of the Bible, a point that 
some deemed religiously scandalous (such as Oetinger), while others agreed in qualified 
terms (such as Kant) or even judged it poetically inspired (such as Blake). In one sense, it 
was Swedenborg’s most outrageous claim: that he had been chosen as scribe to witness 
and record the present-day messianic event taking place in the spiritual world. In another 
sense, however, Swedenborg’s reformulated eschatology spoke to many of the religious 
concerns of the day, with its emphasis on self-judgement, personal reformation and 
regeneration, and a new age of intellectual freedom and freedom from oppressive 
ecclesiastical institutions. To be sure, messianic expectations were alive and well in the 
long eighteenth century, but the counter currents of Deism, pietism, Neoplatonism, 
dissenting sectarianism, and even skepticism conditioned new age receptive to a 
personalized apocalypse. That Swedenborg then organized these themes into an 
elaborate, and at times eccentric, allegorical reading of the Bible was a move that 
severely limited his influence in academic and scientific circles, but also inspired more 
poetic and literary minds. Swedenborg’s spiritual apocalypse was, as we will see, his 
greatest and most damning allegory.  
 Among his many publications, this dissertation is organized around Swedenborg’s 
Arcana coelestia in particular for a number of reasons. Arcana coelestia is his longest 
published biblical commentary (published originally in eight volumes); it is his first 
theological publication after the end of his scientific career; it contains the fullest 
articulation of his views of Jewish interpretive abilities and the role of the “Jewish 
Church” in history; and it contains his first sustained application of the doctrine of 
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correspondences to the Bible. Swedenborg’s name becomes associated with the concept 
of correspondences in locations throughout Western Europe in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries because of his Arcana coelestia. Therefore, even in cases 
where Arcana coelestia isn’t cited or consulted directly, the reception of Swedenborgian 
hermeneutics is indebted to this opus on the secrets of heaven. 
This is, therefore, a study of the use of allegory in a particular period in history, a 
period in which assumptions about ontological connections between nature, scripture, 
reason, and spirit were challenged and changed. As a consequence, exegetical and literary 
articulations of semiotic relationships in language and text were also changed. But 
despite the claims of some eighteenth century critics as well as some critics today, 
allegory did not breathe its last breath in the eighteenth century. This argument will be 
investigated through the lens of a particular commentary, Arcana coelestia, which 
responds, using allegory, to a number of religious and epistemological currents of the 
day, and whose reception follows the enduring, if fraught, life of allegory into the 
nineteenth century. A study of Arcana coelestia’s context, content and reception will 
demonstrate the persistence of allegory in the Age of the Enlightenment. 
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PART I 
ALLEGORY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE DISCOURSE 
CONTIGUOUS WITH ARCANA COELESTIA 
 
CHAPTER 1: FOUR COMMENTARIES 
 
Blind unbelief is sure to err, 
And scan His work in vain; 
God is His own interpreter, 
And He will make it plain. 
Hymn, W. Cowper 
 
 Within the traditions that hold the Bible, in its various configurations, to be sacred 
scripture, every generation has faced questions about how to properly interpret the text 
and about how it mediates a connection to the Divine. As discussed in the introduction, 
factors such as the Protestant Reformation’s belief in sola scriptura, the success of 
Pietistic movements, and the scientific turn away from metaphysical explanations, 
encouraged many eighteenth-century readers to focus on the immediate meaning of 
scripture. God’s words and intentions were apparent to each man in his own language, 
bypassing the requirement for clerical interpretation and its potential for corruption. 
Every believing reader could access the plain truth, available from God there on the page; 
“God is His own interpreter, And He will make it plain” the popular hymn proclaimed.36 
Parallel movements in the direction of literalism were noticeable in Catholicism as well.37 
                                                          
36 William Cowper, “God Moves in a Mysterious Way,” in John Newton, Twenty-six Letters on Religious 
Subjects to Which Are Added Hymns (Dublin: W. Gilbert, 1780), 252. 
37 See Kileen and Forshaw, eds., Word and the World, which responds to Peter Harrison’s argument in The 
Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science that the preference for literal readings in the Early 
Modern period was a uniquely Protestant activity. 
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While it was by no means a uniform movement, by affirming the Vulgate and Patristic 
exegesis as authoritative, the Council of Trent effectively downplayed reliance on the 
medieval four-fold sense of scripture.38 Catholic scientists, especially Jesuits, made 
significant contributions to mechanical philosophy, and Jesuit commentaries, such as that 
of Cornelius Lapide, highlighted the literal sense and its alignment with science while 
moderating, if not outright rejecting, traditional reliance on allegory: "hoc ineptum ac 
somniorum interpretis” Lapide wrote of allegorical interpretation.39  
However, even as trust in the written text was fortified, the accuracy and 
reasonableness of biblical religion came under attack from multiple angles, including 
textual criticism, scientific advancements in physics and natural history, and the growing 
number of freethinkers and Deists who challenged traditional sources of religious 
authority in unprecedented ways. As they had done so often in the past, many Christian 
scholars responded by looking to Judaism and Hebrew study for answers and tools that 
could be applied to interpretive challenges. The difference this time was that the 
Christian’s “hermeneutical Jew” was allied with allegory and hidden meaning, rather than 
literalism, and the growing ambivalence towards allegory was in turn directed at Jews, 
their texts, and their traditions. 
 This chapter will set the stage for a contextualized study of Arcana coelestia by 
examining four biblical commentaries from roughly the same time period and reflecting 
                                                          
38 Killeen and Forshaw, eds., Word and the World, 6-7. 
39 As quoted by J. R. Armogathe in "Per Annos Mille: Cornelius a Lapide and the Interpretation of 
Revelation 20:2-8” in In Millenarianism and Messianism in Early Modern European Culture, Volume II 
Catholic Millenarianism: From Savonarola to the Abbé Grégoire, ed. Karl A. Kottman, (Netherlands: 
Springer, 2001), 45. 
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many of the same hermeneutical subtleties, even while drawing radically different 
conclusions. I have selected four commentaries, two Christian and two Jewish, that 
demonstrate something of the relationship between the two traditions as well as the 
nuances of eighteenth-century attitudes towards allegorical interpretation. The 
commentaries also span the range of Eastern to Western European thought. The ideas 
presented in these commentaries, like their authors in some cases, crossed religious as 
well as national boundaries. Together, they tell the story of the persistence of allegorical 
interpretation, both in places isolated from economic and scientific advancements as well 
as in universities and other purported centers of intellectual innovation. 
As discussed in the introduction, Kabbalah, and in particular the Zohar and 
Lurianic Kabbalah, played a major role in the persistence of allegorical interpretations of 
the Bible, both Christian and Jewish, in the eighteenth century. Belief in the antiquity of 
the Zohar’s sources was still standard, in spite of occasional challenges,40 and reinforced 
the association between ancient wisdom and divine truth, even in an age that heralded 
novelty, progress and invention, and even among the century’s most innovative 
characters. Kabbalah’s influence among natural scientists as well as biblical 
commentators is significant, and as historian Allison Coudert and others have revealed, 
reflects a complicated history of exchange between traditions:  
The Kabbalah offered something of a permeable barrier between Christians 
and Jews, allowing the circulation of ideas. Both Christianity and the 
                                                          
40 Yaacob Dwek demonstrates seventeenth-century criticism of the Zohar, for instance, in the work of 
Venetian rabbi Leon Modena who questioned the early dating. See Yaacob Dwek, The Scandal of 
Kabbalah, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 2011. Belief in the early dating of the Zohar 
persisted into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, especially in Christian kabbalistic circles, 
where it was believed to be part of an ancient wisdom, predating the New Testament.  
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Kabbalah were profoundly influenced by the same Neoplatonic doctrines. 
Christians were therefore not wrong to discover Christian (or neoplatonized 
Christian) concepts in the Kabbalah, for Jewish kabbalists lived for the most 
part among Christians and absorbed Christian ideas. But the ideas absorbed 
were attenuated, shorn of dogmatic subtleties, and mixed with Jewish 
concepts. When Christians rediscovered these ideas, they were therefore very 
different from their original form.41   
 
 Many Christian scholars were therefore attracted to ideas in Kabbalah that were 
both familiar and foreign, novel, but with an air of antiquity. These ideas also provided a 
venue for the displaced proclivity for allegorical thinking. For, on the one hand, the 
hunger for rational, systematic, universal truth that had been building since medieval 
times produced the Enlightenment palate for language that was simple, clear and meant 
only what it appeared to mean. On the other hand, readers of the Bible were confronted 
anew by discoveries, historical, linguistic and geological in nature, which made the plain 
sense of the text nearly impossible to accept in places. Each of the four authors discussed 
below reveals something of the panorama produced by these opposing landscapes. We 
will begin with a man, William Whiston, and a tradition, English Deism, that fervently 
resisted allegorical interpretations of the Bible, and end with a man, Rabbi Menahẹm 
Nahụm of Chernobyl, and a tradition, Ḥasidism, that fully embraced and magnified the 
tradition of uncovering multiple levels of meaning. Between these, we will explore the 
commentaries of two men who bridged seemingly disparate worlds, Christian and Jewish, 
east and west: Moses Mendelssohn and Johan Kemper. The end of the chapter will 
                                                          
41 Allison P. Coudert, “Leibniz, Locke, Newton and the Kabbalah,” in The Christian Kabbalah: Jewish 
Mystical Books and Their Christian Interpreters, ed. Joseph Dan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
College Library, 1997), 163. 
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briefly consider possible connections between these four and Emanuel Swedenborg, the 
most probable, substantive connection being with Kemper. Each of these figures 
illuminates not only the thorny plight of allegory in modernity, but also the ever present 
barriers and passageways between Judaism and Christianity, and it is for these reasons, 
rather than for direct lines of influence, that they are helpful in providing a contextual 
footing for a study of Arcana coelestia.  
William Whiston 
We will begin our study of the Bible in the eighteenth century with a look to the 
debate over allegorical interpretations in England at that time, and to William Whiston 
(1667-1752), whose singlehanded war on allegory utilized the latest in scientific 
discovery as well as the study of Hebrew and Judaism as arsenal. Whiston, like so many 
of his contemporaries, embodies the historian’s familiar refrain that science and religion 
were not yet separate disciplines in the early eighteenth century. Whiston’s work in 
biblical chronology, translation of Josephus, early church history, and biblical manuscript 
study interfaced with his work in mathematics and astronomy in ways unique to his age. 
Among his many books demonstrating this interface was his Astronomical Principles of 
Religion, Natural and Reveal’d, in which he applied his exegetical skills and his 
scientific reasoning to the task of determining, among other things, the location of hell. 
Using a “curious mixture of physico-theological reasoning and prophetic admonition” as 
one scholar puts it42 Whiston determined that the place of darkness and fire described in 
                                                          
42 Roomet Jakapi, "William Whiston, the Universal Deluge, and a Terrible Spectacle," in Folklore: Electronic 
Journal of Folklore 31 (2005): 7-14. 
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scripture could be none other than a “Comet, ascending from the Hot Regions near the 
Sun, and going into the Cold Regions beyond Saturn, with its long smoking Tail arising 
up from it, through its several Ages and Periods of revolving . . .”43 This is but one 
example of how the Bible was explained anew by the pious scientists of early modernity. 
Whiston’s incorporation of astronomy into his exegesis was made possible by his 
mentorship with Isaac Newton. A student of Isaac Newton and successor to Newton as 
Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge, Whiston inherited several of Newton’s 
positions and interests regarding natural philosophy, biblical interpretation and most 
famously, Arianism. However, the question of how these two men aligned, or not, over 
their approaches to the Bible is yet to be settled, and a word should be said about this 
before proceeding.  
James Force, whose research centers on Newton and his influence, argues in his 
book William Whiston: Honest Newtonian, that Whiston’s approach to the Bible is 
essentially Newtonian in nature, and that Newton was a behind the scenes promoter of 
Whiston’s Boyle lectures on biblical literalism, entitled The Accomplishment of Scripture 
Prophecies. Force’s evidence for “Whiston’s literal Newtonian interpretation”44 has been 
challenged in more than one review,45 and, as I will revisit over the course of this 
dissertation, such an argument depends a great deal on how one defines “literal.” For 
                                                          
43 William Whiston, Astronomical principles of religion, natural and reveal'd : in nine parts (London : J. 
Senex and W. Taylor), 1717. 
44 A phrase Force employs repeatedly. See for instance: James Force, William Whiston, Honest Newtonian 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 83. 
45 See, for instance, the reviews of Force’s William Whiston, Honest Newtonian by Simon Schaffer in The 
British Journal for the History of Science 19  (July 1986): 226-228; Anita Guerrini in The Journal of Religion 
67, (January 1987): 100-101; and Mordechai Feingold in Eighteenth-Century Studies 21 (October 1987): 
141-142. 
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while Newton’s biblical studies indeed rely on his knowledge of cultural history and the 
calculations of measurements and the like in order to determine what actually happened, 
his interest in alchemy and symbolism, especially in the tabernacle and temple 
descriptions, suggests an approach somewhat different from Whiston’s in its reliance on 
coded meaning.46 It is worth noting that the National Library of Israel, which has 
collected and curated Newton’s religious papers, describes Newton’s biblical 
interpretation as unambiguously non-literal. In its online introduction to the collection, 
the library curators describe the papers as “evidence of the great lengths that Newton 
went to in trying to decipher writings that, in his opinion, contained secret knowledge 
encrypted in the Holy Scriptures of ancient cultures and in historical documents.”47 
What is clear from the content of both Newton’s and Whiston’s extensive writing 
on the Bible, is that they shared a near obsession with deciphering and preserving an 
uncorrupted version of text. Both men employ comparison between Greek, Latin and 
                                                          
46 See especially Newton’s Prolegomena ad lexici prophetici partem secundam in quibus agitur De forma 
sanctuarij Iudaici. Ms. 434, The Babson College Grace K. Babson Collection of the Works of Sir Isaac 
Newton, Huntington Library, San Marino, California. He writes: “It is universally accepted that future 
events are foreshadowed by the prescriptions of the law, and the Apostle Paul amply testifies to this in 
Colossians 2.17 and Hebrews 8.5 and 9.23. That is why those prescriptions are more fitted than the 
natural World to be a system of things from which the Prophets could derive types; it is also why the 
Apocalypse is full of these types, and therefore these prescriptions and the Apocalypse explain each other 
like twin prophecies of the same things, and cannot be properly understood apart from each other. For 
that book, sealed by the hand of Him who sits upon the throne, is the very book of the law, as will be 
shown later, and its seals are opened in the Apocalypse. We must now therefore study the world of Israel, 
and expound the significance of its parts and ceremonies. And above all we must survey the Sanctuary in 
which the requirements of the law were carried out. This had three phases: the Tabernacle down to the 
time of Solomon, the first temple down to the Babylonian captivity, and the second temple down to the 
captivity under the Romans. We must get to know their design, if we want to have a proper grasp of their 
significance.” Accessed on June 26, 2016.  
http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/THEM00079 
47 Accessed on May 6, 2016. 
http://web.nli.org.il/sites/NLI/English/collections/Humanities/newton/Pages/default.aspx 
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Hebrew versions of the Old Testament, and their criticism of the Hebrew Masoretic text 
falls in line with broader accusations against Rabbinic tradition surfacing at the time. 
More will be said about these accusations and Whiston’s role therein below. The 
implications of this manuscript work were significant for many reasons, and worked into 
several epistemological fault lines of the enlightenment. Fundamentally, the exegetical 
writing of both men exhibits the conviction that the antiquity of a text or tradition was a 
demonstration of its truth. Born out of a Protestant distrust of tradition, eighteenth 
century thinkers such as these tended to view religious developments in both Christianity 
and Judaism from the second century on as corruptions. The Talmud and the Council of 
Nicaea alike came under scrutiny, and the scholar set his aim at discovering the purest, 
most ancient, most holy Bible. Of the many conclusions these two men came to, 
Arianism, or the rejection of the Trinitarian formula of Athanasius and the Church 
fathers, was by far the most controversial and ended with Whiston’s banishment from 
Cambridge University in 1710. Much more popular and with farther reaching 
consequences, was Whiston’s assault on allegorical interpretation, which he promoted 
with renewed vigor thereafter in London.  
A word on context will help situate Whiston’s attack on allegory. At the heart of 
eighteenth-century debates in England surrounding the Bible and its interpretation were 
two components of biblical literature: Genesis, specifically the creation story and the 
flood, and the Old Testament prophets and their connection to New Testament events. On 
the one hand, developments in natural history and astronomy called into question the 
validity of the Genesis narratives, and on the other, manuscript discoveries and textual 
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criticism called into question the assumed correspondence between the prophets and the 
Christian messiah. With each new discovery old assumptions were challenged, and 
Deism, a rising alternative to biblical religion, gained new advocates. Following on late 
seventeenth century philosophical mediations on the subject, such as John Toland’s 
Christianity not Mysterious (1696) and John Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity 
(1695), defenders of the faith were tasked with demonstrating the genuineness of 
Christian scripture and the logical sophistication of its message. 
The rise of the natural sciences led some thinkers to defend biblical truth claims 
by means of “general providence” only, or by means of the ordinary processes and forces 
of nature. Those who insisted on the traditional notion of God’s active intervention by 
means of “special providence” in upholding the two pillars of biblical revelation, namely 
miracles and prophecy, were challenged as never before. Enter William Whiston, with his 
tool box of Newtonian physics, textual dexterity, scholarly rigor and zealousness for the 
truth of the printed Word of God.  
Whiston’s views on allegory are best understood as a response to the attacks of 
Deism, which were triggered in part by the work of Thomas Burnet and his influential 
1681 The Sacred Theory of the Earth. On one hand, Whiston and Burnet had much in 
common, as they both attempted explanations of biblical accounts using mechanistic 
principles. Burnet, for his part, worked to do this with as little recourse to special 
providence as possible, which made the hexameron, or six-day creation, a particularly 
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difficult stumbling block.48 He believed that the world was created in the order and 
manner described in Genesis, but that the length of time itself could only be understood 
allegorically. That it did not literally take six days was no innovation. As far back as 
Augustine, Christian exegetes had been relativizing the measurement of time in the 
beginning. But Burnet’s turn to allegory in an otherwise positivist study stood out. His 
qualification was viewed as a weakness by responding Deists and theists alike.49 That one 
could be so convinced regarding the science behind the Bible, but make use of allegory 
when things got tricky became a point of ridicule. Whiston thought he could do better, 
and was determined to defend the biblical account of creation without the crutch of 
Burnet’s “parabolick sense.”50 Whiston’s support of the Genesis events relied again on 
theories of the impact of comets. The impact of colliding spheres on their natural course 
rapidly changed the landscape of the earth, and the six days of creation describe exactly 
what it would have looked like to an observing set of eyes. No allegory is needed; the text 
means precisely what it says. 
  That the biblical text could have only one meaning, and that its meaning was to 
be understood literally, became fundamental to Whiston’s overall hermeneutical 
                                                          
48 The reception of Spinoza in seventeenth-century England triggered discussions about the 
reasonableness of belief in biblical miracles. Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, for instance, wrote in 
defense of miracles in responding to Spinoza. See Rosalie L. Colie, “Spinoza in England, 1665-1730,” in 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107, no. 3 (June 19, 1963): 183-219. Burnet’s work 
attempted to straddle two positions seemingly at odds in Spinoza’s wake: the inerrancy of scripture and 
God’s operation via the laws of nature.  
49 Burnet had many critics, including Christianus Wagner, Herbert Crofts, and Erasmus Warren. On the 
Deist response to Burnet, see Force, William Whiston, 35-38. 
50 William Whiston, A New Theory of the Earth, From its Original, to the Consummation of All Things, 
Where the Creation of the World in Six Days, the Universal Deluge, And the General Conflagration, As laid 
down in the Holy Scriptures, Are Shewn to be perfectly agreeable to Reason and Philosophy (London: J. 
Whiston and B. White, at Mr. Boyle's Head in Fleet-Street, 1755), 66. 
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approach. He outlined this approach in three postulates in a publication responding to 
Burnet’s and pointedly titled A New Theory of the Earth, From its Original, to the 
Consummation of All Things, Where the Creation of the World in Six Days, the Universal 
Deluge, And the General Conflagration, As laid down in the Holy Scriptures, Are Shewn 
to be perfectly agreeable to Reason and Philosophy. His postulates were stated as 
follows:  
I. The Obvious or Literal Sense of Scripture is the True and Real one, where 
no evident Reason can be given to the contrary. 
II. That which is clearly accountable in a natural way, is not without reason to 
be ascrib’d to a Miraculous Power. 
III. What Ancient Tradition asserts of the constitution of Nature, or of the 
Origin and Primitive States of the World, is to be allow’d for True, where 
‘tis fully agreeable to Scripture, Reason, and Philosophy.51 
Whiston’s Boyle lectures as well as his 1724 follow-up book, The Literal 
Accomplishment of Scripture Prophecy, apply these postulates to the Old Testament 
prophecies. Like Genesis, interpretation of prophetic literature had become a point of 
controversy amidst the challenges posed by Deism, especially for their reliance on double 
meanings. In order to meet this challenge Whiston set out to prove that messianic 
prophecies referred to events surrounding the birth, life and death of Jesus alone, and not 
to the immediate circumstances of the Judahite and Israelite kings and kingdoms to which 
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they were pronounced.  Traditional Christian reliance on more than one sense of scripture 
here was to be abandoned along with other patristic perversions.52 “I observe that the 
Stile and Language of the Prophets, as it is often peculiar and enigmatical, so it is always 
single and determinate, and not capable of those double Intentions, and typical 
Interpretations, which most of our late Christian Expositors are so full of upon all 
Occasions.”53  
In order to demonstrate the literal meaning “without any recourse to Typical, 
Foreign and Mystical Expositions”54 Whiston postulated the corruption of the text by 
second-century Jews, whose intent, he insisted, was to confound Christianity. Just as the 
Athanasian Creed brought confusion and falsity to Christian notions of the father and the 
son, Jews had manipulated the text of the Bible to mislead its followers during the period 
of early Christianity. As Irven Resnick has shown, this accusation of Jewish textual 
corruption has always existed in Christendom, and gained strength and sophistication in 
the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries.55 Such accusations also flourished in Islam. 
Whiston was therefore weaving an old story into his text-critical work: a familiar anti-
Judaism into new manuscript discoveries and analysis. 
                                                          
52 Eighteenth-century Arianism, such as that of Newton and Whiston, was part of a post-Reformation 
wave of enthusiasm for the earliest forms of Christian doctrine, as discussed above. Here, allegory and 
Trinitarianism are both considered by Whiston to be part of the corruption of Christianity over time. As 
we will see in chapter 6, in 1783 John Wesley would accuse Swedenborg of rejecting the literal sense of 
scripture, and with it the doctrine of the Trinity. That the Trinity could be so closely associated with 
allegory and with literalism by two different leading English theologians speaks to the particular 
interpretive uncertainties of the day. 
53 William Whiston, The Accomplishment of Scripture Prophecies: Being Eight Sermons Preach’d at the 
Cathedral Church of St. Paul in the year MDCCVII (London, 1708), 13. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Irven Resnick, “The Falsification of Scripture and Medieval Christian and Jewish Polemics,” in Medieval 
Encounters 2, no. 3 (1995): 344-380. 
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In his An Essay Towards Restoring the True Text of the Old Testament (1722) 
Whiston cites the Talmudic principle of tiqqun sopherim as a starting point for his 
accusation against the Hebrew Masoretic text, and its departures from other versions. 56  
He faults the “later Jews” for altering the chronology and the messianic prophecies of the 
Bible, to “stop the power of the Gospel.”57 In a nod to their own religious convictions, 
Whiston states that these rabbis were “lying for God,”58 but blames them 
unapologetically for all “modern difficulties” in interpretation.59 His The Literal 
Accomplishment of Scripture Prophecies presents a detailed study of the prophecies in 
question, placing them side by side in two columns with their New Testament 
fulfillments. Marginal notes explain every corruption to the text made by Jews. Using the 
Septuagint, the Samaritan Pentateuch, and the Roman Psalter for comparison, Whiston 
notes where the Hebrew text misleads. Where no existing manuscript provides a 
prophecy to correlate with a New Testament citation, the Jews are blamed for the absence 
in every version, as in this note on Matthew 2:23: “This Text is entirely wanting in all our 
Copies, Hebrew and Greek. Nor do there at present the least Footsteps of it remain, since 
the Jews corrupted their Copies.”60 With the latest tools of biblical scholarship at hand, 
therefore, Whiston proposed to reconstruct the original text, which would, he believed, 
present a straightforward description of the messiah born in Bethlehem. 
                                                          
56 William Whiston, An Essay Towards Restoring the True Text of the Old Testament, and for Vindicating 
the Citations Made Thence in the New Testament (London: J. Senex, 1722), 221. 
57 Ibid., 223. 
58 Ibid., 224 
59 Ibid., 232. 
60 Whiston, Literal Accomplishment, 4. 
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Most significant for our present purposes is Whiston’s association of allegory 
with the contaminating nature of Jewish interpretation, which he makes in a supplement 
to An Essay Towards Restoring the True Text of the Old Testament. The supplement 
takes up the case of the Canticles, and argues against its inclusion in the canon. Whiston 
does not challenge the traditional attribution of authorship to King Solomon, but says that 
it was written late in Solomon’s life when he was influenced by Egyptian ways and 
entrenched in idolatry. Any moral content that could be derived from Canticles would 
depend on a reading that was “entirely mystical and allegorical.”61 The literal sense alone 
is depraved, and as such has no place in holy scripture. Whiston uses Canticles as an 
opportunity to declare allegory “that later Jewish Method of Interpretation,”62 pointing to 
Philo as the father of allegory and to Philo’s Egyptian (i.e. idolatrous), heritage. He 
argues that allegory takes a hold on biblical tradition only after the fall of Jerusalem, and 
is used by the earliest Christians only when they are engaged in debate with Jews.63 The 
inclusion of Canticles in the canon came in the second century, when allegory was in 
fashion and, importantly, at the same time the Jews were engaged in their textual 
corruptions: so goes Whiston’s argument. 
However, while Whiston’s understanding of the role of Jews in the history of 
religion centers on their corruption of scripture, more positive elements of his interaction 
with Judaism manifest the knotty relationship between early modern Christian thinkers 
                                                          
61 William Whiston, A Supplement to Mr. Whiston's Late Essay, Towards Restoring the True Text of the Old 
Testament: Proving, That the Canticles Is Not a Sacred Book of the Old Testament; nor Was Originally 
Esteemed as Such, Either by the Jewish or the Christian Church (London: J. Senex, 1723), 12. 
62 Ibid., 41. 
63 Ibid., 21. 
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and their hermeneutical exploitation of Jews and Judaism. Adam Shear points to the fact 
that Whiston’s lifetime coincides with the period of Jewish settlement in England as 
evidence for what he calls Whiston’s “Judeo-centric Christianity.”64 His Arianism made 
Jewish acceptance of Jesus as divine unnecessary for their salvation. And Jewish national 
restoration was seen by Whiston as an important precursor to, rather than result of, the 
second coming of Christ. Even more striking was Whiston’s incorporation of mitzvot, 
kashrut, and the Saturday Sabbath into his notions of what a true Christian practice 
should look like. The purest form of Christianity, again, would have been the earliest, and 
consequently would reflect the Jewish context of Jesus’ Judea. Whiston is very much a 
product of his time in his fascination with Jewish customs, and inherited the project from 
such Christian Hebraists as Johannes Buxtorf and his 1603 Synagoga Judaica. His 
“chimerical philosemitism,”65 to borrow Shear’s phrasing, was also not unique, as 
Christians across Europe had long viewed the conversion of the Jews as integral to 
bringing on the messianic age. Whiston’s distinctive contribution was his elaborate 
documentation of Jewish textual corruption, and the accompanying link between Jews 
and allegory.  
Whiston had many critics. But none elicited the spirited response, from Whiston 
and others, that freethinker Anthony Collins did with his work A Discourse of the 
Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion.66 Collins argued that rather than rescue 
                                                          
64 Adam Shear, “William Whiston's Judeo-Christianity: millenarianism and Christian Zionism in early 
enlightenment England,” in Philosemitism in History, ed. Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 93-110. 
65 Ibid., 110. 
66 Anthony Collins, A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion (London: 1724). 
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the Old Testament for Christianity the man was undermining it. In his sardonic attack 
Collins questioned the very notion that more reliable sources for the Old Testament could 
be identified or that if they could Whiston was the man for the job. He asserted that, in 
his words:  “a Bible restor’d, according to Mr. Whiston’s Theory, will be a mere 
Whistonian Bible, a Bible confounding and not containing the true Text of the Old 
Testament.”67 Collins’s Discourse pointed to the need for a radically different approach 
to scripture, one found paradoxically in the heart of Judaism. For this Collins cited the 
theories of Dutch scholar William Surenhusius, whose legendary encounter with a wise 
Rabbi led him to believe in the revelatory nature of the Mishnah and the legitimacy of 
Jewish methods for interpreting scripture. The anonymous Rabbi, who was described as: 
“well skill’d in the Talmud, the Cabbala, and the allegorical books of the Jews”68 was an 
astute interpreter of the New Testament as well as the Old. When presented with the 
problem of how the New Testament authors inaccurately cite Hebrew scriptures, the 
Rabbi revealed the solution. He demonstrated that the New Testament is a mystical 
interpretation of the Old, properly interpreted only by the methods of Kabbalah. Collins 
surmises from his consideration of this account, that Paul, as well as the Gospel writers, 
must have been educated in the ways of Kabbalah, gaining the ability to interpret the 
mysteries of scripture. Citing Surenhusius’s encounter, Collins therefore concluded that 
“Christianity is the allegorical sense of the Old Testament, and is not improperly called 
mystical Judaism.”69  
                                                          
67 Ibid., 255.  
68 Ibid., 55.  
69 Ibid. 92. 
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 Collins’s admiration for Jewish mystical hermeneutics is tinged with irony, and 
conflicting theories exist among contemporary historians and biographers on exactly how 
sarcastic Collins was being: on whether or not Collins’s admiration for Surenhusius was 
genuine.70 David Ruderman, for his part, argues for the seriousness of Collins’s 
underlying purpose, even if it was cloaked in irony. In his book Connecting the 
Covenants: Judaism and the Search for Christian Identity in Eighteenth Century 
England, Ruderman considers the possibility that Collins was offering a sincere response 
to Whiston’s theories. Perhaps a rabbinic approach to the New Testament was not such a 
ridiculous concept for a text created in first century Palestine. As evidence, Ruderman 
points to both Collins’s source, Michel de la Roche, and his followers, such as Edward 
Chandler, bishop of Coventry, who took the point very seriously indeed, as did 
Surenhusius’s followers on the continent. Such scholars, steeped in Hebrew studies and 
Judaics already, saw something genuine and even erudite in Collins’s proposition. The 
genius of Surenhusius’s work, these men recognized, was in comparing the citations of 
scripture in rabbinic texts, which take certain liberties in their transmission, to citations in 
the New Testament. De la Roche wrote that the New Testament authors “have done 
nothing in the present Case but what was practiced by the ancient Hebrew Theologers.”71  
One English follower of Surenhusius, William Wotton, who elaborated a Mishnaic 
                                                          
70 Scholars such as James O’Higgens, David Berman, Pascal Taranto, Hans Frei and David Ruderman each 
present a different Anthony Collins. Some view him as an atheist, others as a deist, still others as a 
committed Christian. For his part, Frei points to the fact that Collins was a disciple of John Locke as 
evidence of Collin’s skepticism with regard to rabbinic methods. In Frei’s view, Collins would have 
believed, as a follower of Locke, that the “lost rules governing nonliteral interpretation are completely 
arbitrary nonsense and the interpretation itself therefore nonsensical.” Frei, The Eclipse, 70. 
71 From Michel de la Roche’s Memoirs of Literature, as quoted in Ruderman, Connecting the Covenants, 
72. 
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interpretation of the Bible, wrote of his findings: “If I had ever had an Opportunity, I 
wou’d most certainly have gone thro’ the New Testament under a Jew . . . that they 
understand it infinitely better than we do.”72 Even if Collins was wholly sarcastic, 
therefore, many of his readers were not.  
Christianity faced unprecedented challenges in the eighteenth century, and the 
latest in historical and scientific methods of exegesis had not always served it well. In 
many instances it had left behind a text that no longer cohered. New methods of 
interpretation were needed; the medieval reliance on allegorical reading was viewed by 
many as naïve and out of touch with advancements of modernity. Whiston’s attempt at a 
scientific and literal reading of the Bible was the result of a crisis in Christian 
hermeneutics, and Collins’ response exploited the impossibility of the project. That both 
men benefitted from their version of the “hermeneutical Jew”73 tells us more about the 
history of Christianity than it does about Judaism, and will be a point for comparison with 
other biblical commentators of the eighteenth century.  
Moses Mendelssohn 
The question of the polysemic nature of the biblical text was revisited by 
eighteenth century Jewish intellectuals as well, responding to challenges in many ways 
similar to those facing Protestantism and Catholicism, but also in ways unique to Jewish 
contexts. Such challenges included, but were not limited to, forms of biblical criticism 
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85. 
73 See Shear, “Whiston's Judeo-Christianity,” 109. 
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initiated by Spinoza in the seventeenth century, and challenges to the veracity of the 
masoretic text, such as those illustrated above in the work of William Whiston. As with 
Christian biblicism, Jewish scholarship struggled to demonstrate the reasonableness of 
traditional modes of interpretation, including non-literal ones. In the introduction to his 
Hebrew language commentary on the book of Ecclesiastes, German philosopher Moses 
Mendelssohn (1729-1786) defended the medieval model of four methods of 
interpretation, with an appeal to logic: “As is well known, there are four ways to 
elucidate our holy Torah, peshat, derash, remez, and sod. They are all words of the living 
God and are all correct. This neither contradicts the ways of the intellect and logic, nor is 
strange and astonishing to human understanding, as I will elucidate with the help of the 
Eternal, may He be blessed.”74 This statement is a defense of an old hermeneutical 
system for a new age. Written in Hebrew, his commentary appealed to a Jewish audience, 
but Mendelssohn made use of systems of thought developed in his German-language 
philosophical work throughout his commentary, and responded to theoretical challenges 
facing biblical religion more broadly. As such, it gives us an insight into the themes we 
are considering in this chapter from a Jewish vantage-point, namely: biblical 
interpretation in the age of science, Jewish-Christian relations, and the fate of allegory 
amidst the growing interest in literal, historical, and linguistic study of the Bible. 
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Before turning to Mendelssohn’s biblical commentaries, a word on Jewish 
intellectual and scientific culture during the European Enlightenment in is order. One 
finds, among the histories, a wide range of descriptions, from those that illustrate a time 
of relative isolation and even stagnation, to those that speak of unprecedented integration 
and advancement of the Jews of Europe. Hillel Levine, for instance, writes that the 
Jewish community was “curiously unshaken” by the changing winds of European 
epistemology. 75 Among the many reasons for this disengagement, he points to: the 
Jewish concern for history over nature, the effects of persecution in turning the Jewish 
community inward, and the messianic hopes of a people in exile which made divine 
intervention a difficult reality to compromise on. The work of Gershom Scholem 
contributes to an understanding of early modernity as a time of crisis, leading to 
increasing messianism and mysticism, and a time of decreasing interest in traditional 
forms of study and the structures of rabbinic leadership. However, another side has been 
illuminated in the revisionist histories of Jonathan Israel, David Ruderman, Noah Efron 
and others.76 Ruderman, for his part, argues that there was an increase in Jewish 
integration in medical schools and universities in this time period and consequently a 
growing positive awareness of the secular sciences,77 and that the intellectual 
achievements of Anglo-Jewry challenge the standard view that the German Haskalah was 
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the sole source and inspiration of the Jewish Enlightenment.78  Opportunities for Jewish 
integration were ultimately made possible, argues Ruderman, by the separation of 
metaphysics and the natural sciences in European universities, weakening official truth 
claims that required the exclusion of non-Christian perspectives.79   
Mendelssohn, as our representative Jewish European intellectual, himself 
manifests the contrasting emphases that we find in these histories. As we will see, 
Mendelssohn believed Judaism could provide key insights into the potential for an 
enlightened and pluralistic Germany, and that Jewish participation modeled the 
coexistence of diverse communities in a unified state.  He also wrote that the impetus for 
his biblical translation and commentary work was that it would be “the first step toward 
culture from which my nation, alas, is so estranged that one is almost ready to despair of 
the possibility of improvement.”80 Alternating views of Judaism, as already sophisticated 
and as in need of rehabilitation, present in Mendelssohn’s work, and in this he reflects the 
various contexts laid out by our histories, and something of the complex reality of Jewish 
life in early modern Europe.  
In terms of trends in biblical studies, a few things can be said about the particular 
state of Jewish scholarship in this time period. Firstly, the polyphonic nature of Jewish 
hermeneutics allowed for traditional interpretations of scripture in the face of 
advancements among Jews who were engaged in the natural sciences. A discrepancy 
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79 Ruderman, Jewish Thought, 11. The history of this separation and the emergence of “secular theology” 
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between nature and scripture was not necessarily cause for alarm in a rabbinic tradition at 
home with diverse interpretations.81 Secondly, as Edward Breuer argues, the study of 
Talmudic law and Jewish mystical traditions prevailed over biblical grammar and 
exegesis as the focus of interpretive activity, limiting overall engagement with the rapidly 
developing field of biblical criticism. Breuer writes: “Despite the many important 
accomplishments of early modern Jewish scholarship, the general area of Bible and 
language study was pervaded by a palpable sense of decline.”82 The scholarly pursuits of 
the Christian universities into language and manuscript study did not receive the same 
attention in Jewish centers of learning. It is important not to exaggerate the effects of this 
gap, however, as the ground had been laid for Mendelssohn and his “Biurists” in the 
earlier work of Judah ben Bezalel Loew of Prague (1525-1609), whose influential 
critique of Ashkenazi education included an appeal for more formal study of Hebrew 
grammar, the Bible, and science.83 Further, Maimonides was a model of the integration of 
biblical interpretation and philosophical investigation for Jews and Christians alike in this 
period, and Spinoza’s contribution to biblical criticism cannot be overstated. Eighteenth-
century biblical studies was by no means a frontier breached by Christians alone, but one 
shaped by the discourse between Jews and Christians, as it had been since biblical times. 
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 The challenge for Mendelssohn and his followers, the Maskilim, was to engage 
the field of modern biblical scholarship as it was developing in Germany, while not 
compromising on the authority of medieval Jewish sources, which they understood to be 
the key to biblical interpretation. Breuer writes: “they were all committed to maintaining 
rabbinic hegemony in the normative interpretation of Scripture. In upholding exemplary 
features of medieval Jewish culture, eighteenth-century Maskilim embraced a literature 
that was self-consciously and thoroughly imbued with a sense of its own particularism.”84 
This rabbinic particularism proved to be at odds with the universalist spirit of the 
Enlightenment, and the resulting dissonance threatened to put a barrier between Jewish 
and Christian biblical scholarship during the Haskalah. 
Mendelssohn saw himself as uniquely suited to bridge the two worlds of Jewish 
tradition and enlightenment scholarship. At once committed to rabbinic authority and to 
Hebrew language study and literary criticism, Mendelssohn’s middle way involved a 
dedicated engagement with both ways of knowing. This is most evident in his publication 
of a German translation of the Pentateuch with commentary, Sefer netivot ha-shalom, 
commonly referred to as the Bi’ur, a collaborative effort he spearheaded with some 
friends after beginning a translation for his son’s education. Mendelssohn’s attention to 
grammar and philology reflected the interests of modern biblical scholarship, as did his 
consideration of various manuscripts of the biblical text. The introduction and much of 
the commentary addressed the concerns of the modern reader, while the commentary 
drew heavily on interpretations from rabbinic exegetes, especially Ibn Ezra and Rashi, as 
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a “guide to the medieval plain tradition” as David Sorkin puts it.85 In all of this, 
Mendelssohn sent the message that Judaism was not only capable of engaging in a 
sophisticated rendering of the biblical text, but that it was uniquely suited to do so. 
While Mendelssohn’s commentary drew from various rabbinic sources with the 
intension of expanding on the plain sense of the text, or the peshat, he also spearheaded a 
sophisticated defense of the tradition of multiple meanings of scripture, as we see in the 
quote above from his commentary on Ecclesiastes. His efforts in this area rest on a 
general theory of language: put very simply, that all language, written or spoken, can be 
interpreted in multiple ways. Inspired in part by Maimonides, he develops the concepts of 
the primary and secondary meanings of language. Language uses both conventional and 
spontaneous signs; it carries a generally intended meaning, as well as subtle nuances that 
belie levels of intentionality on the part of the speaker. In this, it is like other aspects of 
the natural world. Limbs, and other body parts perform various functions, as do the 
elements of nature. “For example, He created the nose for smelling, for breathing, for 
expelling excess moisture, and for enhancing facial beauty. . . Therefore it is not 
implausible that the [Supreme] Wisdom should have many different intentions in one 
utterance, and that they are all true.”86 All created things have more than one purpose, 
and scripture participates in this design. If, with common sense, we can understand the 
levels of meaning in everyday speech and other natural phenomenon, Mendelssohn 
argued, how much more so with a sacred text? “This is what is meant by the sayings of 
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the sages, may their memories be for a blessing: ‘one verse is expounded in many senses’ 
. . . On this basis, you will understand how it is possible to elucidate in many ways—
through derash, remez, and sod—everything that is said through prophecy or the holy 
spirit, and how they are all correct along with peshat, which is the most necessary of 
all.”87 His understanding of the conventional and spontaneous aspects of speech, the 
primary and secondary meaning of language, was thereby applied to traditional rabbinic 
hermeneutics.  
In Mendelssohn’s conception, the peshat, the plain sense, can be gleaned from a 
loose reading of the text: by paying attention to the general meaning, with little concern 
for the particularities of word choice and rhetoric. On the other hand, a nonliteral 
meaning relies on every detail. Just as one might analyze the specific words, their 
ordering, or the tone with which they are delivered, of another person’s speech in order to 
read the implicit connotations of what they are saying, so too rabbinic tradition reads 
levels of meaning into every nuance of the text. Breuer explains: “[from] the perspective 
of the derash, the arbitrary becomes purposeful.”88 The derash, or the secondary 
intention of the text, requires the isolation of and elucidation on specific terms: 
“Therefore you will see that when Rashi, the light of the exile, may his memory be for a 
blessing, follows derash in his commentary on the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings, 
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he will at times elucidate each verse on the basis of some isolated feature, detached from 
neighboring verses, leaving aside their context and continuity.”89  
Mendelssohn, in the spirit of Maimonides, Rashi, and others, thereby highlights a 
plain sense reading of scripture wherever possible, while also “leaving a place” for non-
literal interpretation. In the introduction to Sefer netivot ha-shalom, Mendelssohn 
meditates on the problem of translation, and specifically on how literal a good translation 
needs to be. It is a problem of utmost concern, as there are instances when a literal 
translation can mislead, and even make a liar out of the text.90 He proposes a 
methodology to guide his own translations as a way to avoid this grave pitfall: where the 
peshat and the derash agree, he translates according to the peshat; where they diverge, he 
translates according to the derash. Using the commentaries of Rashi, Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, 
Nahmanides, and Radak, as guides, Mendelssohn considers the primary and secondary 
meanings to the passages he translates and makes word choices accordingly, to best guide 
his readers. In every instance where the peshat can carry multiple meanings, it must be 
preserved: “It is the way of one who has mastered a language to sometimes have different 
intentions in one statement.”91 
In a technical sense, therefore, Mendelssohn’s translation was guided by 
traditional rabbinic interpretations on multiple levels. His exegesis, as well, was informed 
by an understanding of the text as speaking to more than one level of meaning 
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simultaneously. An example from his commentary on Genesis 2 demonstrates an instance 
where scripture tells the true story of real people in history, but also instructs the reader 
on the level of personal morality. Mendelssohn here describes the events of the biblical 
narrative as a kind of encoded prediction of what will happen to the human race as a 
whole.  
The entire account of creation, as well as all that scripture recounts 
regarding what happened to Adam, Eve, Cain, and Abel, is all true 
and reliable without doubt: what actually happened to these 
individuals is just as [scripture] recounts it. In addition, however, 
these stories contain an allusion to and model for what will happen 
to the entire human species in general. What happened to Adam and 
his children in particular is what happens to the entire species in 
general. For this reason, scripture describes at length the details of 
their [lives], on the basis of which a wise individual will understand 
all that happens to human beings, from the time they were created to 
the end of all the generations.92 
 
 
 At first glance, this appears to be the kind of typological and teleological reading 
of human history that we find so often in Christian sources. Christian thinkers from 
Augustine, to Joachim of Fiore, to Immanuel Kant, traced the history of human perfection 
from past, to present, to future along a developmental model (with Christianity 
representing a mature phase). However, as we continue reading in this commentary, one 
key difference between Mendelssohn’s model and a standard Christian model becomes 
apparent. The development represented by Adam and his children happens on an 
individual level only. This development involves the human task of achieving balance 
between two complimentary faculties: comprehension and desire. When Adam ate of the 
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Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, he became like the angels. But an angelic balance 
of these faculties is not appropriate for humans: desire overtook his comprehension. Each 
individual’s character is determined by the ability to bring the two faculties back into a 
harmonious relationship. A person’s disposition emerges “in accordance with an 
individual’s comprehension and capacity for distinguishing between good and evil, as 
well as in accordance with the faculty of desire that leads him to do good and refrain 
from evil.”93  Mendelssohn describes here the perfection of the individual only, as a 
rational independent being; the collective advancement of the human species is not 
discussed.94 Furthermore, unlike much Christian typology, the interaction of 
Mendelssohn’s multiple levels of meaning is not one of succession or supersession. One 
level does not follow or displace another.  They always exist simultaneously, available to 
the reader to make use of in whatever order or combination benefits him/her at a given 
moment.  
Mendelssohn did share many of the philological concerns and insights of his 
Christian interlocutors, but the conclusions he drew regarding the role of the Bible in 
human religious understanding and action countered many fundamental truth claims of 
Christianity. We will turn briefly to Mendelssohn’s understanding of the role the Hebrew 
language played in the development of human knowledge and reason, and to his bold 
assertions regarding the particularity of biblical revelation, before returning to an analysis 
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of his theory of the multiple senses of language, in order to clarify his place in the history 
of biblical interpretation. 
  Following the work of William Warburton, Mendelssohn became interested in 
the relationship between Egyptian hieroglyphics and Hebrew script and the religious 
implications of such a connection. In his Jerusalem, he posits that the Hebrew language 
was the bridge between a pictographic system and an alphabetical system, each of which 
have their advantages and disadvantages. It solved the problem of idolatry, inherent in 
hieroglyphics, but mediated more of a direct connection than a fully conventional system 
by maintaining some resemblances. The Hebrew letter bet looks like a bayit, the gimel 
like a gamal, etc.95 Hebrew is therefore a kind of archeological artifact documenting the 
shift in human knowledge that abstraction made possible.  Mendelssohn believed abstract 
signs are necessary for the development of human reason, as they contain and 
communicate knowledge while encouraging the mind to look for meaning beyond a 
simple picture.  “Wise Providence has placed within the soul’s immediate reach a means 
which it can use at all times. It attaches, either by a natural or an arbitrary association of 
ideas, the abstracted characteristic to a perceptible sign which, as often as its impression 
is renewed, at once recalls and illuminates this characteristic, pure and unalloyed.”96 
Hebrew, which Mendelssohn believed to be “the source of all other known ways of 
writing” led the way in making units of writing more abstract and human knowledge 
more refined. However, the threat of idolatry still remained. 
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In Jerusalem, Mendelssohn postulates that even text that is made abstract, 
avoiding the pitfalls of hieroglyphics, can become an idol. Anything that is fixed in time 
and space can become the object of misdirected devotion. Even the Pythagoreans, who 
attempted to avoid idolatry by seeking the divine in numbers alone, eventually failed, and 
put math before God. This is why, according to tradition, Moses was permitted to write 
down only the bare minimum of the revelation he received. The rest was transmitted 
orally. Furthermore, the revelation that was committed to writing was primarily 
instruction for “ceremonial law” – a living script that could adapt to the unique needs and 
customs of every generation. Speech (oral Torah) and action (fulfillment of the law) are 
superior symbols because of their flexibility and transparency. As Mendelssohn scholar 
Gideon Freudenthal writes: “Mendelssohn’s idea is this: a good symbol is ‘transparent.’ 
We look ‘through’ it to what it stands for. A good symbol does not itself attract attention, 
is often not ‘seen’ at all.”97 The peshat of the Torah is revelatory to the extent that it 
points to a holy expression in words and action. 
Mendelssohn’s assertion that ceremonial law is the primary emphasis of the Torah 
countered the popular accusation that Jewish customs were backwards and outdated. Here 
we have a description of Jewish law and ceremony as a living connection to God. 
Mendelssohn viewed Jewish ritual as a particular manifestation of revelation in signs, but 
it is by no means universal or absolute. It is its very particularity that becomes a model 
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for other religions, other nations, whose knowledge of revelation may be quite different: 
not better or worse, but necessarily different. 
It is his reformulation of the relationship between the universal and the particular, 
and the role that divine revelation plays in this relationship, that will take us finally to 
Mendelssohn’s most radical departure from the Christian philosophers of his day: the 
particularity of the Bible itself. According to Mendelssohn, we can discern three kinds of 
truth: two are generalizable to all people while one is not generalizable but is relative, or 
particular to a given community. The first two, borrowed from his reading of Leibniz, are 
necessary truth and contingent truth. Each of these is universal and absolute. The third 
category, historical truth, is provided by providence to suit the unique needs of a given 
community and is not generalizable to humanity as a whole. Revealed truth comes under 
this third category, and includes the entire biblical tradition. Fueling the fire of such 
heterodoxy, Mendelssohn asserts that the content of historical truth, i.e. revelation, does 
not concern matters of salvation or redemption. Human reason and observation alone are 
capable of accessing necessary and contingent truth, which can provide the guidance 
needed for an individual to achieve his or her potential for perfection; any other 
arrangement would be cruel given how few people have access to true revelation. 
Historical truth, or revelation, he writes, is about action, not belief. To be sure, the Bible, 
he writes, contains “an inexhaustible treasure trove of rational truths and religious 
doctrines”98 but such insights are not exclusive to revelation. The Torah is exceptional, 
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not for its presentation of universal truth, but for its ability to steer its audience away 
from idolatrous forms of religious expression.  
Such a line of reasoning challenges several fundamentals of Christianity: the 
nature of scripture, the role of faith and the promise of salvation through Christ. 
However, Mendelssohn’s goal is not to weaken Christian truth claims, but to establish a 
philosophical framework for the flourishing of religious pluralism. A given community 
can hold fast to its version historical truth as divine revelation without imposing this truth 
on those of other traditions.  
In many ways Mendelssohn’s views on the particularity of written revelation was 
made possible by Spinoza’s influential and iconoclastic Theologico-Political Treatise 
(1670), which provided a philosophical endorsement for historical criticism of the Bible, 
and inspired such sentiments as Gotthold Lessing’s oft quoted statement: “The letter is 
not the spirit and the Bible is not religion. Hence, objections to the letter and to the Bible 
are not likewise objections to the spirit and to religion.”99 At the same time, 
Mendelssohn’s body of work on Torah commentary also provided a defense of rabbinic 
truth claims and rabbinic methods, backed by medieval-style arguments from tradition 
and from the purported observations of Jews present with Moses at Mt. Sinai.100 His work 
walked the line between the thought patterns of the Middle Ages and those of modernity. 
As such, it drove a vision for pluralism, where Jew and Christian, traditionalist and critic 
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can occupy the same thought space, even if it also provided plenty to object to from the 
perspectives of both orthodoxy and secularism. In his Jerusalem, Mendelssohn suggests 
that by viewing revealed truth as historical, contextualized truth, Judaism provides a 
model for religious coexistence. Multiple types of historical truth, multiple histories, can 
thrive side by side. His last lines “Love truth! Love Peace” are a quotation from the 
eighth chapter of Zechariah, where Jews bring together the nations of the world.101 It is 
difficult to see this utopian vision as anything other than eschatological.  But 
Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem does not herald the messianic age. It points to the realizable 
harmony between citizens of different faith traditions, and suggests that Germany’s 
Jewish minority, rather than a mere remnant of a forgotten past, might have something to 
contribute to the health of the state. 
It is not always wise to simplify a vast and varied set of writings, such as 
Mendelssohn’s, into a convenient summary. For our purposes, however, a few key points 
are worth reviewing. Mendelssohn’s contributions include the following: all language 
carries multiple meanings. The Bible presents multiple meanings through signs. These 
meanings are carried via the subtleties of the written text, even in the shape of the letters, 
and rabbinic tradition holds the key to unlocking these meanings. The Hebrew language 
provided a pathway for the advancement for human understanding through abstraction 
(away from idolatry). As a technology it was providential, but its truth is not universal. 
Text is revelatory to the extent that it guides the religious practice of its reader. The 
Torah is holy to the extent that it sanctifies the ceremonial life of Jews, who, by 
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participating in this particular lived interpretation of their texts, can be a model for other 
communities. Mendelssohn, thereby recast Jewish allegorizing in light of the political, 
historical, and theological concerns of his day and for the sake of Jewish integration. His 
general theory of language, that all language necessarily carries multiple meanings and 
requires interpretation, allowed him to mine rabbinic commentaries for treasures of 
meaning that could connect Jewish readers to their tradition. Furthermore, his assertion 
that the text of the Bible, as language, could mean more than one thing, reflected a 
political affirmation that communities, diverse even in their truth claims, can live together 
amicably.    
While Mendelssohn worked to integrate Jews into the intellectual and political 
life of Europe, another plot line in the story of Jewish-Christian relations in the 
eighteenth century and its effect on biblical interpretation can be told through the life of 
the convert. In Johan Kemper and his biblical commentary we have an example of 
rabbinic, kabbalistic hermeneutics applied directly and consciously to a Christian reading 
of scripture. Furthermore, Kemper is an important addition to this study for providing an 
example of how the Sabbatian controversy affected both Christian and Jewish 
interpretations of scripture. 
Johan Kemper 
In his commentary on the gospel of Matthew, Me’irat einayim (1704), Hebrew 
lecturer at Uppsala University, Johan Kemper (1670–1716), makes the curious 
connection between the biblical image of the serpent and Jesus Christ, the Messiah. In 
commenting on Matthew 8:26, wherein Jesus commands the seas to calm, Kemper ties 
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together Old Testament and New Testament imagery:  “Observe that Moses lifted his 
staff over the sea and divided it, and this staff is a remez of the Staff of mightiness, which 
is Jesus, as it is written: ‘The Lord will extend your mighty scepter’ (Ps 110:2); and 
consequently that staff turned into a snake, because ‘snake’ by means of gematria is equal 
to the Messiah, and therefore that staff swallowed up the snakes that the magicians 
made.”102 This association would not have been entirely lost on his Christian readers, 
who would have inherited typological comparisons between Jesus and Moses’ staff-
turned-serpent in Exodus 4, Exodus 7, and Numbers 21. This instance in particular, 
however, betrayed Kemper’s commentary as distinctively Sabbatian. While kabbalistic 
references to the “holy serpent” have their origins in thirteenth century Spanish 
Kabbalah103 it became a central figure in the late seventeenth-century messianism of 
Shabbetai Ẓevi and his prophet, Nathan of Gaza.104  Kemper’s reading is backed by the 
numerological equivalence between the Hebrew words for messiah and serpent: mashiah ̣
and nahạsh both add up to 358 according to the system of gematria. Kemper’s use of the 
term “dragon” in the same paragraph to refer to the serpent bears the mark of Nathan’s 
Zoharic Treatise on the Dragons, and Shabbetai Ẓevi himself used the figure of the snake 
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in his personal signature.105 As scholars such as Elliott Wolfson, Mats Eskhult and others 
have recently demonstrated, Kemper’s commentaries and other writings present a man 
whose former messiah, a seventeenth-century imposter, came to be replaced by the first 
century Jesus. Other Sabbatian terms and concepts found in Kemper’s commentary 
include his repeated use of the term “Holy King,” his reference to the three parzụfim, or 
faces, of the divine,106 and most importantly, his treatment of Jewish law with its 
simultaneous fulfillment and retraction, a theme to which I will return below.107  
How did such a commentary, written in Hebrew and then translated and published 
in Latin, come to be produced at the Swedish University? A scan of the scholarship on 
Kemper and his role at Uppsala reveals the recurrence of the term “philo-Semitism” by 
way of contextualization. The phrase has been problematized by today’s historians of 
early modern Europe,108 but it nevertheless describes something of the fervor of 
Protestant Hebraism that characterized the period and the place. The question of how to 
describe this particular iteration of Christian interest in things Jewish, whether to frame it 
positively or negatively, is not easily answered. Historian Hans-Joachim Schoeps 
compares the relationship between philo-Semitism and anti-Semitism in the seventeenth 
century to “a sluggish canal and a broad torrent,” and given the missionizing intentions of 
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the many efforts in this direction, the difference between philo and anti is made murky by 
the tide. With this complexity in mind, something can be said about the role Swedish 
Universities played in advancing the study of rabbinic Judaism in Europe. Like other 
European nations, Sweden experienced a wave of interest in Kabbalah and primitive 
Christianity due to a variety of influences including Pietism and Neoplatonism. King Carl 
XI encouraged scholarly investigation of Jewish texts, despite the complete absence of 
Jews from his kingdom,109 and the surge of dissertations on rabbinic topics in Sweden left 
“all other European countries far behind” as Schoeps writes.110 Jewish commentaries, 
such as those by Maimonides, Abravanel, Ibn Ezra, and Rashi, were made available in 
university libraries and converted rabbis were sought for the teaching of Hebrew and 
rabbinics.    
Kemper’s autobiographical Unterthäniger bericht (“Humble Report”) tells the 
story of both his conversion from Judaism to Christianity and his migration from Kraków 
to Schweinfurt to Uppsala. Born Moses Aaron, he was made fatherless as a young boy 
and as a consequence of the family’s instability and his facility with learning, he found 
himself in the homes of Rabbis and of Christians, educated in various religious contexts 
in rabbinic texts and in the Bible. As an adult he was “seized by a heavy anxiety about 
the true sense of the prophecies,” as biographer Josef Eskult puts it, and was drawn to the 
                                                          
109 King Carl XI exemplifies the murkiness of Swedish philo-Semitism in his remarks to Laurentius 
Norrmanus, who was sent to Germany in search of a Jewish convert to teach at Uppsala, when he 
instructs Norrmanus to “find Jewish entrenchments and how to undermine them.” See Eskhult, “Rabbi 
Kemper’s Case,” 152. 
110 Schoeps, Barocke ]uden, Dole translation. 
60 
 
 
messianic predictions that followed the apostasy of Shabbetai Ẓevi.111 Moses Aaron 
threw himself into the hope of a coming messianic age along with so many Jews who 
looked to the pseudo-messiahs of the time. His profound disillusionment after the 
foretold date of September 5, 1695 came and went, led him to reconsider his 
understanding of scripture. His relationships with Christian clergy members who had 
sought him out for Hebrew instruction were fortified in this crisis, and ultimately led him 
to his conversion and to Sweden where he fit the profile of an able Judaeus conversus to 
teach at Uppsala University.  
Kemper’s biblical commentary is of interest to scholars for several reasons. His 
blend of Christianity, the Zohar, rabbinic Judaism, and Sabbatianism, all in the 
associative style of midrash and all in Hebrew, tells not only his personal story but the 
story of an age. He was of course held up by his students as a model of the marriage of 
ancient Jewish sagacity and true Christian faith, or in the words of his Latin translator 
Anders Norrelius a “Rabbi moistened with the waters of the salvation-bringing Baptism 
and of the sound spring of wisdom.”112 To contemporary historians, his commentary 
stands at the intersection of ideas and movements characteristic of the early eighteenth 
century, and can tell us a great deal about a particular clash of culture and thought that led 
to new ways of thinking as the century progressed. 
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In considering how Kemper is unique among the Christian kabbalists of early 
modernity, Elliot Wolfon points to his need “to preserve the nomian framework of the 
Kabbalah even as he sought to undermine that framework by proving the truths of 
Christianity on the basis of the traditional texts.”113 In fact, Wolfson names this tendency, 
which is fed by Kemper’s rabbinic background and his effort to extend the law beyond 
the boundaries of Judaism, “hypernomianism.” The law becomes even more relevant in a 
Christian context. And while a spiritualized explanation of the laws of circumcision, for 
instance, does have other Christian corollaries, his insistence that the close reading of 
kabbalistic texts is key to a true Christian understanding of the law is distinctive. For 
instance, Kemper’s Trinitarian interpretation of the customary kabbalistic prayer “for the 
sake of the unification of the blessed holy One and his presence” is backed by an 
understanding of the nature and relationship between the divine attributes, the parzụfim. 
His formula suggests that Jews everywhere, as Wolfson puts it, “unwittingly affirm the 
trinity” whenever they recite it.114 
Kemper’s “split consciousness”115 is nowhere more evident than in his 
commentary on the Zohar, Beriah ha-tikhon, where he insists that the Gospels are the true 
Oral Torah.116 The Word made flesh is the spoken word, the Oral Torah, the true 
interpretation of the Hebrew scriptures.  
This Torah was spoken orally by the Messiah to all the patriarchs and to the 
true prophets, and it was as clear as the sun, but they were commanded to 
                                                          
113 Wolfson, “Messianism,” 141. 
114 Ibid., 159. 
115 Ibid., 162. 
116 Johan Kemper, Beriah ha-Tikhon, fols. 201b-202a (www.alvin-portal.org), as translated in Wolfson, 
“Messianism,” 150. 
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write it in a hidden way that would have to be explained orally to the masses, 
and especially the teaching of the Gospel that the holy mouth spoke to you. 
This secret may be revealed, but to others it must be by way of parable that 
needs a commentary, and this is the true, just and correct Oral Torah.117 
 
This does not negate the wisdom of the Talmudic sages; again, Kemper draws on 
his rabbinic training in his post-conversion commentaries. The sages, he insists, knew the 
truth of the Gospels, and encoded it in their own commentaries. The Talmud, like the 
Torah, has layers or senses, and when properly interpreted bears testimony of Christ. For 
“[the] masters of the Talmud were cunning, and all of the words that they uttered were 
parables and riddles, and words that draw the heart.”118 Rashi, too, knew this truth and 
encoded it. For instance, Kemper incorporates Rashi’s interpretation of Genesis 28 into 
his own interpretation of Matthew 21:42 (itself an interpretation of Psalms 118:22). 
Employing the kabbalistic methods of sod, remez, and peshat, Kemper demonstrates the 
levels upon levels of tradition and text that need uncovering for the truth of Christianity 
to be revealed. On the stone that the builders rejected, he writes: 
This is a matter of sod, namely he took the stone, (Gen 28:11) which (in turn) 
is a remez of the Messiah, because Jacob placed his head on the stone of 
justice, since he believed in the Messiah . . . Observe, it is not the literal sense 
that Rashi refers to, when he, drawing from the Talmud, says that Jacob took 
more than one stone, when he made a kind of gutter, etc., and the Holy, 
blessed be he, made these into one. The secret is that Jacob took three stones, 
a hint of the Trinity, and they became one, that is Unity.119 
 
                                                          
117 Johan Kemper, Avodat ha-Qodesh, fol. 134a (www.alvin-portal.org), as translated in Wolfson, 
“Messianism,” 151. 
118 Johan Kemper, Beriah ha-Tikon, fol. 160a (www.alvin-portal.org), as translated in Wolfson, 
“Messianism,” 167. 
119 Johan Kemper, Me’irat einayim, as translated in Eskhult, M. "Rabbi Kemper's Case,” 157. The Latin 
translation of Kemper’s commentary on Matthew 21:42 can be found in Eskhult “Andreas Norrelius' Latin 
Translation,” 384-385. 
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 That Rashi expands on the biblical text, adding to it the idea that many stones 
were needed to create a ditch for Jacob’s head, and that God then made these stones one, 
is a hint to the reader of a Triune God. Therefore, according to Kemper, the Trinitarian 
truth of the Torah was known to all of its Jewish authors and commentators, but is lost on 
the typical Jewish reader. As Wolfson puts it, “the open secret of Christianity is the 
esoteric truth of Judaism.”120 The general population of Jews are in the dark when they 
read and study their texts, but nevertheless preserve a truth they cannot perceive. Satan 
himself is to blame for the Jews’ forgetfulness: for their inability to recall the true 
meaning of scripture. “He who has a brain in his head will conclude that the patriarchs 
point to the Trinity, and Satan assisted them in this matter, until the point that the wisdom 
of the Kabbalah was also lost. But know that even today they have very ancient and just 
customs that instruct about the Trinity, but they cover their faces with a mask.”121 The 
Jews are rebuked for hiding their faces with a mask, even as the three faces of God are 
concealed in holy texts. A holy mystery contends with a wicked disguise. 
 As we see in the other eighteenth-century commentaries in this study, Judaism is 
associated with allegory. Both the Torah and its commentaries contain hidden secrets that 
the sages preserve. Christianity is associated with the uncovering of secrets, the bringing 
out into the open. As someone who inhabited both worlds, however, Kemper divides the 
Jews into two camps: the sages who knew the truth of their encoding and the reading 
public who miss the point. An ignorant literalism is associated with Jews while an 
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enlightened literalism is attached to Christians and to the New Testament as Oral 
Torah.122 
Kemper read Jesus into every story of the Hebrew Bible and into every Jewish 
custom using the Hebrew term for type: mashal. Jesus is the shekhinah. Jesus is the 
afikoman, the mezuzah, the fiftieth day after Pesah.̣ Jesus is Torah, Shabbat, Metatron. 
Jesus is Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses and Job. He is the ark, the stone, and the Temple: 
“the goal, archetype, end and fulfilment of all prophecies, holy prototypes and 
prefigurations.”123 Again, there is certainly precedence for such a hermeneutic in 
Christianity, regarding the Bible at least, and Kemper’s conversion can explain much of 
his interpretation even if the format is in an associative, midrashic style. However, we 
can also trace such an interpretive fixation through Sabbatianism. Nathan of Gaza 
borrowed the methods of the marrano Solomon Molko, who introduced Christian 
allegories into his commentaries. Nathan used Molko’s interpretations and substituted his 
own Messiah when interpreting Job, for instance, as an allegory for Shabbetai Ẓevi.124 
About which sources influenced Kemper’s own biblical interpretation we can only 
speculate. But it certainly bares the markings of a tortuous genealogy, one with forays 
into Jewish contexts, Christian contexts, and contexts whose Jewish and Christian strands 
are indistinguishable.  His personal history as well as his life’s work tell the story of 
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religious nomadism and allegory is the vehicle for the passage of ideas back and forth 
across religious boarders.  
Menahẹm Nahụm 
Finally, reference to the hermeneutics of Ḥasidism will round out this study of 
allegorical interpretation in the eighteenth century, and will provide a valuable point of 
comparison with Emanuel Swedenborg, for reasons that will become apparent. Unlike 
Mendelssohn and the Maskilim, Ḥasidic exegetes were less concerned with integration 
into the philosophical and scientific discourse of non-Jews. They were generally 
unencumbered by biblical criticism or the fervor over allegorical interpretation as it was 
developing in universities and around the work of men like William Whiston and Thomas 
Burnet. We have in Ḥasidism, a contribution to eighteenth-century biblical interpretation 
that is thoroughly and unashamedly allegorical: one that weaves together medieval 
rabbinic and kabbalistic sources and puts these sources to  work in producing an “extreme 
spiritualization of the biblical text,” as Arthur Green terms it.125 Informed a great deal by 
the Zohar, eighteenth-century Ḥasidic commentary has much in common with the 
commentaries of Kemper, with the obvious difference that they were written entirely by 
and for the Jewish Ḥasidic communities of eastern Europe, and therefore are not 
concerned with the kind of religious boundary-crossing that we see in Kemper’s work. 
However, it would be wrong to characterize the Ḥasidic movement as entirely isolated or 
anomalous, as the arch of critical scholarship in this field has demonstrated. 
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Earlier scholarship on Ḥasidism tended to highlight the anti-intellectual 
dimensions of the movement, which grew out of folk traditions and the surge of practical 
Kabbalah present in Poland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Scholar Joseph 
Weiss compared the Ḥasidic movement to seventeenth-century English Pietism because 
of what he termed its “emotional intensification.”126 Similarly, Simon Dubnow noted that 
the movement, by focusing on healings, fortune telling, and other-worldly journeys, 
denounced reason “while Paris lauded reason.”127 An earlier focus on Ḥasidic folklore, 
demonology, and opposition to the Haskalah, has, however, been balanced by more 
recent scholarship, such as that of Arthur Green, whose many publications and 
translations draw out the homiletical and exegetical elements of the tradition. Immanuel 
Etkes, as well, warns historians not to adopt the rhetoric of the Haskalah itself by 
associating Ḥasidism with superstition and ignorance.128 A brief look at one Ḥasidic 
commentary in particular will demonstrate the rich contribution of this tradition to the 
history of biblical interpretation, especially as an example of eighteenth century 
commentary that is fully kabbalistic and allegorical.  
Rabbi Menahẹm Nahụm of Chernobyl (1730-1797) came out of the Mezrich 
school of Ḥ̟asidic thought, a student of the Baal Shem Tov and Dov Baer. The Mezrich 
tradition, and Rabbi Nahụm’s Torah commentary, Me’or einayim in its wake, is known 
for its heavy reliance on rabbinic intertextuality. “The Mezrich period in the history of 
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Ḥasidism represents a reappropriation of earlier Jewish mystical terms and symbols and 
their integration into the new religious experience that lay at the core of the Ḥasidic 
world view.”129 Reinterpretation is at its core. The primary literary sources for Me’or 
einayim are the Pentateuch, Aggadic texts and the Zohar. These texts are interwoven and 
utilized for Torah interpretation with a new emphasis: the internal, spiritual life of the 
individual. 
Of interest is the psychologizing tone of the Rabbi Nahụm’s homilies, typical for 
students of Dov Baer. For instance the sefirot, or the ten emanations of God described in 
the Zohar, become expressions of the ten aspects of a person’s inner life. As Green 
writes: “rather than realms within God, they now describe stages and qualities of human 
personality that are essential to the religious life.”130 The upper three sefirot represent the 
intellectual faculties, faculties of abstract thought, while the lower seven represent 
aspects of emotional and moral faculties, such as love, fear, grace, rigor, etc.  
Rabbi Nahụm’s interpretation of the Temple likewise points to the internal life of 
the individual.  
Thus scripture says: “Let them make me a sanctuary that I may dwell 
within them” (Exod. 25:8). It is known that the light of the Infinite, 
blessed be He, shines forth and dwells in the letters of Torah. When a 
person attaches his inner life-force and his words to the Torah, that life 
within him is bound to the portion of divinity that shines forth from 
Torah’s letters. Such is the case of one who studies with this intent, and 
has no ulterior motivations or extraneous goals. This person is himself also 
called a “sanctuary,” for by means of the longing and joy that reach Him 
from such service, God contracts His shekhinah so that it may enter that 
man. Just as the Creator contracted His shekhinah so that it was able to be 
present in the collective Temple, coming down between the two staves of 
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the ark (even though the very heavens cannot contain Him!), so does He 
do in the individual sanctuary within the person. . . This was the true 
dwelling of the shekhinah between the two staves of the ark: the two 
chambers of the heart.131 
 
That the true meaning of the staves on either side of the Ark of the Covenant 
would be the two chambers of the human heart is one example of the kind of allegorizing 
present everywhere in this commentary. Me’or einayim is exemplary of the interiorizing, 
anthropocentric, immanentist, nature of Ḥasidic commentary, and as such represents a 
full expression of these themes in Jewish thought.132  Moshe Idel articulates Rabbi 
Nahụm’s remarkable aim in terms of self-fulfillment: 
By attaining one’s own perfection, each person is able in the present to 
play the role he is destined to play in the final drama of redemption by 
becoming, according to R. Menahem Nahụm, a channel for the divine 
influx. Personal perfection as the main tool for the collective 
eschatological effort has some remarkable implications. Eschatology is not 
the unconditional self-negation of the individual for the sake of a larger 
goal, a self-denial of the revolutionary who is ready to deprive himself of 
the pleasure of well-being for the benefit of the next generations. On the 
contrary, the self-fulfillment of a particular individual is tantamount to his 
attaining the maximum in his personal life and playing the destined role in 
the “public” arena.133 
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Therefore, the primary reference in Me’or einayim is the individual Ḥasid and his 
internal life.134 In Me’or einayim, “every single Jew is a complete Torah in miniature”135 
and every person who serves God is “called a ‘miniature world.’”136 The actions and 
intentions of the individual have cosmic implications: the Torah is restored, heaven and 
earth are united, Divine influx is released and let down. Therefore, the individual is the 
axis mundi: the site of world creating and world centering. This provides an interesting 
comparison to Mendelsohn, who as we saw, interpreted the lives of biblical figures to 
speak to the balance of faculties in the individual.137 One could also compare it to 
religious movements during the Enlightenment more broadly, which tended in many 
cases to stress the “cultivation of an intensely personal inner religiosity”138 as Thomas 
Broman puts it. In Ḥasidism, this emphasis in the individual becomes the primary focus 
of biblical interpretation.  
 Something of the process of the individual spiritual realization can be seen in the 
working out of the figure of Egypt in the text. In the opening lines of Me’or einayim we 
are introduced to a play on words that will echo through the entire text. The Hebrew 
Mitzṛayim is separated into two words meizạr and yam, “straits” and “sea.” Egypt is the 
                                                          
134 There is some debate as to whether Ḥasidic materials are intended to guide the life of a Ḥasid, as a 
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138 Thomas H. Broman, “Matter, Force, and the Christian Worldview,” in When Science and Christianity 
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narrow straits, the “lowest rung” on the sefirotic ladder “for joy is greater when it is lifted 
out of darkness.”139  A second play on words brings us fully into the cosmology of 
Lurianic Kabbalah: the “produce” shever, of Egypt, which attracted both Abraham and 
Jacob in times of famine, is related to the word in Hebrew for breakage. It wasn’t, then, 
just grain that brought the patriarchs to Egypt, but “the fallen fruit of supernal wisdom is 
Torah, that which has fallen from above and become ‘broken.’”140 The descent of Torah, 
and of Abraham, and of the individual Jew, into Egypt is descent into death, complete 
brokenness. Egypt is elsewhere described in terms of moral ineptitude; it is a place of 
“spiritual filth”141 and “filled with promiscuity.”142 Entering Egypt is therefore an 
individual’s state of moral failure or brokenness. It is Abraham renouncing his wife as his 
sister. It is incest, separation, exile. Me’or einayim instructs its readers to view life’s 
inevitable lows, times when earthly concerns overwhelm, times of “formlessness and 
void,” as opportunities for releasing God’s hidden holiness, because there is holiness in 
all things. The task of each person in these moments is to hold onto the two lifelines of 
love of God and fear of God, Hesed and Gevurah, the right arm and the left arm of the 
sefirotic tree. In this state the Ḥasid begins the joining of heaven and earth, or the 
coupling of God the wife with God the bridegroom, the evening and morning are one 
day. “The darkness longs to be included in the light.”143 Egypt is described as an iron 
crucible, refining and purifying by fire.144 
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In relating the Lurianic triple process of zịmzụm, shevirat ha-kelim, and tikkun, to 
poetic influence, Harold Bloom writes: “In Luria, creation is a startlingly regressive 
process, one in which an abyss can separate any one stage from another, and in which 
catastrophe is always a central event. Reality for Luria is always a triple rhythm of 
contraction, breaking apart, and mending, a rhythm continuously present in time even as 
it first punctuated eternity.”145 This pattern of breaking for the sake of healing, with its 
echoes from the Sabbatian experience, reverberates throughout the Ḥasidic commentary. 
Egypt works well as a figure for this process, as the typological focal point for spiritual 
progress. There are other biblical types that symbolize the uniting of heaven and earth, 
most notably the tabernacle and the Temple in Jerusalem. Egypt is an especially 
interesting instance, because it is also related to spiritual imprisonment, regression and 
estrangement, all of which are integral to the union at hand. Simply put, the “going 
down” that occurs with Egypt reflects the spiritual “bringing down” of the divine to earth. 
We have, therefore, a mystical tradition that sees union with God as a process that 
involves “bringing” God, rather than being absorbed up and dissolved into God. 
Egypt also becomes a figure for the hermeneutical process itself. The “letter” of 
the scripture, like the nation to the south of Israel, is the lowest rung of a ladder reaching 
into heaven. By descending, entering into it, the rivers of divine influence are released.  
“When you have done all this, all the blessing that flows into the world will come for 
your sake; you become a channel by which that flow comes down from the world 
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above.”146 Egypt, like the plain sense of the text, contains levels of meaning that can only 
be accessed in its midst.  
Key to understanding Rabbi Nahụm’s idea of the role of Egypt in spiritual union 
is the act of redeeming knowledge. At the time of the flood, we read, true knowledge 
went into exile in Egypt. With Abraham and his sons, the people of Israel went to rescue 
it. To rescue knowledge is to “liberate the letters” of Torah. This is done symbolically 
through slave labor: interpreting the text is compared to the work of the slaves in Egypt. 
Working the bricks, levenim, and mortar, họmer, is related to the hermeneutical principles 
of interpreting Torah, libun hilkhatah and kal va- họmer.147 The “back breaking labor,” 
Be-farekh, is like the Talmudic questioning, pirkhah. Even in the act of interpretation, 
restriction, or constriction, is essential to the process.  This is symbolized by the five 
letters of the alphabet that have a final form, the sofit form. They constrict the otherwise 
flowing goodness of God in the interpretive act. “One who understands that receiving a 
restricted flow of God’s goodness is meant to motivate him to return to God.”148 Like 
Egypt, the sofit forms limit in order to conjoin. They conceal in order that revelation can 
occur. The peshat of the text, therefore, constrains meaning and it contains meaning. The 
individual who works it, as a slave works the land, will release what holiness lies hidden 
within.  
Every detail of the text of Torah becomes ripe with meaning in this commentary. 
Even the small silver sockets described as fittings for the boards of the Tabernacle signify 
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a deeper meaning. Here we find a word play on the Hebrew: the word for “sockets” in the 
construct form adonei, is like the Hebrew word for God Adonai, which literally means 
“my Lord.” The possessive form of the title for God is significant in the Me’or einayim, 
as it is interpreted to refer to “God within.” We read of the relationship between the two 
names for God, Adonai and the Tetragramaton: 
God’s glory, however, is manifest in His many garments; the whole earth 
is a garbing of God. It is He who is within all the garments. This aspect of 
divinity is called ‘adonay, related to the word for “sockets” by which the 
tabernacle was held together. This is God’s presence as it has come down 
into the lower and corporeal rungs; our task is to unite it with the source 
from which it came, with YHWH Who calls all the worlds into being. In 
ever act of worship, be it study or prayer, eating or drinking, we bring 
about this union. All the worlds depend on this: the union of God within—
‘DNWY—with God beyond—YHWH.149 
   
  The silver sockets are the foundation of the sanctuary, the point of contact with 
the world. Here God’s sanctuary penetrates the earth. The Ḥasid’s focus on this earthly 
point of union draws on a theme we find throughout the work of joining the lower and 
upper worlds, and that the place of union is the human heart. Like the precious metal used 
for this purpose, the heart is purified by the study of Torah and evil impulses are put aside 
in order to manifest the divine. “Further, he who studies Torah, uniting the upper wisdom 
with the lower, also defeats his own evil urge.”150 Reading Torah is going down into 
Egypt; reading Torah is the silver socket standing God’s sanctuary in place. Therefore 
reading is both the method and the reference of allegorical interpretation. 
Conclusion: Question of Connection to Swedenborg 
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 The history of Judaism, in ways both similar to and distinct from the history of 
Christianity, has seen periods of ambivalence and even animosity towards allegorical 
interpretation. Judaism has nevertheless been the native ground for many of the Bible’s 
greatest allegorists, starting with Philo in the first century. Ḥasidism is certainly not 
unique in Judaism for its pursuit of deeply hidden meaning within the peshat, but the 
range and extent of its exegetical digging is unmatched. Arthur Green, while not 
employing the term “allegory” notes the significance of the rabbinic context of this kind 
of commentary: 
The notion of a spiritualized Temple is of great significance in the course 
of this homily. Too often has it been claimed, both by defenders and 
detractors of Judaism that the tradition of the rabbis did not allow for 
symbols of Biblical religion to be read in truly spiritual fashion. Ḥasidism 
provides the literature that gives the ultimate lie to this claim. Writing 
wholly within the rabbinic idiom, our author here makes it abundantly 
clear that the true sanctuary of God lies within the human heart, and that 
this inner Temple lay behind both the original command by which the 
outer Temple was erected and the destruction of that same shrine.151 
 
 Ḥasidism’s relative isolation from Christian society and theology make this 
spiritualizing tendency particularly interesting. That a Ḥasidic commentary would bear 
such striking similarities, as we will see, to that of a Protestant mystic and natural 
philosopher from Stockholm is a problem worth pondering. Swedenborg’s spiritualized 
Temple and spiritualized Egypt could be added to a substantial list of similarities between 
his commentary and those of the Ḥasidic masters living at the same time (see chapter 3). 
Might a counter-reaction to the literalism brought by the Reformation share certain 
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characteristics with a post-Sabbatian, Jewish approach to sacred text? That both 
movements echoed with the pulse of Neoplatonism is surely worth our attention.152 What 
was it about the ideas of Kabbalah, as found in the Zohar for instance in the form of 
Rosenroth’s Kabbala denudata, that drew in such men as Gottfried Leibniz, Francis 
Mercury van Helmont, and Henry More? Is the timing of Swedenborg’s Arcana coelestia 
and Me’or einayim coincidental, or was there a movement of ideas that spanned Eastern 
and Western Europe in the mid to late eighteenth century, influencing how the Bible was 
read and understood in both Christian and Jewish contexts? 
 Possible connections between Swedenborg and the other three commentators in 
this chapter are worth brief consideration before shifting to a singular focus on the 
Swede. Evidence that Swedenborg read or was directly influenced by the work of 
William Whiston is lacking, though at least one scholar, Friedemann Stengel, argues that 
he likely was. Stengel points to similarities between the two men in their rejection of the 
doctrines of the trinity, predestination, and original sin.153 We could say a great deal 
about the problems with such a comparison; Swedenborg’s anti-trinitarianism, for 
instance, was significantly different from Whiston’s Arianism in that it highlighted, 
rather than downplayed, the divinity of Christ.154 Our interest, however, is in each man’s 
opinion of allegory as an approach to biblical interpretation, and on this point the two 
men could not be farther apart. While Whiston’s focus was on demonstrating the 
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accuracy of the Bible without use of allegory, Swedenborg’s focus remained on revealing 
levels of spiritual and celestial senses concealed within the text. Whatever influence there 
may be between them, therefore, it had little positive impact on Swedenborg’s 
hermeneutics. 
 The only evidence we have of a connection between Mendelssohn and 
Swedenborg is the former’s correspondence with Immanuel Kant and his review of 
Kant’s book on Swedenborg, Träume eines Geistersehers (1766), in which Mendelssohn 
quotes Kant in calling Arcana coelestia “eight quarto volumes of nonsense.”155 More will 
be said on the exchange between Kant and Mendelssohn in chapter 5, and one possible 
explanation for Mendelssohn’s reaction, namely, Swedenborg’s reliance on traditional 
anti-Jewish tropes, will be explored in chapter 3. This reaction aside, a comparative study 
could be made between Swedenborg’s exegesis, particularly the persistent theme of the 
conjunction of the individual’s will and understanding, with Mendelssohn’s focus on the 
progression of the individual and the bringing into balance the faculties of comprehension 
and desire, found in his commentary on Genesis 2.156 The focus on the inner life of the 
individual that we find in Rabbi Nachum’s Me’or einayim, Mendelssohn’s Sefer netivot 
ha-shalom, and Swedenborg’s Arcana Coelesia, is worth considering in light of other 
Enlightenment-era movements that held up inner transformation and a personal 
relationship to the Divine, such as English Methodism. Significant and meaningful 
                                                          
155 Moses Mendelssohn, review of Kant’s Träume eines Geistersehers, as translated in Kant on 
Swedenborg, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer and Other Writings, ed. Gregory R. Johnson, trans. Gregory R. 
Johnson and Glenn Alexander Magee (Swedenborg Foundation, 2002), 123. 
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differences exist between these authors on matters related to public and private life, 
which we do not have time to explore here. But that allegorical interpretation was the 
means of expression of the ideal of inner, personal transformation, speaks to the 
persistence of an old methodology in a new age. 
 Of the four exegetes considered in this chapter, Kemper is the most likely to have 
had significant contact with or influence on Swedenborg. Kemper’s time at Uppsala 
overlapped with Swedenborg’s, and the close relationship both men shared with Eric 
Benzelius is suggestive of a connection, as we will explore in chapter 3. Swedenborg 
does not credit Kemper for any of his methods or concepts on biblical interpretation, 
though important similarities can be drawn. Swedenborg’s insistence that his religious 
writings were influenced by no earthly thinker prohibited his referencing the work of 
someone like Kemper, but there is reason enough to think that Kemper’s kabbalistic 
commentaries would have been accessible and of interest to Swedenborg in his university 
days, as we will see. 
 Taken as a whole, then, these five exegetes, including Swedenborg, do not align 
neatly into a clear web of connections and influences. Any recognition of similarity 
between such disparate sources as these should be tempered with a study of differences in 
both content of thought and in religious and social context. Some of that has been done in 
this chapter, and more will be done in chapter 3, in taking up methodological questions 
concerning the comparison between Swedenborg to Kabbalah. With these difficulties in 
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mind, comparison, as a “disciplined exaggeration in the service of knowledge”157 in the 
words of Jonathan Z. Smith, can nevertheless offer insight into shared points of horizon 
as well as conflict. Our intention has not been to determine fixed lines of influence 
between these Christian and Jewish authors, but to reveal something of the nature of 
allegorical interpretation in the eighteenth-century, and the way allegory functioned in the 
ongoing discourse on interpretation between Jews and Christians at a time when systems 
of knowing were undergoing radical change. By considering the currents and counter 
currents of thought present in these four biblical commentaries from the same era, some 
contextual grounding has been laid for a study of Arcana coelestia and its reception.  
  
                                                          
157 Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late 
Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 52.   
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PART II 
SWEDENBORG’S ALLEGORY: THE DISCOURSE WITHIN ARCANA 
COELESTIA 
 
CHAPTER 2: SWEDENBORG’S SCIENCE AND ALLEGORY 
 
 We find in the eighteenth century a curious debate arising between some members 
of the scientific community regarding the location of hell. Traditionally, hell had often 
been thought of as a subterranean destination. But renewed interest in astronomy brought 
with it speculations of cosmic termini. As discussed in chapter one, the English 
Newtonian William Whiston determined, based on the description in Revelation 14, that 
hell must be on a comet: its tail of smoke rising continuously as it processes through the 
heavens for all to witness. This echoed a similar hypothesis put forward seven years 
earlier by Leibniz in his Théodicée.158 Another location was suggested in the 1714 An 
Enquiry into the Nature and Place of Hell, by Tobias Swinden. Based on the study of 
solar flares by Jesuit astronomer Athanasius Kircher and his brother Christof Scheiner, 
Swinden concluded that hell must be on the sun. Only a solar hell could make sense of 
biblical descriptions of the burning damned. We see in this just one example of the kind 
of literalism that captured the imaginations of many of those interested in aligning the 
new sciences with biblical narratives.  
                                                          
158 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the 
Origin of Evil, ed. Austin Farrer, trans. E.M. Huggard (Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1985), 
133. Leibniz here identifies Jesus with Adam Kadmon of Kabbalah, and describes his return to earth to 
remove those who are saved. The remaining damned are left on earth, which becomes a flaming comet 
with a tail of smoke like that described in Revelation. 
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 In a 1719 exchange of letters between the young scientist abroad, Emanuel 
Swedenborg, and his esteemed brother-in-law back home, Erik Benzelius, we find a 
discussion of Swinden’s theory and the responses to it in published reviews. Swedenborg 
presents his own speculations depicting the sun as a locus for godly and heavenly things, 
for beatorum rather than damnatorum.  
My reasons are the following: first, that the sun is the centre of the whole of 
our planetary system, and that motion, with the existence of everything in the 
solar vortex, derives its origin from the above-named centre; secondly, that 
above, or the heaven of the planets, is towards the sun, but below is towards 
the extremities of the vortex, towards Saturn and Tartarus; thirly, that the 
principal light and splendor are in the sun, and on the other hand, darkness 
and other terrors are at the greatest distance from it, where the sun can 
scarcely be seen; fourthly, but the principal reason seems to be, because the 
most refined air, and the most subtle essence which exists in the least 
elements, are in the sun: for the nearer we draw to the sun, the finer 
everything becomes, and in its centre we should probably find such a degree 
of refinement and subtlety, that the particles would be almost without any 
composition, when they would also lay aside the name of matter, as well as 
form, gravity, and other properties, which belong to compound particles. It 
seems also probable, that in the greatest refinement, there would likewise be 
the most refined existence; that God, and the angels, that a something which 
has nothing material in its substance, would be there chiefly in their element . 
. .159 
 
Swedenborg goes on to speculate that solar flares could not be a place of 
torment, because they would instantly consume the body of the dead, while the fire 
of hell would be a lasting torment. He ends the letter with a fleeting comment that 
hell fire might rather be conceived of as the “remorses of conscience” before 
quickly adding the careful disclaimer: “I hope that my philosophizing on such a 
                                                          
159 Emanuel Swedenborg, letter to Erik Benzelius, Stockholm, November 26, 1719, in Documents 
Concerning the Life and Character of Emanuel Swedenborg, ed. and trans. R. L. Tafel, (London: 
Swedenborg Society, 1875), vol. I, doc. 86, 313-314. 
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subject may not be misinterpreted; for after all God’s Word is the foundation [of 
everything].” 
This brief suggestion of the hell of the conscience would reemerge in full 
force some forty years later in his most famous work De Coelo et Ejus Mirabilibus, 
et de Inferno (Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell, 1758), in which heaven and hell 
exist outside of time and space, and manifest the internal states of mind of their 
inhabitants. Swedenborg was certainly not the first to suggest a 
metaphorical/psychological hell. But that he does so while positioning himself as a 
scientist, concerned with the exegetical challenges delivered by the physics and 
astronomy of his day, is indicative of a turn to a certain kind allegorical thinking 
that characterizes Swedenborgian thought, whose influence counters the narrative 
suggested by Hans Frei, Peter Harrison and others that the eighteenth century 
witnessed the inevitable “demise of allegory.”160 On the contrary, Swedenborg was 
among those in the eighteenth century who continued to allegorize the Bible, and 
his influence manifests in the work of theologians, poets and psychologists, who 
were drawn to Swedenborg’s articulation of an allegorical heaven and hell – a 
heaven and hell of the conscience. The poetry of Charles Baudelaire, the paintings 
of William Blake, and the psychology of William James and Carl Jung, are but a 
few examples. As we will see in part 3, those influenced by Swedenborg in this 
way drew on a particular understanding of the relationship between the outer 
natural world, and the inner world of spirit. In connecting biblical imagery with 
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inner transformation Swedenborg and his readers carried forward the well-worn 
tradition of biblical allegory into modernity.  
In this chapter I will demonstrate how Swedenborg’s scientific career, far 
from inhibiting his allegoresis, was fully integrated with it both before and after his 
professional turn to biblical interpretation and his Arcana coelestia. In particular, 
the scientific work he did in the ten years leading up to this turn, including 
Principia rerum naturalium (Basic Principles of Nature, 1734), Prodromus 
philosophiae ratiocinantis de infinito (Precursor to a Reasoned Philosophy 
Concerning the Infinite, 1734, henceforth De infinito),  Oeconomia regni animalis 
(Dynamics of the Souls Domain, 1740-41), and Regnum animale (The Soul’s 
Domain, 1744), demonstrate an increasing interest in the symbolic, or 
correspondential relationship between the finite universe and infinite things, or 
between the body and the soul: concepts which would later become part of the 
topography of his biblical interpretation. Swedenborg thus serves as one case at 
least, of an instance of Enlightenment era science fostering a regeneration of 
allegory, in contrast with the cases of literalism demonstrated in the examples 
above.  
This chapter will begin our discussion of the discourse within Arcana 
coelestia by considering the concepts developed by Swedenborg during his 
scientific career that stand in relationship with his subsequent search for hidden 
meaning in the Bible. A study of Swedenborg’s use of allegorical thinking both 
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before and after his turn to the ouverage d’esprit161 will reveal an important 
connection. We will take up three areas of thought, developed prior to his work 
with the Bible, which very much informed his methods of interpretation. These are: 
the doctrine of series and degrees, the intercourse between the body and soul, and 
his “Hieroglyphic key” and related theories of language and dream interpretation. 
Arcana both builds on these thought systems and develops them in the direction of 
antimaterialsim, as we will see towards the end of the chapter.  
The connection between Swedenborg’s earlier, philosophical and scientific 
work and his biblical exegesis has caused some to wonder about the genre of 
Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences: is it scientific or religious? Some 
historians, including the Swedish Inge Jonsson and the German Friedemann 
Stengel, maintain that Swedenborg’s allegorical methods of biblical interpretation 
can almost entirely be explained by paradigms, or “building blocks” as Stengel puts 
it, developed in his scientific career.162 As an example, Jonsson finds a parallel with 
Pythagorean philosophy in Swedenborg’s struggle to find a universal mathematical 
language, and suggests that this struggle “helped to lay the ground for the 
symbolization of reality.”163 Alternatively, some compare Swedenborg’s biblical 
interpretation to religious sources such as Philo, Origen and Kabbalah, as does 
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Martin Lamm in his book Emanuel Swedenborg: The Development of His 
Thought.164 It must be emphasized at the outset that to isolate his scientific 
conceptions and discoveries from philosophical, theological or esoteric ones is an 
anachronistic venture. While Swedenborg himself seems to have made such a 
distinction when he denied having read “dogmatic and systematic theology before 
heaven was opened to me”165 so as to avoid the suggestion of worldly influences, 
the philosophical sources he admits to are themselves enmeshed in dogmatic and 
theological contexts. Swedenborg himself was raised in an orthodox Lutheran 
household, exposed to Swedish folklore regarding spirits inhabiting the world 
around him, and given a traditional Christian education from early childhood. 
Whether his science influenced his religion or his religion influenced his science is 
a moot point: the two were always entangled. The essential point for the argument 
here is that Swedenborg serves as an example of a scientist whose secular career 
and engagement with Enlightenment thought bolstered his non-literal reading of the 
Bible, rather than undermining it. 
Background: Science, Deism, Materialism and Orthodoxy 
As was the case with the four commentators we considered in chapter one, 
Swedenborg’s work must be understood against the background of the intellectual 
culture of his day. Challenges to revealed religion and Christian orthodoxy in the 
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165 Emanuel Swedenborg letter to Dr. Beyer, February, 1767, in Tafel, ed., Documents, vol. II:1, doc. 234, 
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name of reason took on different forms in eighteenth-century Netherlands, 
Germany, England and France: all places Swedenborg visited multiple times for the 
purpose of acquiring the latest knowledge in any number of scholarly fields. The 
legacies of Spinoza, Descartes, Newton, Locke, and Leibniz, to name just a few, 
produced a wide array of philosophical debates, and impacted religious and 
exegetical discourses in a number of ways. It is not within the scope of this chapter 
to fully explore each of these figures and their impact on either Swedenborg or the 
wider epistemology of his time, though their impact cannot be overstated in either 
case. We will have to limit ourselves to making two general points with regards to 
this context.  
First, it is important to avoid a “teleological history of secularization,” to 
borrow a phrase from Wayne Hudson.166 Hudson’s revisionist history of English 
Deism, attempts to decouple unorthodoxy and secularization, and highlights the 
religious commitments of many of England’s most critical thinkers, as well as the 
intra-Christian context of many of the era’s hottest debates. The deists he studies 
radicalized their ontologies with “no difficulty in combining a sincere Christian 
supernaturalism with philosophical ideas which could be turned against it.”167  A 
similar emphasis is made by Jonathan Sheehan in his treatment of The 
Enlightenment Bible. Sheehan posits that the “cultural bible” that the 
Enlightenment produced did not come about by attack, but by the development of a 
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set of instruments aimed at internal, religious reformation. Sheehan and Hudson 
position themselves as corrections to narratives of “the rise of modern paganism” 
as framed by Peter Gay, and the progression of secularism describe by historians 
such as Diego Lucci and Jonathan Israel.168 
A second point balances the first: that even while religious commitments 
remained in-tact for many or most Enlightenment thinkers, the effects of their 
critical impulse challenged traditional reliance on revealed truth as never before. 
Empiricism and rationalism, in many ways rival siblings, formed an alliance in 
displacing long held assumptions about the nature of God, God’s world and God’s 
Word. Truth was sought in human reason and in the experimental sciences with 
unprecedented confidence. The resulting anxiety from within Christian 
establishments regarding biblical truth claims is reflected both in accusations of 
materialism lodged against Swedenborg by reviewers of his scientific writings,169 
and in Swedenborg’s own frequent attacks against philosophers and “learned men” 
in his theological writings, as we will see. 
What concerns us in this chapter is Swedenborg’s place in shifting attitudes 
regarding the relationship between the “book of scripture” and the “book of 
nature.” He was writing at a time when “a rift appeared between the exact language 
of formulae and the symbolism of poetry” as Jonsson writes.170 On the one hand, 
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the study of invisible forces led by Isaac Newton renewed an interest in the 
mysteries of the universe that would inspire the work of Franz Mesmer, Erasmus 
Darwin, and others.  On the other hand, the natural world and the human body were 
being described in fully mechanistic terms, in the work of Julien Offrey de la 
Mettrie, for example, and metaphysical explanations were threatened with 
obscurity, or so feared the critics of such theories. Questions that circulated 
between national boundaries and among natural philosophers included: Is matter 
active or passive? Is space empty or full of particles? What underlying principle of 
nature animates life in plants, animals and humans? Is there a hierarchy of souls 
among these organisms? Can the origin of the universe be explained without the 
use of biblical or supernatural explanations? Confidence in technical descriptions 
of natural phenomenon reached new heights, and science was no longer designated 
the “handmaiden of theology,” to borrow a traditional metaphor. All of this 
affected how people talked about nature and scripture, and whose voices held 
authority. Whether Swedenborg’s allegorical interpretations of nature, language, 
dreams and biblical texts were judged as old fashioned, insane, poetic, or divinely 
inspired depends on which area of reception one chooses to focus, as we will see in 
part three. By studying the development of these methods in the decades prior to 
his writing Arcana we can see how his biblical interpretation builds on and 
responds to his scientific thought. We will now take a brief look at three areas of 
this thought that relate to allegory—the doctrine of series and degrees, the body and 
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soul connection, and theories of language—in order to explore the relationship 
between his earlier and later work. 
Doctrine of Series and Degrees 
Swedenborg formally developed his “doctrine of series and degrees” while 
working on Oeconomia regni animalis just a few years before beginning his 
Arcana. He defines the doctrine in volume II of Oeconomia as “the mode observed 
by nature in the subordination and coordination of things, and which in acting she 
has prescribed herself.”171 Every element of nature is a series in itself, and also 
belongs to a series, as a branch belongs to a tree. Six types of series make up the 
entire universe, three above and three below. The lower series, comprising of the 
mineral, plant and animal kingdoms, operate by means of laws and forms that 
simulate each other as well as those above. By studying one series, the astute 
observer can learn about other series and about the macrocosmic whole. Therefore, 
a study of minerals, plants or animal bodies enables access to knowledge of 
metaphysical realities: “for as often as nature betakes herself upwards from visible 
phenomena, or, in other words, withdraws herself inwards, she instantly as it were 
disappears, while no one knows what is become of her, or whither she is gone, so 
that it is necessary to take science as a guide to attend us in pursuing her steps.”172 
This position permeates the three volumes of Oeconomia, which considers at great 
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length and detail subjects such as the fibers of the brain, the chambers of the heart, 
the mineral make up of blood and blood’s purification in the lungs, the 
development of fetuses, the connection between animation of the brain and 
movement of muscles, and more. The suggestion, more explicitly stated as the 
work progresses, is that all of this science also describes the nature of the human 
soul and its spiritual regeneration.   
Degrees within and between series help to explain this relationship. 
Continuous degrees are units in a series, while discrete degrees are connected by 
correspondence only; they are rungs in the ladder, never touching each other but 
connected by vertical channels. Therefore discrete degrees between series, such as 
between a human and an animal, are bonded by likeness rather than contiguity. 
However, while various forms separated by degree occupy distinct spheres, lower 
forms are filled with the essence of the higher forms. For instance, the cortical 
substance, the seat of the soul, flows into every part of the body.  “Thus the 
microcosm or animal world is likened to the macrocosm or universe, wherein are 
spheres celestial, sublunery and terrestrial. The likeness also lies in the fact that the 
sphere which holds the supreme position or which represents heaven is also within 
and most fully present in all the inferior spheres.”173 More spiritual forms, such as 
what he terms the "simple fiber" descend successively from one series to another, 
generating a similarity of essence between elements in a sequence of types.174 
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Ralph Waldo Emerson points to the Platonic tradition of Identity Philosophy 
as the primary inspiration for Swedenborg’s doctrine of series and degrees, that 
“nature is always self-similar,”175 and contemporary historians rightly cite 
Swedenborg’s reliance on Leibniz and Wolff as interlocutors for this particular 
iteration of the classical concept.176 He shares with these men a fundamental 
interest in investigating a principle of causes, and developing a universal language 
based on the logic of mathematics.  
The mathematical principals of the doctrine of series and degrees builds on 
theories from Swedenborg’s earlier work, Principia rerum naturalium, in which the 
origin of the universe is traced to a single mathematical point. This point became a 
sort of door-way between the worlds of the infinite and the finite, recalling Janus, 
the two-faced Roman god of passage ways.177 From this point, every finite element 
comes into being as part of its own series, and reflects a corresponding series in the 
universe of infinite things. Cartesian dualism framed in the language of Christian 
Wolff goes a long way in explaining these images. To trace these concepts 
themselves to any single point of origin, however, would be a grave 
oversimplification. Such determinism misleads in this case, where a surplus of 
contextual sources leaves us pointing in several directions. Similarities to 
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kabbalistic images and explanations, for instance, will be considered in the next 
chapter. 
While Swedenborg applies his doctrine of series and degrees to a number of 
biological studies, one motive arises above all else as inspiration for Swedenborg’s 
efforts in the period of his writing Principia and Oeconomia: to understand the 
relationship between the body and the soul. Why this project would eventually 
drive him into ten years of singular focus on the interpretation of the Bible is a 
question worth pondering, and whose possible solutions we will consider as we 
proceed. 
The Body-Soul Intercourse 
Arguably, the most controversial idea to come out of Swedenborg’s scientific 
career was the claim that the soul could be materially traced to a certain location 
within the body. His work in this area was aimed at determining the physical 
qualities of the “spirituous fluid,” which contained the soul, as well as determining 
its location in the body and the nature of its mechanical effects on the body. This 
science, titled Rational Psychology (after Christian Wolff’s work of the same 
name), is defined in the opening of Swedenborg’s Oeconomia: 
Psychology is the science which treats of the essence and nature of the soul, 
and of the mode in which she flows into the actions of the body; 
consequently it is the first and last of those sciences which lead to the 
knowledge of the animal economy. But whereas the soul has her residence in 
a place so sublime and eminent, that we cannot ascend to her, and attain to 
the knowledge of her, except by a particular and general investigation of the 
lower and accessible things of her kingdom; or whereas she lives withdrawn 
so far within, that she cannot be exposed to view until coverings under which 
she is hidden are unfolded and removed in order: it hence becomes necessary 
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that we ascend to her by the same steps or degrees, and the same ladder, by 
which her nature, in the formation of the things of her kingdom, descends 
into her body.178 
 
Like the inner qualities of nature cited above, the inner essence of the person 
is described as hidden behind layers of coverings, and science is the only guide 
capable of uncovering and investigating the mysteries within. 
In De infinito, Swedenborg presents the theory that the soul is finite, though 
immortal, extended (meaning it occupies space), bound to a single body, and 
operates according to mechanical laws of nature. In the spirit of Isaac Newton, he 
writes: “Are we to say, because they are hidden from the senses, because the causes 
are unseen, that they are not equally subject to mechanism or geometry?”179 Above 
all, Swedenborg believed the soul to be a knowable object of study, for without 
knowledge of the soul the philosopher is led to doubts of every kind.180 The 
connection between the soul and the body “whereby the one can operate upon the 
other”181 occurs through the traceable motion of substances.  Motions of the soul 
are so subtle as to be barely detectable, but can be observed through the eventual 
effects on membranes in the body. And while the effect on membranes can be 
observed throughout the body, the special membranes and the movements of the 
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cortical substance in the cerebrum are evidence of it the brain’s role as the “seat of 
the rational soul.”182 
In the ten years following De infinito, Swedenborg would attempt to make 
good on these theories by proving the soul’s existence using mechanistic principles. 
“If we had a microscope, we might be able to see the entire structure [of the] soul” 
he wrote.183 The mechanical model used by Swedenborg to explain the movements 
of the soul in the body was based in vibrations. Tremors are created by the subtle 
movement of fluid in an advancing spiral, recalling Descartes’s Theory of Vortices. 
On an anatomic scale rather than a cosmic one, the spiral motions effected a chain 
of reverberations throughout the body, from finer to grosser.  The body could be 
compared to a musical instrument, which produced its sound from the subtle 
quivering of strings. In the body, these tremors are carried by fluid through the 
vascular and lymphatic systems, and make their effect on membranes and in turn 
on the skeleton. The effect in both cases he describes as “harmonious.” The 
interaction of the body and the soul produces an organic melody. 
Unsurprisingly, De infinito raised the eyebrows of those who considered 
themselves watch guards against materialism. Stengel, who makes a study of the 
reception of Swedenborg’s work among his contemporaries, points to reviews, such 
as one published in Nova Acta Eruditorum a year after De infinito’s publication, 
outlining its materialist features. Reviewers warned, as well, of Swedenborg’s 
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possible deistic tendencies in that espoused a philosophy that leaned towards 
universalism and privileged moral conduct over belief.184  
Indeed, it is conceivable that Swedenborg might have taken these concepts in 
a distinctly materialist direction if he had gone a step or two further and concluded 
that the soul could be classified and studied as just another organ in the body. 
However, he held fast to his Cartesian dualism and to his devotion to doctrine of 
the immortality of the soul, and increasingly applied this work to the ontological 
distinction between the spiritual and natural worlds. By the time he writes his 
Regnum Animale, his dualism is such that he describes the relationship in 
typological terms: “The body is her image, resemblance, and type; she is the model, 
the idea, the head, that is the soul of the body. Thus she is represented in the body 
as in a mirror.”185 The mirror is appropriate metaphor for his later understanding of 
the body-soul relationship, since a body and its reflected image don’t touch or 
occupy the same space. They appear identical and move in identical ways, but are 
wholly distinct. To speak in geometrical terms, the relationship is one of parallel 
lines rather than a single vortex (or perhaps Swedenborg would have been 
particularly taken with the model of the double helix – combining the two). We can 
speculate as to whether this turn to the language of “correspondence” and 
“representation” was due in part to his failure to prove the existence of the soul 
using sensory evidence, or was a response to accusations of materialism, or was the 
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result of allegorical methods of dream and scripture interpretation he was 
developing on the side. Whatever the reason, Swedenborg eventually dropped his 
search and study of the soul’s physical presence in the body entirely, and with it he 
dropped nearly all professional work in the physical sciences.186 Like the mythical 
Daedalus, after whom (in one of the greatest ironies of Swedenborg’s life) he 
named his scientific journal in his early career in Sweden, Swedenborg’s 
materialist ambitions disintegrated as he sought too close a proximity to the secrets 
of the soul. 
 Thus, while his doctrine of series and degrees remains intact and is even 
enforced as he turns from biological to textual interpretation, Swedenborg’s ideas 
concerning the nature of the soul are marked by a change of course. As we will see, 
the immateriality of the soul has important implications regarding the invisibility of 
the highest sense of scripture. That the body-soul connection becomes one of 
discrete degree, informs his understanding of distinct levels of meaning in the 
Bible.  
Language Theory 
When discussing the function of the kidneys in Regnum Animal, and the 
corresponding regenerative, or purifying process of the human spirit, Swedenborg 
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is inspired to offer the following digression on the persistence such 
correspondences in all of nature.  
In our Doctrine of Representations and Correspondences, we shall treat of 
both these symbolical and typical representations, and of the astonishing 
things which occur, I will not say in the living body only, but throughout 
nature, and which correspond so entirely to supreme and spiritual things, that 
one would swear that the physical world was purely symbolical of the 
spiritual world; insomuch that if we choose to express any natural truth in 
physical vocal terms, and to convert these terms only into the corresponding 
spiritual terms, we shall by this means elicit a spiritual truth or theological 
dogma, in place of the physical truth or precept. 187 
 
What is astonishing about this excerpt, is the suggestion that nothing more 
than the substitution of words, the vocal substitution of terms, is required for 
spiritual truth to be made evident.188 A similar claim is made in a note in another 
work, De Cultu et Amore Dei (The Worship and Love of God, 1745) in which the 
“transposition of words” is all that is required to initiate an opening of celestial 
paradise.189 
 Swedenborg’s interest in the ontological power of language persists and 
gains in strength, even as his scientific pursuits wane. The bridge between 
Swedenborg’s secular career and his turn to biblical commentary was his work on 
language theory and semiotics. As his work on the soul’s domain was nearing an 
end, Swedenborg wrote several unpublished documents that treated the relationship 
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between corresponding elements on different levels of existence as well as the 
symbolic nature of language, both written and spoken. These include: Clavis 
Hieroglyphica Arcanorum Naturalium et Spiritualium (A Hieroglyphic Key to the 
secrets of Material and Spiritual Things by Way of Representations and 
Correspondences, 1741), A draft on the topic of Rational Psychology (1742), De 
Cultu et Amore Dei, (The History of Creation as Given by Moses, 1745), and 
Explicatio in Verbum Historicum Veteris Testamenti (The Historical Word of the 
Old Testament Explained, 1746).190 A few words on Swedenborg’s application of 
his doctrine of series and degrees, or correspondences, to language in this period 
will shed further light on the nexus between his scientific work and his allegorical 
approach to the Bible. 
Swedenborg’s Clavis Hieroglyphica presents 21 examples of the connection 
between natural and spiritual things via correspondences. Each example explores 
three degrees of reality: the level of the natural word, the level of human reason and 
intellect, and the level of divinity. The third level includes a range of conceptions, 
including things related to the nature of God, love, goodness and wisdom (these 
being higher faculties than intelligence and truth in this arrangement). The 
distinction between the higher two levels is made using the terms “spiritual” and 
“celestial.” So, for example, the trinity of light, intelligence, and wisdom 
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correspond to each other. Just as “Light reveals the quality of objects, but the 
quality of the object appears according to the state of the light, for the object is not 
always what it appears” so too in the case of intelligence at the second level: 
“Intelligence discovers the truth of things, but this truth appears according to the 
state of the intelligence, for what is thought true is not always really so.” Wisdom, 
at the third level and in like manner, reveals the goodness of things. Clavis 
Hieroglyphica ends with a meditation on the nature of correspondence. “The 
spiritual world is the region of antitypes or exemplars; the animal kingdom is the 
sphere of images and types; nature is the realm of shadows or resemblances.”191 
There are 4 species of correspondence, he suggests in this short work, which 
resemble the various four-fold senses of scripture in medieval commentaries. For 
Swedenborg, these are: harmonic, allegorical, typical, and fabulous. The 
breakdown of levels of meaning, or senses, would vary somewhat in later 
exegetical writings, but the emphasis remained: the world is full of these types.192 
And while his scientific career saw his interest in correspondences move from the 
astrological, to the anatomical, to the linguistic, it isn’t until the very end of Clavis 
that he suggests their direct application to biblical texts: “it is good to interpret the 
Holy Scripture on these principles, for the spirit speaks spiritually as well as 
naturally.”193 With this suggestive conclusion, Swedenborg foreshadows the work 
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that would occupy him for the next ten years and that would define him in many 
ways for generations to come. 
While Swedenborg had long been interested in the study of scripture for the 
sake of understanding both physical and metaphysical realities, it wasn’t until the 
mid-1740s that he began, as it were, searching out the soul of the biblical text. His 
first attempts were more poetic, as for example, the unfinished De Cultu, a fanciful 
novel retelling the creation story and incorporating his astronomical and 
cosmogonic theories. However, his exegesis became progressively more systematic 
and scientific in tone as time went on, aided by the reference materials he created 
for himself. Concordances of biblical terms and verses would be valuable tools for 
organizing his symbolic arrangements in future material, especially the opus 
Arcana coelestia.  
 It was Swedenborg’s interest in the unique qualities of the Hebrew language 
that enabled, to some degree, his transition into biblical interpretation. He believed 
the Hebrew language was particularly suited to achieving correspondential 
relationships. Much could be said about the particular flavor of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century Hebraism here. The work of Leibniz, Wolff, and others 
demonstrates an interest in ancient languages such as Chinese, Hebrew, and 
Egyptian hieroglyphics, for their potential to reveal a universal language.194 This 
was due in part to the intellectual fascination in Kabbalah and primitive cultures, 
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but also to interest in emblematics as a literary genre. As we saw in chapter one, 
Mendelssohn wrote about the mediating role of Hebrew in advancing human 
reason, by moving language away from pictorial representations and their potential 
for idolatry to abstract thought. Johann Gottfried Herder’s The Spirit of Hebrew 
Poetry also detailed the unique qualities of the language and the kind of thinking, 
or poetic feeling in this case, it engendered.195 In terms of impact on Swedenborg, 
we have to go a few decades before Mendelssohn and Herder, and look to Casper 
Newman’s Clavis Domus Heber, which considers the symbolic meaning of 
individual Hebrew letters, is a possible influence with Wolff as intermediary. 
Swedenborg’s interest in the Hebrew language therefore forms an important 
part of the link between his earlier philosophical and scientific work and his later 
religious work by providing an opportunity to apply Leibnizian and Wolffian 
philosophy to biblical interpretation. Hebrew, he believed, was closest to the 
language of the angels and as such could mediate influence between degrees of 
reality, bridging the heavenly and earthly realms. Hebrew enters his otherworldly 
experiences on a number of occasions during the transition years, in the mid-1740s. 
In his Spiritual Diary, he writes that the Hebrew letters, by their very shape and 
arrangement, contained heavenly secrets that were entirely lost in translation.196  
Hebrew parallelism, where two words are used to communicate a single idea, 
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likewise allows for the interpretation of levels of meaning: “one expression 
meaning celestial things, the other spiritual.”197 The consonant sounds of Hebrew 
communicated spiritual realities related to faith and reason, while vowel sounds 
communicated higher, celestial realities, or those related to love and affection.198 
The peculiarity of Semitic languages for the absence of vowel letters made Hebrew 
especially useful for its ability to convey multiple meaning in a single word. This 
fact, along with the absence of capital letters and punctuation, uniquely allows for 
the expression of inner meanings. 
The Hebrew Language is such as to embrace ideas, and in fact each of the 
words contain many ideas, so that they are general ideas more than the words 
of any other language. This is clear from many considerations, among others 
that there had been no vowels there so that the meaning of the letter would be 
known from the inward meaning, but not the inward meaning from the 
meaning of the letter, which is what happens instead when vowels are 
attached. Therefore, one who sees the meaning of the letter from the inward 
meaning understands better without vowels what was written by Hebrew 
letters, than with them.199 
This reflection on the significance of the absence of vowels recalls Casper 
Newman’s comparison between Hebrew vowels and the soul of the body, which he 
relates to the Cartesian separation between soul and body.200 Swedenborg adopts 
this model, and adds the innovation of classifying Hebrew vowels into two 
categories: those making the sounds “U” and “O” having a higher, celestial, more 
loving intonation than “E” and “I.”201  
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All of these technical qualities of the Hebrew language, which encourage 
interpretive investigation, serve to underscore the symbolic nature of all language. 
The bottom line for Swedenborg is that the absence of vowels and punctuation in 
the text, and their insertion and interpretation by individuals, allows for the text to 
take on as many meanings as there are readers. Therefore, there are discrete levels 
of correspondence (natural, spiritual, celestial), but within those levels, the number 
of interpretations is infinite. In his diary he describes a vision he has that 
demonstrates how single word can contain thousands of ideas within it, like 
molecules in a cloud, or a like single point seen under a microscope, revealing 
hundreds of tiny insects.202 This is true of all language, but especially of the biblical 
text.  
Antimaterialist Discourse  
During the 1740s, when Swedenborg’s interest in the symbolic logic of both 
the natural world and language was peaking, Swedenborg wrestled internally with 
his own attachment to scientific and materialist aspirations. This is made evident in 
his dream diary and his journal of spiritual experiences, which give us insight both 
into his tumultuous state of mind during this period as well as his reliance on 
correspondences and representations in interpreting the images that came before 
his mind’s eye. “The dreams and visions of this period become parts of an inward 
discussion on particulars of his scientific work in progress, on which his thoughts 
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are continuously centered”203 writes the translator and commentator on 
Swedenborg’s Dream Diary, Lars Bergquist. In one dream, for instance, a shadowy 
image is thrown at him and appears to have a lame foot. Swedenborg interprets: 
“This meant, I think, that natural reason could not accommodate to spiritual 
reason.”204 In another example, he dreams of riding a horse and pulling a heavy cart 
behind. The cart is too heavy for the horse, who eventually collapses and dies of 
exhaustion. This signified “that perhaps I am on the wrong track; the load was my 
remaining work, which followed me.” Like the cart, his work in natural philosophy 
is weighing him down. His dreams and waking visions frequently feature women, 
who are either nurturing and beautiful or threatening and repulsive. The beautiful 
(and sometimes pregnant) women he interprets to be those encouraging of his 
spiritual pursuits, while the vulgar women, often associated with harlotry or 
promiscuity, represent the lure of philosophy and reason for their own sake and 
Swedenborg’s own “immoderate desire” for mathematics.205   
Swedenborg’s anxiety regarding materialism was not entirely new in this 
period. We find in his earlier notes selections copied from Leibniz’s Théodicée in 
which accusations of materialism are considered:  
[The] followers of Hobbes and Spinoza alone must be charged the destruction 
of liberty and contingency; for they suppose that what happens, is the only 
possible thing that can happen, and that it must needs happen by brutal and 
geometrical necessity. Hobbes indeed holds that all things are material and 
that they are subject to mathematical laws alone; while Spinoza in addition 
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deprives God of intelligence and choice, leaving him only a blind power from 
which all things emanate by necessity.206 
 
Swedenborg is careful in his philosophical work to distance himself from the 
perceived extremist view of men such as Hobbes and Spinoza. In fact, the 
unnecessary amount of emphasis he places on the distinction between the finite and 
the infinite in works such as De infinito is best understood as defending his theories 
against accusations of Spinozism. The fact that he was then labeled with 
materialism because of his ideas about the soul in reviews of De infinito, must have 
been a hard blow. Whether or not his turn away from science to biblical studies was 
motivated in part by such reviews, we do find in his biblical commentaries a 
vigorous attack on materialism and science for its own sake. 
His work on biblical interpretation, and especially his publication of eight 
quarto volumes on Genesis and Exodus in his Arcana coelestia, represents a shift in 
focus, as we have seen. The work was not only a new direction in terms of the 
object of study, from the natural world to the world of spirit and scripture, but a 
major break from his earlier materialist leanings. The interpretation of biblical 
images and themes as relating to a struggle against materialism and philosophy for 
its own sake are present in Arcana coelestia from the beginning. As we will see in 
chapter 4, the drama played out between Adam, Eve and the serpent in Genesis 3 
allegorically relates the story of individuals who become “sense-oriented” (those 
seeking the evidence of the senses) and who are blinded by philosophical reasoning 
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and book learning. The serpent, in particular, represents people who “spend much 
time constructing arguments based on things they can sense and specifically things 
they can see—things of the earth, their body, the world, and nature—and that is 
why the snake was described as being crafty above every wild animal of the 
field.”207 Whether Swedenborg is reacting against his own earlier proclivities, or 
primarily against the misguided focus of his contemporaries is up for interpretation, 
though we can see how it manifests an ambivalence towards materialism that 
mirrors to some extent Swedenborg’s own history.  
Continuities in Arcana coelestia 
While Arcana coelestia can be read as a break from or reaction against 
materialism and his own scientific pursuits, we find many affinities to his earlier 
philosophical systems. In his interpretation of the first two verses of Exodus 7, for 
example, which describe the chain of communication from God, to Moses, to 
Aaron, to Pharaoh, Swedenborg references a model of successive degrees:  
[T]hrough those consecutive degrees all things exist in a continuous chain 
linked to the First Being (Esse). And it is in accordance with those degrees 
that influx takes place; for Divine Truth coming forth directly from Divine 
Good flows into one degree after another. On the way down or with each new 
degree it becomes more general, and so grosser and more obscure, and 
becomes more sluggish, and so more responsive and frigid. All this clarifies 
the nature of Divine Order consisting of consecutive degrees and 
consequently of the nature of influx.208 
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Divine influx, or revelation, descends through a series of steps. Each plane of 
reality is connected to the last by means of this influx, and the whole of heaven and 
earth are joined in communion; every part stands in relation to the whole. 
The pattern of series and degrees which he developed in his earlier work 
reaches its peak in a theological context much later in Part 3 of his Sapientia 
angelica de divino amore et de divina sapientia (Angelic Wisdom Concerning 
Divine Love and Divine Wisdom, 1763). It is put to use much earlier, however, as a 
tool to biblical interpretation throughout Arcana coelestia, where his three upper 
series become three levels of meaning, three heavens and three degrees of an 
individual’s understanding. “Therefore as many distinct and separate degrees exist 
in the human being as there are heavens.”209 The vertical channel connecting these 
degrees is their correspondence, a pattern of similitudes that opens channels of 
descending influx. “That good passes down a flight of steps so to speak, the nature 
of it being determined at each distinct and separate level by the way it is 
received.”210 
And while his opinions regarding the physicality of the soul changed as he 
turned against materialism, we can see many remnants in Arcana coelestia of his 
earlier work on the relationship between body and soul. The opening paragraphs of 
Arcana coelestia compare the letter of the Bible by itself to “a body without a 
soul.”211 Such a metaphor is far more than a poetic flourish for the author of this 
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commentary, who occupied himself over the preceding decade with technical 
questions related to the body-soul connection. In this light, Arcana coelestia can be 
seen as an antidote, in some ways, to his failure to locate the soul physically in the 
body. If he can demonstrate the existence of a hidden soul to the text, the body’s 
soul is implied even if it remains out of the reach of scientific instruments. His 
break from materialism was not, therefore, a break from an essential motivating 
factor which pervades his work, scientific and religious. His motivation throughout 
was to demonstrate the reality of higher levels including God, heaven and the soul, 
and to demonstrate the connection between these higher levels and lower ones in 
the earth, nature and human body. If he failed to empirically prove the existence of 
these higher levels with the instruments of science, his theological writings set out 
to prove them using the instruments of his spiritual senses, drawing on “things seen 
and heard” in a state of altered consciousness. 
Conclusion: Experimental Science 
While the successes and failures in Swedenborg’s scientific career appear to 
have caused a great deal of anxiety for him in the years leading up to his turn to 
biblical commentary, those experiences also appear to have given him the very 
tools with which he constructed his biblical hermeneutics. The same serpent who 
led Adam and Eve out of paradise seems to have led Swedenborg into paradise, or 
at least to have accompanied him along the way to an understanding of the 
connectedness of natural and spiritual things and to his self-described spiritual 
awakening. His scientific pursuits crystalized around in his doctrine of series and 
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degrees and his doctrine of correspondences, the very doctrines he subsequently 
employed in his biblical pursuits.   
Historians see no coincidence in the naming of Arcana coelestia, which 
echoes microbiologist Antonie van Leeuwenhoek’s Arcana naturae detecta (1695): 
a publication that informed much of Swedenborg’s views on cellular biology and 
the generation of organisms. If the connection is to be trusted, Swedenborg’s 
interpretation of the Bible can be seen as a response, or counterpart, to 
Leeuwenhoek’s investigation of biological forms. Leeuwenhoek crafted the first 
magnifying lenses able to see individual cells hidden from ordinary site, and 
Swedenborg’s spiritual lenses investigated the inner senses of biblical language, 
invisible to the average reader. 
Those who compare Swedenborg’s biblical commentaries and theological 
publications to his earlier philosophical and scientific writings will notice several 
distinctions. One in particular is quite telling: in his later writing, he almost never 
cites the work of predecessors, while his scientific work frequently documents the 
thinkers on whom he builds his ideas, including Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, and 
many others. As noted above, Swedenborg believed providence kept him from the 
formal study of theology so that his theological writing would be the result of 
heaven’s influence alone. But if we consider statements made in the preface to 
Oeconomia, another explanation presents itself. Here, he describes two types of 
scientists: those who build up hypotheses from experimentation, and those who, 
from contemplation and analysis of this built up knowledge, are able to discover 
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the principles and causes of things. Swedenborg himself never performed 
dissections or charted the course of the stars with telescopes. He worked from the 
sketches, descriptions, charts and tables of other men.212 He was the reaper of 
other’s men’s harvest: “[The] proper time has arrived; for a rich store of experience 
is at hand; an accumulated heap sufficient to enable us to build a palace; a luxuriant 
field where our sickles may reap an abundant harvest; a table where we may enjoy 
the most sumptuous banquets.”213 Perhaps in turning to the divine sciences, in 
which his insights are based on “things seen and heard” while touring the spiritual 
world, Swedenborg reversed his role and took upon himself the work of an 
experimental scientist. From here on out, his role is to observe and report, while 
interpretation is left to the angels and to God, who replace earthy scientists as his 
primary interlocutors. 
As we have seen, Swedenborg’s allegorical methods were nether hindered 
nor suppressed by his engagement with natural science. His science was fully 
allegorical in itself. Every particle, every organ, every revolution of the planets and 
every fiber in the body was excavated for whatever heavenly secrets it might 
conceal. In turn, his exegesis was fully scientific, to the extent that his earlier 
philosophical systems remain more or less intact in Arcana coelestia, despite 
cautionary themes regarding the pitfalls of materialism.  
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We will take up the question of the reception of Swedenborg’s doctrine of 
correspondences in part three. It is worth mentioning in closing, however, that it seems to 
have had some impact on Swedish scientists who came after Swedenborg. As historian 
Sten Lindroth writes in his book Swedish Men of Science, the doctrine inspired scientists 
who “found a warrant that the fragile objects they worked with had a spiritual 
significance which sanctified the scientist’s working day.”214  While many scientists of 
the Enlightenment moved away from religious explanations of natural phenomenon, 
others remained within a theological framework, even as the contours of that framework 
were refitted to a new environment. Contrary to histories that point to a teleological 
secularization, Swedenborg sits in a chain of so many scientists of modernity whose 
religious convictions motivated inquiry and investigation.  
Thomas Broman, argues that rather than secularizing, the result of Enlightenment 
on religious expression is better understood as privatizing. The appearance of religious 
movements in England and elsewhere that stressed the “cultivation of an intensely 
personal inner religiosity” demonstrates this movement. “Thus, instead of hailing or 
condemning the Enlightenment as the creator of the conflict between ‘science’ and 
‘religion,’ might we not more usefully understand it as the origin of another fundamental 
boundary, that between ‘public’ and ‘private’?” 215 The internalizing of religious 
expression, and especially of biblical exegesis, is evidenced in Arcana coelestia, where 
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scientific explanations for the seven days of creation, for example, are rejected in favor of 
an account of the seven steps of personal, spiritual regeneration allegorically represented. 
Thus we find in Swedenborg an example of enlightenment thought in which 
the logic of symbolism did not disappear. A study of Swedenborg’s secular career 
in physics, anatomy, chemistry, and astronomy reveals patterns of thought 
consistent with the hermeneutics of Arcana coelestia, and gives us an alternate 
narrative to the history that marries Enlightenment science and biblical literalism.  
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CHAPTER 3: SWEDENBORG, JEWS, AND THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE 
Chapter one of this dissertation explored how the interpretation of the Bible in the 
eighteenth century was informed on the one hand by new challenges brought by the 
scientific revolution, and on the other hand by conceptions of Judaism and of the Hebrew 
language that built on and in some cases reversed previous notions of Jewish literalism. 
Chapter two considered the integration of Swedenborg’s biblical allegoresis with the 
methods and theories from his scientific career. This chapter will take up the question of 
Swedenborg’s relationship to Judaism and the effects of this relationship on his biblical 
interpretation. Swedenborg’s simultaneous reliance on and ambivalence toward Judaism 
in his biblical interpretation and his understanding of human religious history provides a 
case study in early modern hermeneutics and Jewish-Christian relations: one that draws 
on traditional notions of Jewish literalism, while also producing exegetical content with 
striking resemblances to Jewish mysticism. 
This chapter will consider two questions. The first asks what function the Jews 
serve for Swedenborg in his role as commentator. Given their recurring presence in his 
published and unpublished work, and the lack of evidence that he interacted closely with 
living Jews around him or with Jewish texts, we can assume that Swedenborg’s treatment 
of the Jews is discursive, or that Swedenborg’s figurative Jews stand in for a mode of 
interpretation that he wishes to critique. Secondly, we will take up the question of 
Swedenborg’s relationship to Kabbalah. This will require an investigation into existing 
scholarly responses to this question, a review of the nature of Kabbalah in Swedenborg’s 
environment, and possible avenues of influence. More fundamentally, however, it will 
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require a theoretically robust framework for thinking about comparison, since much of 
the discussion of Swedenborg and Kabbalah, from Immanuel Kant to Moshe Idel, has 
been based solely on similarity of content. Finally, we will consider whether these two 
questions answer one another. Should Swedenborg’s negative depiction of Jewish 
literalism, given the resemblance of his commentary to Kabbalah, be understood as 
defensive? Or would he have been unaware of the connection peers and future readers 
alike would draw to Kabbalah? Should his negative views of Jewish interpretation be 
simply understood as traditional anti-Judaism or anti-Semitism? My conclusion will be in 
favor of a defensive stance, though I will argue it is an inherited defensiveness, drawing 
on tropes available to him from Paul, Augustine, Luther and others, triggered by an 
awareness, on some level, that his spiritualizing comes too close to the methods of 
mystical Judaism that were held in such esteem by family members and intellectuals 
close to him. Bloom writes: “In psychic life, as in international affairs, ‘defense’ is 
frequently murderous. In the realms of the inter-poetic, defense is rather murderous also, 
because there defense is always against influence.”216 Swedenborg’s defensiveness 
comes to him ancestrally, but is magnified by the threat of resemblance between his own 
interpretations and that which has already been destroyed. 
“The Jewish Church” in Swedenborg’s Published and Unpublished Work 
In the first volume of Arcana coelestia, Swedenborg explains the paradox of the 
plural titles and verbs in Hebrew used to describe God. The word for God with its plural 
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ending, Elohim, as well as verses such as Genesis 1:26, “Let us create adam in our 
image” have long challenged Jewish and Christian readers of the Bible, who professed an 
object of worship that was singular in essence at least. Swedenborg, for his part, asserts 
that such grammar indicates the inclusion of the angels in heaven: “Where anything is 
effected by the ministry of angels, as in the first chapter of Genesis, He is spoken of in 
the plural number.”217 Whether knowingly or unknowingly, this interpretation put 
Swedenborg firmly on one side of a centuries-old exegetical debate between Jews and 
Christians, and not on the side one might expect of  the son of a Swedish Lutheran 
bishop. In the footsteps of Justin Martyr, Christians have tended to see this verse as the 
earliest, most ancient evidence of the role of Christ, or Logos, in creation.218 Jewish 
classical sources on the other hand put God in conversation with ministering angels, who 
question the necessity of this new creature, adam, even as they assist in his creation.219  
On the one hand, one could argue that any resemblance to Jewish sources in 
Arcana coelestia is coincidental. Swedenborg’s rejection of Lutheran atonement theology 
left him more unitarian than trinitarian, and his prolonged visions of angels in the 
                                                          
217 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 300. See also Arcana caelestia 4402:4, 9160 and Emanuel Swedenborg, 
The Apocalypse Explained: According to the Spiritual Sense in which the Arcana Therein Predicted but 
Heretofore Concealed are Revealed, trans. John Curtis Ager (New York: American Swedenborg printing 
and publishing society, 1915), 222. 
218 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 62:2 as cited and discussed in Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines, 40.  
219 Genesis Rabbah 8.4-5. Daniel Boyarin points to evidence that at the time of Justin’s Dialogue the 
Jewish interpretation involving angels may not have been without controversy within the Jewish 
community. Boyarin argues that it is Justin’s insistence on identifying the Logos with Christ that forces the 
issue. Justin works to “deny the Logos to the Jews, to take it away from them, in order for it to be the 
major theological center of Christianity, with the goal of establishing a religious identity for the believers 
in Christ that would, precisely, mark them off as religiously different from Jews.” Border Lines, 38. 
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spiritual world brought them front and center to his reading of the Bible.220 However, if 
we consider that this interpretation of Genesis 1:26 is immediately followed by an attack 
on Jewish interpretive abilities, another picture emerges.  Swedenborg writes here of the 
inability of Jews to understand the internal sense of scripture: “that they did not know and 
do not know of the existence of the internal man, or of anything internal, for if they had 
known of it, or if they now knew of it, so as to acknowledge it, such is their character that 
they would profane it, and there would be no hope of any salvation for them in the other 
life.”221  
The example of Swedenborg’s interpretation of the verse from Genesis with its 
resemblance to Jewish sources and the accompanying attack raises questions about 
intellectual and cultural exchange between Christians and Jews. It will be my contention 
that what we find in Swedenborg is more than a hermeneutical mugging. More helpful 
than accusations of thievery or more benignly, inspiration, is Harold Bloom’s concept of 
“poetic misprision.” Bloom’s “anxiety of influence” will provide a theoretical grounding 
on which to interpret Swedenborg’s relationship to Judaism towards the end of this 
chapter. More must first be said about how Jews are depicted in Swedenborg’s work, 
published and unpublished. 
                                                          
220 An important difference should be noted between Swedenborg’s concept of angels and the angels of 
classical Judaism. While in Judaism angels are a different species all together, present at the time of the 
first human’s creation, for Swedenborg they are human in every respect: beings who have died and are 
living in heaven. The story of creation for Swedenborg is not about the creation of the universe in time, 
but the spiritual regeneration of the individual in this life, which other people, angels, participate in from 
heaven. The association of the days of creation with personal spiritual growth is also made in Ḥasidic 
texts, though angels remain non-human. 
221 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 302. 
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The Jews are regular interlocutors for Swedenborg, not in the “natural world” but 
in the “spiritual world” – in his dreams and waking visions of interactions with those who 
have passed on. Swedenborg kept a diary of his spiritual experiences from 1747-1765, 
which he never published, though significant sections of it were copied into published 
works such as Arcana coelestia. The pages of this diary record interactions with angels, 
spirits and demons in the spiritual worlds, all of whom are humans who once lived an 
earthly existence and maintain identifying features such as gender, ethnicity, and 
religious and national affiliation. This last point is one that marks Swedenborg’s view of 
angels and spirits as unique from other Christian and Jewish conceptions: his angels and 
spirits are not a separate species but are entirely human. The Jews referenced in his 
Experientiae Spirituales are therefore no longer living on earth, but are human in every 
other way. Every instance of his having “spoken frequently with Jews” occurs in the 
spiritual world.222 The recorded interactions should not be interpreted, as at least one 
influential scholar has done,223 as descriptions of specific this-world conversations or 
relationships he held with those living around him, but rather as symbolic manifestations 
of his internal world, images informed by his religious and historical imagination. They 
are telling, not as coded evidence for the influence of Jews and Judaism on his ideas, but 
                                                          
222 For example, see Emanuel Swedenborg, The Last Judgement (posthumous): Various Things Concerning 
the Spiritual World, trans. John Whitehead (London: The Swedenborg Society, 1934), 254 and Arcana 
caelestia, 3481. 
223 Marsha Keith Schuchard, in a number of her publications, cites Swedenborg’s entries in his Spiritual 
Diary as records of actual meetings. For example, see Emanuel Swedenborg, Secret Agent on Earth and in 
Heaven: Jacobites, Jews, and Freemasons in Early Modern Sweden (Boston: Brill, 2012) 429-430, 
referencing Spiritual Diary numbers 2097 and 3500. 
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as descriptions of how Swedenborg thought about Jews. And for this, they are quite 
useful.224 
Swedenborg’s spiritual-world Jews are, in a word, stubborn. He records several 
conversations, in which he argues with Jews about the coming of the Messiah. He goes to 
great lengths to explain biblical, prophetic evidence that Jesus is Messiah, and yet they 
walk away from him. He wields insights from Greek and Hebrew study, he insists on the 
impossibility of bodily resurrection and the physical repopulation of Canaan, but they are 
not moved.225 They refuse true faith in Christ, and in one particularly unfortunate number 
they are relegated to the spiritual world’s ghettos, living in close and filthy quarters.226 
This description of their living quarters in the other life comes just before we are invited 
into the particulars of one disputation between Swedenborg and a group of Jews on the 
question of the Messiah. In this episode, the Jews describe a literal coming of the 
Messiah, while Swedenborg insists on a spiritualized event: 
When they are asked whether they firmly believe that they will all get to the 
land of Canaan, they say that all will then go there, and that the Jews who are 
dead will then rise again, and from their sepulchres will enter that land. To 
the reply that they cannot possibly come out of the sepulchres, because they 
are already living after death they say that they will then descend and enter 
their bodies, and so live again. When told that the land cannot hold them all, 
they reply that it will then be enlarged. When told that the kingdom of the 
Messiah, because He is the Son of God, will not be on earth but in heaven, 
they reply that the land of Canaan will then be heaven. When told that they 
do not know where Bethlehem Ephratah is, where the Messiah is to be born, 
according to the prediction in Micah (5:2), and in the Psalms (132:6), they 
reply that the mother of the Messiah will nevertheless there give birth to Him; 
                                                          
224 Similarities to Swedenborg’s other-worldly attempts at conversion can be found in medieval 
conversion narratives, which often contained a dream element. See, for example, Ryan Szpiech 
Conversion and Narrative: Reading and Religious Authority in Medieval Polemic (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
225 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 3481. 
226 Swedenborg, True Christianity, 841. 
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and some say that wherever she brings forth there is Bethlehem. When they 
are asked how the Messiah can dwell with such wicked people, and it is 
proved by many passages in Jeremiah, and especially by the sons of Moses 
(Deut. 32), that they are the worst of men, they reply that among the Jews 
there are both good and bad, and that the bad are there meant. When they are 
told that they sprang from a Canaanitish woman, and from Judah's whoredom 
with his daughter-in-law (Gen. 38), they answer that that was not whoredom. 
But when to this it is replied that still Judah commanded her to be brought 
forth and burnt for whoredom, they go away to consult about it, and after 
consultation say that Judah only acted the part of a brother-in-law, a duty 
which neither his second son, Onan, nor his third son, Selah, fulfilled. And to 
this they add that very many of them are of the tribe of Levi, who held the 
priestly office, and that it is enough that they are all from the loins of 
Abraham. When they are told that within the Word there is a spiritual sense 
wherein Christ or the Messiah is fully treated of, they reply that this is not 
true; and some of them say that within the Word, or in its depths, there is 
nothing but gold; and other such statements they make.227 
 
This number is noteworthy for the fact that Swedenborg insists on a spiritual 
sense to the prophetic predictions of Christ’s coming, but quotes scripture and uses a 
literal interpretation of the Bible’s negative descriptions of the Israelite people against the 
Jewish community of his present day. That the Jews of the Bible are “the worst of men” 
and also the scribes of the Word of God, containing all of heaven’s secrets, is an irony 
that pervades Swedenborg’s work, and expresses, I will argue, an anxiety that is both 
familiar to many manifestations of Christian messianism before him, but also uniquely 
his own.   
The number quoted above ends with a reference to biblical interpretation for the 
sake of alchemy, a detail that reappears in the few places Swedenborg acknowledges a 
Jewish tradition of multiple levels of meaning in scripture. Elsewhere he makes the 
explicit correlation between alchemy and Jewish mysticism: “I have spoken to them 
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about the spiritual meaning, to which they responded at first that they were aware of the 
Word's having in it a mystical meaning, and that by that mystical meaning they know that 
they acquire gold and are able to make gold.”228 Also: “Moreover, they declare that the 
Word contains within itself many arcana, which they term mystic; but they have no desire 
to know that these relate to the Lord. They are, however, willing to know when it is said 
that they relate to gold.”229 The association between Jewish mysticism and alchemy can 
be understood in light of Swedenborg’s familiarity with the work of Gottfried Leibniz, 
whose interest in both alchemy and Kabbalah formed the basis of a lengthy relationship 
with Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont, collaborator in the production of the Kabbalah 
denudata.230 It is worth nothing that there is no reference in Swedenborg’s writing to 
Jewish mysticism that does not mention alchemy,231 while references to Jewish literalism 
pervade his biblical commentaries. He seems also to distinguish between the “spiritual 
sense” available to Christians, and the “mystical sense” spoken of by the Jews.232 
However, upon closer examination we discover that Swedenborg’s use of the word 
“mystical” evolves over time and his earlier uses of the term are primarily positive. For 
instance, in the unfinished commentary he worked on prior to Arcana coelestia, 
Explicatio in Verbum Historicum Veteris Testamenti, Swedenborg uses the phrase 
“mystical sense” synonymously with “spiritual” or “internal sense.”233 The terms 
                                                          
228 Swedenborg, Last Judgement, 254. 
229 Emanuel Swedenborg, De verbo, trans. John Whitehead (London: Swedenborg Society, 1934), 23. 
230 Allison Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 7. 
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“mystical” and “mysticism” carry no special meaning and no controversy. In Arcana 
coelestia, however, it is never used synonymously with “spiritual” and we find several 
examples of its use with negative connotations. Here the mystical sense is associated with 
doubters who obscure the true sense of scripture with their own cleverness and 
reasoning,234 with those who use correspondences to deceive and work magic,235 or with 
the allegorical Song of Songs, whose correspondences are a mere imitation of those in the 
books of Moses and the prophets.236 It appears that around the time he began Arcana 
coelestia, the sensus mysticus was relegated a category for false or corrupted uses of 
correspondences. It was a category that included all those who were incapable of a true 
interpretation, including Jews, magicians, and those deluded by their own cleverness.237 
 To understand Swedenborg’s treatment of Jews and Judaism in his biblical 
commentary, it is necessary to examine his many references to the “Jewish Church.” The 
Jewish Church is a term employed by Swedenborg in discussing the role of Jews in the 
religious history of humankind.238 In line with the trend popular in his day and building 
on the work of Venerable Bede, Joachim of Fiore, and many other Christian thinkers, 
Swedenborg divided the history of religions into a set number of eras. He writes, in 
Arcana coelestia 2894-2900 and elsewhere, that there have been four previous churches, 
or ages, in the history of humankind, each with its own kind of connection to the heavens 
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237 In the next chapter we will take up Swedenborg’s phrasing “Sensualia et scientifica,” which functions 
similarly to categorize those who misinterpret scripture – the Jews and the scientists. 
238 The phrasing of the “Jewish Church” is not unique to Swedenborg, and can be found in the work of 
Isaac Newton and others.  
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and consequently its own unique revelation. The first of these, the Ecclesia Antiquissima 
required no written Word because its connection to God and to heaven was unmediated. 
People of this era were in direct and constant communication with angels, and understood 
the connection between natural and spiritual realities without the need of a mediating 
scripture: “they indeed saw worldly and earthly things with their eyes, or apprehended 
them by some other sense, but from them and by means of them they thought of celestial 
and spiritual things.”239 After the fall of this most ancient church, the second, Ecclesia 
Antiqua, required revelation in the form of a written Word, though that Word is almost 
entirely lost.240 These people had a diminished connection to heaven; they understood 
heavenly truths on an intellectual level but not a direct experiential level. They “knew but 
did not perceive what the representatives and significatives involved.”241 With the fall of 
the ancient churches, the Ecclesia Judaica was established and with it came a new 
written revelation in the form of the Old Testament. With the fall of the previous ages, all 
direct experience and knowledge of heavenly truths was lost on humankind, and people 
were left with the symbols only. The people of the Jewish Church, therefore, had the 
representations, the symbols, and the external forms of ritual, with no concept of the 
correspondences they invoked. This church’s Word, the Old Testament, was filled 
everywhere with correspondences that were lost on its audience. The Christian church 
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ushered in a fourth era, and served as a corrective to its predecessors in that heaven and 
earth were united in a divine/human body rather than a coded text. God’s Word came 
directly from the mouth of the Messiah God, though representatives and symbols were 
still employed, and were still mysterious too much of Christendom. Here, early on in 
Arcana coelestia, Swedenborg terms this fourth era Ecclesia nova, but later iterations of 
his history of churches will mark the “New Church” as a fifth, post-Christian 
dispensation; its revelation consisting of the opening of the spiritual sense of the Old and 
New Testaments, via the servant of God, Swedenborg himself.  
Swedenborg’s historical arrangement therefore situates Judaism as the middle part 
in the general decline of the human race, in terms of its ability to perceive and 
communicate with heaven. Judaism, and with it the Jews of his day, manifested a form of 
human religiosity that, while ripe with hidden meaning, had lost all explicit 
understanding of what it was about. As mentioned, this scheme builds on the work of 
many before him, and it is worth noting that Christian models for dividing history this 
way in medieval times were inspired, to a certain extent, by the threefold historical 
outline found in Tractate Sanhedrin of the Babylonian Talmud, which was termed in 
Christian circles the Vaticinium Eliae. The Talmud’s division of time according to the 
governance of the law resonated with a Pauline conception of historical progression and 
conveniently fit a trinitarian scheme. Similar models were put forth after Swedenborg as 
well. One pronounced and popular example from the eighteenth century is Gotthold 
Ephriam Lessing's Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (The Education of The 
Human Race, 1778), which describes the Old and New Testaments as educational 
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primers for the human race at different stages of its development. The Old Testament is 
like a textbook for children while the New Testament is a textbook for adolescents.242 
Swedenborg’s scheme is therefore one in a chain of theories of the history of human 
religion and reason, a chain with Jewish and Christian links. His particular iteration 
borrows the developmental model, and incorporates theories of pagan coded symbolism 
and Jewish appropriation of those symbols, theories that were circulating among 
contemporaries such as Leibniz, Mendelssohn, and William Warburton, bishop of 
Gloucester.243  
All of this, of course, reflects the traditional Christian attitude, articulated so 
acutely by Augustine, that the Jews are the scriniaria, the desk, the library, the means of 
preservation of truth, even if their carnal nature forbids them from knowing the depths of 
the very thing they guard.244 Swedenborg’s variation on this theme presents a particular 
puzzle because it comes amidst a growing acknowledgement of Jewish non-literal 
readings of scripture, and it comes in a form that looks remarkably similar to kabbalistic 
sources easily available to Swedenborg and to those around him. This puzzle has been the 
focus of several scholarly investigations in recent decades, which will occupy the next 
part of this chapter.  
Swedenborg and Kabbalah 
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Given the environment of his upbringing and his professional activities, 
Swedenborg was embedded in an amalgam of conflicting views regarding the wisdom to 
be mined from Jewish sources and the perceived ignorance of Jews themselves. Currents 
of hermeticism, Neoplatonism, Hebraism, and Kabbalah swirled between thinkers and 
movements in eighteenth-century Europe, and these currents clashed in some cases with 
tides of Christian orthodoxy and traditional stereotypes of Jews. Swedenborg, in the very 
ambiguity of his relationship to Jewish mysticism, embodies the tension between 
creativity and destruction that this environment conditioned. The resemblances to 
Kabbalah together with the anti-Judaism that pours fourth in his theological writing are 
evidence, not of direct unmediated influence, but of an inherited history of ambivalence.   
Scholars have identified three potential avenues for influence: philosemitic trends 
present at Uppsala University in the eighteenth-century, the diffusion of kabbalistic 
thought among intellectuals in England, France, Sweden and Germany with whom 
Swedenborg had either direct or indirect contact, and hermetic undercurrents present in 
the religious practices in certain circles of European society which Swedenborg may or 
may not have frequented. It should be noted that there is no consistent definition of 
“Kabbalah” in the work of these authors. Most often they do not attempt a working 
definition; a problem to which I will return below. 
The first type of evidence that Swedenborg was familiar with Kabbalah, at least in 
its Christianized form, comes out of Uppsala University where Swedenborg was a student 
from1699-1709. At this time, Uppsala was rising in recognition as a center of European 
intellectual advancement. In the wake of Descartes’ visit to Sweden in 1650, the nation’s 
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natural philosophers were moved by a spirit of freedom of thought and by royal decree 
scientific studies at Uppsala were released from the oversight of the church “The 
doctrines of the Christian faith may not be subjected to philosophical criticism, but for 
the rest, philosophy shall be free, in practice and discussion.”245 Added to this climate of 
liberal education was a fascination with Old Testament monarchical narratives on the part 
of the Carolean autocracy, which drew parallels between Swedish history and ancient 
Israel. As Eskhult writes: “Thus, the March across the ice-covered Belts in Denmark 
were in panegyrical poetry compared to Israel's crossing of the Red Sea in the midst of 
the waves upon the dry ground. Likewise, Charles XII's introduction of extra taxes on 
rich people was justified by reference to a similar event in biblical Israel (2 Kings 15, 
20).”246 
This backdrop explains the surge in Hebrew and Rabbinic studies at Uppsala in 
the early eighteenth century, despite the prohibition against the settlement of Jews in 
Sweden, also by royal decree. During the years that Swedenborg was a student in 
Uppsala’s department of philosophy, the department employed professors of Oriental 
languages with expertise in Hebrew, rabbinic studies and “the sacred antiquities of the 
Jews,” such as Johannes Palmroot and Daniel Lundius.247 Daniel Djurberg, professor of 
theology during this time, was integral to the development of the study of Kabbalah, and 
his treatise on the Zohar was accompanied by the following dedicatory poem extolling 
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the value of Kabbalah for the Christian interpreter: “Who does here appear as a new 
teacher of the old synagogue and from where shines such a good light forth in the dense 
darkness? Whoever you are, I recognize the metals drawn out from a better mine and the 
property left by the old Fathers. The cloud is scattered and the world turns bright. Ben 
Jochai gives light to the Christians.”248 There was a perception that the study of Kabbalah 
would aid Christian understanding of scripture and would assist in efforts to convert 
Jews.  
This trend in rabbinic and kabbalistic studies was inspired in no small part by the 
philosemitic interests of Swedenborg’s brother-in-law, Eric Benzelius, with whom he 
lived while he was a young student and with whom he corresponded regularly in later 
stages of his life. Benzelius was professor and chief librarian at the Uppsala and a 
Hebrew enthusiast who traveled Europe acquiring kabbalistic texts for the University. It 
was on behalf of Uppsala that Benzelius aided in the recruitment of Johann Kemper, 
whose commentaries were explored in chapter one, to teach Hebrew and Zoharic 
interpretations of the New Testament. It was also Benzelius who petitioned for the 
translation of Kemper’s commentaries into Latin.249 While we have no evidence that 
Swedenborg interacted with Kemper and we cannot assume, as some have, that 
Swedenborg learned Hebrew from Kemper, it is likely that his presence at Uppsala had 
an impression on young Emanuel especially given the mutual connection to Benzelius.  
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Among contemporary scholars who take up the issue, Bernd Roling is one who 
bases an argument for Swedenborg’s kabbalistic influence on the environment at 
Uppsala.250 This scholarship generally builds on the groundbreaking work by Hans-
Joachim Schoeps on seventeenth-century Swedish philosemitism.251 Recent research by 
Swedish historian Susanna Åkerman-Hjern has uncovered a dissertation by Uppsala 
University Hebrew professor David Lundius, bearing Swedenborg’s signature on the 
cover page, indicating his ownership of the document. Lundius’s dissertation gives a 
general overview of Kabbalah, describes the functions of the various sefirot and 
references the Sefer Yetzira as well as mystical Bereshith and Mercabah literature. 
Åkerman-Hjern notes two Latin phrases in the dissertation which resemble important 
terms in Swedenborg’s later theological writings: influxum Divinum and arcana Dei. She 
concludes from the Uppsala evidence that a “soft but definite” influence is present.252 
A second focus for the study of kabbalistic influences on Swedenborg is the 
impact it had more generally on European natural philosophy and theology. 
Swedenborgian scholar James Lawrence writes “Leaders of both Jewish and Christian 
orthodoxies forcefully rejected Christian Kabbalah from the beginning, yet the reception 
of Kabbalah into serious conversations in early modern and modern theosophical currents 
created a broad intertext among philosophers with religious commitments—especially 
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those interested in the nexus of metaphysics, natural philosophy, and theories of 
representation in images, mathematics and language.”253 Lawrence cites Swedenborg’s 
admitted admiration of Gottfried Leibniz as a critical point of contact with kabbalistic 
thought, particularly in Leibniz’s search for the perfect language and fascination with 
Hebrew and Egyptian hieroglyphics. Swedenborg never met Leibniz in person (Benzelius 
did), though he comments on and quotes liberally from Leibniz’s Théodicée in his 
Philosopher’s Notebook (otherwise known as Codex 36). It is here, in quoting Leibniz 
and Hugo Grotius that we find the only three explicit references to Kabbalah in 
Swedenborg’s entire corpus of writing. The term enters the conversation on a few key 
topics: human freedom, the substance of the soul, and messianism. Each is a direct 
quotation, in the words of other men, and do not represent a working knowledge of 
Kabbalah on the part of Swedenborg himself. The Philosopher’s Notebook suggests a 
generalized familiarity on Swedenborg’s part with some basic concepts and terminology, 
but from secondary sources only.254 
Helpful here is Swedenborg biographer Ernst Benz’s description of Swedenborg’s 
changing philosophical interests over time, away from mechanistic philosophy and 
towards more theosophical interests. Whereas he had previously revered the geometric 
principles put forth by Descartes, his encounter with German metaphysicians such as 
Leibniz, Christian Wolff, and Andreas Rüdiger mediated a crucial shift. Through these 
figures, Swedenborg began an investigation into divine physics, drawing on organic 
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principles that linked the nature of God, the Bible, the natural world, and the human 
body. Benz describes a network of influential natural philosophers, whose thought 
intersected around certain interests and traditions of knowing: 
By grounding all living forms in a primary universal formative energy, 
Swedenborg joins the great tradition of mystical Naturphilosophie, 
ranging from Albertus Magnus and Nicholas of Cusa, through Paracelsus 
and Jacob Boehme, then through the English Behmenists and Rosicrucians 
like Robert Fludd, to the great researchers like Johann Baptista van 
Helmont and Henry More, whom Swedenborg so frequently quoted. The 
terms he used to describe the creative energy of nature already indicate 
that he knew the tradition of this idea.”255 
 
We do know of significant kabbalistic influences on many of the figures listed by 
Benz here, as well as Platonic and Aristotelian principles.256 Such genealogies help us 
understand certain epistemological contexts, but offer little clarification for determining 
whether and in what ways Swedenborg can be said to have been specifically influenced 
by Kabbalah. Kabbalah itself is a concept whose definition gets lost in such a context.  
Renaissance Hellenism blended into Christian and Jewish mystical cosmologies, and its 
effects surely did not follow a linear path on its way to eighteenth-century philosophy.  
The related question to all of this, of how much of a direct impact Neoplatonism 
had on Swedenborg, is unsettled. The 1915 Swedish-language study by Martin Lamm 
makes the strongest case for a connection to Neoplatonism in Swedenborg’s work, and 
also for a strong connection to Kabbalah as we will see below. Lamm points to both his 
reading of patristic sources and to the influence of the Cambridge School, though much 
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of Lamm’s argument is speculative.257 Inge Jonsson plays down Swedenborg’s direct 
reliance on Neoplatonism, pointing to significant theological differences with Plotinus, 
for instance, but does place Swedenborg in the category of philosophia prennis, with 
many of its Platonic implications intact.258 Though an in-depth study to address problems 
with defining and identifying Neoplatonism in Swedenborg and his interlocutors is not 
within the scope of this dissertation, it is worth noting that many of the factors 
complicating a direct connection to Kabbalah also relate to the question of Neoplatonic 
influence. Swedenborg’s readers have long assumed he drew from a Neoplatonic 
understanding of the world and the soul, though the exact nature of this influence is 
elusive. Positive comparisons can be made in any number of specific instances, though 
alternative explanations can often be found. At the very least, scholars agree that the 
currents of Neoplatonism were certainly in the water, so to speak.   
A third possible avenue for kabbalistic influence has been raised by Marsha Keith 
Schuchard. Schuchard’s premise is that the reason Swedenborg was so silent when it 
came to Jewish Mysticism was that he was a secret practitioner of “Judaized Yoga” or 
“Tantric Kabbalah.”  His erotic meditative techniques, she argues, were taught to him 
directly by Jews and by Moravian acquaintances who acquired such practices from their 
missionary activity among the Jews of Europe and the Buddhists of Asia. In fact, she 
writes, Swedenborg was involved in a host of clandestine activities not the least of which 
                                                          
257 See Lamm, Emanuel Swedenborg, 31-32, 55-56, 75-77, and 80-81. 
258 See Jonsson, Visionary Scientist, 80-81, and 190-191. 
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was serving as a secret intelligence agent for the Swedish and French monarchies.259 
Through her articles, books, and a recent biography of Swedenborg, she paints a picture 
of a man involved in high-level conspiracies and a practitioner of sexualized forms of 
mystical devotion. Through all of this, she argues, he was a master of Kabbalah, 
receiving wisdom from his maggid and achieving union with the Shekhinah, though these 
are terms never employed by Swedenborg himself. She asserts: “From August 1743 
through July 1745, Swedenborg lived virtually incognito in Holland and London, where 
he studied Hebrew and advanced through the stages of kabbalistic visionary training.”260  
Schuchard makes many claims regarding Swedenborg and Kabbalah that are 
difficult to verify or outright mistaken.261 As reviewer Nicholas Goodrich-Clarke writes 
                                                          
259 For a discussion of Swedenborg’s relationship to members of the Swedish political party the Hats, and 
their support of an alliance with France and receipt of money from Louis XV, see Lars Bergquist, 
Swedenborg’s Secret: The Meaning and Significance of the Word of God, the Life of Angels, and Service to 
God (London: The Swedenborg Society, 2005), 353-366.  
260 Marsha Keith Schuchard, “Emanuel Swedenborg: Deciphering the Codes of a Celestial and Terrestrial 
Intelligencer,” in Rending the Veil: Concealment and Secrecy in the History of Religions, edited by Elliot R. 
Wolfson, (New York : Seven Bridges Press 1999), 190.  
261 For example, many of her claims concerning Swedenborg’s supposed kabbalistic practices are 
grounded in the assertion that he knew and learned from Rabbi Samuel Falk, the “Ba’al Shem of London.” 
See, for example, Marsha Keith Schuchard, ‘From Poland to London: Sabbatean influences on the mystical 
underworld of Zinzendorf, Swedenborg, and Blake’, in Holy Dissent: Jewish and Christian Mystics in 
Eastern Europe, ed. Glenn Dynner (Detroit, MI, 2011), 260. Her evidence for this connection relies on her 
interpretation of numbers in his Spiritual Diary: “In his spiritual diary, Swedenborg described a charismatic 
magician and alchemist, whose features, garb, and rituals seem to point to the Ba’al Shem, who taught 
Kabbalah and performed Hermetic experiments for curious (and wealthy) Christians.”  Her footnote to 
this statement references five unconnected numbers in Swedenborg’s Spiritual Diary.  Two of the 
numbers (4047 and 4140) simply describe visions of candles and ornamental candlesticks. Presumably the 
fact that Falk was believed to have performed miracles by keeping candles alight for lengthy periods of 
time is the link Schuchard sees in these numbers. Number 3771 describes a vision of a Quaker community 
in the spiritual world, and does mention a man “seen ascending and speaking upon a certain platform, 
such as is constructed for diviners, who was said to have been one of their chiefs.” The description of the 
man ends there, but it is clear that the reference is to a Quaker, not a rabbi. In number 4072 Swedenborg 
simply describes seeing a tall man dressed in white “like the mass robes in our churches.” If anything, 
Swedenborg believes he is seeing a priest in this instance, and not Rabbi Falk.  And finally, number 4305 
describes seeing a man grinding meal and surrounded by mirrors, who Swedenborg compares to a 
magician, and who makes the statement that all things are illusory. 
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of her 2012 biography of Swedenborg, Schuchard’s claims “regularly stretch the 
interpretation of her sources” and “verge on conspiracy theory.”262 Similar credulity 
issues follow her work on other figures as with her 2008 book William Blake's Sexual 
Path to Spiritual Vision.263 Swedenborg is not the only historical figure who becomes, in 
her world, practitioner of ritualized, Judaized, Orientalized sex. Despite these problems, 
her work has had a surprising reception in academia, where she has made it into more 
than one edited volume, and it is difficult to find a contemporary consideration of 
Swedenborg and Kabbalah that does not reference her work. 264 Her problematic 
conclusions unfortunately obscure what would otherwise be an interesting set of 
questions posed by her study. What are the implications of the cultural and religious 
balagan that was London’s East End in the mid-eighteenth century, where Jew, 
Moravian, Quaker and Mason lived in close quarters and might have met in a local coffee 
house or printing press? How is this context reflected in the visions and thought of 
Emanuel Swedenborg, who worked, socialized and published there during his most 
spiritually tumultuous years? Schuchard is right to pose such questions, but her answers 
veer too quickly into fantasy and lose their relevance. 
                                                          
262 Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, review of Emanuel Swedenborg, Secret Agent on Earth and in Heaven: 
Jacobites, Jews, and Freemasons in Early Modern Sweden by Martha Keith Schuchard, in Reviews in 
History.  http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1236, accessed September 27, 2016. 
263 Marsha Keith Schuchard, William Blake's Sexual Path to Spiritual Vision, (Inner Traditions: 2008). 
264 Volumes include: Rending the Veil: Concealment and Secrecy in the History of Religions, ed. Elliot R. 
Wolfson (New York : Seven Bridges Press 1999); Holy Dissent: Jewish and Christian Mystics in Eastern 
Europe, ed. Glenn Dynner (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011); Leibniz, Mysticism and Religion, 
ed. Allison P. Coudert, Richard H. Popkin, and Gordon M. Weiner (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1998).  
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 As we wade through what little evidence we can gather, then, a picture emerges 
of a man who was familiar with Jewish mystical thought as interpreted by converts and 
Christian kabbalists in his early university years, and through the mediated influence of 
western esoteric and theosophical currents of the day, but beyond that we know very little 
for sure. The particulars of how he was influenced and which of his ideas might 
justifiably be credited to Kabbalah remains consigned to the art of speculation. 
Nevertheless, the comparisons are compelling. Swedish historian Martin Lamm describes 
the many analogies of thought between Swedenborg and Pico della Mirandola, all the 
while relenting that “We are unfortunately faced with the more or less impossibility of 
establishing by which route the doctrines of the Kabbalistic philosophy have reached 
him.”265 This doesn’t stop Lamm from attempting a few educated guesses, however, and 
he traces the possible routs of kabbalistic influence through medical documents in 
Swedenborg’s possession and through Swedish poet George Stiernhielm. He also notes 
the importance of Plotinus, whose Enneads was a common source of inspiration to both 
Pico and Swedenborg.266 
Lamm’s comparative interest is shared by many. Lists of similarities between 
Swedenborg and Kabbalah most often cite 1) Swedenborg’s interest in the mystical 
significance of individual Hebrew letters,267 2) the connection between earth and heaven 
                                                          
265 Lamm, Emanuel Swedenborg, 284. 
266 Ibid., 55, 284. 
267 The following example is taken from his Spiritual Diary, 4671: “every letter contained some idea, yea, 
the sense of the ideas; and he also taught me what [yod], what [aleph], and what [hey] signified; but, 
what the rest [of the letters] signified, it was not permitted him to tell: he said also that all things of the 
Word are inspired in this manner, and that the third heaven knows thence, when the Word is read by man 
in the Hebrew text, all the divine-celestial which is inspired, and that each and all the things therein treat 
of the Lord. Such a sense cannot be explained, because it is the celestial sense, of which not one idea can 
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mediated by the flow of influx, 3) the marriage relationship within the Godhead, or the 
uniting of “male” and “female” divine attributes, 4) the creation of the world from a 
single “point,”268 and finally and most frequently cited 5) Adam Kadmon of Kabbalah and 
Swedenborg’s Maximus Homo – that the realm of the Divine takes the shape of a human 
body. To this list, I would add sets of similarities depending on which kind of Kabbalah 
is in question. The Christian Kabbalah of Johan Kemper and Franciscus Mercurius van 
Helmont similarly allegorize the life of Christ as it relates to individual spiritual 
progression. Macroprosopus and Microprosopus of the Kabbalah denudata compare 
nicely with Swedenborg’s interpretation of the Divine Esse and Exestere. Another 
significant overlap with Christian Kabbalah is in what Elliot Wolfson terms 
“hypernomianism” in his study of Johann Kemper: that “the commandments possess an 
enduring spiritual value but that their practical application is limited to a specific time in 
history.”269 Ḥasidic Kabbalah is strikingly similar in a number of ways: its interpretation 
of biblical themes and figures as symbols for elements in the individual’s psychological 
and religious life;270 the language of microcosm and macrocosm to explain the 
relationship between human and divine worlds; the idea of avodah be-gashmiyut, or 
worship through mundane activity; and the concept that the angels are directly affected 
by the rituals and text study of earthly humans. To these sets of similarities, we can add 
                                                          
be expressed. From this it may be apparent, that the Word, according to the Lord's words, is inspired as to 
every jot and tittle.”  
268 See Lamm’s discussion of Swedenborg’s punctum naturale, in Lamm, Emanuel Swedenborg, 30-31. And 
on the primordial point of Kabbalah, see, for instance, Daniel Matt’s translation and notes in The Zohar, 
Pritzker Edition: Translation and Commentary, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 1:115b. 
269 Wolfson, “Messianism,” 4. 
270 Margolin, The Human Temple. 
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curious details, such as the fact that in both the Zohar and in Swedenborg’s Arcana, 
priests are symbols for divine love,271 or that Swedenborg’s reliquae, or remnants of 
holiness buried in the souls of individuals, are represented in the Bible by the number ten, 
recalling the ten sefirot and the nitzutzim of Lurianic Kabbalah.272  
With any such comparison, the differences are as significant as the similarities, 
and for all of the points listed above we could elaborate important distinctions. For 
example, the Christian Kabbalah of Kemper, while alike in allegorizing the life of Christ, 
differs in its pervasive reliance on Trinitarian theology (Swedenborg, as was said above, 
denounced the doctrine of the Trinity). Ḥasidic commentaries are alike for their 
internalizing hermeneutic, but differ in their regular reliance on word play and skilled 
manipulation of the Hebrew language for doing this, something Swedenborg’s cursory 
knowledge of the language prevented him from doing even though he idealized Hebrew 
as the language of the angels. 
Regardless of important differences, however, the fact of similarity is itself 
sometimes taken as evidence of influence: Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Renowned scholar 
of Jewish Mysticism, Moshe Idel, makes one such leap in his book Absorbing 
Perfections: Kabbalah and Interpretation. He comments on a certain vision Swedenborg 
recorded of a girl dressed in black and joyfully moving between lights. In Swedenborg’s 
words “I was told that the interior things of the Word are such when they first ascend. 
                                                          
271 In Arcana caelestia 1728 Swedenborg writes that the Lord’s divine truth is represented in the biblical 
symbol of king and the Lord’s divine love is represented in the symbol of the priest. In the Zohar, king and 
priest are Binah and Hesed respectively. See Matt, The Zohar, 2:67b. 
272 See Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 576, 1906, 2075 and elsewhere. 
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The black dress stood for the Word in the letter. Afterwards, a young girl flew towards 
the right cheek, but this was only seen by the interior sight.” Noting that Swedenborg 
says nothing of the dress of the second girl in the vision Idel muses: “she may correspond 
to the woman who discloses her secrets in the Zoharic parable. I would therefore suggest 
that Swedenborg has adapted kabbalistic material in his visions.”273 Idel is here 
comparing Swedenborg’s vision to a famous Zoharic parable of the Torah as a woman 
who reveals herself to her lover gradually in a series of unveilings. The similarity is 
interesting, and much more could be said about it,274 but Idel’s move to view this as a 
direct adaptation of kabbalistic material is not convincing. He glosses over an important 
difference between the two mystical accounts, namely that in Swedenborg’s account 
neither of the girls remove articles of clothing or in any way reveal hidden parts of 
themselves to the spectator.  
Comparison is seductive, as the more sober proprietors of theory and 
methodology would remind us, and the recognition of patterns is not to be trusted as 
evidence of contiguity. Wouter Hanegraaff and Friedemann Stengel are two 
contemporary scholars who firmly downplay such similarities in their discussions of 
Swedenborg’s possible relationship to Kabbalah, insisting that other explanations can 
                                                          
273 Idel, Absorbing Perfections, 305. 
274 A more interesting comparison than the one Idel makes is with Swedenborg’s first girl, the one in the 
black dress. Gershom Scholem writes of Tikkune Zohar: “[The] idea of the garment of the Torah recurs 
over and over again in this latest section of the Zohar, though with very divergent shades of meaning. It is 
based on the identification of the Shekhinah (who is also the Queen of Matrona) with the Torah as it was 
revealed to men. It is stated several times, for example, that the color of her garments after the fall of 
man, but in particular during the period of exile, is black in token of mourning. But in other passages the 
color black is related to the literal meaning of the Torah, which is the first layer of meaning to be 
discerned in it.” In On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 67, 
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nearly always be found.275  Swedenborg’s Maximus Homo, for instance, can be explained 
by his dedicated and lengthy study of human anatomy. That the organizing structure of 
the heavens is in the image of a human body suggests that his religious imagination 
simply borrowed from his intricate knowledge of the body’s organs and systems. The 
Zohar’s “Primordial Man,” according to this argument, is not the same figure. To take 
similarity as evidence of influence is what Jonathan Z. Smith calls the confusion of 
homeopathic and contagious magic.276   
 Comparison nevertheless has its place, as the likes of Jonathan Z. Smith, 
Kimberley Patton and others have so artfully demonstrated. Just as we must clarify what 
comparison cannot tell us, we must also ask what it can tell us. In Swedenborg’s case, we 
can safely assume that the comparison to Kabbalah would not have been entirely lost on 
Swedenborg himself. Given all that has been said above; given the philosemitic 
environment at Uppsala and other European universities, his close relationship with his 
brother-in-law Eric Benzelius, his admiration of Leibniz, and the growing association of 
Kabbalah with allegory, we have to assume that he would have been aware at least of the 
potential association readers would make. That is to say, while we cannot determine with 
any certainty which of his concepts or methods are borrowed from Jewish or Christian 
Kabbalah, however similar they appear, we can assume that taken as a whole, his 
commentary would look somewhat kabbalistic to the average European intellectuals of 
                                                          
275 Hanegraaff, “Swedenborg, the Jews,” 135-154; Stengel, Aufklärung, 408-419. 
276 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 21. 
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his day, and these were Swedenborg’s target audience.277 Therefore, just as, for instance, 
his overly zealous distinction between the infinite and the finite, found in De infinto, is 
best understood as a distancing from Spinoza’s pantheism as we saw in the last chapter, 
the distance he places between his interpretations and Jewish hermeneutics should be 
understood in context: both the context of eighteenth-century conceptions of Kabbalah, 
and the context of the history of Jewish-Christian relations in Europe. A cursory study of 
Harold Bloom’s “anxiety of influence” will provide a way forward for thinking about 
Swedenborg and Kabbalah, given all that comparison can and cannot tell us about the 
relationship. 
The Anxiety of Influence 
While Bloom’s theories on the “anxiety of influence” are primarily aimed at 
literature and poetry, the application to religious texts is an appropriate one. “Religion is 
spilled poetry”278 he writes in his work Kabbalah and Criticism. According to Bloom, 
influence, defined as “literary love, tempered by defense” 279 moves along labyrinthine 
rather than linear lines. But the difficulty in tracing influence lies principally in the fact 
that a borrowed tradition is misread in transmission. A strong reading is always a creative 
                                                          
277 Benz argues that his target audience would be the university “As knowledge of the new natural 
sciences emanated from university lecterns and learned societies, Swedenborg thought that the truth of 
his writings could spread through the universities and gain an increasingly firm hold among scholars.” His 
choice of the Latin language as well as the format and rhetorical style of Swedenborg’s theological 
writings point to his intended readership, Benz, Emanuel Swedenborg, 490-491. In a 1767 letter to Dr. 
Gabriel Beyer this is explicit: “The universities of Christendom must first be instructed; then will come the 
teachers, for the new heaven has no influence upon the old spirituality which is based securely on the 
doctrine of justification by faith alone.” See Document 234 in Tafel, ed., Documents Concerning, vol. II:1, 
261. 
278 Bloom, Kabbalah and Criticism, 52.  
279 Bloom, Anatomy of Influence, 8. 
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misreading. Precisely because of its novelty and inaccuracy, it has the potential for future 
life; it survives by suggesting yet another misreading. Bloom admits the troubling 
implications of this approach, but notes that literary critics and philosophers alike have 
turned their attention from the “thing in itself” to hermeneutics, to a study of the 
prejudices of the interpreter, a move he likens to Kabbalah:  “The Talmud warns against 
reading Scripture by so inclined a light that the text reveals chiefly the shape of your own 
countenance. Kabbalah, like the poetry of the last two centuries, read Scripture only in so 
inclined, or figurative a defensive mode.”280 In his own creative misreading of 
Cordoverian Kabbalah, Bloom compares literary influence to the process of divine 
emanation, or the way in which the ten sefirot come to being in succession, each from the 
last. Like the sefirot, a poem contains all future misreading within it. When the new 
creation emerges, cause and effect are reversed, the child infuses the parent with new life, 
and both together empower a new generation.281 This is an apt description, not only of the 
process of a poet’s use of his or her sources, but of the relationship between the Bible and 
the countless generations of commentaries and interpretations it has inspired, which 
themselves provide a kind of reverse inspiration, allowing for the Bible’s continued 
relevance in foreign contexts. 
The Bible has been inspiring “creative misprision” for over two thousand years. 
By exploring the contours of the reading and misreading that occurs between Jewish and 
Christian sources over the centuries, a discourse emerges that belies any understanding of 
                                                          
280 Bloom, Kabbalah and Criticism, 90. 
281 For a description of the “behinot sequence” and how it relates to literary influence, see Bloom, 
Kabbalah and Criticism, 64-70. 
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these as two, distinct traditions, even when, or perhaps especially when, the 
commentaries themselves insist on such a distinction. In those moments when Christian 
and Jewish sources resemble each other, a study of comparisons can provide a narrative, 
not of origins, but of memory, or what Bloom calls “belatedness.”  Latent, or forgotten, 
strategies in one tradition are triggered by the something in the presence of the other 
tradition. Like Swedenborg’s reliquiae, or the nitzutzim of Kabbalah, remnants of a 
shared heritage are discovered in hidden places, even if the shells that contain them are 
potentially destructive. 
David Stern writes of the impact the critical theory of Harold Bloom and others 
has had on the study of ancient and medieval Jewish and Christian exegesis:  “If the study 
of ancient exegesis over the last two decades has taught us anything, it is the lesson that 
interpretation is inevitably overdetermined. Multiple forces and sources seem always to 
feed into it.”282 Rather than embracing the purity of genealogy, or polarized oppositions 
such as Hellenism and Hebraism, Stern argues that today’s scholars face an economy of 
negotiations being played out in the texts they study. Every interpretation is a negotiation 
on multiple levels, some of which scholars have access to, but some of which we can 
only guess at. The biblical interpreter appropriates, making the text his/her own, and this 
involves all the idiosyncrasies of any creative act. To understand exegetical texts, we 
must understand them as works of culture, read them “by using the comparative context 
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Appropriation,” in Dohrmann and Stern, eds. Jewish Biblical Interpretation, 13. 
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to explore the different ways in which exegesis can be understood only by understanding 
one interpretation and its tradition in the context of others.”283  
We might also consider, in this vein, the work of two scholars who consider 
instances of the anxiety of influence between Jews and Christians, and the slipperiness of 
Kabbalah in particular. Yehuda Liebes who explores the question of Christian influence 
on the Zohar, chiefly points to evidence in the text of a response to Christian 
trinitarianism. 284 He highlights resemblances in the figure of R. Simeon b. Yohai to Jesus 
Christ, and to evidence of Christian influence in Zoharic formulations of Genesis 1:1. All 
of this is explainable, argues Liebes, when you consider the decidedly Christian context 
in which the Zohar was written. However, while such concepts may have been impacted 
by Christianity, the meaning behind them changed significantly in the new context. For 
instance, while we do find something of a father/son relationship within God, “in the 
Zohar the time of the ‘son’ is definitely not the messianic era; on the contrary, it refers to 
the period of exile. The ‘son’ is seen as defective and marred by barrenness, while the 
Messiah is a transformed version of this ‘son.’”285 Leibes concludes that it is in light of 
this influence that we should reconsider the interpretive abilities of Christian Kabbalists, 
who saw evidence of the trinity everywhere in the Zohar and may  have even preserved 
Christological elements in the Zohar that were edited out in Jewish copies.286 Their 
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failure to grasp the polemical elements of the Zohar’s “son” should come as no surprise, 
but should be seen as one more generation of creative misprision. 
Another example of contemporary scholarship that informs how we think about 
influence between Judaism and Christianity is that of Peter Schäfer. His research into 
feminine images of the divine in Christianity and Kabbalah explores the nature of 
influence in Jewish-Christian contexts: “influence does not describe the relationship of 
two entities, one of which is the ‘original’ and ‘active’ partner, while the other is its 
‘passive’ counterpart, a receptacle that receives and imbibes material without changing 
it.”287 Schäfer argues that to trace the feminine aspect of divinity in one direction or the 
other – to say that Christians adopted kabbalistic language, or that it was Jews who were 
influenced by Mariology – is to miss the point that these traditions have always occupied 
the same world. Christianity and Judaism should be viewed “not as two essentialized self-
contained entities, but as two poles of one spectrum or as two components of one 
religious discourse constantly engaged in active relationship. This relationship produces 
various configurations—positive and negative, friendly and hostile, attracting and 
rejecting—but it is always a relationship, which (consciously or unconsciously) never 
obliterates their common origin.”288 Following Bloom, Schäfer traces the anxiety of 
influence as it related to feminine images of God, and especially as triggered by the 
figure of Mary, mother of Christ.289 Mary seems to have been a lightning rod for 
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289 See also Arthur Green, “Shekhinah, The Virgin Mary, and the Song of Songs: Reflections on a 
Kabbalistic Symbol in Its Historical Context,” in AJS Review 26, no. 1 (Cambridge University Press on behalf 
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expressions of such anxiety, as anti-Jewish and anti-Christian sentiments were able to be 
expressed through images and legends of Mary in both traditions. Such depictions, 
however, bore the markings of a complex itinerary: “the polemical rejection of Mary’s 
function in the process of the salvation of humankind does not necessarily exclude the 
positive adaptation of her role and attributes through the transformation of the Christian 
narrative into a bold Jewish counternarrative.”290 That the figure of Mary could at once 
express polarization and creativity speaks to the intimate nature of the communities in 
question.  
Swedenborg and the Anxiety of Influence 
Swedenborg is best interpreted in light of this history of negotiation and 
influence, of adaptation and resistance. His embrace of allegorical modes of 
interpretation would have made his commentary comparable to kabbalistic commentaries 
coming out of Uppsala and elsewhere, such as those produced by Johan Kemper 
discussed in chapter one. Resurrecting the old familiar trope of Jewish carnality from the 
grave sites of Jerome, Augustine, Martin Luther and others, marked his spiritual 
interpretations as distinctly and traditionally Christian. In doing so, he bears the markings 
of the many cultural negotiations at play in his day and in the centuries preceding. 
Swedenborg insisted that no mystic, Christian or Jew, influenced his theosophical 
views. When asked by a friend about views on the writings of Jakob Böhme in 1767, he 
replied that he could not judge Böhme’s writings because he never read them: “I was 
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forbidden to read writers on dogmatic and systematic theology, before heaven was 
opened to me; because unfounded opinions and inventions might thereby have easily 
insinuated themselves, which afterwards could only have been removed with 
difficulty.”291 It may very well be true that Swedenborg never formally studied the work 
of Böhme or others whose visions and hermeneutics so closely resemble his own. 
However, I share the perspective of scholar of comparative mysticism Steven Katz, who 
argues that the pre-experiential patterns of the mystic’s surrounding religious and social 
structures necessarily affect his mystical experience.292  The various cultural and spiritual 
negotiations being played out in the lives of those in Swedenborg’s relational orbit, as 
well as the tensions inherent in those negotiations, are evident in his experiences, in his 
theology and in his commentary. This fact does not disaffirm the sense of originality he 
expresses. Harold Bloom writes of “sublime” literature in particular, quoting Longinus: “ 
. . . sublime literature transports and enlarges its readers. Reading a sublime poet, such as 
Pindar or Sappho, we experience something akin to authorship: ‘We come to believe we 
have created what we have only heard.'”293 I argue that this experience of the sublime, 
and the accompanying confusion between reader and author is at play in biblical 
commentary, and especially in mystical biblical commentary. Emerson, who was himself 
deeply immersed in Swedenborgian thought, “declared himself free of precursors: ‘That 
which I can gain from another is never tuition but only provocation,’ fit motto for a 
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prophet rather than a poet”294 writes Bloom. If we understand the claim of originality to 
be an indication of sublimity, a conversation emerges between an author and numerous 
feeds of information. Assimilation breeds antagonism, but also creativity.  
Swedenborg’s Philosopher’s Notebook contains, as discussed above, three 
quotations from Leibniz and Grotius with content on Kabbalah, and are the only instances 
of the word Kabbalah in his own handwriting. A fourth, related, quotation on page 178 of 
the Codex contains a few curious omissions. He records some thoughts on messianic 
prophecies from Hugo Grotius’ De veritate religionis christianae, but leaves out the 
source of the interpretation being discussed. The lines Swedenborg left out have been 
helpfully provided in brackets by Alfred Acton in his 1931 English translation. The 
quotations with bracketed lines reinserted are as follows:  
[The Jews themselves were not unaware that many things in the Sacred 
Writings must be understood in a figurative sense, such as] that the wolf 
should lie down with the lamb, the leopard with the kid, the lion with the ox, 
and that a little child should sport with snakes; that the mountain of God 
should rise above other mountains; that strangers should come thither to 
perform holy rites. [Some things are promised definitely and without 
condition, and] if they have not yet been fulfilled, they can still be expected. 
 
[The Cabalistic Jews set up a certain son of Enoch as a medium between God 
and man, without any indication that he had any such great power. How 
much more justly shall we set Him up who has given us so many testimonies 
of His power.] Nor does this tend to the lessening of God the Father from 
whom this power came to Jesus, and to whom it will return, and whose honor 
it serves.295 
 
                                                          
294 Ibid., 10. 
295 As quoted in Swedenborg, Philosopher’s Notebook, 379. From Hugo Grotius De veritate religionis 
christianae, 347-348 and 366. 
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The second paragraph, which contains the explicit reference to Kabbalah, compares 
Christian conceptions of Christ to kabbalistic conceptions of Enoch, as a means of 
elevating the relationship between Father and Son. The first paragraph, however, is 
telling for the fact that Swedenborg copied sections that were interesting to him for their 
interpretation of the Prophets, while intentionally leaving out the line about Jewish 
figuration. Was the idea of Jewish allegory uninteresting to him, or did he pass over these 
lines because of the dissonance they would have caused with his understanding of Jews, 
that they “worship external things” and know only the “external sense” of scripture? It is 
my contention that Harold Bloom’s concept of “poetic misprision” helps us understand 
the kind of erasure we see in Swedenborg’s notebook. As Schäfer writes, concerning the 
application of Bloom’s ideas to Jewish-Christian relations: “the act of re-creation is 
tantamount to ‘killing’ the transmitted; thus the inevitable feeling of anxiety towards the 
‘source’ that is transformed and recreated, the ambivalence of attraction and 
repulsion.”296 Swedenborg’s notebook was not intended for publication, and we cannot 
assume that the omission was out of any sense of fear that reliance on Jewish 
interpretations would challenge his reputation. However, we can assume that the Jewish 
origin of the particular interpretation in question was displeasing to him, given the nature 
of the other entries in the notebook. His notebook was created for the purpose of 
recording the sources of content that was meaningful to him. Credit is given everywhere 
else in the text. 
                                                          
296 Schäfer, Mirror of His Beauty, 232 
147 
 
 
The notebook omission provides evidence that Swedenborg would have certainly 
known about Jewish allegorical interpretation, and would have been aware of kabbalistic 
interpretive activities that had nothing to do with alchemy. This notion is reinforced by 
his connection to Uppsala University scholarship on Jewish and Christian Kabbalah. His 
strongly worded negative descriptions of Jewish literalism and carnality suggest a 
defensive stance, or what Bloom terms “kenosis,” the act of isolating oneself from one’s 
sources of influence. In addition to his treatment of Jewish interpretive abilities, we can 
understand Swedenborg’s placement of the “Jewish Church” in the decline of human 
religious history as, in Bloom’s sense, kenotic. That the term more frequently refers to 
Christ’s emptying his divinity in order to take on a human nature is a telling coincidence. 
Christian exegetes, in the image of Christ, empty themselves of the Jewish heritage 
associated with their Bible, a practice initiated by Paul and carried on through the 
generations by so many Bible scholars who denounced Judaism while also mining its 
resources for the precious stones that can best refract religion’s light.  
Conclusion: Types and Stereotypes  
Swedenborg’s understanding of the role of the Jewish Church in history is tangled 
up with his understanding of the nature of Jewish people living in his day and their 
inability to interpret scripture correctly. Descriptions of the Jews in his theological work 
slip between the past tense and the present tense without a thought. He generalizes across 
time and space, painting a picture of Judaism that is flat, entirely without nuance. 
Generalizations are also leveled at Moravians, Quakers, Catholics, Africans, the Dutch, 
and more. Christians as a whole are condemned in several places for corrupting the true 
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faith. Swedenborg was not alone, of course, in creating broad taxonomies of race and 
culture or in offering judgements about the spiritual qualities of certain categories of 
people. These generalizations were not out of order for his time. If they raised eyebrows, 
it was because of the backdrop of conversations with angels and spirits, not because of 
stereotyping. Of the many objections readers of his day made in to his published works, 
anti-Judaism was not high on the list.297 Nevertheless, the labeling of Jews as purely 
“external” in nature pervades his construction of history and religion in a way the other 
generalizations do not. 
It is my contention that the anti-Judaism we find in Swedenborg is the result of 
the anxiety of influence. On one hand it is the inherited anxiety of Christendom, whose 
reading and interpreting of the Bible was indebted to and challenged by Jewish sources. 
On the other hand, it is a personal anxiety of influence, for a man whose travels through 
heaven and hell and whose allegorical methods of interpretation bore too much 
resemblance to the sources of kabbalistic thought he was exposed to as a young man. 
My argument is not that Swedenborg intentionally copied any particular Jewish or 
kabbalistic concept. He may have, but the evidence for such intentionality is weak. I am 
arguing that the likeness between his commentary and aspects of Kabbalah would not 
have been lost on him, and that this awareness triggered a defensive appeal to stereotypes 
of Jewish literalism available to him from familiar sources such as Augustine and Luther. 
It is also my contention that Swedenborg’s commentary can be read, in Bloom’s words, 
as a “creative misreading” of Jewish and Christian sources before him and that his work 
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reflects the complex history of these sibling traditions. To better demonstrate how 
Bloom’s concept of the anxiety of influence plays out in Swedenborg’s biblical 
commentaries, the following chapter will undertake a close reading of the interpretation 
of Genesis 3 in Arcana coelestia, where the Jewish Church figures prominently in an 
allegorical reading of Adam, Eve and the serpent of Eden. 
  
150 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: SENSUALIA ET SCIENTIFICA: A READING OF ARCANA COELESTIA ON 
GENESIS 3 
 
 In considering the discourse within Swedenborg’s own writing, the topic of part 
two of this dissertation, we have so far looked at allegory from two perspectives: on the 
one hand in the relationship between Swedenborg’s biblical interpretation and his 
philosophical and scientific career, and on the other hand, in the troubled relationship to 
Jews and Judaism that manifests as he works out a spiritual sense that both resembles 
Kabbalah and denies Jews the ability to interpret beyond a literal reading. In this chapter 
we will explore the format and content of Arcana coelestia and through a reading of his 
commentary on Genesis 3, will see how these two threads come together in this one 
example. For, in the single figure of Eden’s serpent, Swedenborg presents the spiritual 
pitfalls common to Jews and scientists alike:  
The pages to come, though, by the Lord’s divine mercy, will reveal how the 
snake destroyed those lowest things in pre-Flood people through a focus on 
the senses and through self-love. They will show how the snake destroyed 
them among Jews through a concern with sensory experiences, tradition, and 
trivialities, and through self-love and materialism. Then they will show how 
the snake has destroyed and is destroying people at the present day through 
sensory, scientific, and philosophical matters, and once more through self-
love and materialism.298 
 
The traits represented by the serpent caused not only the first great fall of the 
human race (see more on this below), but also the fall of the Jewish people and the fall of 
learned men in Swedenborg’s day. And what were these sins? We find here, and repeated 
throughout this chapter the pairing of two qualities, marking two particular ways of 
                                                          
298 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 259 [2]. 
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knowing that lead one astray: the sensory and the scientific, sensualia et scientifica. This 
pairing occurs 14 times in Swedenborg’s interpretation of Genesis 3. And in three of 
these instances a third kind of knowledge, philosophical, joins the two (as in the above 
quotation). These qualities, these ways of knowing, are indicators for the faulty logic and 
moral corruptibility of both Jews and academicians: two categories of people who receive 
a great deal of Swedenborg’s attention as he decodes the Eden story. In this chapter we 
will consider this interpretation at some length in order to demonstrate Swedenborg’s 
methods of interpretation as an example of eighteenth century allegory. As with the four 
commentaries we considered in chapter one, Swedenborg’s engagement with allegory 
was tied to epistemological developments during the Age of the Enlightenment and to the 
discourse about Christian and Jewish religious identity and interpretive abilities. 
Before embarking on a reading of Genesis 3 through Arcana coelestia, two 
introductory matters will be considered. The first is the degree to which Swedenborg’s 
concerns regarding sensualia et scientifica are autobiographical. This will provide us the 
opportunity to refer to the unpublished commentary he wrote prior to Arcana, Explicatio 
in Verbum Historicum Veteris Testamenti (The Word of the Old Testament Explained, 
1746), in which his personal spiritual crisis is openly incorporated into the allegorical 
interpretation of Genesis and Exodus. Secondly, I will present a general introduction to 
the format, content, and publishing history of Arcana to provide the necessary 
background for a close reading of the text. 
Selling off Silver and Cattle: Swedenborg’s Spiritual Crisis 
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 As we saw in chapter three, the anxiety Swedenborg experienced towards the end 
of his scientific career is recorded in his unpublished journals, where he described vivid 
visions and dreams.  According to his interpretations of these experiences, he associated 
sexual desire and other temptations of the senses with his appetite for acquiring 
knowledge and with a longing to be praised for his intellectual accomplishments. As he 
moved away from scientific and philosophical matters and turned toward the study of the 
Bible, traces of this anxiety lingered and made their way into his commentaries. In the 
following four numbers from the unpublished Explicatio, he interprets the selling of 
silver, livestock and land by the Egyptians in famine time from Genesis 47. His 
interpretation begins in abstract and universal terms, discussing the pitfalls of knowledge 
without spiritual application. His first two autobiographical statements are parenthetical, 
but he soon drops the brackets and with an increasingly agitated tone identifies personally 
with the starving Egyptians, and ends with a direct appeal to God for guidance. 
The cognitions themselves are signified by silver. These are of no use without 
application to things spiritual. They are the first things to be taken away, so 
that the cognitions which have hitherto been made, thus serve no use, being 
without application to things heavenly. (If I am deprived of these, as now 
appears, then the cognitions hitherto granted me by the divine mercy of God 
Jesus Christ are of no use; thus up to now the labor has been in vain, this 
being a consequence). 
 
Cattle and the like, together with horses, also signify interior cognitions, like 
horses; here, they signify the pleasures and cupidities of the world. (These 
also are taken away from me, so that I dare nothing, I know nothing, as to 
whither I shall go.) 
 
The land is the intellect belonging to the mind. This is taken away at the same 
time, so that I understand almost nothing; for so do evil spirits obscure me, 
and the things which I may be able to write are given me piecemeal. 
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This is my state today, exactly as was presignified to the man of Egypt. What 
further these words mean, I know not. I await thy salvation, God Messiah!299  
 
 This pleading prayer is followed by a line drawn across the page, and the rest of 
the page is left blank.300 The interpretation resumes on the next page, returning to 
universal principles and without the use of first-person pronouns. The commentary takes 
on a personal tone again over a hundred numbers later, when considering Jacob’s end-of-
life words to his son Dan, in which he declares that Dan “shall be a serpent upon the way, 
an asp upon the path; he shall bite the horse’s heels, and his rider shall fall backward.”301 
Here, we realize the origin of Swedenborg’s previous supplication in Jacob’s words “I 
await your salvation, O Lord!” and the verse triggers again the insertion of Swedenborg’s 
own life story into the biblical narrative. The serpent, he explains, signifies science.302 
Dan, who bites the heels of horses, causing the rider to fall back, signifies those who “by 
means of their own sciences . . . wish to scrutinize and search out things superior, such as 
things spiritual and celestial.”303  Of his own life, he then writes of falling backwards in 
this way:  
                                                          
299 Emanuel Swedenborg, The Word of the Old Testament Explained, trans. Alfred Acton (Bryn Athyn, PA: 
Academy of the New Church, 1928-1951), 423-425. Evidence in Explicatio of Swedenborg’s troubled state 
is currently the subject of research by George Dole and I am indebted to conversations with him for these 
insights. 
300 See Emanuel Swedenborg, Emanuelis Swedenborgii autographa Tom. VIII, Explicationes in verbum, seu 
Adversaria II:270 (Holmiae: ex officina phototypographica Lagrelius & Westphal, 1901-1916) 2:270. 
301 Dan in Hebrew means Judge. 
302 Swedenborg, Aversaria, 2:1273. English translation from Emanuel Swedenborg, The Word of the Old 
Testament Explained, vol. 3, trans. Alfred Acton (Bryn Athyn, PA: Academy of the New Church, 1934) 
2962. For an explanation of the difference in paragraph numbering between the manuscript and Acton’s 
translation, see “Prefatory Remarks,” in Alfred Acton, Introduction to the Word Explained: A Study of the 
Means by which Swedenborg the Scientist and Philosopher became the Theologian and Revelator (Bryn 
Athyn, PA: Academy of the New Church, 1927), 4-5. 
303 Sedenborg, Adversaria, 2:1279. English translation from Acton, trans., The Word, 3:2969. 
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I should confess that whenever I have desired to consult the understanding in 
those things which are heavenly, I seem to myself to fall backward; and this 
so clearly, and on such innumerable occasions, that unless, by the divine 
mercy of God Messiah, I had been at once returned to the way, I would 
quickly have fallen backward. Thus I have the clearest experience before my 
eyes. Wherefore, human philosophy can never enter into things which are 
spiritual and celestial, but spiritual and celestial things must introduce the 
natural.304 
 
 This last statement, that philosophy cannot enter into spiritual things, echoes the 
old formulation that philosophy is the handmaid to theology. However, Swedenborg is 
situated in an age that challenged this arrangement in stark terms. His sentiment, for 
instance, resonates with Kant’s understanding of the limits of human reason, but Kant 
formulates his distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal as a critique of 
metaphysics (as will be discussed in chapter 5), while Swedenborg’s distinction results in 
a critique of the sciences. He himself has experienced the limits of human philosophy, 
and has been thrown off his horse countless times with the inappropriate application of 
science to higher things rather than the other way around. That Swedenborg knows first-
hand the sting of the serpent’s bite is relevant to our understanding of his published 
interpretation of Genesis 3 in Arcana coelestia. The cause of his fall relates, as it were, to 
the cause of humanity’s first fall and present-day fall, and the cause of its darkest days 
during the era of the “Jewish Church.” This will all be illuminated below. Some 
introductory remarks on Arcana coelestia are in order first. 
Publishing the Secrets of Heaven 
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 While Swedenborg’s earlier attempt at a commentary on Genesis and Exodus in 
Explicatio was never published, his more systematic and fulsome Arcana coelestia 
appeared in print in London beginning with the first volume in 1749, in quarto format. In 
a likely attempt to improve sales, volume 2 was published simultaneously in English and 
Latin versions, and printed one chapter at a time. The experiment did not continue, 
however, and the remaining six volumes were published whole and in Latin only. All 
eight volumes were published anonymously, with the final volume arriving in 1756, and 
the entire project was financed by Swedenborg personally.305 While we do not know the 
reason why he published it anonymously, we know that his identity was generally known 
by 1761. Swedenborg’s choice of a London printer should be understood in light of the 
religious freedom and the thriving new publishing industry that arose uniquely in this 
environment. John Feather writes: “In the eighteenth century, the English book trade 
flourished as never before in its history. The comparative freedom of the press, the 
abolition or abandonment of traditional controls on personnel, the growth of a leisured 
and wealthy class of cultured readers, and the development of an international market for 
English books all made their contribution to its commercial success.”306 The publication 
of Arcana coelestia was therefore part of a larger moment in the history of the printed 
book: Swedenborg was on the forefront of a newly mechanized enterprise for producing 
and distributing written work. 
                                                          
305 The estimated cost of the total printing is £3,200 pounds. On the question of financing, and receipt of 
money from Louis XV, see Bergquist, Swedenborg’s Secret, 353-366. 
306 John Feather, "British Publishing in the Eighteenth Century: A Preliminary Subject Analysis," Library 8 
(1986), 32. 
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One aspect of the British printing trade that characterized the age was the 
emergence of the advertisement, and this too, Swedenborg was privy to. John Lewis, 
bookseller and printer, handled the publication and in his advertisement for the English 
translation, praises the work for its erudition, innovation and freedom from tradition: 
This work is intended to be such an exposition of the whole Bible, as was 
never attempted in any language before. The Author is a learned foreigner, 
who wrote and printed the first volume of the same work but last year, all in 
Latin, which may be seen at my shop in Paternoster Row, as above 
mentioned. . . He hath struck out a new path through this deep abyss, which 
no man ever trod before; he has left all the commentators and expositors to 
stand on their own footing; he neither meddles nor interferes with any of 
them; his thoughts are all his own; and the ingenious and sublime turn he has 
given to everything in the Scripture, he has copied from no man; and 
therefore, even in this respect, he hath some title to the regard of the 
ingenious and learned world.307  
 
 
If Swedenborg’s commentary was entirely unique, as Lewis advertised, it was not 
because of his allegorical methods, but because of the nature of the non-exegetical 
material included. Swedenborg’s Arcana is only one part biblical commentary. Each 
chapter in this eight volume opus begins and ends with a section on “The Marvels – 
things seen in the world of spirits and in the angelic heaven.”308 These accounts, which 
detail such things as the nature of heaven and hell, the speech of angels, and the 
experience of waking up after death, bookend each episode of biblical commentary, and 
are entirely unrelated thematically to the exegetical material. Many of the memorabilia or 
                                                          
307 John Lewis, “Advertisement,” as found in Robert Hindmarsh, Rise and Progress of the New Jerusalem 
Church, in England, America, and Other Parts: Particularly in Reference to its External Manifestation by 
Public Worship, Preaching, and the Administration of the Sacraments, with Other Ordinances of the 
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“memorable relations” as they are often referred to in English, continue between chapters 
as episodes or installments of a larger essay.309 This method was not repeated in any of 
the many subsequent theological works he published, and in fact his very next 
publication, De Coelo et Ejus Mirabilibus, et de Inferno, ex Auditis et Visis (Heaven and 
Its Wonders and Hell: Drawn from Things Heard and Seen, 1758), is a work singularly 
focused on his other-worldly experiences. As we will see in the final chapters of this 
dissertation, the layering of two modes, or genres, of writing had repercussions for how 
Arcana coelestia was received: critics and philosophers such as Immanuel Kant tended to 
focus solely on Swedenborg’s memorable relations; religious followers tended to 
emphasize, and preach on, the exegetical material; while artists and poets, such as 
William Blake, responded to the combination. 
 Whether or not this method was effectual, Swedenborg gives his reasons for the 
unique arrangement at the beginning of chapter two:  
The Lord, in his divine mercy has given me the opportunity to learn the inner 
meaning of the Word, which contains deeply hidden secrets that no one has 
ever been aware of before. No one can become aware of them without 
learning how things stand in the other life, since almost all of the Word’s 
inner meaning looks, speaks, and points to that life. For these reasons I have 
been granted the privilege of disclosing what I have heard and seen over the 
past several years of interaction with spirits and angels.310 
 
 His presentation of visionary experiences therefore serves as a kind of evidence, 
not only of his being gifted the ability to understand scripture from God and heaven, but 
                                                          
309 These “memorable relations” do appear also in Explicatio in Verbum, though in a less systematic, more 
associative style. They are marked, not as opening and closing sections of each chapter as in Arcana, but 
simply with marginal indentation wherever they land. 
310 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 67. 
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of the very nature of scripture, that it serves as a conduit to other dimensions of spiritual 
reality. In several places in Arcana coelestia, Swedenborg describes how the Bible is 
perceived and interpreted by the angels in three heavens. In number 167, for example, he 
writes that those in the lowest heaven reenact for each other, in a dramatic production, the 
literal stories of the Bible, while the angels of the second, or spiritual heaven, perform the 
stories with finer detail and attention to their inner meaning. The angels of the third and 
highest heaven, the celestial heaven, enact a meaning of the text that is ineffable and 
infinite: “in great richness . . . filled with angelic ideas for which there are no words, and 
by the Lord’s good pleasure, they see it in all its boundless variety.”311 
 While Swedenborg has much to say about the way scripture is interpreted on 
various heavenly planes, he does not encourage others to seek the kind of direct access to 
heaven and hell that he has been granted. Whatever connection to angels a reader of the 
Bible initiates, certain veils are not meant to be lifted. Consequently, an important effect 
of the way Swedenborg combines his experiences and his exegesis is that he claims 
unique authority to interpret directly from God, bypassing ecclesiastical authority and 
tradition. As discussed above, he denies the influence of any tradition or teacher. He 
dismisses past attempts by Christians to allegorize as misguided, and associates Jewish 
mystical interpretation with alchemy.  
Wouter Hanegraaff argues on the basis of Swedenborg’s claim of independence 
from tradition that Swedenborg’s spiritual sense is distinctly Protestant: it is from 
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scripture alone, and by the grace of God that the Word is opened to him. 312 However, 
Swedenborg might better be understood as part of a tradition of charismatic interpreters 
reaching into the Middle Ages. Robert Lerner, for instance, has described a particular 
school of thought developed in the high and later Middle Ages that utilized an “ecstasy 
defense” against charges of heresy. Robert Liege, Joachim of Fiore, Arnold of Villanova, 
and many more, produced innovative interpretations of the Bible on the basis of visions 
and miraculous experiences. Swedenborg especially fits the profile of this school of 
thought, with its emphasis on illuminating the spiritual sense of scripture (a gift 
distinguished from prophecy), on decoding the book of Revelation in particular, and on 
progressivist interpretations of human religious history. In this light, Swedenborg’s is not 
uniquely Protestant, but part of a thread with pre-reformation roots devised to challenge 
authority and to justify exegetical innovations in a “framework of subversive historical 
theology.”313 Joachim of Fiore is an important predecessor to Swedenborg, given that he 
so effectively set the stage for future Christian conceptions of typology and of religious 
history. Joachim believed that the Old Testament represented the historical age of the 
Father, the New Testament the age of Christ, and the Apocalypse the age of the Spirit to 
come. He believed that he lived to witness the beginning of the final age; that 
ecclesiastical reforms of his time would signal the messianic era; and that by correctly 
interpreting the actions of present-day popes and kings, he could decipher the unfolding 
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of events predicted by biblical figures.314 All of this has interesting parallels in 
Swedenborg’s work, and his version of the successive eras of religious history will be 
explored below. 
We can trace Swedenborg’s messianic interests to well before he began writing 
Arcana coelestia,315 but over time Swedenborg comes to view the unlocking of scripture 
provided in his own publications as the second coming of Christ, the inauguration of the 
new and final age predicted in the book of Revelation.316 The devastating events in 
Revelation do not describe the second coming literally, but are all symbolic for a spiritual 
upheaval, a rebalancing of heaven and hell that will occur at the end of one era (the 
Christian Church) and the beginning of a new one (the New Church). The opening up of 
the secrets of scripture is one effect of this event, and Swedenborg believed himself to 
have been selected for the job of scribe. Arcana coelestia, as well as his other 
commentaries, such as his Apocalypsis Revelata (Apocalypse Revealed, 1766), were 
therefore understood by their author to be major moments in the Apocalypse itself. 
 However, not every book of the Bible concealed a hidden meaning, according to 
Swedenborg, and he believed an internal sense was revealed to him for just 29 Old 
Testament Books, and five from the New Testament. Swedenborg’s small canon was a 
point of controversy among his readers, as we will see in chapter 6, but there is no tone of 
                                                          
314 See Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, “Epochs and Eras,” in Philosophia Perennis: Historical Outlines of 
Western Spirituality in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought, 369-408 (Netherlands: Springer, 
2004). 
315 See for instance the short, unpublished De Messia Venturo in Mundum, (On the Messiah Who is Going 
to Come into the World, 1745). English translation in The Messiah About to Come, trans, Alfred Acton 
(Bryn Athyn, PA: Academy of the New Church, 1949). 
316 nunc liceat intellectualiter intrare in arcana fidei “it is now permitted to enter understandingly into the 
mysteries of faith.” True Christianity, 508. 
161 
 
 
apology in those places where he lists the books with a spiritual sense.317 His rational for 
the exclusion of so much of the Christian scriptures centers on the sayings of Christ and 
the fulfillment of prophecy in the events of the Christ story. He cites Luke 24:44, in 
which Jesus says: “Everything must be fulfilled that is written about me in the Law of 
Moses, the Prophets and the Psalms.”318 Swedenborg reasons that the Law includes the 
five books of Moses, Joshua, Judges, Samuel and Kings. He adds the Major and Minor 
Prophets and the book of Psalms, and leaves out material otherwise categorized as 
wisdom literature or Writings. As for the New Testament, Swedenborg excludes all but 
the four Gospels and the book of Revelation.319 The precise words of Christ, recorded in 
the Gospels alone, contain hidden wisdom: “all of which have concealed in them a 
spiritual sense, through which immediate communication with heaven is granted, while 
the writings of the Apostles contain no such sense, although they are nevertheless useful 
books for the church.”320 This language, acknowledging the usefulness of the rest of the 
New Testament material if not its holiness, echoes Luther’s reason for separating the 
deuterocanonical material from his Old Testament in 1534 under the heading: 
“Apocrypha: These books are not held equal to the Sacred Scriptures, and yet are useful 
and good for reading.”321 Whether or not Swedenborg consciously saw himself as either 
participating in, or improving on, Luther’s edited down canon, a spirit of reform and 
renewal pervades his commentaries. His messianic calling to uncover and record the 
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spiritual sense of scripture was overly ambitious, however, and only three of the 34 books 
of God’s true Word received his full commentary: Genesis and Exodus in Arcana 
coelestia, and Revelation in Apocalypsis Revelata. 
As for the format of the exegetical material in Arcana coelestia, it follows a 
consistent pattern. Each chapter of the Bible is first quoted in its entirety in Latin, 
drawing heavily on Sebastian Schmidt’s 1696 Latin Bible. Swedenborg then gives a brief 
summary of the spiritual sense of the chapter, before beginning a lengthy, verse by verse 
study of the inner meaning. Each verse is quoted in turn a second time in the main body 
of the commentary, followed by paragraphs elucidating each word or phrase in that 
verse.322 In the introduction to the latest English translation of Arcana, the New Century 
Edition, William Ross Woofenden and Jonathan Rose compare this format to the proofs 
of Euclid, whereby a proposition is stated, argued and proven in a design imitating 
geometric patterns.323 By considering the biblical text from these three vantage points—
quoted by chapter, summarized and then scrutinized in verse and word—Swedenborg 
makes use of different “optical powers,”324 a metaphor suited to the hermeneutics of 
Swedenborg, who himself compared the perception of internal realities of spiritual things 
to seeing nature through a microscope.325  
 A major component of Swedenborg’s biblical commentary is cross-referencing. 
Nearly every interpretive moment is reinforced with the quotation of one or more verses 
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from different parts of the Bible. He most frequently uses proof texts from the Psalms and 
the Prophets, but the citations span the biblical corpus, including the New Testament, and 
draw on the extensive concordances he produced for himself from 1746-1748. His cross-
references typically serve to reinforce a particular allegorical interpretation: to show how 
the meaning of a given word or concept is consistent throughout the Bible. For example, 
when introducing the inner sense of the serpent in Genesis 3, he cites five other instances 
of snakes in the Bible and elucidates their meaning in each context, demonstrating the 
consistency of the reference. The snake in Psalm 140:3-5 refers to people who “beguile 
others with false reasoning;” with Psalm 58:3-5 he describes those who “prevent people 
from listening to anything wise,” with Amos 5:19-20, those who place too much 
“confidence in the evidence of our senses,” with Jeremiah 46:20-24, those who are 
blinded by sensualia et scientifica, and with Job 20:16-17, those whose sophistic 
arguments are like the sound of a snake.326 These exhaustive references, coupled with the 
repetition required by his axiomatic method, make reading Arcana coelestia notoriously 
laborious, a point that will feature in our discussion of Arcana coelestia’s reception in the 
following chapters. It nevertheless creates a network of correspondences that reaches 
across the biblical text, intended to demonstrate the rootedness of certain symbols, that 
their meaning is fixed and consistent.327 
                                                          
326 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 195. 
327 Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of symbols is similar to Swedenborg’s in this respect, that they are 
“bound to the universe,” fixed in correspondences. See Paul Ricoeur, “Metaphor and Symbol” in 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, 45-69. On the history of French 
philosophical engagement with the concept of correspondences (a term Ricoeur does employ) see Lynn 
Rosellen Wilkinson, The Dream of an Absolute Language: Emanuel Swedenborg and French Literary 
Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). 
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 As we will see in part three of this dissertation, Swedenborg was criticized for his 
heavy emphasis on interpreting Old Testament texts by prominent contemporaries such 
as Immanuel Kant and John Wesley. However, such an emphasis was not out of place in 
the context of the work of Newton and Whinston, for instance, who took seriously the 
work of interpreting the Old Testament in light of new scientific and intellectual 
advancements, and amidst the surge in hermetic and kabbalistic interests among 
Swedenborg’s predecessors. Neither should the emphasis be overstated, as typological 
readings in Arcana coelestia involve regular digressions into Gospel texts, and the book 
of Revelation receives special attention in later publications, as discussed above. 
 Finally, a word on Swedenborg’s “senses,” or the levels of meaning he finds 
encoded in the biblical text is in order. While there is much in Arcana coelestia to 
suggest Swedenborg intended a systematic, even mathematical, approach to the internal 
sense, in practice his interpretation is quite fluid.328 The number of senses varies from 
place to place: he sometimes divides them into three329 and other times into four.330 More 
frequently he simple refers to the “internal sense” as distinct from the “external sense” 
effectively dividing the levels of meaning into two broad categories, which can be then 
                                                          
328 On the discrepancy that often manifests between hermeneutical principles and practice in biblical 
exegesis, see Ocker, Biblical Poetics. 
329 For example see Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 10614 [2], and Angelic Wisdom Concerning Divine Love 
and Wisdom, trans. John C. Ager (West Chester, PA: Swedenborg Foundation, 1995), 221. 
330 For example Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 4279 [2]. Also Apocalypse Explained 1024 and 1066. On 
the comparison between these four senses and other Christian and non-Christian four-fold models of 
interpretation see Lawrence, “Speaking of Something Else.” See also William R. Woofenden, “Doctrinal 
Patterns in Arcana caelestia,” Studia Swedenborgiana 7:4 (January 1992): 31-47; 8:1 (July 1993): 49-77; 
8:2 (July 1993): 29-53; 8:3 (December 1993): 43-63. 
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subdivided in various arrangements.331 Rather than force a consistent pattern or 
framework onto the content of Swedenborg’s interpretation, we do better to identify the 
general themes or references. The internal sense usually refers to one of three things: the 
spiritual growth of the individual, the history of churches or eras, or the life of Christ. 
Each of these three follows a developmental model and concerns the process of spiritual 
growth or “regeneration.” An interpretation of a given word or verse in the Bible might 
reference one, two, or all three of these themes. It might reference, for example, Jesus’ 
education when he was a child, while also speaking to the childhood of people more 
generally, or the infancy of the human species during ancient times. We can identify 
certain emphases in certain sections or volumes of Arcana coelestia, but he does not treat 
these three themes systematically.332 He can move from one to another without notice, or 
discontinue one line of inquiry before it reaches a full conclusion. Therefore, while 
Swedenborg’s tone is often scientific or systematic, his train of thought can be circuitous. 
This is not surprising given the overall content of the work, and it again brings to mind 
that Arcana coelestia is at least as much a record of his religious experience as it is 
doctrinal exposition. 
 For all its inconsistencies, one premise remains constant in Arcana coelestia. 
Fundamental to Swedenborg’s hermeneutics, and the concept upon which his exegetical 
and theological writings build, is the division of every spiritual reality into two essential 
                                                          
331 This division into two basic categories that are then subdivided fits a pattern in the history of Christian 
biblical interpretation. See Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, trans. Marc 
Sabanc (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 25-26. For a historical overview of various divisions between 
senses by Christian exegetes, see Klepper, “Theories of Interpretation.” 
332 See Wouter Hanegraaff’s chart in the Introduction to Swedenborg, Secrets of Heaven, 98. 
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parts: love and wisdom. In God, Divine Love and Divine Wisdom are married. In humans 
as well, these faculties can be discerned: as the human brain is divided into right and left 
hemispheres, the human mind is divided into will (love) and intellect (wisdom). The 
heavens are likewise divided into celestial (loving) and spiritual (wise) realms. They 
correspond to the sibling virtues of goodness and truth, and their hellish counterparts are 
evil and falsity. In the human body they correspond to the heart and the lungs. In worship 
they are the bread and the wine, and so forth. The importance of this fundamental 
dualism for understanding Swedenborg’s biblical interpretation cannot be overstated.333 
Love and wisdom correspond to every biblical pairing: sun and moon, the beasts of the 
earth and the birds of the air, Abram and Sarai, Esau and Jacob, priests and prophets, tree 
and river, curtain and board, pearl and jewel, etc. Their imbalance is the subject of nearly 
every biblical conflict and their unity is the subject of every resolution. Taken as a whole, 
the biblical narrative warns of the consequences of one side predominating, or what 
amounts to having faith without charity or charity without faith. This dualism will inform 
much of Swedenborg’s reading of chapter 3 of Genesis, and speaks most frequently to his 
general concern about the dominance of intellectualism and dogmatism, a concern that is, 
as we have seen, at least somewhat autobiographical.  
Adam, Eve and the Serpent 
Swedenborg’s interpretation of Genesis 3 can be found in the third chapter of his 
first volume in Arcana coelestia. The chapter begins and ends with parts of a memorable 
                                                          
333 On Swedenborg’s possible connection to Platonism and Neoplatonism in this and other instances of 
dualism, see the discussion in chapter 3. 
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relation on the topic of what it is like for a person who has just died and is waking up and 
being welcomed in the spiritual world. The contents of the memorable relation and the 
interpretation of Genesis 3, as we said above, are not related to each other thematically 
and Swedenborg makes no attempt to connect them as the chapter progresses: the reader 
is simply given two wholly distinct portions of material to digest in one chapter. The 
implications of this arrangement, again, are twofold: 1) that Swedenborg gains the 
authority to interpret, not from any source of book learning or church tradition, but from 
his unique admittance to heaven while still living in his natural body and 2) that to read 
and interpret scripture is to participate in an activity whose effects span heaven and earth. 
And while the content is unrelated, the use of allegorical interpretation is present in both 
the memorable relation and the exegetical material. The objects and events he witnesses 
in the spiritual world are interpreted immediately. For example, upon waking up 
Swedenborg sees a young man riding a horse and trying to steer it towards hell. The 
horse refuses to move, and the man is forced to dismount and begin walking. This 
symbolizes, he writes, that before a person is permitted to drive themselves into either 
heaven or hell, they are first “taken to a society of good spirits” and “instructed in the 
knowledges of what is true and good.”334 Having interpreted his visionary experience, 
Swedenborg turns his attention to the text of the Bible. 
The interpretation of Genesis 3 is divided into three parts: verses 1-13, 14-19, and 
20-24. Each section begins with the entire text laid out first with no commentary and this 
is followed by a brief summary. In his summary of verses 1-13 Swedenborg reminds us 
                                                          
334 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 187-188. 
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(as the content of the interpretation relates to that from Genesis 2), that the Garden of 
Eden narrative tells, in its inner sense, about the spiritual demise of the earliest humans. 
Importantly, he does not point to a historical Adam or Eve, but says they represent the 
earliest humans as a whole, or the “Most Ancient Church.” This is a break from 
Swedenborg’s earlier commentary in Explicatio, in which Adam and Eve are treated as 
historical figures.335 In Arcana coelestia they become figures in a typological sense, and 
represent qualities of the first people, not the people themselves. Those of the Most 
Ancient Church were characterized by innocence and an unmediated connection to 
heaven. They existed in a “celestial” state, like those of the highest heaven, and therefore 
embodied the harmonious balance of love and wisdom in which love leads. Genesis 3 
tells of their downfall, which begins with the third generation.  
The two trees in the garden, the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge represent 
the two faculties of Divine Love and Divine Wisdom discussed above. Their balance is 
indicated by the placement of the trees at the center of the garden and correspond to the 
harmonious state of the first humans. That the Tree of Knowledge was violated signifies 
the introduction of an imbalance: that facts and intelligence became more important than 
love and charity, or that through doctrines they learned about love, rather than the other 
way around.336 The association of religious knowledge, doctrines, and faith with the “left 
                                                          
335 See Explicatio, Chapter 2. Interestingly, while Adam is indeed the “first-born” of all humanity in 
Explicatio, Swedenborg writes here that his rib was removed “only in a kind of dream” and that Eve was 
created separately in another location. We see in comparison to Arcana caelestia, a different 
arrangement of Swedenborg’s use of allegory. See verse 21. 
336 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 200. Mendelssohn’s interpretation of the eating of the forbidden fruit, 
discussed in chapter 1, similarly speaks of an imbalance between desire and comprehension. In 
Mendelssohn’s arrangement, however, desire overtook comprehension, whereas in Swedenborg’s it is 
understanding, or wisdom, that overpowers love. Swedenborg’s regular use of the metaphor of marriage 
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brain” activities of the intellect is characteristic of Swedenborgian thought, and the 
dominance of this side is related to the pitfalls of both Lutheran faith alone theology and 
the arrogance of the educated elite, as we will see.  The snake, the first man, and first 
woman, each represent different faculties within this ancient community as it began to 
deteriorate: the snake their attachment to their sense perceptions, the woman their self-
love, and the man their ability to reason. The narrative of their fall from God’s favor 
represents that “driven by self-love they began to believe nothing that they could not 
grasp with the physical senses”337 and that they began to “examine closely the tenets of 
faith in the Lord.”338 It is therefore doubt, questioning, the fixation on the senses and the 
“making sense” of faith that led to their demise, or their fall from a state of perfect 
perception and loving connection to God and heaven. The particulars of this fall, and how 
it connects to Swedenborg’s commentary on the state of Jews and modern scientists, 
emerges as he works through the interpretation verse by verse. 
The Bible is full of signs rather than similes, Swedenborg writes, because the 
earliest people “did not compare various human traits to animals and birds but called 
them such.”339 Ancient mythic symbolism refers to inner qualities of the human spirit, 
and the Bible is written in this tradition, as the practice “persisted in the ancient church . . 
. and prophets perpetuated it.”340 When we read about trees and snakes in a garden, 
                                                          
to describe the relationship between love and wisdom echoes the Zoharic interpretation. In the Zohar, 
the trees represent different sefirot: the Tree of Life is Yesod, and the Tree of Knowledge is Shekhinah. 
The sin of Adam and Eve is in separating these would be lovers, and their reunification is the goal of 
human religious activity. See, for instance, Matt, The Zohar, 1:35a-1:36b. 
337 Ibid., 191. 
338 Ibid., 192. 
339 Ibid., 195. 
340 Ibid. 
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therefore, we are also reading about human traits.341 Swedenborg’s semiotics has an 
ontological component: the correspondence relies on the integrity of the sign. This 
contrasts, for instance, with Kant’s formulation in which biblical symbols can be 
removed once they have served their purpose of pointing to a moral philosophy. Kant’s 
views will be explored in the next chapter, but it helps to underscore the nature of 
Swedenborg’s biblical reading. His is a theory of naming in which what a thing is called 
shares in the reality of certain underlying qualities. The serpent, in this view, is the 
symbol for the lure of sense and science, sensualia et scientifica, and this meaning would 
have been immediate for someone living at the time of the most ancients: “In ancient 
times, people who put more trust in what they learned through their senses than in what 
had been revealed were called snakes.”342 But “snakes” are by no means a problem 
exclusive to antiquity. 
“The situation now is even worse” writes Swedenborg. People today who will 
believe only what can be proven with the senses become in the end blind to truth.343 
Scholars and philosophers deny the reality of spirit, and see only matter. They “bury the 
idea [of the spirit] in speculation until it disappears from their sight and turns into 
nothing.”344 They believe they are being led by the pursuit of truth, but their love of self 
and of the world distorts their perception. As it was in ancient times, so is it today. Much 
of Swedenborg’s interpretation of Genesis 3:1-13 is taken up with comparing the 
                                                          
341 The capacity for pagan or ancient cultures to appreciate and encode sacred knowledge was a subject of 
particular fascination during the enlightenment. See Assmann, Moses the Egyptian, 102. 
342 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 196 
343 Ibid. 
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skepticism of humanity’s third generation to the skepticism of his day. He goes into great 
detail describing what these people, in both time periods, are like.  
Such people want to be recognized as gods or as fonts of wisdom, but if you 
ask them whether they know what it is to lack selfhood, they will answer that 
it is nonexistence; once depraved of it, they would be nothing. If you ask 
whether they know what it is to live from the Lord, they consider the concept 
a fantasy. If you inquired whether they knew that conscience was, they would 
describe it as nothing more than an imaginary something-or-other good for 
keeping the common people under control. If you inquired whether they 
knew what perception was they would do nothing but sneer and call it a sign 
of religious mania.345 
 
 We have in this description something of a portrait depicting Swedenborg’s 
perception of the Deists and skeptics of his day. They are the learned blind, the educated 
fools. They are Adam and Eve exposed, driven by reason and self-love. Their store of 
knowledge is the true wealth keeping the camel from passing through a needle’s eye.346 It 
is a skepticism that he was himself susceptible to at certain times in his life, as we have 
seen, and so its threat is also a personal one.  
Just as Swedenborg blurs past and present in describing these snake people, he 
likewise blurs the boundary between earthly and spiritual representatives of this class. 
Swedenborg meets spirits in the other world who are characterized in the same way. They 
confuse evil and good to such a degree and are utterly confused by their own intelligence. 
They “take to debating what constitutes spiritual and heavenly life, or faith, and they 
always succumb to doubt and even denial, as I have been allowed to see. . . While they 
are in this abyss, the slightest objection overpowers a thousand truths, like a spec of dirt 
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on the pupil of the eye that prevents a viewer from seeing the universe and everything in 
it.”347 Speculation and debate obscure true perception. He identifies this fault in people 
from the ancient past, people in his immediate cohort, and in spirits living on past death 
who nevertheless deny spiritual realities. It is a fault that pervades his cosmos, crossing 
every boundary of time and space.  
We are left wondering about these grave and ubiquitous errors. What exactly 
constitute the qualities of sensualia et scientifica? Much later, in considering the act of 
interpretation itself, in the dream interpretation of the baker and butler in Egypt, 
Swedenborg lists 14 kinds of illusions of the senses that lead one astray (and in this case 
away from the internal sense). They begin with things related to scientific discoveries and 
move into more religious matters. Some of these illusions of the senses are: the belief that 
the sun revolves around the earth, that the existence of all things proceeds from an 
original moment at creation rather than the perpetual coming into existence from God, 
that all reality can be detected in simple substances such as monads and atoms, that life 
ends when the body dies, that the soul resides in the brain or the heart and rules the body 
as if it were a machine, that man lives from himself alone and not from God, that adultery 
is allowed, and that man is saved by faith alone.348 We see in this list several of the 
religious and scientific debates of Swedenborg’s day, as well as positions he himself once 
held, such as the material domain of the soul and the Lutheran doctrine of faith alone 
(faith without charity, in the Swedenborgian framework, signals the dominance of the 
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intellectual, or wisdom side of the faculties). That Swedenborg found such views 
alluring, or that his own proclivity for intellectual debate and academic advancement was 
interpreted as a temptation of the senses can be seen in his treatment of many of the 
Bible’s female characters, such as Sarah whose beauty was too much for her Egyptian 
hosts to resist.349 That Eve could sway Adam in favor of the serpent’s path, therefore, is 
less a commentary on sexual temptation than intellectual temptation.350  
In the second section of the Genesis 3 commentary, on verses 14-19, sensuality 
becomes more of a focus, and we see a decoupling of the sensualia et scientifica pair. 
Swedenborg reiterates the cause of the fall of the Most Ancient Church in terms of their 
reliance on their senses, as time went on, and in this section he associates this focus on 
the senses with literalism. In a telling comparison, Swedenborg links the way the ancients 
began to rely on their sensory experience for knowledge, rather than influx from heaven, 
to people who concentrate on the grammar and words of language rather than the 
message those words impart.351  Just as the ancients lost sight of the reference of their 
symbolic language, literalists cannot perceive the truth embedded in language, and in 
both cases it is the senses that lead astray. The shallow perceptions of sight, sound, taste 
                                                          
349 Ibid., 1480. 
350 Swedenborg does exploit standard gender role divisions in parts of his interpretation of Genesis 2 and 
3, as discussed in Susanne Scholz, "Beyond Postmodernism? Esoteric Interpretations of Gen 1-3 by E. 
Swedenborg, R. Steiner, and S. D. Fohr," in Hidden Truths from Eden: Esoteric Readings of Genesis 1-3, 
eds., Caroline Vander Stichele and Susanne Scholz, 169-196 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014). Scholz, however, 
overstates the case and misses the significant ways Swedenborg’s interpretation overcomes a gendered 
reading. For instance, in Arcana caelestia 152-159, Swedenborg presents the interpretation that by “man” 
(vir), and “woman” in Genesis 2: 22-23, are not meant individuals of different genders, but two faculties 
within the individual.  
351 Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 241. 
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and touch distract from spiritual realities. The consequences of this distraction are various 
forms of disbelief, symbolized by the curses God gives to the three sinners in Eden.   
It is in the middle of an interpretation of Genesis 3 verse 15 that Swedenborg 
begins his discussion of the state of the Jewish Church. The introduction of disbelief that 
occurred in the later generations of the Most Ancient Church, and that is symbolized in 
the curses on the serpent and Eve, continues to grow as humanity develops collectively. 
The darkness reaches a climax with the Jewish Church, such that by the time Jesus is 
born into the world, the world had “sunk all the way down into a hellish, diabolical kind 
of selfhood, through self-love and materialism.”352 The rationality of humanity, like the 
heel of Adam, becomes infected with the serpent’s venom and humanity loses its ability 
to save itself.353 It is in the midst of this interpretation that we find the number quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, which describes the snake’s destruction with both Jews and 
scientists/philosophers. And as the chapter progresses, we find that the ultimate illusion 
of sensory thinking, according to Swedenborg, is the rejection of Christ. The curse on 
Adam, that he was to eat bread in the sweat of his face, is linked both to the ancients who 
were “so degenerate and so immersed in what belonged to their senses and their body that 
they refused to hear about religious truth or about the Lord’s nature” and to the Jews 
“whose nature was such that they would not acknowledge heavenly things and did not 
want any other Messiah than a worldly one.”354 Adam’s soiled bread is compared to the 
                                                          
352 Ibid., 256. 
353 Swedenborg acknowledges the widespread messianic interpretations of the curse in Genesis 3:15, that 
“He will trample you on the head and you will wound him on the heel” even while defending the details of 
his interpretation as entirely unique. See Arcana caelestia, 250.  
354 Ibid., 276. 
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manna rejected by the Jews who were infected with serpents as a consequence in 
Numbers 21: 6. 
The final section of Genesis 3, which relates God’s banning Adam and Eve from 
Eden, is interpreted by Swedenborg generally to concern the issue of profanation. In his 
summary and initial interpretations he links the biblical narrative back to the fall of the 
earliest church. But he quickly resumes his exposition of the Jewish Church and writes at 
some length here on the spiritual ineptitude of the Jews and their propensity for 
profanation. Genesis 3:22, in which God gives his reasons for the couple’s expulsion, 
triggers this moment in Swedenborg, with its plural pronoun “us” and the pairing of two 
words for God, Jehovah Deus. He also explains the Hebrew word Elohim for his 
audience, with its plural ending.355 As we saw in chapter 3, Swedenborg’s explanation of 
God’s plurality is accompanied by the assertion that the Jews have been kept from 
understanding this mystery. “Here lie two pieces of wisdom. One is that Jehovah God 
symbolizes the Lord and at the same time heaven. The other is that if those people had 
learned the mysteries of faith, they would have been destroyed forever.”356 Why the 
revealing of a biblical mystery necessitates such an immediate comment on the inability 
of Jews to understand that mystery is itself a puzzle. It is especially puzzling given that 
the “ministry of angels” is the solution to God’s plural forms also found in Jewish 
sources, and we are left wondering if in these two pieces of wisdom we see a 
defensiveness described by Bloom’s anxiety of influence, as discussed above.  
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In terms of the interpretation of Genesis 3, it is the second part of verse 22 that 
Swedenborg relates directly to the Jews. God’s words “now perhaps people will put out 
their hand and take from the tree of life as well, and eat, and live forever” indicate that 
the other tree in the garden was in danger of the same violation the Tree of Knowledge 
endured. In Swedenborg’s terms, Divine Love would be violated the same way Divine 
Wisdom was, were the sinners not driven out. Likewise, in order to protect the inner most 
senses of scripture, which speak of Divine Love, the Jews were prevented from their 
access. 
This was the reason why mysteries of faith were never revealed to the Jews. 
Being what they were they were not even explicitly told that they would, nor 
explicitly told that the Lord would come into the world to save them. Indeed 
they were kept in such ignorance and stupidity, and are so still, that as a result 
they did not know and still do not know of the existence of the internal man, 
or of anything internal at all. For if they had known it then, or were to know it 
now, so as to acknowledge it, they would profane it and in so doing would 
have no hope at all of salvation in the next life.357 This is what the Lord 
meant in John, “He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, lest they 
see with their eyes and understand with their heart, and are converted and I 
heal them.” John 12:40. Also, the Lord spoke to them in parables, and 
without explaining any to them, 'lest seeing they might see, and hearing they 
might hear, and understand', as He declares in Matthew 13:13.358  
  
Adam and Eve were kept from profaning the Tree of Life, and the Jews, in this 
interpretation, were kept from profaning the Divine Love tucked behind the words of the 
Bible, lest they be “destroyed forever.”359 The above number is especially noteworthy for 
                                                          
357 Despite the reference to the salvation of Jews in the next life, Swedenborg does not hold to the view, 
more or less traditional in Christendom, that Jews will collectively convert at the end of days. The 
conversion and/or salvation of Jews in the next life is described as an individual, rather than collective, 
event. He describes, in places, the locations in the other world where “better” and “worse” sorts of Jews 
live eternally, as for instance in Arcana caelestia 941. 
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its repeated move from past to present: that they “they were kept in such ignorance and 
stupidity, and are so still” and “if they had known it then, or were to know it now. . .” The 
link between the Jews of history and the present day Jews is especially unfortunate given 
his view of the Jewish Church in history.  
The exegetical material in this chapter ends with a reflection on the nature of the 
fall. Swedenborg summarizes how his view of the fall is different: that we can’t trace all 
of humanity’s sin to one historical individual. He describes the sins of the first few 
generations as a whole, and how it has corollaries in the present: but we do not inherit 
their sin according to the traditional view. Swedenborg clarifies that he does believe in 
inherited sin, that evil can be passed from one generation to the next, but he puts a 
distance between the events of the first humans and the sins of the present.360 This sets 
him up to be able to reject Lutheran atonement theology, or rather to put an entirely new 
spin on an old theme. Jesus came into the world, not to atone for the sin of Adam and 
Eve, but to address the darkness that enveloped humanity collectively during the reign of 
the Jewish Church. Jesus “fought against the hells” which had gained too much power 
and created an imbalance between goodness and evil.361 Swedenborg therefore shifts the 
timing and location of humanity’s darkest hour, from the primordial garden to first 
century Israel.  
Conclusion: Swedenborg’s Fall 
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It is worth noting, in conclusion, that Swedenborg criticizes the Christian Church in 
his commentaries on Revelation in terms similar to his criticism of the Jewish Church. 
Christian profanation and the imbalance of faith over charity in the church are 
symbolized in elements of the Apocalypse and signal the end of that church’s era and the 
coming of the New Church. Swedenborg joins Joachim of Fiore, Dante and others, in 
critically applying an interpretation of Revelation against the church authorities of his 
day. His claims about the spiritual corruptibility of Jews as a whole, then, are in turn 
lodged at Christendom.362 The relocation of humanity’s fall to the time of Christ’s birth is 
emphasized in his early commentary in Arcana coelestia, but a subsequent “fall” receives 
greater attention in his later work. 
The overall move in Swedenborg’s chapter on Genesis 3 in Arcana coelestia, from 
a focus on materialism and intellectualism to a focus on Jews, all the while telling the 
story of the first generations of humanity, gives an indication of Swedenborg’s 
conceptions about where threats against biblical spirituality were located. The first kind 
of pitfall associated with the serpent, that of empiricism or trusting one’s own sense 
perceptions, is both universal and personal for Swedenborg: anyone can fall prey to it, as 
he himself did. The second pitfall is neither universal nor personal at the surface level. It 
applies to the Jews (and later to Christians who profane like the Jews), and Swedenborg 
wasn’t one of them. If, however, we read Swedenborg’s interpretation as an indication of 
the “anxiety of influence” as discussed in the previous chapter, it becomes very personal 
                                                          
362 Peter Olivi, in Joachim’s wake, made a similar move in applying traditional interpretations of carnal 
Israel to carnal Church, forcing a self-critical reading of traditional tropes about the Jews (as blind and 
carnal). See Klepper, Insight of Unbelievers, 73. 
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indeed.  It is precisely in the places where Swedenborg’s work shared the most 
meaningful hermeneutical horizons with Kabbalah in its various forms that he drew on 
old stereotypes of Jews as literalists, from Augustine, Luther and others. In working out 
an allegorical interpretation of Genesis 3 in an age that increasingly associated allegory 
with Jews, Swedenborg inserted an indissoluble divide between himself and Jews: one 
that underscored his own access to the Bible’s secrets, while insisting on the limits of 
Jewish interpretation. 
Finally, in concluding part two of this study, it is worth asking the question whether 
Swedenborg’s condemnation of those who seek knowledge through the senses, those 
symbolized by the serpent of Genesis 3, is contradictory, given that it is precisely through 
things “seen and heard” in the spiritual world that Swedenborg derives his authority to 
interpret scripture. Swedenborg resolves this contradiction, as we saw in chapter two, by 
claiming to leave behind the empiricism of science in favor of a spiritual empiricism. 
And yet his readers are asked to rely entirely on his sense-based observations, spiritual or 
otherwise, while being warned off the experiential reports of other men. In one sense 
then, his attack on sensualia et scientifica can be understood as resulting from another 
kind of anxiety of influence; the attack marks his religious experience as distinct from the 
natural sciences, which rely on the familiar mechanisms of observable sights and sounds 
but are nevertheless limited and unreliable. 
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PART III 
PERSPECTIVES ON SWEDENBORG AND ALLEGORY: THE DISCOURSE 
ABOUT ARCANA COELESTIA 
 
CHAPTER 5: RECEPTION IN PHILOSOPHY AND IMMANUEL KANT’S ANXIETY OF 
INFLUENCE 
 
 Part three of this dissertation will consider the role of allegory in the work of 
those who read and responded to Swedenborg’s biblical commentary.  Swedenborg’s 
reception in philosophy, theology and the arts and literature, will be taken up in turn over 
the course of three chapters. Like those whose commentaries we considered in part one, 
the figures treated in this section are responding to challenges to biblical hermeneutics 
lodged from the frontiers of the new sciences as well as to the tides of anti-Judaism and 
Christian Kabbalah that shaped eighteenth-century Christian self-identity. Unlike those in 
our first chapter, however, the individuals discussed below are also responding to 
particular approach to interpretation found in Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences. 
Criticism of Swedenborg, among the figures studied here, ranges from those who accuse 
him of heresy and fanaticism, to those who dismiss him as too attached to Christian 
institutions and outdated symbols of orthodoxy. His followers, likewise, range from those 
who view his interpretations as linked to an ancient and hallowed inner sense tradition, to 
those who view his exegesis as something entirely novel, ringing in a new era of true 
understanding. For many of these figures, however, their estimation of Swedenborg is 
decidedly mixed, reflecting the ambiguity towards allegory that characterizes this 
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century. It is this latter opinion that best characterizes the viewpoint of Immanuel Kant, 
our first subject in this study of Swedenborg’s reception.   
If we limit ourselves strictly to the field of philosophy, or to those who would 
place themselves and their work in that category, the reception of Arcana coelestia, and 
of Swedenborg’s work in general, more or less begins and ends with Kant. Kant had the 
last word on Swedenborg in certain circles, for while his assessment was far from 
unequivocal, it was enough to discourage further investigation among his followers. As 
we will see, Swedenborg’s philosophical influences after Kant are limited to a few 
fleeting moments in the countercurrents of idealism and romanticism, such as we find in 
the work of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Swedenborg’s secular influence was far 
greater in literature and the arts than in academic philosophy and this is due largely to 
Kant’s evaluation of him.  
Kant is important to this study for a number of reasons. First, it was Arcana 
coelestia in particular, among Swedenborg’s writings that he purchased, read and wrote 
about. Second, Swedenborg’s system of correspondences, or the assertion that spiritual 
realities appear in the form of symbols and representations in the physical world, is a 
point that Kant wrestled with as he drew new borderlines around the field of metaphysics. 
And finally, Kant’s approach to biblical interpretation has much in common with 
Swedenborg’s despite his dismissal of the exegetical material in Arcana coelestia. It may 
be going too far to say that his engagement with Swedenborg caused his “critical turn”363 
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Imagination," in What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, 
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but Kant’s interest in Swedenborg did come at a time when his ideas about metaphysics 
were shifting, a time when he began to subject his interest in incorporeal things to 
rational critique. Arcana coelestia, for better or worse, takes its place in the course of 
Western Philosophy, in part at least, as a footnote to Kant’s redefinition of metaphysics. 
This chapter will consider the diverse ways Kant’s reading of Arcana coelestia impacted 
his philosophy relevant to the themes that presently concern us, namely: shifting ideas 
about science, religious identity and the allegorical interpretation of scripture. 
Kant read and responded to Arcana coelestia at a turbulent time for German 
metaphysics. Frederick Beiser describes the tumultuous context:  
[The] problem arose when the old Aristotelian metaphysics, which had 
dominated German intellectual life in the seventeenth century, was thrown 
back on the defensive by the growth of the new sciences .The geometrical 
method of Cartesian physics, and the inductive-mathematical method of 
Newton, had undermined both the concepts and methods of the old 
Aristotelianism. The scholastic forms had been banished from physics as so 
many occult qualities and the deductive method of syllogistic reasoning was 
dismissed as fruitless. Metaphysics, it therefore seemed, was doomed to 
extinction, the legacy of a moribund scholasticism.364 
 
 Opposing responses to this crisis, from Leibniz and Wolff on one hand, and the 
Pietists on the other, further muddied the waters. Kant’s own equivocation on matters 
related to knowledge of God, providence, and the immortality of the soul, arises, 
therefore, amidst contexts that were very much in flux on these matters. Kant engaged 
                                                          
ed. James Schmidt, 426-452 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); and Constantin Rauer, Wahn 
und Wahrheit: Kants Auseinandersetzung mit dem Irrationalen, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007). 
364 Frederick Beiser, “Kant’s Intellectual Development: 1746-1781,” in Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. 
Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 27. 
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with and responded to Swedenborg, both positively and negatively, during various stages 
in the development of his thought, as we will see. 
I have argued that the case of Emanuel Swedenborg, and his ambiguous 
relationship to Jews and Judaism, is best understood as the result of what Harold Bloom 
terms an “anxiety of influence.” I will maintain that a similar anxiety appears in the work 
of Immanuel Kant, whose critical philosophy subsequent to reading Arcana coelestia 
demonstrates an affinity to many of Swedenborg’s key concepts, at the same time that he 
questions the veracity of Swedenborg’s visions and even his sanity. That his sharpest 
attack on Swedenborg comes in a chapter titled “Anti-Kabbalah” will further allow us to 
wade through the mud, so to speak, of eighteenth century scholarly rhetoric concerning 
Jewish mysticism. It will allow us to investigate a web of associations around mysticism, 
religious identity, spirituality and corporeality, and the implications of these associations 
on ideas about which individuals, which traditions, and which schools of thought were 
qualified to comment on the true nature of things.  
 Kant’s anxieties concerning Swedenborg appear in two general areas of his 
thought, one that is fairly broad ranging and pervades his work, and one that is more 
marginal. The first is epistemological, and concerns the limits of what we can know 
through the use of reason. This question requires, for Kant, the bracketing of areas of 
metaphysics that consider the existence and nature of spiritual realities, and centers on 
what our senses and mental faculties can reasonably demonstrate with certainty. The 
second area is exegetical and thereby concerns questions of the proper place for and 
interpretation of scripture. The state of the conflict between theology and philosophy 
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comes into play here, as it is the unique capacity of the latter to reveal true, moral, 
religion in scripture and to avoid the pitfalls of outdated and self-serving methods of 
interpretation (i.e. allegory) that Kant wishes to demonstrate. Kant frames his guiding 
principles in these areas of investigation in terms of reason and morality. His aim is 
practical and sensible, even if his style is notoriously opaque. However, in both instances 
his conclusions reveal more of a reframing of problematic categories rather than outright 
rejection. His continued interest in the intelligible world and the community of spirits, 
despite his demarcation of reason’s limits within the sensible world, is accompanied in 
several places with abridgments of Swedenborgian thought. And while he rejects 
Swedenborg’s allegorical methods, his alternative of a “moral sense” involves a familiar 
uncovering of wisdom hidden within the text and amounts to a reformulated geheimen 
Sinn.  
An analysis of Kant’s relationship to Swedenborg will consider these two areas of 
thought further below. It will be necessary first to summarize Kant’s handling of 
Swedenborg’s ideas throughout his work. This chapter will conclude with a section 
comparing Kant’s treatment of Judaism and the Old Testament to Swedenborg’s, and 
finally with a section on the response to Kant’s philosophy relative to Swedenborg from 
German idealism in the work of Schelling. Swedenborg’s brief representation in the 
deliberations of eighteenth-century German philosophy can be explained on the one hand 
by his own indebtedness to Leibniz and Wolff. More than that, however, it was his 
visions of the world of the dead that seemed to have captured the imagination of Kant, 
Schelling and others and to have been deemed relevant to discussions on the limits of 
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science and reason.365 Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences, with its familiar 
Leibnizian tenor and its ostensible application to science, to life after death and to biblical 
hermeneutics, resonated in thinkers such as Kant and Schelling, though not without 
triggering the anxieties of an enlightenment age fixated on reason and certainty.   
Overview of Kant’s Interest in Swedenborg 
Through his private correspondences, his university lectures, and his published 
writings we learn of Kant’s fascination with Emanuel Swedenborg. In a letter to Charlotte 
von Knobloch, written early in his career,366 Kant describes his skepticism of tales of 
miracles and clairvoyance, but writes that his position changed when he heard the stories 
coming from Sweden.367 Kant summarizes, at the request of von Knobloch, the findings 
of an investigation he organized into the facts surrounding three incidents, two involving 
Swedenborg’s communication with people who had died (one being the brother of 
                                                          
365 On Swedenborg’s reception among German intellectuals, including Johann Goerg Hamann, Johann 
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Sweden’s Queen Louisa Ulrika at her request), and a third involving Swedenborg’s 
knowledge of a distant fire in Stockholm. Kant sent a friend to investigate the events, to 
interview witnesses and to speak directly with Swedenborg, and reports on the collected 
evidence in positive terms. He mentions his frustrated attempts to correspond directly 
with the Swede, and that he awaits “with longing” the publication of a forthcoming book 
by Swedenborg out of London. For, rather than respond to Kant’s inquiries directly, 
Swedenborg had indicated that the answers to all of Kant’s questions would be answered 
in the book. “I have made every provision for receiving it as soon as it leaves the 
press,”368 writes Kant. This enthusiasm on Kant’s part is not sustained, or if it is, his 
public rhetoric about Swedenborg takes a very different tone, as we will see. 
 Kant also discusses Swedenborg in his university lectures, the notes from which 
we have from his students, including Johann Gottfried Herder. Swedenborg’s name arises 
in the lectures when Kant is discussing the possibility of communication with spirits, and 
he encourages his students to neither outright reject nor accept naively Swedenborg’s 
visions. For “to dismiss all, must deny soul or state after death—phantoms have fooled us 
99 times out of 100. Thus one inclines not to believe the probability of the majority of 
cases; but do not dismiss all of them summarily! Do not call liar, but rather non liquet 
[not proved].”369 And elsewhere on Swedenborg “[his] sensations indeed on the whole 
could be true, but are in part never certain.”370 His lectures and letters therefore reveal a 
                                                          
368 Tafel suggests the book was De Commercio Animæ & Corporis (Interaction of the Soul and the Body, 
1769). See note 3 above. 
369 Johann Gottfried Herder, “Excerpts from Herder Metaphysics and Herder Supplements (1763-1764),” 
as translated by Johnson and Magee in Kant on Swedenborg, 74. 
370 Ibid., 75. 
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certain equivocation and curiosity, and center on the question of communication with 
spirits and the connection between physical and spiritual realities. The fact that Kant went 
on to write an entire book on Swedenborg, however, challenges the perception that this 
was a fleeting or peripheral interest of his.  
Kant’s most famous and controversial engagement with Swedenborg comes in his 
short work, anonymously published, Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume 
der Metaphysik (Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics, 1766). 
An in-depth survey of Kant’s Träume is an appropriate place to begin our study of the 
reception of Arcana coelestia, as it was, for so many European intellectuals, their first 
introduction to Swedenborg and in many cases the last word on his relevance, or 
irrelevance, to the concerns of the day. Furthermore, the location of Träume in the 
development Kant’s critical philosophy, that it comes at a time when his views on the 
role of metaphysics and the limits of reason were radically shifting, makes it relevant to 
the study of Swedenborg’s place in philosophical discourse, and it will be necessary to 
spend some time here unraveling it.   
Contents of Träume  
 Any analysis of Kant’s Träume must grapple with its many inconsistencies in 
both content and style. Friedemann Stengel summarizes the problem faced by generations 
of readers: 
These ambivalent statements of Dreams, which vacillate between 
appropriation, sharp rejection and transformation; between satire and 
psychiatric diagnosis at the same time, were not named in order to provide a 
stringent and consistent interpretation of the text in regard to the ‘actual’ 
intention and the ‘true’ content. It will be difficult to present a non-
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ambiguous interpretation of Dreams that would lead, through a plausible 
harmonization or dissolution of the verbal and structural contradictions to a 
unified image with a clear overall message. This is not least due to the fact 
that the ambivalence of the individual chapters is also reflected stylistically. 
Ironic diatribes and ridicule against the spirit-seer and rationalist philosophy 
alternate with considerations in indirect language, with personal positionings 
through indicative clauses set in the first person,  and with powerful 
rejections, whose objects can no longer be readily gleaned from the flow of 
the text. Through this complex rhetorical procedure, Kant’s intentions remain 
obscured, especially where his concrete adversaries remain in the dark. Often, 
it is not clear which sections correspond to one another or if Kant is perhaps 
even having several people speak.371  
 
We will consider the effect of these inconsistencies on Kant’s readers, and their 
effect in turn on Swedenborg’s reception, once a preliminary summary of the book’s 
structure, method, and argument is in place. The book is divided into two parts. The first, 
“Which is Dogmatic,” and the second, “Which is Historical,” deal respectively with 
universal questions of metaphysics and the particular case of Swedenborg. In an 
introductory “Preliminary Report Promising Very Little Before the Actual Treatise” Kant 
wonders at the proliferation and success of other-worldly tales, of “Hypochondriac 
emanations, fairy tales and convent miracles.”372 Should a philosopher admit even one of 
these tales? Or should such things be rejected categorically? Kant, seeking to balance 
dogmatism with skepticism, answers that it is just as foolish to discount them all as to 
believe without discernment, and admits to his own credulity: “the author of this treatise 
tried to avoid the former prejudice and thus allowed himself to be somehow led astray by 
the latter. Thus he admits with a certain humility that he was naive enough to undertake 
an investigation into the alleged truth of some of the stories of the kind mentioned. He 
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found, as is the case when one has nothing to look for, he found . . . nothing.”373 In 
defense of writing a book on this topic, Kant writes that he spent much time, money and 
effort on reading “a large work” (Arcana coelestia) and this should not be wasted. 
Anticipating the bewilderment that readers would face, he concludes: “Out of these 
circumstances arose the present treatise which, as we flatter ourselves, ought to satisfy 
the reader fully regarding the nature of the subject, with the result that he will not 
understand the noblest part, will disbelieve the bulk and simply laugh at the 
remainder.”374 Given the confused reviews and responses to his book, summarized below, 
Kant succeeded in this goal. 
Kant’s initial judgement on Arcana coelestia, that in it he found nothing, is more 
complicated than it first appears. One who is familiar with Swedenborg will note 
immediately a hidden tension in this preface, where Kant puts forth a third solution to the 
problem of whether to believe or not believe. The third solution is to simply not engage 
“such idle and useless questions” and to hold fast only to what is useful. Placing spirit 
stories in opposition to what is useful contradicts the thrust of Arcana coelestia, where 
spirit stories intermingle with a theological system singularly aimed at a life of useful 
service. Swedenborg replaces the Protestant emphasis on sola fide with his own emphasis 
on usefulness – that faith and charity are meaningless until they are applied. The theme of 
usefulness pervades Arcana coelestia, where the Kingdom of God becomes regnum 
usuum, and all knowledge and understanding that is not put to use is lost when a person 
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dies and enters the spiritual world because it contains nothing of spiritual substance.375 
This emphasis would have been attractive to Kant, whose philosophy was so guided by 
principles of morality and pragmatism. How are we to interpret Kant’s opposition 
between what is useful and spirit seeing in light of the fact that Swedenborg demands 
such a presence in both categories? Does Kant intend to use Arcana coelestia’s emphasis 
on usefulness against itself? This is a tension that returns wherever Kant discusses 
Swedenborg, especially in the last chapters of Träume. For, the purported uselessness of 
Swedenborg’s work is belied by Kant’s reluctance to give up on hope for a world of the 
numinous with remarkably specific features. 
The first chapter of Träume sets up a series of questions about the connection 
between the body and the spirit and about the nature, substance and location of the 
spiritual realities. Throughout, Kant repeats his general opinion, that while he is “inclined 
to affirm the existence of immaterial beings in the universe” including his own soul,376 
definitive answers to such questions are beyond the reach of our understanding. Thus, 
while he “cannot say whether or not spirits exists” or what “spirit” even means, he can 
compare the experiences different people report concerning spiritual realities, and by 
observing which of these reports align with his own imperfect perceptions and which run 
counter, something can be clarified.377  
With this methodology in place, Kant moves on in the second chapter, titled “A 
Fragment of Occult Philosophy to reveal Our Community with the Spirit World,” and 
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presents a description of the spirit world very much resembling Swedenborg’s reports, 
though he does not yet name Swedenborg. He considers a reality where the human soul is 
simultaneously linked to two worlds, the physical world and the spiritual world, and the 
human individual thereby stands in relationship to two communities. When a person dies, 
relationships of the natural world cease, but the individual continues in his/her spiritual 
relationships, which are formed in accordance with the moral life developed while living 
in the body.  It is through community with spirits that a person is able to receive influx 
from the spiritual world, and on occasion to have insight into this process. Such a view 
aligns seamlessly with descriptions in Arcana coelestia, where we read for example:  
Man is altogether ignorant that he is governed of the Lord through angels and 
spirits, and that with everyone there are at least two spirits, and two angels. 
By spirits man has communication with the world of spirits, and by angels 
with heaven. Without communication by means of spirits with the world of 
spirits, and by means of angels with heaven, and thus through heaven with 
the Lord, man could not live at all; his life entirely depends on this 
conjunction, so that if the spirits and angels were to withdraw, he would 
instantly perish.378  
 
Furthermore, Kant’s descriptions of influx from spirits align with Swedenborg’s 
correspondences. Insights from the spiritual world come in the form of symbols or 
representations, which take on different configurations with different people, according to 
their “different constitution.” The heterogeneity of representations is an obstacle for us in 
understanding spiritual realities, but not too great an obstacle. “In this way it is not 
improbable that spiritual impressions could penetrate into our consciousness if they were 
to stimulate images in our imagination which are somehow co-related to them. In this 
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way, ideas communicated under the influence of spirits tend to take concrete shapes in 
the signs of language which is customarily spoken . . .”379 With this more or less positive 
summary of a dualistic universe looking very much Swedenborgian in place, Kant ends 
the chapter with a warning of cases where imagination and mental illness enter the mix to 
the detriment of one’s ability to sort truth from fiction. Fantasy and distorted 
representations can have their origin in genuine influence from spirits, but it can be 
difficult or impossible to sort out pure visions from falsified ones. He ends with a 
warning to metaphysicians, echoing the fabled words of Tycho de Brahe’s coachman 
who advised him not to plan his rout by the stars “my dear Sir, you may be 
knowledgeable in heaven, but on earth you’re a fool.”380  
 The third chapter, titled “Antikabbalah: A Fragment of Common Philosophy 
Dissolving the Community with the Spirit World” takes on a very different tone, and 
reduces spirit seeing to malfunctioning of the brain. In explaining this new authorial 
voice, Gregory Johnson argues that Kant is here influenced by the style of Rousseau, and 
structures his argument as a dialectic.381 The voice in chapter three is not his own, argues 
Johnson, but is that of the “enlightened skeptic” and serves as a parody of French 
philosophers such as Voltaire and Diderot and of the German Popularphilosophen.382 
                                                          
379 Kant, Dreams of a Spirit Seer, trans. Manolesco, 55-56. 
380 Ibid., 58. 
381 I would like to note here that while Johnson’s scholarship has made important contributions to my 
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Kant’s cue to the reader is to misquote Aristotle at the start, imitating the tendency for 
enlightenment thinkers to misuse classical sources for their own cause. This would be 
convincing if the misattributed quote wasn’t used elsewhere by Kant without irony383 and 
wasn’t so in line with the concern expressed many times in the book: “When we are 
awake, we have a common world, but when we dream, each has his own.”384 For indeed, 
according to Kant, the truth must be consistent. Our experiences are best confirmed by 
similar experiences in other people, our judgement by the collective judgement of 
humanity, by the sensus communis. So, while Kant does adopt a new tone in voicing a 
skeptical explanation for spirit seeing in chapter three, it is not clear that the voice is not 
also Kant’s voice. 
In chapter three Kant explores scientific explanations for spirit seeing. Drawing 
on Descartes, he points to the internal activity in the brain that occurs when one is 
engaged in a fantasy or waking dream. Nerve activity that incorporates the senses outside 
the brain allow a person to engage objects that are outside of themselves. In a person who 
is mad, there is confusion between these two, and objects of fantasy are perceived as 
objectively real. In this way, ghost stories and spirit seeing can be explained as mental 
illness.  
The chapter ends by reflecting on one inconvenience brought about by these 
considerations: “they render superfluous the deeply-thoughtout conjectures in the 
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previous chapter. Furthermore, no matter how ready a reader might have been to give 
some assent to the idealistic approach contained therein, he will now undoubtedly prefer 
a hypothesis which allows more ease and brevity in arriving at some definite conclusion, 
and also one which promises a greater degree of approval.” If at the end of chapter three 
Kant seems to be suggesting the skeptical path is the lazy way out of a difficult problem, 
this is enforced by the contents of chapter four, in which the two approaches so far laid 
out are weighed on a “scale of understanding.” The credulous voice of chapter two is 
balanced against the skeptical voice of chapter three, and Kant admits he is a believer. 
This is a defect which truly speaking I cannot remove, nor do I want to 
remove it ever. I do admit, therefore, that all the stories which I have heard 
about the apparition of departed souls or other spirit influences, and all the 
theories about the alleged nature of spiritual beings and their alleges relation 
to us, humans, weigh a great deal more in the tray of the scale, marked 
“Hope,” whilst in the other tray marked “Speculation” the arguments do not 
appear to weigh more than air.385 
 
His bias in favor of the viewpoint of chapter two is destabilizing. He cannot shake 
his attraction to such things, and he utilizes skepticism to safeguard against imprudent 
naiveté. The two viewpoints, when combined, create a parallax effect, speculation 
balanced with hope is the only way of preventing optical illusion. “Nothing is more 
sacred to me, nothing more important right now than to find the path to truth in a calm, 
open-minded attitude, regardless of whether it will or will not confirm or rebut my 
previous judgements, regardless of whether it will leave me decided or undecided.”386 We 
sense the urgency with which he tests his credulity with criticism. 
                                                          
385 Kant, Dreams of a Spirit Seer, trans. Manolesco, 68 
386 Ibid., 67. 
195 
 
 
Kant’s description of the scale of understanding is autobiographical, and he 
understands it to be so. Readers should make up their own minds, he writes, which brings 
him to the question of ultimate concern: what we can know scientifically. If belief is 
personal, epistemology is communal. And here the limits are more clearly delineated. 
Philosophy simply cannot answer questions about the nature of spirit, nor should it 
attempt to. Curiously, he ends part one of his book by washing his hands of spirit seers, 
even as part two delves more deeply into the particular case of Emanuel Swedenborg.  
“And now I lay aside this whole subject of spirits, a remote part of metaphysics; I treat it 
as finished and done with. In the future I shall display no further interest in it.”387 
Perhaps, rather than putting the subject to bed, this statement marks the end of his 
personal confessions, for the thrust of remainder of the book is to create a distance 
between his own ideas and those of Emanuel Swedenborg, who he finally addresses by 
name.388 
Kant begins part two by noting that there is nothing more harmful to a 
philosopher’s reputation than being accused of credulity. He then presents the three 
famous stories surrounding Swedenborg’s clairvoyance with an attitude of indifference, 
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unlike the tone of his letter to Charlotte von Knobloch, which treated the same subject. 
Why should a philosopher report on stories about Swedenborg, “the arch-spirit seer of all 
spirit seers”? Kant’s answer builds a comparison to metaphysicians, who weave fairy 
tales of a similar sort. Philosophy should either accept or reject both together.389 But is 
Kant suggesting Metaphysics in its present form has no place in philosophy or that spirit 
seeing does have a place? His answer in favor of rejecting them both unfolds in the last 
two chapters, though not without further contradictions.  
Part two formally introduces Arcana coelestia, as “eight quarto volumes of sheer 
nonsense,” a line Mendelssohn would repeat in his review.390 Kant dismisses the 
allegorical content of Swedenborg’s commentary with one line: “His discoveries are 
often applied exegetically to clarify the secret meaning of the first two books of Moses, 
and similar new interpretations are devised for the whole of the Holy Scriptures.”391 
Kant’s interest lies elsewhere, he writes, in the memorable relations and in descriptions of 
the interaction between physical and spiritual things. The style of Arcana coelestia is 
dull, but this, Kant writes, is actually a fact in Swedenborg’s favor. It counters the 
suspicion that Swedenborg writes to deceive his audience. He cannot be called a liar, but 
the question of his sanity is left on the table. 
  Chapter two of the second part pleads with the reader, with more stress than one 
might deem necessary, not to draw comparisons between Kant and Swedenborg.  
I state as bluntly as possible: when it comes to such comparisons and 
insinuations I have no sense of humor, and I declare herewith emphatically: 
                                                          
389 Kant, Dreams of a Spirit Seer, trans. Manolesco, 76. 
390 Ibid., 82 
391 Ibid., 82. 
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either there is a great deal more wisdom and truth in Swedenborg’s writings 
than we may have thought at first glance, or the fact that his ideas agree with 
my own system is a mere coincidence, just as is the case with some poets, 
who, when they race in frenzy, as they themselves profess, utter prophecies, 
prophecies which now and again come true.392  
 
If Swedenborg got anything right it was by accident, Kant seems to be saying; 
don’t use this as a reason to connect Kant’s ideas to spirit-seeing. This petition is 
followed by a description of some of Swedenborg’s key ideas that do appear most similar 
to Kant’s. Swedenborg claims that each individual has two memories, an internal 
memory and an external one. Likewise, each has two kinds of senses, outer senses and 
inner senses.393 Time and space are perceived differently by the inner senses: proximity 
in this sense is determined by likeness rather than physical location.394 We are interiorly 
“close” to spirits who are like us, even if they are spirits whose bodies are from another 
continent.395 And the primary theme in Swedenborg, according to Kant’s reading, is that 
bodies cannot exists without spirits, or that material beings exist by the power of the 
world of spirits. It is the totality of all spirits, or the community of spiritual beings that a 
person belongs to interiorly, that gives a person life.396 Furthermore, the parts of the body 
are mutually related according to physical laws, but body parts also receive animating 
powers from the soul. This “inner meaning” is not known to man, but is also true for 
everything in the visible world. Each thing has two meanings, a minor, material meaning, 
                                                          
392 Ibid., 81, see also 89. 
393 Ibid., 84. 
394 Ibid., 85. 
395 From Kant’s first lecture in Metaphysics: “[a person] is already in this world in community with all 
righteous and well-meaning souls, be they in India or Arabia; only he does not yet see himself in this 
community, until he is freed from sensuous intuition.” As translated in Johnson, Kant on Swedenborg, 91-
92. 
396 Kant, Dreams of a Spirit Seer, trans. Manolesco, 86. 
198 
 
 
and an inner meaning: the former being a mere symbol of the later.397 With a second nod 
to the exegetical implications of all this for Swedenborg, Kant writes: “This is the reason 
why Swedenborg tried to give a new interpretation to the Bible.”398 The outer meaning of 
the Bible, like the human body “is a mere shell.”  
Kant repeatedly expresses his concern that readers might suspect he is trying to 
convince them about the veracity of Swedenborg’s ideas. This concern is expressed at 
times explicitly399 and at times in the form of ridicule: “I am tired of copying the wild 
vagaries of the words of all dreamers or of continuing with his descriptions of the state 
after death.”400 He worries that by giving Swedenborg so much attention, readers, 
especially pregnant women or more poetically, those pregnant with idealism, will be 
misled.401 It is an anxiety that stretches across the chapters of Träume such that one 
wonders if he is more concerned about his readers’ credulity or his own. 
If Kant’s Träume expresses an internal struggle, however, it is not without 
purpose.  The major thrust of the book is to take the ridicule directed at spirit seers, and 
redirect it towards metaphysicians, or those “brainless sophists who needlessly add to the 
bulk of our quarterly journals.”402 These “dreamers of reason” are not unlike the mystics, 
or “dreamers of sense” in their lack of grounding or lack of critical reason. If both are 
deceived though, the quality of the deception is worth examining. The first type of 
                                                          
397 Ibid., 87. 
398 Ibid., 87. 
399 Ibid., 90. 
400 Ibid., 89. 
401 Elsewhere he states that women are especially prone to believing these things: see Kant, Dreams of a 
Spirit Seer, trans. Manolesco, 77  
402 Ibid., 82-83, 90 
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dreamers allow deception of reason, a common enough and well understood problem. 
Less clear is deception of the senses, and this interests Kant, for whom the experience of 
the senses is so fundamental to the ability understanding anything. 
By the end of the book, Kant has replaced an idealistic metaphysics, “with whom 
my destiny made me fall in love hopelessly”403 with a critical metaphysics. The first, 
which answers questions concerning the hidden nature of things, sets its sights too high 
and tends to disappoint. The second, which determines which problems can be resolved 
with human reason and which cannot, “becomes a true science tracing the limits of 
human understanding.”404 He therefore sets the course for a true philosophy aimed at 
determining these limits, a project that would motivate his subsequent work and most 
importantly his three critiques: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781, Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft, 1790, and Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790. And so it would appear that this has 
been the goal all along: to redraw the borderlines of metaphysics and to exclude all 
activity that can’t be either explained by physical laws or corroborated through mutual 
experience. “Human reason was not meant to try and part the highest clouds in heaven or 
lift from our eyes the curtains in order to reveal to us the secrets of other worlds.”405 With 
that, Swedenborg’s Secrets of Heaven is decisively bracketed and removed from 
philosophical discourse. Or so it would seem. In actuality, Swedenborg’s removal from 
Kant’s thought and public discourse was not so absolute. Below, we will briefly consider 
the two areas of Kant’s thought, mentioned in the introduction, which continued to 
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404 Ibid., 91. 
405 Ibid., 98. 
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overlap with Swedenborg after the publication of Träume: metaphysical speculation and 
allegorical interpretation of the Bible. 
The above summary and interpretation of Träume is not intended to clarify Kant’s 
position or resolve its contradictions: there is no way around them. Rather, it is intended 
to shed light on Arcana coelestia’s place in eighteenth century discourse about the 
correspondence between nature and spirit, the relationship between mysticism and 
rationalism, and about the interpretation of scripture, by considering one very influential 
interpretation of it. The influence of Träume was marked sharply, however, by a sense of 
confusion over how to interpret it, a confusion that impacted how Swedenborg was read 
and understood by his early readers. The reception of Arcana coelestia was therefore very 
much linked to the reception of Träume. 
Reception of Träume 
That readers can’t seem to agree on whether the greater part of Kant’s estimation 
of Swedenborg in the book stems from admiration or ridicule, is perhaps because Kant 
himself was conflicted and, at least some of the time, intentionally vague and 
contradictory in this regard. In a 1766 letter responding to Moses Mendelssohn’s 
“consternation” regarding the tone and ambiguity of the book, Kant writes “it was 
difficult for me to devise the right way to clothe my thoughts so as not to expose myself 
to mockery. It seemed to me most advisable to forestall others by first of all mocking 
myself, a completely honest procedure since my own mind was conflicted on this . . .”406 
                                                          
406 Immanuel Kant, “Letter to Moses Mendelsson,” April 8, 1766, as translated by Johnson and Magee in 
Kant on Swedenborg, 83-84. 
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That his own mind was conflicted is clearest from the contents of Träume explored 
above. This did not, however, soften the blow to Swedenborg’s reputation. 
 Swedenborgian historian Robert Kirven describes the “long shadow” of Kant’s 
attack in Träume, and the devastating blow it had on perceptions of Swedenborg in the 
eighteenth century, so much so that even three hundred years later “the mere invocation 
of the name of Immanuel Kant is sufficient to permit complete dismissal of the 
viewpoint, experience, and reasoning of Emanuel Swedenborg.”407 This shadow is 
epitomized in a review by Herder, who advised those who were curious to read Kant’s 
book in place of Arcana: “A reader who does not want to spend eight pounds sterling to 
read through a mass of enthusiasm in the original will find an excerpt here, which the 
author culled not merely from the writings, but from the spirit of the enthusiast, and 
which is here amusing when it could have cost effort.”408 However, as a brief survey of 
the responses to Träume will show, if there was indeed a shadow cast, it was as much the 
result of the confusion about how to interpret Kant’s book as it was a judgement on the 
value of Swedenborg’s work. 
 The confusion over Kant’s intended message was immediate. In the same year of 
its publication, Moses Mendelssohn wrote “The joking pensiveness with which this little 
work is written leaves the reader sometimes in doubt as to whether Herr Kant intends to 
make metaphysics laughable or spirit-seeing credible.”409 Mendelssohn was intimately 
                                                          
407 Robert H. Kirven, “Swedenborg and Kant Revisited: The Long Shadow of Kant’s Attack and a New 
Response,” in Swedenborg and His Influence (Bryn Athyn, PA The Academy of the New Church, 1988), 103. 
408 Johann Gottfried Herder, “Review of Dreams of a Spirit-Seer: March 3, 1766,” as translated by Johnson 
and Magee in Kant on Swedenborg, 115. 
409 Moses Mendelssohn, “Review of Dreams of a Spirit-Seer: 1767,” as translated by Johnson and Magee 
in Kant on Swedenborg, 123. 
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familiar with Kant’s work on metaphysics. Three years earlier, he narrowly came in first 
to Kant’s second in an essay competition for the Prussian Royal Academy.410 The two 
corresponded subsequently, the contents of which reveal an intention, on Kant’s part at 
least, to work together on creating “a new era” for metaphysics.411 Kant’s response to 
Mendelssohn’s confusion is quoted above, and does little to clarify his personal feelings 
towards spirit-seeing such as that of Swedenborg, which in the same sentence he 
describes as “mere delusions” and then qualifies that “I myself would try to defend it if 
someone were to argue it impossible.”412 
 Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, likewise, wrote in his review of Träume, “After 
reading through these pages, we have become doubtful whether they were written in jest 
or in earnest; at any rate both are almost always together.”413 And in a letter to 
Swedenborg about Kant’s book, theologian Friedrich Christoph Oetinger writes that “the 
author lifts you on high with praises, as much as he pushes you down with accusations 
lest he be regarded as a fanatic.”414 Whether Swedenborg read the book or what his 
                                                          
410 Kant’s second-place essay responded to the Academy’s prompt: “"Whether the metaphysical truths in 
general, and especially the first principles of natural theology and morals, are capable of the same degree 
of proof as geometrical truths, and if they are not capable of such proof, what is the nature of their 
certainty, and to what degree can they achieve it, and is such certainty sufficient for conviction?" Kant’s 
response was titled: “Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und 
der Moral” (Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality). 
411 See Kant’s discussion of this possible collaboration in letter to Mendelssohn dated April 8, 1766, in 
Johnson, Kant on Swedenborg, 84-85.  
412 Ibid., 86. 
413 Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, “Review of Dreams of a Spirit-Seer: September 23, 1766,” as translated 
in Johnson and Magee in Kant on Swedenborg, 120. 
414 Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, “Letter to Emanuel Swedenborg: December 4, 1766,” as translated by 
Johnson and Magee in Kant on Swedenborg, 122. 
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reaction was, we don’t know. But the confusion it generated about his own work would 
certainly create immediate obstacles for his readers. 
 Nineteenth and twentieth-century readers of Kant, even as they are more able to 
place Träume in the full context of his life work, have come no closer to a consensus on 
his motivations. In the bibliography to his 2001 dissertation on the topic, Johnson cites 27 
German, French and English scholars that argue for what he terms “the received view:” 
that Kant’s tone is primarily skeptical and satirical, and that whatever influence 
Swedenborg had on Kant it was primarily negative. These sources include Kuno Fisher, 
Willi Goetschel, Monique David-Ménard, and Martin Schönfeld. Johnson then cites 46 
authors who challenge the received view, including Ernst Benz, Carl Du Prel, Keith 
Ward, and Carl Jung, leaving one to wonder what exactly is received about the received 
view. Johnson adds his name to the challengers, and in the introduction to his 2002 
translation of Träume, he argues for six aspects of Kant’s mature philosophy that 
resemble Swedenborgian thought: 1) Swedenborg’s dualistic universe in which 
individuals simultaneously inhabit the spiritual and material worlds is like Kant’s “dual 
aspect” metaphysics in which all beings exist in phenomenal and noumenal worlds. 2) 
Kant’s ideality of time and space compare with Swedenborg’s descriptions of time and 
space in the spiritual world. 3) Swedenborg believed the moral law of the spiritual world 
enters the consciousness via influx, and Kant similarly points to the origins of moral law 
in the noumenal. 4) Kant’s identification of moral law with a “kingdom of ends” (Reich 
dew Zwecke) is anticipated in Swedenborg’s regnum finium.  5) Swedenborg’s 
correspondences resonate with Kant’s interpretation of both history and scripture through 
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“signatures” of the noumenal “as phenomenal intimations of a transcendent, intelligible 
world.” And 6) Kant’s conception of the moral and practical core of wisdom was 
influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and by Swedenborg.415 The following section will 
consider the congruencies that relate to the themes that concern us.  
The Limits of Reason: A Porous Boundary 
In his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation, De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma 
et principiis (On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds), Kant 
distinguishes between two powers of cognition that perceive reality in two distinct 
worlds: the understanding perceives the intelligible world and sensibility perceives the 
sensible world. Here, Kant presents his pre-critical view of understanding, that as pure 
reason it accesses to the numinous, or the world of moral perfection. This optimistic view 
echoes his earlier faith in the principle of determining ground, in which one can access, 
through reason, a chain of causes that originate in the “necessary being.” As such, his 
Inaugural Dissertation appears to backtrack on critical theories worked out in Träume. 
Beiser finds it “indeed extremely puzzling, to find that in August, 1770, Kant appears to 
revive speculative metaphysics in his inaugural dissertation. . . The conception of 
metaphysics that Kant outlines in this work seems to be the complete negation of that in 
the Dreams. The aim of metaphysics is not to determine the limits of reason, but to give 
us a rational knowledge of the intelligible world.”416 Beiser explains this apparent 
contradiction by tracing the development of Kant’s thought in the years between 1746 
                                                          
415 Johnson, Kant on Swedenborg, xvii-xix.  
416 Beiser, “Kant’s Intellectual Development,” 47. 
205 
 
 
and 1781 through four phases of his “unhappy love affair” with metaphysics. Earlier 
“infatuation” turned to a period of disillusionment and skepticism, such as we see in 
Träume. However, the Dissertation marks a subsequent phase of “partial reconciliation” 
in the 1770s before Kant entered the fourth phase of “divorce” from metaphysics all 
together, beginning in 1781. 
If Beiser’s four phases are accurate, they explain Kant’s more positive 
engagement with Swedenborg in his lectures on Metaphysics (L1) in the 1770s.417 “The 
thought of Swedenborg is in this quite sublime” we read from Kant’s lecture notes.418 
The matter at hand is the immortality of the soul, the relationship of the soul to the body 
and the nature of the soul’s domain after the death of the body. This phase is only a 
partial reconciliation, as Beiser notes, and Kant holds to assertions about the limits of 
reason, qualifying the optimism demonstrated in the Inaugural Dissertation: “we can 
comprehend no more through reason than that such spirits are possible.” But the field of 
psychology allows us nevertheless to consider such things at length “in order to purify the 
concept of the spiritual nature of the soul.” 419 Particular affinities with Swedenborgian 
thought in this lecture include: the subjectivity of space and time in the spiritual world; 
that a person’s spirit is in community with other spirits “now” – even as the person is 
alive in their physical body; and that the makeup of this community is determined by the 
moral quality of a person’s action in the world. In other words: a person’s spirit is 
                                                          
417 On the problem of dating these lectures, see the introduction by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon in 
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), xxx-xxxiii. 
418 Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. Ameriks and Naragon, 105. 
419 Ibid., 105 
206 
 
 
proximate to and in community with like-minded spirits.420 This positive summary of 
Swedenborg’s views is moderated with the assertion, again, that such things cannot be 
observed directly, for we are limited in this world to our “sensuous intuition” and will 
have “spiritual intuition” only after the death of the body. It is impossible to see spiritual 
realities with the physical eyes, and what Swedenborg claimed to have seen is impossible 
(even if it is sublime). He concludes that providence has closed the door on the world of 
the spirit’s future, and the chief matter before us is how to live righteously in the present. 
This line of reasoning presents a logical paradox: that Swedenborg’s experiences are 
impossible, or worse, useless, and yet they produce descriptions that Kant finds somehow 
intuitively truthful.  We have in the metaphysics lectures a snapshot into how Kant’s 
encounter with Swedenborg merged with his thinking on the limits of reason. Kant is 
interested in articulating a border beyond which human reason cannot penetrate. But as 
we see here and elsewhere, this border is a porous one. Spiritual intuition is inaccessible 
while a person lives in the body, and yet how could an embodied person have the idea of 
a spiritual intuition without some entry point? We see how Kant’s thinking during this 
period was shifting and searching for new ground upon which to establish a new era of 
metaphysics, a project he eventually abandoned. 
As Kevin Hector demonstrates, Kant’s thought evolved subsequently from this 
pre-critical view. As he lost faith in stable principles of understanding, his faith in a 
necessary being and in the non-arbitrariness of our beliefs was threatened as well. His 
subsequent focus on the principles of cognition, over and above physical and 
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metaphysical laws, was an attempt to overcome the instability that this disillusionment 
brought. For Kant, this required an understanding of human reason that drew on 
principles of empiricism. As Hector writes of Kant’s shift: “The cure for what ails 
metaphysics, therefore, is simple: instead of drawing endless inferences from abstract 
definitions, metaphysics should derive their principles strictly from empirical data.”421 
Therefore, eleven years after his Inaugural Dissertation, Kant would change his position 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, and argue that both understanding and sensibility are 
limited to knowledge of the sensible world, that our knowledge of reality is interrupted 
by a disunity between subject and object, and that the intelligible world is unknowable.422 
In all of this, we recognize questions and categories that Kant wrestled with in Träume, 
aimed ultimately at redefining the function of metaphysics: to determine the perimeter of 
what we can know. Swedenborg, whose visions of heaven’s secrets he found to be 
alluring early on, was an example upon which he could build an argument about such a 
perimeter, or at the very least the obligation of metaphysicians to seek its location. 
Several scholars have considered Swedenborg’s role in the development of Kant’s 
thought in the decade prior to his first Kritik. In his 2007 Wahn und Wahrheit: Kants 
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Irrationalen (Delusion and Truth: Kant's Discussion of the 
Irrational), Constantin Rauer argues that Kant’s struggle with Swedenborg was a driving 
force of his first Kritik, but a negative one: or that Kant’s philosophy subsequent to his 
                                                          
421 Kevin W. Hector, “Giving Oneself the Law,” in The Theological Problem of Modernism: Faith and the 
Conditions of Mineness (Oxford University Press: 2015), 38. 
422 See Hector, “Giving Oneself,” 43-45. The mundus intelligibilis is identified with Swedenborg’s spiritual 
world in Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, 105. 
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engagement with Swedenborg is aimed at combating illusions and delusions such as 
those he read in Arcana coelestia. It need not be the case, however, that Kant’s negativity 
towards Swedenborg prohibited occasions of intersection later on. Friedemann Stengel 
rebuts Rauer’s argument in his 2014 German language study of Swedenborg, citing 
Rauer’s omission of the positive references to Swedenborg in lectures and publications 
that came after Träume, and even after his Critiques. For example, Kant’s eschatology, in 
Stengel’s view, is a “partial appropriation” of Swedenborg’s in that it similarly rejects the 
notion of a final day of judgement, and is concerned with self-judgement and the eternity 
of the moral worlds (heavenly or hellish) one creates for oneself through moral or 
immoral action. This view is most clearly expressed in his 1794 Das Ende aller Dinge 
(The End of All Things).423 In addition to his eschatology, Stengel identifies several 
elements of Kant’s mature philosophy of religion and his moral philosophy that are 
“modifications” of ideas available to him in Arcana coelestia.424 These include: his ideas 
on original sin and the doctrine of Justification, which emphasize freedom and self-
responsibility of individuals over grace and external procedures for the cleansing of sin; 
his conception of Judaism; his hermeneutics; and his emphasis on the requirement of an 
intelligible world for moral philosophy, an intelligible world present with the individual 
here and now, and not merely one experienced after death. References to Swedenborgian 
thought, therefore, appear in Kant’s work during various phases of his development. He 
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is at times repulsed by and at times attracted to Swedenborg, and this exchange should be 
understood in light of Kant’s own vacillations concerning metaphysics.    
Allegory: Rejected or Redefined? 
As we have seen, Kant’s argument for the unknowability of the spiritual world is 
occasionally punctuated with digressions into the nature of the spiritual world – a curious 
combination and one that reveals something of his own weakness for things beyond. We 
see a parallel anxiety in how he thinks about the true meaning of scripture, and here again 
Swedenborg is a jumping off point. In his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 
abgefaßt (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 1798) Kant is careful to dissect 
a nuanced difference between Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences and his view of 
the relationship between true religion and religious symbols: 
To say, with Swedenborg, that the real phenomena of the world present to the 
senses are merely a symbol of an intelligible world hidden in reserve is 
fanaticism. But in exhibiting the concepts that are the essence of all religion – 
concepts (called Ideas) that belong to morality and so to pure reason – it is 
enlightenment to distinguish the symbolic from the intellectual (public 
worship from religion), the temporarily useful and necessary husk from the 
thing itself. Otherwise we exchange an Ideal (of pure practical reason) for an 
idol, and miss the final end. It is an indisputable fact that all peoples on earth 
have begun by making this mistake and that, when it came to the question of 
what their teachers themselves really meant in composing their sacred 
writings, the interpretation had to be literal and not symbolic; for it would be 
dishonest to twist the teacher’s words. But when it is a question not merely of 
the truthfulness of the teacher but also, and indeed essentially, of the truth of 
his teaching, then we can and should interpret these writings as a merely 
symbolic form of representation, in which established formalities and 
customs accompany those practical Ideas. For otherwise the intellectual 
meaning, which is the final end, would be lost.425 
                                                          
425 Kant, Anthropology, 65. This section of the book considers various cognitive powers, such as making 
associations, having foresight, having imagination, and dreaming. For each of these powers he considers 
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Here, Kant begins with a distinction between enthusiasm and enlightenment, in 
which Swedenborg’s idea of the correspondential relationship between spiritual and 
natural things is rejected in favor of a more conventional view of symbols. However, as 
we read on, the true culprit for misreading symbols is identified, not with the fanatic 
Swedenborg, but with biblical literalists. Those who make an idol out of Pure Ideas are 
readers who miss the true teaching of the scripture and focus instead on ways these ideas 
are represented in forms of culture and language. In this instance, Kant does not address 
Swedenborg’s exegetical methods as much as his ontological view of a dualistic universe, 
and where he does address biblical interpretation he seems to be siding with a non-literal 
reading, one that rejects the husk for the kernel within.  
Elsewhere however, he does address Swedenborg’s use of allegory directly and in 
negative terms. For instance, in his Der Streit Der Fakultaten (The Conflict of the 
Faculties, 1798), Swedenborg is associated with a kind of mystical and typological 
reading that runs counter to reason. The conflict between the faculty of theology and the 
faculty of philosophy, specifically around biblical interpretation, demonstrates the kinds 
of interdisciplinary arguments that interest Kant. The biblical theologian bases their 
interpretation on ecclesiastical faith, which Kant describes as “laws proceeding from 
another person’s act of choice.”426 The rational theologian, on the other hand, bases their 
                                                          
and those that are fanatical, or arise from madness or self-deception. This section considers the power of 
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426 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor (University of Nebraska Press, 
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interpretation on “inner laws that can be developed from every man’s own reason.”427 
With this distinction in hand, Kant presents the principles of interpretation that should 
guide a philosophical approach to sacred texts, each of which flies in the face of 
ecclesiastical tradition in the strongest terms. These principles of interpretation revolve 
around the idea that there is only one religion and it is morality. There is no merit in faith, 
but only in deeds. Any interpretation of scripture should have this end in mind: a true 
reading is a moral one.428 The doctrine of the trinity, of the resurrection and of the dual 
nature of Christ, that he is both God and man, are all things that have no practical 
relevance at all until they are interpreted with a moral end in mind, and in many cases this 
requires a non-literal reading.  
He considers the resurrection as an example and rejects outright the belief in the 
immortality of the body. “For who is so fond of his body that he would want to drag it 
around with him for eternity, if he cannot get along without it?” Such an assertion strains 
reason. The apostles, who spoke of a bodily resurrection “must have meant only that we 
have reason to believe Christ is still alive and that our faith would be in vain if even so 
perfect a man did not continue to live after (bodily) death. This belief, which reason 
suggested to him (as to all men), moved him to historical belief in a public event . . . 
failing to realize that, apart from his moral belief, he himself would have found it hard to 
                                                          
427 Ibid. 
428 This appeal to a moral interpretive methodology resembles Augustine’s approach. In discussing when 
to read literally and when to read figuratively, Augustine also appealed to morality: “anything not related 
to good morals or true faith is figurative.” Kant goes further than Augustine in rejecting the narrative of 
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credit this tale.”429 Christ’s death, according to Kant’s interpretation, inspired in his 
followers a sense of longing for immortality, or a conviction that he must still be alive 
spiritually. This intuition was then expressed in terms available to the apostles in that 
time, and we are required to translate their words forward to the standards of our day, 
independent of ecclesiastical tradition and according to reason. It is noteworthy that here 
Kant associates a “moral purpose” with a sense of the immortality of the soul, as morality 
and belief in an afterlife are a troublesome pair for the philosopher – appearing elsewhere 
in his writing to be mutually exclusive.430  
Another example of Kant’s biblical interpretation is in his treatment of the Garden 
of Eden story found in his essay Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte 
(“Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” 1786). Here, as with Mendelssohn, the 
individual development of the human being is compared to the journey of the first man. 
Kant offers an interpretation of Genesis 3, in which he traces Adam’s transition through 
four stages of reason. For instance, Genesis 3:2-3 describes the first stage, in which 
man’s discernment is determined by his senses rather than his intellect; the eating of 
permitted and forbidden fruit signifies the animal-like instincts of someone who choses 
food based solely on the basis of taste and smell.431 The story as a whole, then, refers to 
                                                          
429 Kant, Conflict of the Faculties, 69. 
430 For instance, in his Metaphysics lectures: “In general we still allege that it is not at all suitable here to 
our vocation to worry much over the future world; rather we must complete the circle to which we are 
here determined, and wait for how it will be with respect to the future world. The main point is that we 
conduct ourselves well at this post, righteously and morally, and attempt to make ourselves worthy of 
future happiness.” Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, 106. 
431 Immanuel Kant, “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” in Toward Perpetual Peace and Other 
Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, trans. David L. Colclasure (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 26. 
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the “transition from the brutishness of a merely animal creature to humanity, from the 
leading reins of instinct to the direction of reason, in a word, from the guardianship of 
nature into the state of freedom.”432 Adam’s story is the story of human history, and also 
the story every human who progresses through the stages Kant describes in order to 
achieve moral agency. 
Biblical interpretation then, according to Kant, must distinguish between the things 
belonging to pure religion and things related to the mere vehicle of ecclesiastical faith. 
The latter is not religion, but a tool for arriving at religion, properly understood.433 He 
then anticipates the objection, from theologians and philosophers alike, that this is 
nothing more than allegory. But, he argues, the opposite is true! For the theologian, who 
mistakes the husk, or the vehicle, for the thing itself, he is the one who is forced to use 
allegory. To the hypothetical accusation that Kant’s biblical interpretation is allegorical, 
he writes: “My reply is that the exact opposite is true. If the biblical theologian mistakes 
the husk of religion for religion itself, [it is he who must interpret the scriptures 
allegorically;] he must explain the entire Old Testament, for example, as a continuous 
allegory (of prototypes and symbols) of the religious state still to come—or else admit 
that true religion (which cannot be truer than true) had already appeared then, making the 
                                                          
432 Ibid., 29. On comparison with Maimonides’ interpretation of Genesis 3, and the difference between 
Kant and Maimonides with respect to their view of nature and morality, see Heidi Ravven, "Maimonides’ 
Non-Kantian Moral Psychology: Maimonides and Kant on the Garden of Eden and the Genealogy of 
Morals," The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2012): 199-216. 
433 This distinction has parallels with Maimonides, who, in book III, Chapter 28 of his Guide for the 
Perplexed distinguishes between rational, or true beliefs, and necessary, or traditional beliefs. When 
applied to the Bible, references to anthropomorphic traits of God in the text are interpreted as necessary 
rather than true. The reliance of both Kant and Maimonides on Aristotle’s semiotics may account for this 
similarity. On Kant and Maimonides, see Michael Zank and Hartwig Wiedebach, "The Kant-Maimonides 
Constellation," and other essays in The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2012). 
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New Testament superfluous.”434 And here, in his explicit rejection of allegory, Kant 
associates the husk with the Old Testament and with Judaism. The theologian is 
compelled to connect the Old Testament and the New Testament by means of typology, 
but in doing so binds himself to outdated Jewish tenets that “can well make us moan.”435  
In the section on objections to allegory, Kant counters the anticipated charge that 
his interpretation is mystical, by distinguishing his methods from Swedenborg’s:  
As for the charge that rational interpretation of Scriptures is mystical, the sole 
means of avoiding mysticism (such as Swedenborg’s) is for philosophy to be 
on the lookout for moral meaning in scriptural texts and even to impose it on 
them. For unless the supersensible (the thought of which is essential to 
anything called religion) is anchored to determinate concepts of reason, such 
as those of morality, fantasy inevitably gets lost in the transcendent, where 
religious matters are concerned, and leads to an Illuminism in which 
everyone has his private, inner revelations, and there is no longer any public 
touchstone of truth.436  
 
The winds of mysticism are barred by the stronghold of practical morality. As 
noted above, Kant’s stated opposition between morality and Swedenborgian mysticism is 
curious given Swedenborg’s own emphasis on usefulness. Like Kant, Swedenborg 
repeated emphatically that moral action replaces faith as the factor determining the 
quality of one’s religiosity. Furthermore, Swedenborg, like Kant, rejects certain creedal 
traditions such as the trinity, the bodily resurrection and the final judgement day.437 
Given Kant’s exegetical principles outlined above, Swedenborg’s offense is not his 
appeal to the immortality of the soul, nor his rejection of ecclesiastical faith, nor even his 
                                                          
434 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, 79. 
435 Ibid., 65. 
436 Ibid., 80-81. Kant’s designation of things “mystical” and “fantasy” echo statements made in 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, in which he sorts expressions of human cognitive powers in 
to categories of reasonable expressions and unreasonable ones. See note 430 above.  
437 In Swedenborg’s view, while Christ’s body did rise to heaven, the bodies of humans do not. 
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doctrine of correspondences, if by correspondences we limit ourselves to the idea that the 
biblical narrative points to a deeper truth by means of symbols. Swedenborg’s offence, in 
terms of Kant’s principles, is his stubborn reliance on the Old Testament. This attitude 
towards the Hebrew scriptures explains, in part, Kant’s reaction to reading Arcana 
coelestia, in which he digests the memorable relations but pays little to no attention to the 
exegetical material, relying as it does, so heavily on the text of the Old Testament. The 
general principle of looking for higher wisdom behind or within the plain sense was not 
objectionable in itself to Kant, despite his dismissal of allegorical interpretation as 
schwärmende Auslegungen (swarming interpretations).438 The problem was that 
Swedenborg made “the mistake of including Judaism” in his reading.439 
Antikabbalah  
 In his 1793 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (Religion 
within the Limits of Reason Alone), Kant lays out his argument that while Christianity is 
concerned with what is moral, Judaism is concerned merely with what is statutory. He 
writes that originally, Judaism was no religion at all, but a political entity concerned with 
externalities, legalism, rewards and punishments.440 If the first Christians found it 
necessary to ground themselves in Jewish texts, over time this has had the negative effect 
of magnifying the legalism of Church councils and the like, and perpetuating the drive to 
                                                          
438 See Stengel, Aufklärung, 642; Kant, Dreams of a Spirit Seer, trans. Manolesco, 82. 
439 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, 65. 
440 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. 
Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 116. 
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“seek religion without and not within us.”441 In a telling footnote to the second edition of 
the book, Kant discusses Mendelssohn’s reasons for not converting to Christianity. 
Mendelssohn’s argument is that Christianity is founded on Judaism and to convert would 
be, in Kant’s words, to “demolish the ground floor of a house in order to take up his 
abode in the second story.”442 Kant provides his parenthetical commentary to this notion, 
writing that “(Actually nothing would then be left but pure moral religion unencumbered 
by statutes.)” The books of the Jews should be preserved, he concludes, not for the 
benefit of religion, but for the value of scholarship only.  
 In Kant we see an important similarity to and an important distinction from 
Swedenborg’s treatment of Judaism. For Swedenborg, the Old Testament and the Hebrew 
language are uniquely conducive to creating correspondential connections to spiritual 
realities. For Kant, the Old Testament is an outdated hindrance to true religion. Yet, while 
their assessments of the value of Hebrew scriptures differ markedly, their 
characterizations of Jews themselves are alike in drawing on stereotypes of Jews as 
materialistic. Arcana coelestia therefore, while challenging Kant’s prejudice against Old 
Testament religion, would have confirmed his prejudice against Jews. As Stengel writes, 
for both men the stereotype is put to use in distinguishing true, internal religion from the 
empty, external symbols of religion: 
This tendentious construction of Judaism in Kant already pervades the 
Secrets of Heaven, although one must add, of course, that Kant would also 
have had, particularly on this subject, recourse to an expansive tradition of 
literary antiSemitism. However, the reasons that led Swedenborg to his view 
of Judaism do not diverge from those of Kant. What makes them conspicuous 
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is that they fulfill a similar function within his overall concept: in 
Swedenborg’s work, as well, the focus is on morality and on the relationship 
between external faith and the internal – moral – attitude.443 
 
 However, while Kant clarifies his stance on Jews and on Old Testament religion 
in his writings, his opinion of Kabbalah is less clear. Kant’s use of the term 
“Antikabbalah” in titling his harshest critique of the spirit seeing of Swedenborg, like so 
much of Träume, is ambiguous. He does not explain the wording of this chapter title and 
Kabbalah is mentioned nowhere else in the book. The chapter appears, in part, to be 
criticizing the philosophy of the Leibniz-Wolffian school, which Kant interfaced with 
regularly by lecturing on Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s textbook on metaphysics. As 
discussed above, the chapter draws a connection between “dreamers of reason” and 
“dreamers of sense,” thereby ridiculing metaphysicians and mystics all at once. The 
connection between Swedenborg and Kabbalah does reappear in his metaphysics 
lectures, where theurgy and Neoplatonism enter the discussion on the possibility of 
contact with departed souls.444 Swedenborg and Kabbalah are not explicitly linked here, 
but are part of the same train of thought. Swedenborg’s opinion on the presence of spirits 
in the thoughts and representations in us is followed by an attack on the visions and 
fantasies associated with third century theurgical practices: “Theurgy is the entire art of 
entering into the community of spirits, magic, cabala, and whatever else there was. It is 
not worth the trouble to speak of it any further. –All matter is lifeless, this is the principle 
of physics, without this there is no natural science at all.” In each of these cases, in the 
                                                          
443 Stengel, Aufklärung, 680. Translated by Suzanne Schwarz Zuber. 
444 Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. Ameriks and Naragon, 295, 353. 
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lectures and in the Antikabbalah chapter, whatever else is at stake, the end goal is the 
demarcation of the limits of scientific reasoning. The discourse about Kabbalah is, for 
Kant, less about Jewish esotericism, and more about including certain forms of rational 
metaphysics in broad categories of fanaticism that can be wholly disqualified from 
commenting on scientific matters.445  
 In Kant’s thought then, Judaism is useful in negatively defining pure religion, just 
as Kabbalah (however vaguely conceived) is useful in negatively defining practical 
reason. Swedenborg is also used discursively – as a negative foil for describing the limits 
of reason. And yet in both Kant’s treatment of Judaism and of Swedenborg, something of 
the anxiety of influence can be discerned. As we have shown, Swedenborg’s concepts of 
the spiritual world resonates with Kant’s philosophical system, often in quite specific 
ways, such as the subjectivity of time and space. And in the case of Judaism, some of his 
harshest criticisms are also in areas that overlap with his own thought. Sidney Axinn 
demonstrates this dynamic in arguing, for instance, that Kant asserts the impossibility of 
knowing concretely about the spiritual world or life after death, but criticizes Jews for 
centering their ethical system on concerns for this life rather than the hereafter.446 He 
denounces the Old Testament as lacking in moral substance, but also cites the ten 
commandments as essential to moral religion. And his anti-anthropomorphism is not 
                                                          
445 Stengel does not think Kant is referring to Swedenborg with the term “Antikabbalah” but argues from 
Häfner’s Macht der Willkür that he may be alluding to the masonic order Elus Coëns, founded in 1754 by 
the Portuguese Christian kabbalist Jacques Martinès de Pasqually, Stengel, Aufklärung, 666, note 150.  
446 Kant writes, for instance: “Furthermore, since no religion can be conceived of which involves no belief 
in a future life, Judaism, which when taken in its purity is seen to lack this belief, is not a religious faith at 
all.” From Kant, Religion within the Limits, 117. 
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unlike that of the Judaism he denounces.447 All of this affirms our thesis that criticism, 
even in its harshest forms, does not imply lack of positive overlap, and in many cases it is 
in fact an indication that investigation into possible resonances of thought will be 
rewarded. Both Kant and Swedenborg serve as examples of eighteenth century Christian 
thinkers whose anti-Jewish rhetoric contradicts aspects of their own work. The same can 
be said of Kant’s rhetoric about Swedenborg himself. 
Countering Kant: German Idealist Philosophy 
 While Kant had the last word on Swedenborg for the majority of philosophers 
who followed him, given his vast and weighty influence on the future course of western 
thought, moments of positive reception of Swedenborg do appear in idealist/romantic 
philosophy.  In Schelling we find an example of this countercurrent, and his reading of 
Swedenborg is useful as we conclude this treatment of Kant, especially because he 
responds directly to the criticism found in Kant’s Träume.  
 Friedemann Horn’s work on Schelling points to his sources in German 
translations of Swedenborg’s work available at the time, including Arcana coelestia, in 
acquaintances interested in Swedenborg such as G. H. Schubert, and in secondary sources 
indebted to Swedenborgian thought such as Johann Lavatar’s Aussichten in die Ewigkeit 
(Insights into Eternity, 1768-1778) and Jung Stilling’s Szenen aus den Geisterreich 
(Scenes from the Spiritual Realm, 1797).448 Schelling had “no epistemological difficulties 
                                                          
447 Sidney Axinn, “Kant on Judaism,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 59, no. 1 (July, 1968): 11-17. 
448 Friedemann Horn writes: “anyone who made an effort could gain access to virtually all the works of 
Swedenborg at that time.” See Horn, Schelling and Swedenborg: Mysticism and German Idealism, trans. 
George F. Dole (West Chester, Pa: Swedenborg Foundation, 1997), 32-34. See also Ernst Benz, 
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in his encounter with Swedenborg” because of his rooting in the mystical-theosophical 
traditions of his Swabian homeland. These traditions were at home with the ideas of a 
vibrant afterlife and a knowable world of spirits. 449 It was the death of his beloved wife 
Caroline, however, that elicited Schelling’s most open engagement with the ideas the 
“Swedish spirit-seer” in his work Clara. Oder über den Zusammenhang der Natur- mit 
der Geisterwelt (Clara: Or, on the Connection of Nature to the Spirit World, 1810c).450 
 Clara is an unfinished work, following a discussion between four characters 
through four seasons of a year, set initially amidst a graveyard celebration of All Souls 
Day. Each of the characters represents an opinion on the spirit world and its relationship 
to the human soul and to the natural world. The dominant opinion, the opinion 
interpreters have identified with Schelling’s, is that of the Doctor, who believes humans 
do have access to knowledge about the spirit world but only to the degree that they 
understand the natural world. “A tree that draws strength, life, and substance into itself 
from the earth may hope to drive its topmost branches hanging with blossom right up to 
heaven.”451 The work therefore takes up the same issue that Kant addresses in Träume, 
namely the question of our ability or inability to know an intelligible world, and 
Schelling draws the opposite conclusion to Kant’s. 
                                                          
"Swedenborg und Lavater. Über die religiösen Grundlagen der Physiognomik," in Zeitschrift für 
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449 Horn, Schelling and Swedenborg, 3. 
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 Schelling’s Clergyman character is the Kantian voice, maintaining that the two 
worlds are completely separate and the dead are inaccessible to the living. Evidence of 
the immortality of the soul is to be found only in the human conscience, and a moral life 
does not concern itself with worlds and spirits that are inaccessible to our physical senses. 
The other three characters hold some version of an opposing view to the Clergyman, and 
through their discussions, an anti-Kantian viewpoint emerges: “Thus, one shouldn’t 
suspect those seeking certainty of knowledge, even in the most spiritual objects, of 
fanciful imagination or of trying to lead people to so imagine; rather, one should suspect 
those who work against that certainty, even if they should do so with the pretext of 
having a sense that supersedes science itself.” The work supports the idea of contact with 
the spirit world, of access by means of dreams, visions, and rare cases of clairvoyance. 
References to Swedenborg as exemplar appear twice in the work, though neither time by 
name. The first reference is in the context of those who understand the diversity in the 
spirit world, or the infinity of shades between heaven and hell. He is “that Swedish 
visionary” who, rather than deriving his knowledge by returning from death, “had his 
inner being opened to him in some other way so that he could look into that world.”452 
The second time Swedenborg is “the northern visionary” with insights into the nature of 
revelation on different plants, and summaries of ideas on this topic found in Arcana 
coelestia are presented.453 
                                                          
452 Ibid., 56.  
453 Ibid., 77. See Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 9358 and 9360. On the popularity of Swedenborg’s ideas 
about alien religion in romantic circles, see Horn, Schelling and Swedenborg, 28.  
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 It is telling that the philosophical reception of Swedenborg’s ideas found its most 
positive expression in a more literary format. As we will see in chapter seven, poets and 
authors in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were inspired by a variety of 
Swedenborg’s concepts, especially those related to language and symbolism. Schelling’s 
Clara is the only example of his philosophical writing to take such a narrative format, 
and the fictional setting and characters are perhaps what allowed him to explore the 
fantastic descriptions of other worlds found in Swedenborg’s writings. However, if the 
content of Clara is fanciful in its depiction of supernatural realities, it nevertheless 
responds seriously to the philosophical debates of the time. Swedenborg passes between 
Kant and Schelling as a major example of a kind of knowledge under dispute. Schelling 
responds to Kant, using concepts found in Swedenborg that Kant bracketed, and insists 
on the capacity of spiritual realities to be known by the same faculties that know things 
scientifically – an argument Swedenborg brought to the fore of his own work.  It speaks 
to the relative success of Kant’s efforts over Shelling’s that western philosophy has by 
and large continued in the direction away from metaphysics. 
 Conclusion: Angels and Allegory 
In their chapter on “The Battle of Reason with Imagination,” Hartmut Böhme and 
Gernot Böhme explore one facet of Kant’s interest in Swedenborg that is helpful in our 
present study in so far as it concerns the figurative aspects of human language. Böhme 
and Böhme are among those who make the case that Kant’s critical turn is in large part 
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due to his engagement with Swedenborg.454 They write: “We presume that in 
Swedenborg Kant perceived a sort of twin brother, a counterpart, from whom he found it 
vitally important to distance himself.”455 The example they use from Swedenborg to 
make this argument is the idea of the language of angels. Swedenborg’s angels 
communicate thought in speech, but it is an unmediated speech – a way of presenting 
ideas without social convention or pretense. A single uttered sound communicates pure 
thought without any rhetorical elements, and nothing can be withheld or hidden. Kant 
would have been attracted to this concept, concerned as he was with pure reason and 
pure religion, but he ultimately sided with the usefulness of “civilizing external gloss” as 
Böhme and Böhme put it. A representational theory of language “essentially contains the 
possibility of deception and falsification”456 but civilized behavior and civilized speech 
are nevertheless art forms indispensable to good human relations and good education, 
Kant believed.457  
In a certain sense then, Kant, in siding with language’s indispensable feature of 
masking inner thought with outer words, was highlighting the very principle of 
interpretation that both he and Swedenborg found so important to biblical interpretation. 
Sacred text, like human speech (and unlike angelic speech), conceals its true meaning 
behind the literal sense of the words.  In fact, this interpretive question regarding the 
nature of language, written or spoken, gets at the heart of social and epistemological 
                                                          
454 Stengel criticizes Böhme and Böhme for their emphasis on Kant’s negative response to Swedenborg, 
though he agrees with their assessment of Swedenborg’s importance for the development of Kant’s 
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455 Böhme and Böhme, “The Battle of Reason,” 437-438. 
456 Ibid., 449. 
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conditions of the eighteenth century, whereby language is “by its very nature mediation, 
and the idea of unmediated language is an absurdity.”458 This puts the early modern 
interest in biblical literalism in a new light. If the language of the Bible is true and 
immediately accessible, as so many insisted with increasing confidence at that time, it is 
then unique from other forms of language. It is like Swedenborg’s angelic speech – 
wholly different and uniquely holy. Between Kant and Swedenborg and the biblical 
literalists such as William Whiston, a common set of concerns can be discerned: is divine 
speech different from human speech, and is this difference marked by varying degrees of 
immediacy? Does the Bible, as holy Word, mask its true meaning, or is its truth 
immediate? Neither Kant nor Swedenborg bothered with historical critical methods, 
which they had access to. And both men reacted negatively to forms of biblical literalism 
of their time. Both sought an inner meaning concerned with morality, or with right action 
over and above right belief and both looked for wisdom hidden within the figures of 
speech.  
For Kant, especially after his critical turn, the idea of angelic speech is ultimately 
wrapped up in a set of concepts that must remain theoretical and even banned from 
philosophical discourse. The philosopher no longer orbits a spiritual sun, but a natural 
one. His is the “Copernican revolution for philosophy” as Hanegraaff puts it.459 His 
public rejection of Swedenborg marked a larger moment in the history of science. That 
Swedenborg himself would be used as a tool in finally separating religion from science, 
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metaphysics from physics, is tragic given his own efforts to keep them intertwined. The 
irony with which this separation is made however, such as that found in the pages of 
Träume, is highlighted by the continued presence of key Swedenborgian concepts in 
Kantian philosophy and in the sometimes irreverent and often countercultural influences 
of artists and poets who playfully adopted aspects of Swedenborg’s doctrine of 
correspondences well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Before considering the 
reception of Arcana coelestia among such artists, however, something of their reception 
in religious institutions and among theologians must first be explored. 
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CHAPTER 6: THEOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO ARCANA COELESTIA 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, in Swedenborg’s understanding, the books of the Bible 
with an internal sense are limited to 34 in number. Among other things, he excludes all 
the epistles of Paul, stating that only five New Testament books contain an internal sense: 
the four gospels and the book of Revelation. As for Paul, Swedenborg writes in his 
Spiritual Diary that he “indeed spoke from inspiration, but not in the same way as the 
prophets, to whom every single word was dictated but that his inspiration was that he 
received an influx, according to those things which were with him, which is quite a 
different inspiration, and has no conjunction with heaven by correspondences.”460 Paul’s 
lack of correspondential connection to heaven, in Swedenborg’s view, is curious given 
Paul’s role in establishing allegory as a mode of Christian interpretation. Indeed, 
Swedenborg’s interpretation of Sarai and Hagar in Genesis 16 is not wholly dissimilar 
from Paul’s famous allegorical interpretation of the matriarch and her slave in Galatians 
4.461 Why then, would Swedenborg sever alliances with his strongest biblical reference 
point for interpreting the Bible according to the “spirit” rather than the “letter?”462  One 
answer lies in the particular doctrines Swedenborg wishes to eliminate from true 
Christianity, doctrines that are more clearly articulated in Paul’s epistles than in the 
Gospels, such as salvation by faith, Trinitarianism and the atonement. But another reason 
                                                          
460 Swedenborg, Spiritual Diary, 6062. 
461 See Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia, 1895-1896, where Hagar represents the “exterior man” with 
“affectionem scientiarum” and Sarai the internal, or truth conjoined to good. Swedenborg’s Hagar 
therefore has much in common with the serpent of Genesis 3, as discussed in chapter 4. 
462 See 2 Corinthians 3:6. 
227 
 
 
emerges, in light of Swedenborg’s relationship to the Bible. Discounting Paul in this way 
disconnects Swedenborg from the long tradition of allegoresis, and allows him to claim 
absolute originality – that his is a new understanding, given through him from a new 
heaven to a new earth.  
 Swedenborg’s treatment of Paul’s Epistles was a point of controversy among his 
early readers as we will see.463 And the related question of whether Swedenborg’s 
interpretations were in line with or worked against tradition, whether his allegorical 
exegesis was heretical or authentically Christian, dominated theological discussions 
among his critics and followers alike. This chapter will explore these various positions. 
We will see, for instance, how among Swedenborg’s followers, those who were 
interested in forming a separate church body tended to emphasize Swedenborg’s exegesis 
as distinctive, while those interested in theological or cultural assimilation often 
emphasized his connection to a spiritual sense tradition. His critics also used 
Swedenborg’s exegesis to defend their positions. John Wesley was concerned with 
highlighting the many ways Swedenborg contradicted the literal sense of scripture, and 
with it traditional doctrines of justification and the Trinity, and Johann August Ernesti 
accused Swedenborg of fraudulently applying allegory to further a naturalist agenda and 
lead Christians astray. 
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 The question of whether and how to compare Swedenborg’s exegesis to patristic 
and medieval sources was answered in a number of ways, exposing the theological 
concerns of various readers and reviewers and shedding light on the diversity of early 
modern attitudes toward pre-modern hermeneutics. We see this, for instance, in the very 
first review of Arcana coelestia, published in 1750 by an anonymous author in the 
German journal Neue Zeitungen von Gelehrten Sachen. Since Arcana coelestia’s 
authorship was still unknown at the time, the reviewer makes an assumption based on the 
mystical and allegorical nature of the commentary that the author is a Roman Catholic: 
“If the readers look through it only a little bit, they will quickly discover that, without a 
doubt, the work was written by some person from among the blackcoats, who has written 
it in a state of trance.”464 The reviewer goes on: “The entire book belongs in the centuries 
of scholasticism, when people tormented their senses with such futile thoughts, while 
neglecting the truth of Scripture.”465 The identification of Arcana coelestia’s author with 
Catholicism and scholasticism brings to the fore a tension that would persist in the 
reception of Swedenborg’s work concerning his departure from the plain sense meaning 
of scripture and his relationship with earlier forms of allegorical interpretation.  
This chapter will consider several of the influential early theological responses to 
Swedenborg’s commentaries. It will be organized as a geographical tour, and will 
explore, in turn, Swedenborg’s reception in Sweden, England, and Germany. Differing 
legal and ecclesiastical structures impacted the currents of religious thought in each of 
                                                          
464 Review of Arcana caelestia in Neue Zeitungen von Gelehrten Sachen, as translated in Hanegraaff, 
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these locations such that organizing our study this way will help to contextualize our 
sources. However, there was no single, unified response in any of these places, and we 
will survey variations on positive, negative, or mixed receptions in each country. And, as 
we have highlighted in previous chapters, we will see that the discourse about Jews (both 
their supposed carnality and their mysticism) and the discourse about science (its use in 
either dismantling or sustaining a true understanding scripture and faith) continue their 
entanglement with the plight of allegory among those influenced by Arcana coelestia in 
the long eighteenth century, either positively or negatively.  
Swedenborg in Sweden 
 In 1770, the Supreme Council of the State of Sweden initiated an official 
investigation into the writings of Emanuel Swedenborg presided over by the King 
himself. The investigation was triggered by the emergence of a circle of Swedenborgian 
followers among the clergy and university faculty in Gothenburg. The publication of 
reviews and sermons based on Swedenborg’s interpretations of the Bible, by Gabriel 
Beyer and Johan Rosén in particular, raised the suspicion of the local Consistory who 
were alarmed by the many challenges in Swedenborg’s writings to Lutheran orthodoxy. 
Swedenborg’s theological writings were deemed by the Consistory’s leader, Olaf 
Ekebom, to be “corrupting, heretical, injurious, and in the highest degree to be 
rejected.”466 Ekebom lists six theological objections to Swedenborg: 1) the undermining 
                                                          
466 Olof Ekebom, letter concerning the teachings of Swedenborg, privately circulated and included in a 
letter to Swedenborg from Peter Hammarberg in May, 1769. Translation from Letters and Memorials of 
Swedenborg, trans. and ed. Alfred Acton (Bryn Athyn, PA: Swedenborg Scientific Association, 1955), 662. 
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of the literal sense of scripture through the doctrine of correspondences; 2) the rejection 
of a trinity of three persons in one God; 3) the rejection of atonement theology; 4) the 
rejection of justification by faith; 5) a symbolic interpretation of the holy supper; and 6) 
inflammatory comments made in conversation with deceased Protestants in the world of 
spirits.467 This list would foreshadow the objections to be made by prominent theologians 
in other countries, including John Wesley and Johann August Ernesti, who would accuse 
Swedenborg of promoting a religion that was fundamentally opposed to biblical theology 
and biblical tradition. 
In his written response to the Supreme Council, who had mandated an 
explanation, the accused Beyer summarizes Swedenborg’s work and defends 
Swedenborg’s reputation as a scholar and Christian. He justifies Swedenborg’s 
hermeneutic as, on the one hand, fully in line with the “fundamental rule” of the church 
that no doctrine can contradict the literal meaning of the Word and, on the other hand, as 
the perfected expression of the long-standing tradition of uncovering an inner sense: 
“With regard to the interpretation of Scripture; we are soon able to discover, that what 
with Origen were mere obscure traces, what Coccejus attempted to guess at, and what 
several God-fearing and learned theologians saw through a veil, has been manifested in 
clear daylight in the Arcana coelestia and especially in the ‘Apocalypse Revealed,’ which 
have been published by Assessor Swedenborg.”468 In so framing the issue, Beyer also 
foreshadows the reception of Arcana coelestia in other countries, but this time among 
                                                          
467 Ibid., 662-664. 
468 “Dr. Beyer’s Defense,” in Tafel, Documents, vol. II, 332. 
231 
 
 
Swedenborg’s defenders and followers, who tended to either devalue instances of early 
Christian allegory or ignore them completely. 
Beyer cautions that there will be many who misunderstand Swedenborg and many 
who will be unqualified to judge his writings, including: dogmatists, the unlearned who 
are “not grounded in philology and the sciences,” those who are distracted by worldly 
lusts, and those “who cleave to the letter, like the Jews.”469 We have, in this list of 
disqualified readers, an echo of Swedenborg’s own catalogue of people who are 
incapable of interpreting scripture,470 but with one important distinction. While 
Swedenborg warned of the consequences of placing too much value on scientific 
learning, Beyer warned of the consequences of its absence. Swedenborg, having left 
behind his own scientific and philosophical career, was on guard against the skeptics and 
deists of his day. Beyer, and with him so many of the first Swedenborgians, saw the 
utility in highlighting Swedenborg’s reliance on the principles of physics, chemistry, and 
astronomy, for instance, in his exegesis, marking his as a form of allegorical 
interpretation uniquely suited to modernity. The phrase “science of correspondences,” 
while heavily associated with Swedenborg, is not one he uses to refer to his own 
hermeneutics, but has been the standard way of referring to Swedenborgian methods 
since the time of his first followers.471 
                                                          
469 Ibid., 328-329. The reference to the Jews is edited out in the version printed as a missionary pamphlet 
in 1829 by the London Missionary and Tract Society of the New Jerusalem Church.  
470 See chapter 4. 
471 See, for instance, C.A. Tulk, The Science of Correspondency, ed. Charles Pooley (London: James Speirs, 
1889). The phrase does occur in Swedenborg’s work, for instance in Arcana caelestia 10407, where he 
speaks of the ancient Egyptian knowledge of scientia correspondentiarum, but he doesn’t use the phrase 
to describe his own methods. He does occasionally refer to correspondences as the “science of sciences” 
but this has the effect of elevating it above natural science. 
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Swedenborg himself was traveling at the time of the investigation in Sweden, and 
refused to defend himself when the trouble was brought to his attention, citing his trust in 
God’s providence to provide for the appropriate dissemination of his books. He was, 
however, working on his final publication at the time of the trial, and readers of Vera 
Christiana religio (True Christian Religion, 1771) have long interpreted the two-volume 
work as a response to doctrinal objections lodged against him by the Swedish Lutheran 
Church in 1770. The end result of the trial was minimal, owing at least in part to 
Swedenborg’s family connections to Swedish aristocrats and clergymen.472 Swedenborg 
was not himself persecuted, and his books were not deemed officially heretical, though 
they were banned from publication in Sweden and Beyer and Rosén were removed from 
their positions.473 
The banning of Swedenborg’s books, while a milder outcome than the alternative 
of heresy charges, had a noticeable inhibiting effect on Swedish Swedenborgianism. 
While a small Exegetic and Philanthropic Society was formed in 1786 to translate and 
publish Swedenborg’s work in Swedish (via printers in Denmark),474 his legacy has been 
associated more with a sense of cultural heritage than religious heritage in Swedenborg’s 
native land.475 To get a fuller sense of the theological responses to Arcana coelestia, both 
                                                          
472 See Benz, Emanuel Swedenborg, 513. 
473 The ban was lifted in 1809 when liberty of the press was officially instated in Sweden, but 
Swedenborgians were still forbidden from organizing into a sect. 
474 Siven Lilcenrants, “Annals of the New Church,” in New Jerusalem Magazine or a Treasury of Celestial, 
Spiritual, and Natural Knowledge, (London: London Universal Society for the Promotion of the New 
Church, 1790), 25. 
475 For more on early Swedenborgianism in Sweden, see Marguerite Beck Block, The New Church in the 
New World: A Study of Swedenborgianism in America (New York : Swedenborg Pub. Association, 1984), 
52-55. 
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negative and positive, it will be necessary to focus outside of Sweden, for it was in 
England and Germany that Swedenborg’s work triggered the most robust theological 
discussions in the decades following Arcana coelestia’s publication. It was in England 
that readers of Swedenborg fully organized themselves into an ecclesiastical body that 
would ordain their own clergy and meet in their own sanctuaries, though Swedenborg 
himself never intended such an arrangement. And while German readers of Swedenborg 
did not organize this way, they engaged each other and their critics in the public arena, 
the results of which reflect a turbulent theological landscape involving many of the 
themes that concern us here. 
Swedenborg in England 
1) John Wesley 
One of Swedenborg’s most famous contemporary critics was John Wesley (1703-
1791), founder of Methodism. Like so many others, Wesley’s views of Swedenborg were 
conflicted, ambiguous, and changed over time. According to the testimony of a Rev. 
Samuel Smith, his conversion from Methodism to Swedenborgianism was due to a series 
of remarkable letters between Swedenborg and Wesley that he personally witnessed. As 
one of Wesley’s preachers, he was present in February of 1772, when Wesley received a 
letter from Swedenborg stating that he had been informed in a vision that Wesley had a 
“strong desire” to speak with him. Apparently Wesley admitted to his eagerness to meet 
with Swedenborg and responded suggesting a meeting in six months’ time, when he 
would return to London. Swedenborg replied that a meeting in six months would be 
impossible, since he would pass finally into the spiritual world on March 29th – which he 
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did.476 A second account, also transmitted through the chain of early followers of 
Swedenborg, quotes Wesley in 1773 stating: “We may now burn all our works of 
Theology. God has sent us a teacher from heaven; and in the doctrines of Swedenborg we 
may learn all that is necessary for us to know.” 477 While we cannot know the true mind 
of Wesley regarding Swedenborg in the 1770s from these accounts, given the anecdotal 
nature of the evidence, the accounts speak to the fact that many of the first English 
Swedenborgians were associated with Wesley’s inner circle. Wesley and Swedenborg 
themselves traveled in some of the same circuits: both had close ties to London 
Moravians and were involved to some degree with the Moravian community on Fetter 
Lane in the late 1730s and early 1740s. In temperament and calling, however, the two 
men could not be further apart: the one a charismatic public preacher and the other a 
private philosopher turned mystic with a speech impediment that kept him from speaking 
publicly.  
It is difficult to determine the movement of Wesley’s judgement on Swedenborg 
up to the 1770s. In February, 1779 he wrote a friend, Elizabeth Ritchie, that “although 
Swedenborg’s tract is majestic, though in ruins, still, he had strong and beautiful 
thoughts, and may be read with profit by a serious and cautious reader.”478 That same 
year, he wrote in a journal entry “his ideas are low, groveling, just suiting a Mahomedan 
                                                          
476 See “John Wesley’s Testimony Concerning Swedenborg in 1772, and 1773,” in Tafel, Documents, vol. II, 
564-566. 
477 Ibid., 568. 
478 John Wesley, The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley, A. M., ed. John Tolford (London: Epworth Press, 
1931), VI, 340. 
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paradise.”479 Such ambivalence is familiar to us from Kant, and we will see more of it in 
such figures as Friedrich Christoph Oetinger and William Blake. Wesley’s ambivalence, 
however, is not lasting, and he soon turns his efforts concerning Swedenborg to an 
unequivocal series of attacks. 
Whatever more positive impressions Wesley may or may not have had earlier in 
his career, the interest in Swedenborg among Wesley’s followers prompted him to 
publish a series of scathing reviews in his Arminian Magazine after Swedenborg’s death. 
These reviews tell us something about the discourse about Swedenborg as a seer and 
biblical commentator in the eighteenth century, but also about eighteenth century 
discourse about the Bible itself. In particular, Wesley’s 1783 “Thoughts on the Writings 
of Baron Swedenborg” addresses Swedenborg’s exegetical methods and his relationship 
to biblical theology. Wesley’s central argument in the piece is that Swedenborg’s 
writings are wholly contrary to the biblical message literally understood: “In all this 
jumble of dissonant notions there is not one that is supported by any scripture, taken in its 
plain, obvious meaning.”480 Swedenborg’s allegorical methods are “ploughed with the 
heifer of Jacob Bohmen”481 and “utterly absurd.”482 He then presents a series of specific 
heretical interpretations to be found in Swedenborg’s commentary, as evidence of how 
far the Baron strays from the truth on the page.  
                                                          
479 John Wesley, "Rev. J. Wesley's Journal,” in The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A. M., John Emory, ed. 
IV (New York: Carlton & Porter, 1856),  506. 
480 John Wesley, “Thoughts on the Writings of Baron Swedenborg,” in The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, 
A. M., John Emory, ed. (New York: B. Waugh and T. Mason, 1835), XII, 430. 
481 Ibid., 427. 
482 Ibid., 428. 
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Among Swedenborg’s many errors, according to Wesley, is his insistence that 
God is never angry. “Then the scripture is full of blasphemy for it continually ascribes 
anger to God.” Wesley, whose atonement theology required reconciliation with a Father 
estranged from the time of Eden, is concerned with the preservation of a particular 
narrative arrangement of the Old and New Testaments that relies on descriptions of an 
angry God. Likewise, Swedenborg’s rejection of a theology of “three persons” is a bother 
to Wesley who finds that anti-trinitarianism “stares you in the face, almost in every page” 
of Arcana coelestia.483 That Trinitarian and atonement theologies are manifest in 
scripture, however, is an assumption with roots in Patristic interpretations that relied 
heavily on typological and allegorical methods.484 The insistence that these tenents are 
backed by a literal interpretation alone is a turn characteristic of Reformation 
hermeneutics, whose success into modern times can be at least in part attributed to 
Wesley’s efforts. 
Wesley has objections to Swedenborg on other topics as well. Swedenborg makes 
claims regarding the past and the future that he deems non-biblical. He presents 
Swedenborg’s interpretation of the apocalypse, that it does not describe actual future 
events of the physical world, but present-day spiritual tribulations of the church. 
According to Swedenborg, the dragon described in Revelation symbolizes the fallacy of 
justification by faith; and this interpretation is itself blasphemy of the worst kind, by 
Wesley’s estimation. He also points to Swedenborg’s notion of an “ancient Word” that 
                                                          
483 Ibid. 
484 The ransom theory of atonement, for instance, has its roots in the work of Origen. See footnote 57 
above.  
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predates the Old Testament, which Wesley believes cannot be true since there was no 
form of writing before the two tablets delivered by God on Mt. Sinai. Also regarding 
heaven and hell: he outlines heresies contrary to scripture, such as Swedenborg’s 
assertion that angels and spirits are deceased humans from earth and other planets. But 
the most dangerous of all Swedenborg’s heresies is his idea of hell, in which evil souls 
are not forced to suffer but are permitted to indulge in their own lusts. Wesley is 
especially scandalized by the pleasures described in Swedenborg’s hell, a hell without 
terror and whose inhabitants, Wesley writes, encounter “harlots instead of fire.”485  
Wesley had many objections to Swedenborg on theological and exegetical 
grounds. But his attacks grew more vigorous when his own followers started converting 
to Swedenborgianism. Six of his ministers converted, including Rev. James Hindmarsh, 
father of Robert Hindmarsh who would go on to found a separate New Church movement 
in England. It was in the churches, coffee houses and street corners of England that the 
New Church movement took root, and a brief study of the positive reception of 
Swedenborg’s ideas in England will shed light on how many of his first followers framed 
Swedenborgian hermeneutics against the theological contexts of their day. 
                                                          
485 Wesley, “Thoughts,” 440. In addition to these theological attacks, Wesley published a detailed report 
of a 1743 incident intended to expose Swedenborg as a madman, ironically titled “An Account of a Very 
Great Man,” in Arminian Magazine, IV (1781): 46-69. The report, from Rev. Aaron Mathesius, says he ran 
naked into the streets delirious from fever, and spoke to his landlord about heading to the synagogue to 
tell the Jews he was the messiah come to be crucified for their salvation. Swedenborg’s earliest followers 
put a great deal of effort into denouncing this report, such as we find in Hindmarsh, A Vindication. See the 
discussion of this matter with comparison to Swedenborg's own journal entries at this time in Lars 
Berquist, Swedenborg’s Dream Diary, 52-59.  
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2) The English Swedenborgians 
In a preface to his 1778 English translation of Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell, 
Thomas Hartley laments the hostile reception of Swedenborg in his homeland, and 
expresses hope for a better outcome in England: “But, to the honor of our constitution, 
we can as yet call the liberty of the press (and a liberty within the bounds of decency may 
it always be) the privilege of Englishmen, and therefore may reasonably hope for better 
success to our author’s writings in this land of freedom; not that we expect any 
encouragement on their behalf from our Pharisees and bigots of any denomination, for 
they are the same everywhere.”486 It was indeed because of the religious tolerance in 
England that Swedenborg did so much of his publishing there, and his ideas found their 
greatest public following in England for the same reason. Soon after his death, reading 
circles and societies formed, which were publicly advertised and attracted a following 
among enough influential clergy and prominent citizens that a movement took hold. 
While the New Church in England remained relatively small, it nevertheless generated 
moments of lively activity, attracting artists such as William Blake and Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, and initiating missionary activity onto the New World, where 
Swedenborgianism would acquire its most influential voices. Much has been written on 
the history of the New Church in England and America, and its influences on the arts, 
psychology, transcendentalism, religion and spirituality, and there are many areas of 
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reception that are beyond the scope of this study.487 We will limit ourselves here to the 
rhetoric about Swedenborg’s biblical interpretation in the decades after his death. 
As we saw, sharp criticism emerged from Wesley and others on theological 
grounds. But the positive reception of Swedenborg’s theology was not itself without 
controversy. Conflict arose among readers of Swedenborg almost immediately, between 
those who wanted to separate and form an ecclesiastical body and those who wanted to 
remain integrated into existing church structures. The non-separatists were headed by the 
Rev. John Clowes, an influential Anglican cleric in the Manchester area. The separatists, 
based in London, were led by the young, formerly Methodist, Robert Hindmarsh, who 
eventually procured a Dissenter’s License for the movement. Under Hindmarsh’s 
leadership, the movement’s members would come to teach from their own catechism, 
sing from their own hymnals, pray in their own churches and ordain their own ministers, 
dressed in their own ecclesiastical vestments. Each group had its own disagreements and 
occasional splintering factions, but by and large we can trace the direction of the two in 
distinctly different directions. Hindmarsh’s group, made up largely of disenfranchised 
Baptists and Methodists, maintained their separation from “Old Church” Christianity, 
founding their own schools, requiring rebaptism, and in 1799 officially declaring their 
belief in the divinity of Swedenborg’s writings. Clowes’ Manchester group rejected such 
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moves towards orthodoxy, and instead experimented freely with other spiritual trends of 
the day such as animal magnetism, communication with angels, and vegetarianism.488 
This division can be seen, to some extent, in the various ways followers of 
Swedenborg talked about his biblical interpretation; whether Swedenborg’s exegesis was 
part of an ancient and hallowed tradition, or was something entirely new. Thomas 
Hartley, for instance, who was an early follower and friend of Swedenborg’s, writes in 
his preface about the ancient knowledge of the science of correspondences, mentions 
Clement and Origen and quotes Hermes Trimegistus by way of introducing 
Swedenborg’s system of interpretation: “All things which are in the heavens are also in 
the earth in an earthly manner; and all things which are in earth are also in the heavens in 
a heavenly manner.”489 Hartley’s view of Swedenborg, as part of a tradition with ancient 
roots, was bolstered by his interest in mysticism by way of Bohme and William Law and 
demonstrates a kind of free-association available to non-sectarian Swedenborgians.  
In contrast, we see more of the dissenter’s mindset reflected, for instance, in the 
work of one of the first men to be ordained a New Church minister, the Rev. Joseph 
Proud. In his 1808 A Course of Lectures in the Fundamental and Most Essential 
Doctrines and Subjects of Christianity, Proud leaves aside any discussion of the history 
of allegorical interpretation, and discusses only the Christian Church’s complete failure to 
grasp the internal sense of scripture. Proud argues that the internal sense would have been 
                                                          
488 See Block, New Church, 61-72. As Block points out, this division of Swedenborg’s followers in two 
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opened to Christians, had they lived into the moral perfection of Christ’s teaching. But 
the fallacies introduced by the church fathers, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, barred 
them from the Word’s true meaning. 
[Had Christians] continued in the pure truth and holy doctrine, taught them 
by Jesus Christ and His apostles, they would have elevated their 
understanding into spiritual light; because in that case, their hearts would 
have been principled in heavenly love. But the Christian world, with its 
leaders and great men, too soon departed from the pure truths Jesus taught 
them; because, they departed from pure love, principles, and life of genuine 
Christianity; in consequence of which, their understandings were darkened to 
the Holy Word, and they invented doctrines suited to the impure state of their 
own hearts, the perverted state of their understandings, and the disorder of 
their lives.490 
 
 Hindmarsh, likewise, writes in his A Vindication of the Character and Writings of 
the Honorable Emanuel Swedenborg, that while early Christians may have had some 
superficial conceptions about allegory, “it does not appear from any of their writings, 
which have reached our times, that they were at all acquainted with the science of 
correspondences, which is the true key to the spiritual sense of the Word; and 
consequently they have left unexplained a thousand difficult passages, which the pious 
and well-disposed members of the church in all ages have been desirous of 
understanding.”491 As James Lawrence articulates, this approach would become 
normative within sectarian Swedenborgian circles, where reference to earlier Christian 
(or Jewish) spiritual sense traditions was, and still is today, extremely rare.492 This 
tendency to overlook earlier allegorical traditions is best understood in the post-
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Reformation context of New Church movement at its start. It was the ability of Reformed 
Christians to disregard medieval allegorical commentaries and traditions that created an 
environment in which readers of Swedenborg might see the interpretive methods found in 
Arcana coelestia to be evidence of a new dispensation, a new way of knowing and of 
receiving revelation. And so they did in most cases.  One exception to this trend is in the 
work of Rev. Samuel Noble, whose 1825 The Plenary Inspiration of Scriptures is worth 
consideration for its study of the history of allegory in Christianity, even if the end goal 
of Noble’s study is to reinforce Swedenborg’s distinctiveness. 
Noble was an ordained minister of the New Church, having joined Proud’s 
congregation as a young man in the 1790’s. His The Plenary Inspiration is, however, 
written for a non-Swedenborgian audience and never mentions Swedenborg by name. 
The book drew on public lectures he gave at Albion Hall in London, in an attempt, as 
Lawrence puts it “to present to the public a radical thesis for scripture in as neutral and 
inoffensive tones as possible.”493 While the book is quite specific in mapping out 
Swedenborg’s interpretations of the Bible, Noble avoids using the term correspondences, 
referencing “analogies” or the “doctrine of spiritual interpretation” instead. His is an 
apologetic for a Swedenborgian approach to the Bible that avoids insider language that 
might be off-putting. He begins with a critique of trends in biblical interpretation in his 
day, calling out Protestants, Catholics, Deists and skeptics alike for various assaults on 
revelation: for increasingly crediting human authorship over Divine inspiration. Noble 
argues first from scripture, that the text itself points to an inner meaning, and then 
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presents a century-by-century outline of the history of Christian allegory in order to 
counter his contemporaries who would stop at the literal sense of the text. 
What regard is to be had to the doubts of a few moderns, when opposed to the 
unanimous decision of all antiquity,--to the unvarying acknowledgement of 
so many ages? Although, through part of its course, the doctrine of spiritual 
interpretation may have been rendered less clear by the foulness of the 
channel through which it flowed; and although it has, in modern times, been 
made less distinguishable by a mixture of other waters; it has unquestionably 
had its rise in the virgin days of Christianity: Unless then it is to be 
contended, that the farther from the fountain, the purer the stream, it must be 
admitted, that the doctrine of the spiritual interpretation is the pure doctrine 
of the Christian Church.494 
 
Noble is therefore very much aware that he is swimming against the tide in 
arguing that the only truly Christian way to read the Bible is to read beyond the literal 
sense. In presenting this history, Noble makes lengthy references to Johann Lorenz 
Mosheim's Institutiones Historiae Ecclesiasticae Antiquae et Recentioris (1755, 
translated into English in 1806 as An Ecclesiastical History, Ancient and Modern). 
Noble’s use of Mosheim is complicated and polemical. He rightly finds in Mosheim’s 
history a bias against allegory and a position in favor of “the golden rule” of modern 
interpretation, that the one and only sense is that of the letter. For instance, he notes 
Mosheim’s avoidance of Paul, who, Noble writes “decidedly favored the practice of 
drawing from the plain words of Scripture, not, indeed, insipid and forced allegories, but 
weighty and just ones.”495 He then flips Mosheim’s intended interpretation of this history. 
Rather than telling a progressive history in which literal interpretation eventually 
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triumphs, as Mosheim would have it, Noble’s version shows a steady decline, or a 
misguided rejection of the true meaning. This history traces the great allegorists from 
Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius, Jerome, Isidore of Seville, the venerable Bede, 
Anthony of Padua, Hugh of St. Cher and many others. That he glosses over important 
distinctions between these authors and their interpretive methods (Jerome himself harshly 
criticized the allegorical methods of Origen, for instance) is due to Noble’s desire to paint 
this history as consistent and steadfast. He writes: “Indeed, no truth in history is more 
certain than this; that for at least fourteen or fifteen hundred years, few who received the 
Scriptures at all, ever thought of denying that they contained mysteries in their bosom 
which do not appear upon the surface.”496 Noble does mention a few exceptions 
dismissively, such as Nicholas of Lyra, but these literalists merely reinforce his thesis 
that those on the right side of history were reading beyond the letter.497 
In contrast to this view, he quotes Mosheim disparaging allegory. In Mosheim’s 
words: “It must be acknowledged, that even in [the first] century several Christians 
adopted that absurd and corrupt custom, used among the Jews, of darkening the plain 
words of the Holy Scriptures by insipid and forced allegories, and of drawing them 
violently from their proper and natural signification, in order to extort from them certain 
hidden and mysterious significations.”498 The quotation from Mosheim highlights the 
difference with Noble’s position regarding the history of allegorical interpretation, but it 
also inadvertently highlights another difference. Mosheim’s derogatory reference to 
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Jewish allegory is in line with the discourse about Jewish exegesis in the eighteenth-
century, as we saw in chapter one: comparable, for instance, to William Whiston’s 
assertion that allegory is an archaic and essentially Jewish way of reading texts. Noble 
does not comment here on the mention of Jewish allegory by Mosheim, nor does he 
elsewhere acknowledge Jewish non-literal exegetical practices. He does, however, 
dedicate a considerable amount of time to discussing the role Jews played in creating the 
biblical text, which follows and surpasses Swedenborg in emphasizing their externality. 
According to Noble, the events described in the Bible, while pointing symbolically to a 
higher truth, nevertheless literally happened in history. “If the Bible-history had been a 
pure allegory throughout, destitute of a foundation in actual occurrences, it would long 
ago have been rejected as a mere fable.”499 The revelation contained in the inspired text 
required a grounding in historical events. The Jews, argues Noble, were selected as 
“mediums of representing” the truth of scripture because of their nature and disposition. 
He lists a curious set of traits that made the Jews best suited for this role: they substitute 
ritual for moral reasoning, they are not inwardly principled, and they are uniquely suited 
to being manipulated, openly controlled, or “constantly overruled” by Providence.500 In 
this way, the requisite events could take place in the world that would provide for all the 
right allegories in God’s sacred text, without impinging on the free will of the Israelites, 
since it was in their nature to “multiply ceremonial observances beyond what was 
required.” 
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Now this disposition of that people to neglect essentials and to cleave to 
formalities, if it disqualified them from constituting an interior church 
themselves, eminently adapted them to be made the representatives of such a 
church, and to have their affairs overruled, so as to be subservient to such 
representation. Nor is there any room to object, that such control was 
incompatible with their free agency and moral responsibility, when this their 
gross temper and superficial disposition is regarded.501 
 
Noble here takes Swedenborg’s description of the Jews as a merely “representative 
church” to another level – stating that the Jews, lacking a will of their own, were 
compelled to act in a certain fashion for the sake of the inner meaning of the text that 
would describe them. In support of this argument, Noble includes an appendix 
summarizing the contents of Buxtorf’s famous Synagoga Judaica, to provide examples of 
how Jews find “in almost every text of Scripture, an authority for some trifling ceremony 
or custom.”502 Thus, he argues, one can look to the irrational customs of modern-day 
Jews for evidence of their superficial and submissive nature in biblical times. All of this, 
Noble puts to the service of his argument that a truly Christian interpretation of scripture 
is, and always has been, an allegorical one.  
While Noble connects his hermeneutics to a long history of interpretation of an 
inner sense, he nevertheless argues that modern Christians finally have access to a 
“Universal Rule” that can bring rational certainty where before there was only intuitive 
perception. This rule is a reformulation of Swedenborg’s correspondence between 
degrees, or levels: “Such a rule, then, it is conceived, is afforded in the Mutual Relation 
which exists by creation between things natural or material, spiritual or moral, and 
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divine; which is such that the lower order of objects answers to the higher.”503 The study 
of mathematics and natural philosophy, he argues, have finally provided the framework 
into which the ancient tradition of the spiritual sense can be applied. Now the Bible will 
be interpreted with the light of science. And as Lawrence points out, it is this element in 
particular, rather than reference to earlier Christian allegory, that gets highlighted in 
Swedenborgian apologetics going forward: “It will be Noble’s establishment of a 
‘scientific’ framework for discovering the inner sense meanings of the Bible that will 
have a long reach into future discourse much more than the tactic of featuring the 
allegorical tradition as an apologetic tactic for a defense of Swedenborg’s biblical 
hermeneutic.”504 Noble’s work was, as we said, apologetic. His non-Swedenborgian 
audience is implied by the lack of reference to Swedenborg by name, or to language 
unique to Swedenborgianism. And yet, his work addressed a need within the community 
of Swedenborg’s early followers, to understand Swedenborg’s place in the history of 
Christian exegesis, and to pronounce his as the finally “scientific” culmination and crown 
of this history.505  The emphasis on earlier Christian allegorical exegesis served, not 
simply to demonstrate Swedenborg’s traditionalism, but that his New Jerusalem 
descended onto a well-laid foundation.  
Swedenborg in Germany  
                                                          
503 Ibid., 132. 
504 Lawrence, “Speaking of Something Else,” 77. 
505 His Plenary Inspiration generated significant enthusiasm within the Swedenborgian movement, and 
private individuals and printing societies funded its advertisement after it was published. See Lawrence, 
“Speaking of Something Else,” 74. 
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1) Johann August Ernesti  
As in Sweden, the status of Lutheranism as the state religion in Germany 
prohibited formal development of the kinds of Swedenborgian movements we see arising 
in England. Germany did have its prominent converts, such as Abbé Pernety, Prussian 
Court Librarian, and Immanuel Tafel, Professor and Librarian the University at Tübingen 
and German translator of Swedenborg. However, the early criticism by Kant and 
censorship of Oetinger, which will be examined below, inhibited public admiration for 
Swedenborg.  Arcana coelestia, in particular, was reviewed critically by the influential 
Johann August Ernesti (1704-1781) in 1760. Ernesti was a philologist, theologian and 
professor of literature and rhetoric at the University of Leipzig. His lengthy and scathing 
review of Arcana coelestia was printed in the first volume of his own Neue Theologische 
Bibliothek, without naming Arcana coelestia’s anonymous author.506  Swedenborg is 
mentioned by name, however, in a second attack by Ernesti in a review in the eighth 
volume of the same journal. Ernesti’s reviews were widely read and responded to by 
those interested in Swedenborg from various sides, and Swedenborg himself responded in 
a most unorthodox manner, with the inclusion of a memorable relation in his Vera 
Christiana religio, in which the spirits associated with Ernesti in the other world engage 
Swedenborg in theological debate, and lose.507 
                                                          
506 Ernesti claims to know Swedenborg’s identity in the review, but does not name him. An English 
translation of the review can be found in J. C. Cuno’s Memoirs on Swedenborg to which is Added Dr. J. A. 
Ernesti’s Libelous Attack and its Refutation trans. Claire E. Berninger and Alfred Acton, ed. Alfred Acton 
(Bryn Athyn, The Academy Book Room, 1947), 139-153. While Cuno mentions the review, Tafel and 
Berniger include the full review with notes. 
507 Swedenborg, True Christian Religion, 137. 
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 In his reviews, Ernesti accuses Swedenborg of calculated fraud: of using allegory 
and mysticism with the intent of promoting a naturalist agenda. It is a curious 
combination of charges, in which the materialism of Epicurus and the allegory of 
Coccejus ostensibly intermingle, with the intent of deliberately leading readers astray. 
One sees without difficulty that, under this fanatical form, the author wishes 
to bring forward materialism and his own philosophical opinions, and that 
this is a novel of a new kind which may perhaps be compared with Klimm’s 
subterraneum journey, except that the latter fiction is harmless, while the 
former in its misuse and distortion of Holy Writ, under the guise of the above 
mentioned inner sense, is highly worthy of punishment.508 
 
Ernesti’s two-fold attack on Swedenborg’s allegory and his materialism is a 
complicated pairing, and one that betrays the anxieties that characterize eighteenth-
century debates about biblical religion. As we have seen in the work of William Whiston 
and others, the preference for literal interpretations on one hand, and the search for 
scientific explanations of biblical narratives on the other, created unfamiliar challenges to 
Christian orthodoxy. Ernesti found plenty of heretical material in Arcana coelestia to 
object to, but he framed his criticism in terms that reflected the particular hermeneutical 
challenges of his environment. Elsewhere Ernesti writes: “it is clear that, like the crude 
Fanatici, he is a naturalist, and that he hides his naturalism under cover of Biblical 
expressions, or changes the Biblical theology into a naturalismum as, in a different way, 
do the Socinians.”509 The Socinians were known for their rejection of Trinitarian doctrine 
and of substitutionary atonement: a likeness to Swedenborg whose connection to 
naturalism is not immediately clear, but underlies Ernesti’s fears about the corrosiveness 
                                                          
508 Ernesti, “Review of Arcana caelestia,” in J. C. Cuno’s Memoirs, 152. 
509 Ibid., 167. 
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of those threatening Christian orthodoxy. These anxieties, which were lodged as attacks 
against Swedenborg, were also Swedenborg’s anxieties, as we have seen. In his own, 
unusual, response to Ernesti, Swedenborg lodges a similar criticism against his reviewer: 
“that in writing as he did against the worship of our Lord and Savior, he at the same time 
robbed the Lord of His Divinity, contrary to the orthodoxy of his church, or allowed his 
pen to plough a furrow in which he thoughtlessly sowed naturalism.”510 The charge of 
naturalism was lodged back and forth between Swedenborg and Ernesti, revealing not so 
much either man’s avowal of naturalist principles, but a climate of suspicion amidst 
challenges to biblical religion, or the concern over science’s infringement on revelation. 
2) Oetinger’s Geistleiblichkeit 
The Lutheran theologian and theosopher Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702 – 
1782), was important to the reception of Swedenborg in Germany in a number of ways. 
Like others we have studied in this dissertation, Oetinger’s initial enthusiasm for 
Swedenborg was later tempered with concern and even criticism. Oetinger’s case is 
different from Wesley’s and Kant’s, however, in that his early admiration for 
Swedenborg was published, widely read, and led to his official censure the same year as 
the publication of Kant’s Träume. His later falling out with Swedenborg, which was, like 
Wesley, over theological issues grounded in biblical interpretation, was met with the 
additional difficulty of having his reputation so closely tied to Swedenborgian heresies. 
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Oetinger held positions as superintendent of the churches in Weinsberg and in 
Herrenberg, and as prelate at Murrhardt. Like Schelling, therefore, he was moved by 
theosophical currents sweeping south western Germany. He was both admired and 
disparaged for his theological eclecticism, which incorporated the theosophy of Jakob 
Böhme, the end time predictions of biblicist and Greek scholar Johann Albrecht Bengel, 
and the cosmology of Lurianic Kabbalah. His interest in Kabbalah began while he was a 
seminarian at Tubingen, where he writes that he was “possessed of a great desire to think 
like an ancient Jew.”511 He later sought out experts in Jewish and Christian Kabbalah in 
Frankfurt and Halle and studied, among other sources, the Zohar, the Kabbalah denudata 
and the Lurianic Eitz Hayyim.512 As Ernst Benz writes, during his earlier career Oetinger 
looked to three men in particular, Luria, Böhme, and Swedenborg, as “principle witnesses 
of spiritual knowledge.”513  
Oetinger was a reader, translator and commentator on Swedenborg’s writings and 
corresponded personally with Swedenborg in the 1760s. He translated several of 
Swedenborg’s theological works into German including De Nova Hierosolyma et Ejus 
Doctrina Coelesti (The New Jerusalem and Its Heavenly Doctrine) in 1772, De 
Commercio Animæ & Corporis (Interaction of the Soul and the Body) in 1772, and the 
popular De Caelo et Ejus Mirabilibus et de Inferno (Heaven and its Wonders and Hell) in 
                                                          
511 Ernst Benz, Christian Kabbalah: Neglected Child of Theology, trans. Kenneth W. Wesche and ed. Robert 
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1774.514 However, it was his partial translation of, and commentary on, Arcana coelestia 
in his 1765 book Swedenborgs und anderer Irdische und Himmlische Philosophie 
(Earthly and Heavenly Philosophy of Swedenborg and Others) that got him into trouble 
with church authorities. 
Swedenborgs und anderer speaks with highest praise about Swedenborg’s 
insights. In the preface to the work he uses Swedenborg’s background in math and 
philosophy to justify his message, an emphasis similar to Noble’s in England some sixty 
years later: “The infidelity which is rife now in the world, has induced God to make use 
of a celebrated philosopher in order to communicate to us heavenly information. 
Mathematics have checked the imagination of this philosopher; wherefore it will not do 
to say, that he reports mere imaginations. Experimental facts (standhafte Erfahrungen) 
are not imaginations. These experiences are due to the influx of heavenly intelligences by 
the command of the Lord.”515 In this preface, Oetinger compares Swedenborg to the 
apostles, who received the Holy Ghost, and validates Swedenborg’s experiences with his 
devotion to the Bible: “Does not Swedenborg place the Scripture higher than anyone 
else?”516 The combination of exegetical and visionary material in Arcana coelestia 
clearly made an impression on him. However, the fact that his book included translations 
of Swedenborg’s memorable relations only, and not his exegesis, demonstrates an initial 
bias against Swedenborg’s approach to biblical interpretation that would, in time, become 
                                                          
514 As late as 1777 he also translated and discussed the section headings from Swedenborg’s Deliciae 
sapientiae de amore conjugial in his anonymously published Freimüthigen Gedanken von der ehelichen 
Liebe (Frank Thoughts on Conjugial Love). 
515 As translated in Tafel, Documents, vol. II, 1028. 
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a matter of great concern and ultimately lead him to openly criticize Swedenborg in later 
publications. 
 Oetinger’s book was reviewed positively and negatively, but it was Ernesti’s 
virulent attack on Oetinger in particular that drew the attention of Württemberg 
Consistory, and in 1766 the book was confiscated, he was ordered to submit future 
publications to the Consistory for censure, and he was forbidden from seeking further 
audience with Swedenborg. He continued to write and publish prolifically, however, 
either pseudonymously or through channels outside of Württemberg.517 In reference to 
this censorship, Tafel calls Oetinger the “first martyr for the New Church,”518 and while 
Oetinger never formally subscribed to Swedenborgianism, he certainly suffered for his 
attraction to Swedenborg’s writings. Oetinger penned a lengthy and steadfast defense of 
his book to the Duke of Württemberg, but in a letter to Swedenborg he admits to 
weakening: “The affection I entertain for you threatens to become lukewarm amid the 
many reproaches showered upon me; it must be refreshed. You can scarcely believe how 
much I have still to suffer on your account. The Consistory treats me in a most violent 
manner.” Oetinger summarizes the Consistory’s ten questions, but follows with his own 
nagging concern: “It is a fixed purpose in my mind to write a defense of your books with 
one sole exception, that, contrary to your principles as to the literal sense, you take away 
the internal sense of the Pauline Epistles; and that you explain the city of God as meaning 
                                                          
517 Pricilla Hayden-Roy, A Foretaste of Heaven: Friedrich Hölderlin in the Context of Wurttemberg Pietism, 
(Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994), 38. 
518 Tafel, Documents, vol II, 1027. 
254 
 
 
the church, with an abandoning of the literal sense and in contradiction to the words of 
Christ: Behold, I make all things new.’”519  
The objection Oetinger raises in his letter to Swedenborg has two layers to it, 
which say a great deal about his thoughts on biblical interpretation relative to 
Swedenborg’s commentary. On the one hand he is troubled by Swedenborg’s explicit 
removal of Paul’s letters from the spiritual sense canon. On the other hand, Swedenborg’s 
allegorical interpretation of the Holy City in Revelation invalidates the literal sense of the 
apocalypse and denies an actual descent of an actual New Jerusalem on earth, as 
promised in the Bible. Oetinger is troubled that Swedenborg denies an internal sense for 
part of the New Testament and denies a literal sense for another part. Or perhaps it is the 
implication of Paul’s diminished status relative to the gospels that bothers Oetinger, 
rather than the idea that they contain no heavenly secrets. Either way, Swedenborg’s 
treatment of New Testament texts poses difficulties for Oetinger’s theological reliance on 
Paul for the doctrine of justification and on Revelation for his hope in Christ’s return. It is 
worth noting that Oetinger does not raise objections to Swedenborg’s typological 
interpretations of the Old Testament, a point we will return to below. In the same letter, 
Oetinger gives his opinion of the two different genres of material included in Arcana. “I 
wish that you yourself would acknowledge that your explanations of Scripture are quite 
as worthy of belief as your visions and revelations from heaven.”520 Going forward, 
Oetinger would continue to draw inspiration from Swedenborg’s descriptions of the 
                                                          
519 Letter from Oetinger to Swedenborg (Stuttgart, December 16, 1767), as translated in Acton, Letters 
and Memorials, 639. Also in Tafel, Documents, vol, II, 1033. 
520 Letter from Oetinger to Swedenborg in Acton, Letters and Memorials, 640. Tafel, Documents, 1035. 
255 
 
 
spiritual world and the mechanism of its connection to the physical world, but he would 
also grow more and more critical of Swedenborg’s exegesis.  
In both his attraction and his repulsion to Arcana, Oetinger grounds himself in the 
concept of Geistleiblichkeit, or “spiritual bodiliness.” According to this concept, the 
descent of the divine into the world constitutes a “baptism” of material things. The 
created world and physical bodies are made holy, not by the mercy of some transcendent 
reality, but by the corporeal presence of the divine. Oetinger’s Geistleiblichkeit combines 
threads from his sources of influence, including the biblical realism of Bengel, father of 
Württemberg pietism,521 and the incarnational theology he read into the sefirotic system 
of Kabbalah. According to his Christian kabbalistic reading, the upper three sefirot made 
up the Trinitarian godhead, and the lower seven, or the “seven spirits,” manifested God’s 
physical presence in creation. 
We can see how a partial adaptation of Swedenborg’s correspondences would 
work for Oetinger, especially with Swedenborg’s interest in the mechanics of the human 
body and the physical universe as a reflection of heaven. But Swedenborg’s figurative 
reading of the apocalypse in particular offended Oetinger’s sense of the importance of 
Christ’s Geistleiblichkeit, for it leads to “the result that Christ has not come in the 
flesh.”522 And here is the heart of Oetinger’s confusion over Swedenborg, who held fast 
to an incarnational Christology – to Christ’s coming in the flesh initially – but who 
believed Christ’s return to earth would occur in logos rather than in body. In a 1771 letter 
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to an instructor at the University of Tubingen, Oetinger summarizes his concern 
regarding Swedenborg’s correspondences:  
His matters might be mended, if he would but purge a little all he has said, 
and if he would not obtrude his hieroglyphics in such a shallow manner. Yet 
all he says is foolish. I am troubled at his writing in so silly a manner. 
According to Swedenborg the Second Coming of the Lord does not take 
place in person, but it is effected in the Word, through a man, before who He 
has revealed Himself, and whom He has filled with His Spirit. The glory of 
Jehova is to be revealed, and all flesh shall see it (Isa. X, 3.5). How very 
presumptuous he is, thus to diminish the force of the sense of the letter!523 
 
 Hanegraaff argues that Oetinger initially sees Swedenborg as an ally against the 
allegorical methods used by philosophical idealists such as Leibniz and Wolff, but turns 
against Swedenborg upon realizing his allegiance to the opposition.524 While it is clear 
that Oetinger rejects an allegorical or figurative interpretation of the apocalypse, to say 
that he rejects allegory all together, or that he first mistook Swedenborg to be a biblical 
literalist, is misleading. As Stengel demonstrates, Oetinger used allegorical/typological 
methods of interpretation himself when they suited his interests, particularly in 
prefiguring Christ’s second coming through the stories of the Old Testament.525 
Oetinger’s preference for biblical realism is inconsistently applied, and is aimed primarily 
at a literal end of days matching biblical accounts. Swedenborg’s allegorical approach to 
the Bible is impossible to miss from the first pages of Arcana, and Oetinger’s own 
exegesis has much in common with Swedenborg’s. Oetinger’s particular iteration of the 
emblematics tradition, which he terms “theologia emblematica,” as well as the signature 
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rerum of his regular interlocutor Böhme, are not wholly dissimilar from Swedenborg’s 
correspondences.526 Oetinger’s view, in short, is that scripture uses emblems to 
accommodate truth to the minds of humans; the decent of God into the world required the 
use of symbols. Pricilla Hayden-Roy describes Oetinger’s emblematics in the following 
way: "the plethora of emblems generated by biblical concepts is an expression of the 
drive of the spirit to specify itself in a manifold of physical forms."527 This is a careful 
rejection of historical literal interpretations but also a rejection of docetism, the denial of 
Christ’s physicality, that Oetinger saw as the “satanic doctrine” at the heart of Leibnizian 
idealism. 528 Oetinger’s emblematics is therefore distinguished from Swedenborg’s 
spiritual sense primarily in reference to the bodily return of Christ, while in other areas of 
scriptural interpretation, as well as the interpretation of nature, he embraces the inner 
meaning revealed by the faculties of the sensus communis.529  
 In focusing on the area of apocalyptic realism, Oetinger was responding to a 
schism he saw emerging among German Christians of his time. On the one hand, 
rationalist and neologian scholars such as Johann Salomo Semler and Wilhelm Abraham 
Teller undermined a literal apocalypse by contextualizing the text of the New Testament. 
On the other hand, the spiritualization of the text, such as that found in Swedenborg, 
denied the return of Christ on entirely different grounds.530 Such a de-corporealized 
messiah seemed not only contrary to the foundational truth of the incarnation, it offended 
                                                          
526 Ibid., 583-584. See also Hayden-Roy, Foretaste of Heaven, 44-46. 
527 Hayden-Roy, Foretaste of Heaven, 44. 
528 See Hanegraaff, Swedenborg, Oetinger, and Kant, 77-78. 
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Oetinger’s Böhmian and Lurianic interpretation of a Geistleiblichkeit. Counter to both 
these influences, Oetinger urged doubters to hold fast to a realistic Judgement Day, and 
followed Bengel’s prediction of an1836 apocalypse.   
 Swedenborg’s problematic interpretations of the apocalypse aside, Oetinger was 
attracted to many aspects of Swedenborg’s descriptions of a spiritual world and felt it 
important to verify and then circulate the memorable relations. In his pursuit of evidence, 
he repeatedly asks Swedenborg for a sign from heaven of the truth of his visions, a 
request Swedenborg refuses as one more “hostile murmur” asking for a miracle.531 
Nevertheless, several key points about Swedenborg’s idea of heaven and hell make their 
way into Oetinger’s thinking despite his doubts, and evidence of Swedenborg’s influence 
can be seen even in Oetinger’s last publications.532 He recast’s Swedenborg’s spiritual 
world as a temporary state, where deceased souls await the Last Day – navigating the 
realism of Swedenborg’s visions with a rejection of his figurative apocalypse. 
 As Stengel demonstrates, Oetinger canonized aspects of Swedenborg’s thought, 
along with Kabbalah, Böhme, and alchemy, and Swedenborgian influence on his thought 
persists in his writing long after he stops referencing Swedenborg by name. Readers, such 
as Shelling, were able to detect the “subcutaneous implantation,” as Stengel puts it, of 
                                                          
531 See 1766 exchange of letters, Acton, Letters and Memorials, 623-630; Tafel, Documents, vol II, 252-
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Swedenborgian ideas in Oetinger’s later work.533 Therefore, while Oetinger’s criticism 
was far less hostile than Kant’s, we see a similar dynamic in that Oetinger and Kant both 
openly reject Swedenborg after an initial period of admiration, but also demonstrate the 
assimilation of certain Swedenborgian ideas about the spiritual world in their later work.  
3) Johann Adam Möhler  
So far, this study has focused on Swedenborg’s reception among Protestant readers. 
An important Catholic treatment of Swedenborg’s Arcana coelestia is found a generation 
after Oetinger, in an influential German-language book published in 1832 comparing 
Catholic and Protestant theologies. In his Symbolik, Catholic theologian Johann Adam 
Möhler dedicates an entire chapter to Swedenborg, citing him as a case of anti-
Protestantism gone too far. Like Oetinger, Möhler points to Swedenborg’s rejection of 
Paul as a vehicle for his rejection of key doctrines, such as original sin and bodily 
resurrection. Möhler is not opposed to Swedenborg’s exegesis in principle, though he 
uses the more derogatory designation “mystical sense” to describe Swedenborg’s 
tendency to apply a “boundless scope to the play of an irregular fancy” leading to grave 
errors of interpretation.534   
Unlike Arcana coelestia’s anonymous first reviewer, who associated Swedenborg’s 
allegorical methods with Catholicism, here Swedenborg’s non-literal interpretation is said 
to be motivated by a critique of the doctrines of the Reformers from within. However, in 
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taking down the doctrines of the Trinity, of Adam’s fall and of the vicarious death of 
Christ, writes Möhler, Swedenborg subverts the very foundations of Christianity.535 
Möhler especially criticizes Swedenborg’s “presumptuous ignorance” of the history of 
allegorico-mystical interpretations of the Bible in Christian and in Jewish traditions. 
Swedenborg’s charge that the Jews are too carnal to understand scriptures hidden senses 
and that the early Christians too simple, offends Möhler on historical grounds, and he 
bemoans Swedenborg’s lack of positive reference to the likes of Valentinus, Origen, 
Gregory the Great, Alcuin, Richard of St. Victor, and Thomas Aquinas. Möhler also 
includes a direct comparison to the four senses of Kabbalah: “He insists, that it was only 
by a special revelation he was made attentive to it, or at all events favoured with the true 
key for its right use. But what is his distinction between the various senses of Holy Writ, 
other than Sod (body), the Derusch (soul), and the Phaschut (spirit) of the Cabala—
senses which themselves correspond to [those] of Philo.”536 Möhler would be able to 
forgive Swedenborg his ignorance of these traditions, which bear such resemblances to 
his own, had he not claimed direct revelation from God as the source of his 
interpretations. Möhler does not explicitly denigrate Jewish interpretive abilities in his 
criticism of Swedenborg here, but it is interesting that he chooses to align Swedenborg’s 
senses to those of Philo and Kabbalah, rather than the medieval quadriga. His 
comparisons to Christian exegetes are less specific, revealing something of a desire 
distance Swedenborg from this heritage. 
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 Möhler ‘s comparison to Jewish allegory is followed by a critique of 
Swedenborg’s vivid and fanciful descriptions of how the Bible appears in the spiritual 
world. That scripture appears in the other world as a shining star, engulfing those who 
touch it in a brilliant fire, is too literal a description where metaphor would have been 
more appropriate:  
Had these descriptions been mere allegorical representations, to point out to 
sensual men the effulgence of divine light, wherewith a soul is filled . . . we 
should then have commended the aptness of such illustrations. But such is not 
Swedenborg’s meaning; he here designs to state positive facts. For our part, 
we here discern an idolatry manifested to the dead word of Scripture, which 
exceeds all that the slavishness to the mere letter has ever exhibited, and has 
perhaps no parallel in history, except in the controversy among 
Mohammedans, whether the Koran be created or uncreated. Yet even the 
rational Moslem will reply, that the ideas, indeed, of the sacred book are 
eternal, but by no means the form wherein they are set forth.537   
 
 By Möhler’s estimation then, Swedenborg’s use of allegory demonstrates an 
inexcusable ignorance of the tradition, and his lack of awareness of the symbolic 
potential of his visions is equally foolish. Swedenborg’s biblical interpretation is 
allegorical in all the wrong ways and his mysticism is disturbingly literal. All of this, 
according to Möhler, comes from Swedenborg’s overzealous opposition to Lutheran 
doctrine of Justification. Given the overall polemical tone of Symbolik, Swedenborg 
represents for Möhler the folly of Protestantism turned against itself.538 Therefore, we see 
in the response from both Protestant and Catholic theologians that allegory is utilized as a 
point around which to build criticism of Arcana coelestia.  
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Conclusion: Perspectives on Influence and Allegory 
The memoirs of the Dutch John Christian Cuno, merchant, poet and personal 
acquaintance of Swedenborg, tell the story of the attacks from Ernesti and Kant from the 
sidelines. Cuno describes engaging Swedenborg in friendly exchanges about his critics, 
and defends the character and intentions of his comrade, even if he shares many of the 
theological objections of those highlighted in this chapter. Cuno, like others, was alarmed 
by Swedenborg’s spiritualized apocalypse, his assertion that angels and devils are 
deceased humans, his exclusion of the Epistles from the biblical canon, and that his “new 
doctrine contradicts the old.”539 He nevertheless pleads with Swedenborg to defend 
himself against his public critics, as did Oetinger and Beyer. And on several occasions 
Cuno notes his surprise that Swedenborg isn’t more persecuted than he is, given the 
nature and content of his writing.540 He concludes, reasonably, that the amount of 
censorship aimed at Swedenborg correlates with the level of his influence: that so few 
refute him simply because his writing has born so little fruit.541  
What Cuno’s conclusion fails to grasp, however, is that the difficulty in assessing 
the extent of Swedenborg’s influence, philosophically, theologically or otherwise, is due 
to the fact that the transmission of his ideas was accomplished by his critics as often as 
his followers. Tracing the life of Swedenborg’s religious and intellectual contributions is 
as complicated and overdetermined as tracing the ideas that influenced him. A more 
useful analysis looks, not at the extent of his influence, which is impossible to quantify, 
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but at the discourse that accompanies the discussion of his ideas. In this approach, the 
discourse about allegory is particularly productive, as we have seen.  
Allegory is at the heart of the discourse about Arcana coelestia among its earliest 
responders. Those who attacked Swedenborg on theological grounds, did so in defense of 
the literal sense of the Bible; those followed him did so by espousing the spiritual sense 
of the Bible, either as part of the time-honored wisdom of true Christianity, or as a new 
and scientific way of understanding the true content of revelation. At stake in each of 
these responses is the nature of God’s Word. Does it communicate truth directly or 
through the use of symbols? Does it accommodate to the different technologies and 
epistemologies of different ages, or is its message unchanging? Is the language of God 
and of angels transparent or opaque? A related set of questions can be applied to the 
realm of human expression. We will see in the early reception of Swedenborg among 
artists and poets a renewal of symbolic and allegorical techniques, and an increasing 
interest in the multivalence of language and of art. Like his reception in philosophy and 
theology, however, Swedenborg’s influence among artists comes with as much criticism 
as praise.  
 
  
  
  
  
264 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: ARTISTIC EXPRESSIONS: 
THE LANGUAGE OF CORRESPONDENCES IN BLAKE, COLERIDGE AND BALZAC 
 
The thrust of this dissertation has been the argument, through the example of 
Emanuel Swedenborg and his interlocutors, for the persistence of allegorical 
interpretations of the Bible into the eighteenth century, despite post-Reformation trends 
in favor of literalism, even in areas pervaded by a sense of scientific awakening. Part 
three of this dissertation has so far explored philosophical and theological responses to 
Swedenborg’s interpretive methods, and how those responses are tied up with notions of 
allegory: either its rehabilitation or its demise. We have encountered several figures who 
demonstrate a degree of ambivalence towards Swedenborg, or who change their opinion 
of him over time, such as Immanuel Kant, John Wesley, and Friedrich Christoph 
Oetinger. We have also encountered a great deal of ambivalence towards biblical allegory 
among Swedenborg’s critics, despite the persistence of non-literal interpretations of 
various sorts. This double ambivalence, towards Swedenborg and biblical allegory, 
materializes in the arts and literature as well and coincides with the emergence of 
Romanticism in the late eighteenth century.    
Those who tell the history of hermeneutics often point to a semantic preference 
for “symbols” over “allegories” in the Romantic period. In the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, allegory became “aesthetically suspect” as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
writes; it was identified with dogmatic restrictiveness, bound to tradition and fixed in 
meaning. Symbols were a more organic, liberating alternative, Gadamer explains.542 
                                                          
542 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 79. 
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Samuel T. Coleridge (1772-1834) exemplifies this trend, and argues in his “The 
Statesman’s Manual” that symbols are tautegorical, or express the same meaning as their 
referent, while allegories are a mere abstraction: “Now an allegory is but a translation of 
abstract notions into picture language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction from 
objects of senses,” but the symbol “always partakes of the reality which it renders 
intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that unity of 
which it is the representative.”543  Symbols participate in the reality of thing they 
represent and therefore impart meaning through aesthetic impressions rather than 
grammatical technicalities. As Gadamer and others have demonstrated, however, this is a 
semantic distinction that belies a great deal of continuity with an allegorical heritage. “Is 
not the symbol-making activity also in fact limited by the continued existence of a 
mythical, allegorical tradition?”544 Jon Whitman suggests that the Romantic distinction 
between symbol and allegory was a shift in the meaning of the terms, a shift which was 
itself an “historical event,” and that, in fact, Coleridge’s symbols had a great deal in 
common with Paul’s use of allegory in the first century. Paul and Coleridge both 
reinterpret events in history through biblical themes for the sake of emancipation from 
old paradigms.545  
                                                          
543 Samuel T. Coleridge, “The Statesman’s Manual,” Complete Works: With an Introductory Essay upon His 
Philosophical and Theological Opinions, ed. W.G.T. Shedd (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1853), 437f. 
544 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 81. 
545 Whitman, “From the Textual to the Temporal.” Elsewhere, Whitman argues that the Romantic 
distinction should be understood in light of the polemic, started in the late Middle Ages, against “speaking 
otherwise.” He points to the trend made popular in the fourteenth century by Nicholas of Lyra to disclose 
meaning once deemed allegorical, within the literal or apparent sense of scripture. Whitman, 
Interpretation and Allegory, 18. Whitman and Gadamer both demonstrate the rehabilitation of allegory 
and the displacement of symbolism in contemporary criticism. See also Knaller, “A Theory of Allegory.” 
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Coleridge’s familiarity and engagement with Swedenborg, which will be explored 
below, is especially useful in exploring the Romantic discourse about symbol and 
allegory, because Swedenborg’s correspondences are a kind of middle-way between 
modes, as he defines them in “The Statesman’s Manual.” The system of correspondences 
laid out in Arcana coelestia is allegorical in Coleridge’s sense, in that it connects 
alternative, abstract meanings to the words of scripture. It is also symbolic in Coleridge’s 
sense, in that every element of the natural world connects in essence to realities on other 
levels of existence; the Bible simply participates in this interconnectedness in ways other 
texts do not.546  
This chapter will consider examples of artists and authors of the long eighteenth 
century whose creative manipulation of biblical symbols and whose engagement with 
Swedenborg’s correspondences will help us explore the ambivalence towards allegorical 
interpretation that characterizes this age. By going outside the genre of traditional biblical 
commentary, we will explore interpretations of the Bible that reject doctrinal, or 
traditionally determined readings, and work instead to claim personal and social locations 
via the use of biblical symbols. In eighteenth century England, for instance, biblical 
themes are put to the service of revolutionary movements by poets such as Blake, 
Coleridge and Shelley, who reference biblical exile and “the wandering Jew” to address 
political perspectives of their time.547 Lord Byron expresses his nationalism through 
                                                          
546 See chapter 2 for a description of Swedenborg’s doctrine of series and degrees and its relationship to 
correspondences in both the natural world and in sacred text. 
547 Stuart Peterfreund, “Enactments of Exile and Diaspora in English Romantic Literature” in 
Romanticism/Judaica: A Convergence of Cultures, ed. Sheila A. Spector (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. Co., 
2011), 13-29. Peterfreund writes: “Not surprisingly, during the era of English Romanticism, which bore 
witness to its share of revolutions, rebellions, and widespread social disruption, the personal of the Jew as 
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identifying with the ancient Isrealites in his Hebrew Melodies: “And where shall Israel 
lave her bleeding feet? / And when shall Zion’s songs again seem sweet?”548 In French 
literature, biblical allusions persist, sometimes for the sake of criticism of religious 
structures of thought, but often exhibiting the Bible’s positive influence such as in 
Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du mal.549 And in America, landscape artists drew parallels 
between the New World and the biblical Promised Land.550 Swedenborg’s influence 
among artists in these various contexts (English Romanticism, French literature, and 
American landscape painting) speaks to an artistic interest in the function of language 
and symbol, in biblical correspondences, or in the connection between earthly and 
spiritual realities.551 Like his reception among philosophers and theologians, his reception 
among artists, novelists and poets was decidedly mixed. Nevertheless, his hermeneutical 
approach was suited to the creative sensibilities of those who sought to reimagine their 
                                                          
diasporic victim and winess, not merely as a fiendish other, had a role in the literature of the period," 14-
15. Jeffrey Robinson argues that this fact is partially what drew twentieth-century Jewish literary critics to 
the Romantic lyric, such as Harold Bloom, Lionel Trilling, M.H. Abrams, and Geoffrey Hartmant. See Jeffrey 
Robinson, “Jewish Critics of Romanticism: Formal Predispositions” in Romanticism/Judaica: A 
Convergence of Cultures, ed. Sheila A. Spector, 183-199 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. Co., 2011). 
548 George Gordon Byron, The Works of Lord Byron: Embracing His Suppressed Poems, and a Sketch of His 
Life, (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1854), 519. 
549 See Abraham Avni, “The Bible and Les Fleurs du mal,” PMLA 88, no. 2 (Modern Language Association, 
Mar., 1973):299-310. Avni uncovers traces of biblical influence on Les Fleur du mal, including allusions to 
biblical characters, close parallels to biblical diction, and echoes of biblical phrases and idioms. 
550 John Davis explores ways that nineteenth century American national identity was linked to “Holy Land 
consciousness” in the work of landscape artists such as Miner Kellogg, Edward Troye, James Fairman, and 
Frederic Church in, The Landscape of Belief: Encountering the Holy Land in Nineteenth-Century American 
Art and Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).  
551 On Swedenborg and Baudelaire see Wilkinson, Dream of an Absolute Language, 217-248; on 
Swedenborg and English Romanticism, see Robert Rix, William Blake and the Cultures of Radical 
Christianity (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007); on Swedenborg and American landscape artistry, see Eugene 
Taylor, “The Interior Landscape: William James and George Inness on Art from a Swedenborgian Point of 
View,” in Archives of American Art Journal 37 (1997): 2-10. See also forthcoming, Devin Zuber, A Language 
of Things: Swedenborg and the American Environmental Imagination (UVA Press, 2017). 
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national and religious identities in visionary ways. These artistic expressions constitute 
Swedenborg’s greatest impact outside of the sectarian Swedenborgian movement. This 
chapter will consider just three artists from the long eighteenth century whose work 
contributes in this way.  
I have chosen Blake, Coleridge and Balzac because of their relevance to the 
particular themes of biblical interpretation, correspondences, scientific enlightenment, 
and Jewish and Christian identity.  Of the three, Blake and Coleridge have a great deal 
more in common, being English, Romantic poets of the same generation. In addition to 
their many religious and national commonalities, they also knew each other through their 
mutual Swedenborgian contact Charles Augustus Tulk, politician and founding member 
of Hindmarsh’s Theosophical Society in London. We also have the written annotations of 
both Blake and Coleridge on several of Swedenborg’s works, providing us with direct 
insight into their personal views. Balzac, who will be this dissertation’s final subject, is 
most often categorized as a realist rather than a romantic, though it is noteworthy that his 
“Swedenborgian novels” Séraphîta and Louis Lambert depart from his usual style with 
their fantastic settings and supernatural characters. Balzac, like Blake and Coleridge, is 
interested in Swedenborg for the symbolic and visionary potential his work inspired. 
Unlike Blake and Coleridge, however, Balzac underscores Swedenborg’s scientific 
genius, idealizing a unification of science and spirit that Swedenborg represented. Our 
English romantics maintain a suspicion of this side of Swedenborg’s work, which is 
related to their ambivalence towards naturalism and deism, as we will see. In both 
Balzac’s Séraphîta and Blake’s The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Swedenborg appears 
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as a fictionalized character, while Coleridge’s explicit engagement with Swedenborg is 
relegated to his annotations. None of these three joined a Swedenborgian church, though 
the extent of their confessional identities as Swedenborgians varies between them and 
over the course of their individual lives. We will consider them in turn chronologically. 
The Visions and Poetry of William Blake 
In a move similar to Coleridge’s distinction between symbol and allegory, 
discussed above, William Blake (1757-1827) distinguishes between vision and allegory, 
the latter being a “totally distinct and inferior kind of Poetry.” In his notes on interpreting 
the last judgement, he writes: “Vision or Imagination is a Representation of what 
Eternally Exists. Really and Unchangeably. Fable or Allegory is formed by the Daughters 
of Memory.” By associating allegory with memory, Blake is defining it as interpretation 
of the past, formulated and artificial, while vision is an immediate impression of the 
divine. The Bible, Blake writes, is no allegory, but “Eternal Vision or Imagination of All 
that Exists.”552 Blake’s categories are not mutually exclusive, it is worth noting, for 
“Fable or Allegory is Seldom without some Vision.”553 It was indeed Swedenborg’s 
visions that drew Blake to the seer. What part of Swedenborg Blake would come to see as 
visionary versus allegorical, however, is a complicated question, and one that reveals a 
complicated reception of Swedenborg’s work. It would be convenient if the two kinds of 
material found in Arcana coelestia, biblical commentary on the one hand and 
                                                          
552 William Blake, “A Vision of the Last Judgement,” in The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, 
ed., David Erdman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 544. 
553 Ibid. 
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“memorable relations,” or accounts of interactions with angels and spirits in the other 
world, on the other, fit into Blake’s categories of allegory and vision. But, as we will see, 
Blake mocks outright both Swedenborg’s memorable relations and his exegesis, while 
also drawing inspiration from each. Swedenborg, like many of Blake’s sources, is mined 
for his visionary potential, while simultaneously critiqued and distorted in Blake’s poetic 
work. 
Blake is often one of the first to be named when the question of Swedenborg’s 
early reception arises, and with good reason. He and his wife signed as attendees at the 
first official gathering of the Swedenborgian General Conference in 1789 in London. He 
read and annotated several of Swedenborg’s works. He mentioned and responded to 
Swedenborg in a number of his own writings, most notably his The Marriage of Heaven 
and Hell (1790). And he closely associated with several early Swedenborgians, especially 
Tulk and the English sculptor John Flaxman. But Blake’s relationship to Swedenborgian 
thought is far from unequivocal: Jorge Luis Borges, for instance, called Blake 
“Swedenborg’s rebellious disciple.”554 Scholars who engage the question of Blake’s 
relationship to Swedenborg tend to describe an early enthusiasm that later turns to 
denigration and distancing, but that near the end of his life Blake’s criticism softens and 
positive connections and references are discernable.555 A few points should be made that 
                                                          
554 Borges, “Testimony to the Invisible,” 8. Here Borges is contrasting the general credulity concerning the 
visions of Ezekiel and Saint John of the Cross, “but we do not believe in William Blake, Swedenborg’s 
rebellious disciple, or in his master, still near us in time. . . Exactly when did true visions cease and 
apocryphal ones begin?”  
555 For instance, see Hazard Adams, Blake’s Margins: An Interpretive Study of the Annotations (Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Co., 2009), 28-29; Morton D. Paley, “A New Heaven is Begun: Blake and 
Swedenborgianism,” in Blake and Swedenborg: Opposition is True Friendship, ed. Harvey F. Bellin, Darrell 
Ruhl, George F. Dole, Tom Kieffer and Nancy Crompton, 15-34 (New York: Swedenborg Foundation, 1985). 
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moderate the contours of this arch. First, Blake’s early, and brief, support of the English 
New Church movement should be understood in the context of his overarching rejection 
of organized religion rather than the opposite. Many of the movement’s propositions and 
resolutions, which were voted on over the course of the four days of the Conference he 
attended, were aimed at public separation from the “Old Church” and emphasized 
spiritual liberty and rational inquiry.556 Further to this point, his later criticism of 
Swedenborg should be read in light of the perception of the encroachment of a new kind 
of orthodoxy on Swedenborgianism itself.557 Secondly, despite the variations in his 
attitude toward Swedenborg over the course of his life, a few points of connection 
remained consistent, namely: the aforementioned critique of present day ecclesiastical 
structures and dogma, and the heavy reliance on biblical symbols. We also find similar 
forms of anti-Judaism in Blake’s work as well as the striking resemblance to Kabbalah. 
The scholarly debates over Blake’s exposure to Kabbalah mirror in some ways those 
regarding Swedenborg and Kabbalah, as we will see. The following will explore these 
factors by briefly considering two of Blake’s poems, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 
and The Everlasting Gospel. First, a word on Blake scholarship – the debates over his 
sources and how to categorize his methods – is in order. 
 A survey of scholarship on William Blake demonstrates an inherent difficulty in 
determining his place within the various movements and traditions of his time. Kathleen 
Raine and George Mills Harper, for instance, place Blake firmly within the tradition of 
                                                          
556 See Raymond H Deck Jr., "Blake and Swedenborg," PhD diss. (Brandeis University, 1978), 300-310. 
557 Rix makes this last point in William Blake, 121, 132. 
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Neoplatonism, with its eighteenth-century hermetic and kabbalistic proclivities.558 E. P. 
Thompson rejects this view, and places Blake instead among the dissenting sects, such as 
the Muggletonians, of the English Reformation.559 Laura Quinney argues that opposing 
popular and esoteric sources in the way Thompson does obscures the fact that these 
movements were intertwined and that Blake freely appropriated and misappropriated 
from a variety of sources.560  
If we look at scholarly opinions on Blake’s relationship to the allegorical 
tradition, the thesis for continuity comes from Edwin John Ellis and William Butler 
Yeats, who draw a connection between Blake’s symbolism and medieval Christian 
allegorists, writing that his was “no mere freak of an eccentric mind, but an eddy of that 
flood-tide of symbolism which attained its tide-mark in the magic of the Middle Ages.”561 
Sheila Spector challenges Ellis and Yeats’ comparison, and asserts that Blake was in fact 
rejecting the methods of earlier Christian exegetes and adopting the “wholly 
incomparable” framework of Kabbalah.562 And finally, Robert Rix points to Blake’s use 
of Swedenborg’s correspondences to explain key symbols and themes.563 We will discuss 
                                                          
558 Kathleen Raine, Blake and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); George Harper, 
The Neoplatonism of William Blake (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961). 
559 E. P. Thompson, Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law (New York: New Press, 
1994). 
560 Laura Quinney, William Blake on Self and Soul, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 55-
58. 
561 Edwin John Ellis and William Butler Yeats, “The Preface,” in The works of William Blake: Poetic, 
Symbolic, and Critical, eds., Edwin John Ellis and William Butler Yeats (New York, AMS Press, 1973) Vol. 1, 
x. 
562 Sheila Spector, Wonders Divine: The Development of Blake's Kabbalistic Myth (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell 
University Press, 2001), 23. See also, Sheila Spector, "Glorious Incomprehensible": The Development of 
Blake's Kabbalistic Language (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2001). 
563 Rix, William Blake. 
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several of these positions further below. My position will be similar to Quinney’s, in 
arguing that the assertion, such as we find in Spector, that Blake’s kabbalistic myth 
making is wholly distinct from Western thought seriously misrepresents both Blake and 
Kabbalah, whose influence by and on Western thought is far more intricate than she 
allows. Blake’s poetic imagination rejects the very question of adaptation versus denial of 
traditional forms of symbolism. Swedenborg is a helpful interlocutor here, as Blake uses 
his visions and his doctrine of correspondences in very specific ways, both in formulating 
ironic twists that mock Swedenborg and church, but also in ways that harmonize 
variations on biblical, ecclesiastical and Swedenborgian themes. Satire and reproach 
mingle with imitation and positive adaptation of key concepts in Blake’s use of 
Swedenborg, as with his use of the Bible.  
Blake’s “misprision” of Swedenborg, to borrow Bloom’s term, is nowhere more 
apparent than in his The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, a lengthy and elaborately 
illustrated poetic satire on Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell. Specifically, we can trace 
Blake’s inspiration for the poem to number 588 in Swedenborg’s work, in which we find 
the following line: “In regard to the number of the hells, there are as many of them as 
there are angelic societies in the heavens, since there is for every heavenly society a 
corresponding infernal society as its opposite.”564 Blake was enamored with the concept 
of a corresponding heaven and hell, and annotated this number with the following 
interpretation of it: “under every Good is a hell, i.e. hell is the outward or external of 
                                                          
564 Swedenborg, Heaven and Hell, 588. 
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heaven & is the body of the lord, for nothing is destroy’d.”565 To borrow Spector’s 
terminology, Blake saw in Swedenborg an “obversive” relationship between good and 
evil. The idea that heaven and hell were two sides of the same coin exploits a tension in 
Swedenborg’s work, where traditional notions of sin and evil are matched with the idea 
of hell’s necessity for the sake of cosmic equilibrium and human free will. Furthermore, 
in Swedenborg’s hell, the residents are there by their own choice, and are permitted to 
indulge their desires and delusions, a point which scandalized John Wesley as we saw in 
the last chapter. Blake found the idea compelling and took it to an extreme never intended 
by Swedenborg. 
 In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Angel and Devil take on untraditional 
personae. The angels are rule makers and enforcers, spoilers of pleasure and free 
expression under the pretext of reason, virtue, and humility: “Prisons are built with stones 
of Law, Brothels with bricks of Religion.”566 The Devil is hero of the story, replacing the 
errors of the Bible with the Proverbs of Hell, and preaching that true love of God consists 
in “Honoring his gifts in other men” rather than vain devotion to God alone.567 
Swedenborg, for his part, appears at the poem’s start as the angel at the tomb, “his 
writings are the linen clothes folded up.” It is worth noting that, according to 
Swedenborg, clothing in the Bible corresponds to the outer husk of scripture – the literal 
                                                          
565 William Blake, annotation on Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell, London Second Edition, 1784, as found in 
William Blake, Complete Writings: With Variant Readings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (New Yo rk: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 929. 
566 William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, plate 8, line 1 in Blake’s The Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell, ed. Clark Emery (Coral Gabels, FL: University of Miami Press, 1963). 
567 Ibid., plate 22. 
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sense.568 In making Swedenborg’s writings the clothing left behind without a body, Blake 
may be using Swedenborg’s own doctrine to suggest his work is empty at its core: that 
Swedenborg’s poetic impulse was frustrated by his stubborn adherence to old forms. 
Further on we read: “Thus Swedenborg’s writings are a recapitulation of all superficial 
opinions, and an analysis of the more sublime—but no further.”569 Robert Rix points to 
other uses of Swedenborg’s correspondences in the poem, even in the very symbols 
employed in the Proverbs of Hell, such as in the line: “The tygers of wrath are wiser than 
the horses of instruction.”570 Tigers, in Swedenborg’s system, correspond to lust and 
horses to doctrine. Swedenborg, in this instance, helps Blake in his expression of the 
triumph of passion over dogma.571  
The piece both mocks and engages with Swedenborg’s work in other ways. It 
contains five “Memorable Fancies” or descriptions of encounters with places and beings 
in heaven and hell, imitating Swedenborg’s “memorable relations” first published as part 
of Arcana coelestia.572  In one of these, Blake is taken by an angel to see his eternal 
resting place in hell, which first appears as a dark and gruesome cave infested with 
spiders and monsters. When the angel parts from him, however, he sees the landscape in 
its true light, as a moonlit river with a harpist on its banks producing sublime melodies. 
                                                          
568 For example, see Swedenborg, True Christianity, 215: “things that are good and true in the Word’s 
literal meaning are like vessels or clothing for the naked goodness and truth that lie hidden in the Word’s 
spiritual and heavenly meanings.” This has parallels in the Zohar, where clothing is compared to the outer 
layers of Torah, as discussed in chapter 3. As Rix demonstrates, Blake was especially influenced by 
Swedenborg’s True Christianity while writing The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Rix, William Blake, 122. 
569 Blake, The Marriage, plate 22. 
570 Ibid., plate 9, line 5. 
571 Rix, William Blake, 132. 
572 See chapter 4 where Swedenborg’s Memorable Relations are described. 
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He accuses the angel: “All that we saw was owing to your metaphysics.” This story plays 
on a theme found in Swedenborg’s memorable relations, where residents of hell appear 
beautiful to themselves and appear to reside amidst splendid surroundings until exposed 
as wretched by the light of heaven.573 Blake’s story mischievously suggests that 
Swedenborg misunderstood what he witnessed in hell, and that heaven’s was in fact the 
false light. 
A Swedenborgian theme that plays out in the illustrations of The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell is the presence of conjugal relationships in the afterlife. It was an idea 
that sparked significant controversy at the time, both within and without the New Church 
movement, and it was one aspect of Swedenborg’s thought that Blake embraced without 
equivocation. The figurative marriage of heaven to hell, however, brought this theme to a 
most unexpected conclusion. The poem earns its title both from the image on the cover 
page, in which a resident of heaven and a resident of hell embrace in the nude, and in the 
poem’s last lines: “Note: This Angel, who is now become a Devil, is my particular friend; 
we often read the Bible together in its infernal or diabolical sense, which the world shall 
have if they behave well. I have also the Bible of Hell, which the world shall have 
whether they will or no.”574 The two Bibles then, one heavenly and one hellish, document 
this extraordinary union. 
                                                          
573 For instance, after describing the grotesque appearances of places and spirits in hell, Swedenborg 
writes: “But it must be understood that this is the way infernal spirits appear in the light of heaven, while 
among themselves they appear as men. This is of the Lord's mercy, that they may not appear as 
loathsome to one another as they appear before the angels. But this appearance is a fallacy, for as soon 
as any ray of light from heaven is let in, their human forms appear changed into monstrous forms, such as 
they are in themselves.” Heaven and Hell, 553 [4]. 
574 Blake, The Marriage, plate 24. 
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Reading the Bible according to an “infernal sense” of course taunts those such as 
Swedenborg, who claim unique access to the “internal sense.” The Bible of Hell, on the 
other hand, boasts a kind of open access and immediacy, which is curious given the 
enigmatic nature of hell’s Proverbs quoted earlier on.  The confusion over the 
accessibility of Blake’s two Bibles reflects something of an aesthetic preference for 
hermeneutic inconsistency. The Bible, like Swedenborg, is both object of ridicule and 
provider of powerful symbols and visions. And the Bible, like Swedenborg, requires an 
unorthodox, even diabolical, interpretation in order to draw out a fuller genius and 
relevancy. This is not to say that Swedenborg and the Bible were functionally on par in 
Blake’s world, far from it. But Swedenborg’s interpretation of the Bible continued to 
inspire Blake’s poetic imagination to the very end, as we see in his last poem ever 
written, The Everlasting Gospel.  
 Blake, like Swedenborg, experienced recurring visions of people who had died 
and passed into the spiritual world, and like Swedenborg he was immersed in the study of 
the Bible from a young age, making biblical symbolism an especially effective means for 
theological and poetic expression. It is Blake’s apocalypticism, however, which may be 
the most fruitful area for comparison. Blake’s The Everlasting Gospel, for example, a 
poem wedged into empty margins of his notebook near the end of his life, reveals an 
affinity to Swedenborg’s concept of a spiritual apocalypse in the present day, even if 
Blake’s biblical iconoclasm is at odds with Swedenborg’s earnest tone. Both Blake and 
Swedenborg use the book of Revelation, not to predict an impending divine judgment or 
the bodily return of Christ to earth, but as a means to critique the Christian Church of 
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their day, to call Christians away from blind allegiances to clerical authority, and to urge 
their readers to wake up and realize a new potentiality for spiritual freedom and 
enlightenment.575 
The Everlasting Gospel is an exercise in contradictions. Blake’s simultaneous 
reliance on and overturning of the biblical narrative has confused both novice readers and 
seasoned Blake scholars alike. His Jesus is at once forgiving and vengeful, meek and 
unapologetically proud, chaste and impure, violent and gentle, fully in the flesh and fully 
transcendent. Nevertheless, while Blake’s Gospel is dissonant and at times light-hearted, 
it is by no means unserious.  His concerns are ultimate ones, his message urgent. This is 
made evident by the poem’s dependence on the imagery and language of the biblical 
book of Revelation: the promised final judgment on humanity. Blake’s work, the product 
of English utopianism, does not describe the end of time, or any literally chronological 
scheme of events. Rather, his “end” is in the present tense. His Last Judgment is the event 
of being awakened from a deep sleep. His prophecy announces a new consciousness. 
Kathleen Raine describes Blake’s apocalypse as a “destruction of a texture of illusion.”576  
“To Blake,” she writes “the Last Judgment is enlightenment, it is the opening of our 
inward sight which enables us to see things as they really are. That is why it is ‘last’; for 
it is absolute, no further possibility remains for opinion or speculation.”577  The wrath of 
                                                          
575 This interpretive thread goes far back into the history of Christian readings of Revelation. Peter Olivi, 
for example, used interpretations of the apocalypse to critique the church. See Klepper, The Insight of 
Unbelievers, 73 
576 Kathleen Raine, Blake and the New Age (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 64. 
577 Ibid., 58. 
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God promised with this event, is not the literal punishment of the wicked or the reward of 
the righteous, but the revelation of our true nature.  
 When considering Blake’s choice of a title for the poem, some scholars have 
pointed to the use of this phrase among dissenting sects in nineteenth-century England. 
“The Everlasting Gospel” referred, in the context of such movements as the Ranters and 
Muggletonians, to a new revelation of the true meaning of scripture, which was to usher 
in a new “Age of the Holy Spirit.” The accompanying antinomianism was certainly an 
aspect of Blake’s worldview, and his alternative gospel can be interpreted in light of the 
spirit of reinterpretation that such groups inspired. However, for Blake the dangers of 
authoritarianism were too great a risk to align himself with the creeds of any organized 
movement. His influence by and ultimate rejection of the New Church movement of the 
English Swedenborgians demonstrates this dynamic. However, Swedenborg serves as an 
interlocutor for Blake especially on the topic of the Last Day, and Swedenborg’s vision 
of an apocalypse that unveils itself in the process of individual spiritual regeneration and 
in the shifting consciousness of humanity as a whole, provided a productive theological 
and visionary basis for Blake’s present-day eschatology. Importantly, the “everlasting 
gospel” is a phrase Swedenborg used in one particular section of The True Christian 
Religion, a work that was especially influential on Blake.578 In this number, Swedenborg 
                                                          
578 Rix catalogues Blake’s allusions to Swedenborg’s True Christian Religion in The Marriage, and argues 
that in relying so heavily on this text in particular, Blake was targeting a specifically Swedenborgian 
audience with The Marriage. True Christian Religion (True Christianity in the translation cited elsewhere in 
this dissertation), was widely used and referenced by Swedenborgians as an introduction and summary of 
their beliefs.  Rix, William Blake, 122, 128-134. 
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is engaged in a heated debate with none-other than Martin Luther, in the spiritual world, 
on the timing and nature of the apocalypse.579 
A cursory study can be made of just one section of this lengthy poem. Section k580 
begins with the simple question: “Was Jesus Humble or did he / Give any Proofs of 
Humility”?  Such a question anticipates the obvious answer of Christianity, whose 
messiah arrived as a helpless baby, born in a stable one silent night. However, Blake 
makes the contrary argument, drawing out all the evidence he can of Christ’s 
disobedience to authority, including his own parents, and of his destructive wrath. 
Caiaphas, his priestly accuser, returns throughout the poem and reflects the satanic 
“accuser” of the apocalypse (Rev 12:10), Caiaphas’s role as antagonist accentuates Jesus’ 
defiance.  “He did not die with Christian Ease / Asking Pardon of his Enemies / If he had 
Caiaphas would forgive / Sneaking submission can always live.”  A humble Christ would 
have deferred to Caiaphas, but in doing so, would have been an “Antichrist Creeping 
Jesus.”   Blake associates such an antichrist with the elders and priests of the community, 
alluding to the “Synagogue of Satan” from Revelation 3:9. For Blake, the synagogue and 
its scribes, the Temple and its priests, are all figures for corrupt, authoritarian religion.  
 However, a second answer is given to the opening question. Christ refrained from 
humbling himself before his accuser, but in doing so, succeeded in humbling himself to 
God. Against the backdrop of a negative humility avoided, this positive humility brings 
on the apocalyptic moment: “Then descended the Cruel Rod.”  Like the iron scepter of 
                                                          
579 See Swedenborg, True Christianity, 796. 
580 According to the arrangement in Erdman, ed., The Complete Poetry, 518-520. 
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Revelation 2:27 this rod inaugurates the terrors of Judgment Day. The sun and moon 
darken angels cry out souls await, buried in the earth.  The remainder of section k marries 
apocalyptic imagery with the gospel story of Jesus’ prayer in the garden of Gethsemane 
the night before his own end. Blake’s “Revenge at the Last Day” ambiguously refers to 
both Jesus’ last day in the flesh, and the last days of all humanity. He makes use of the 
paired themes of wakefulness and sleep, darkness and light, drawn from both biblical 
accounts. Echoing the admonishment to the church of Sardis in Revelation 3, Blake 
commands: “Awake arise to Spiritual Strife / And thy Revenge abroad display / In terrors 
at the Last Judgment Day.”  The section ends with the comparison of sleep to the 
negatively depicted states of humility and doubt, each relating a certain spiritual 
darkness. “born in a night to perish in a night / When the Soul slept in the beams of 
light.”  
 While Swedenborg was, for Blake, something of a sparring partner rather than a 
prophet to be followed uncritically, we can see in Blake’s work meaningful traces of 
Swedenborg’s spiritualized interpretation of the book of Revelation. In True Christianity 
numbers 753-790, for instance, Swedenborg describes the apocalypse as the end of the 
old era and the beginning of a new one: “So everything is born and wastes away, and is 
born again, so that creation may continue in existence.” And that Christ comes again in 
the present day to those who are awake to spiritual realities: “He cannot appear to any 
man unless the eyes of his spirit are first opened.” As Rix notes, Swedenborg’s view of 
the apocalypse manifesting as the coming of Christ in the religious life of the individual 
resonated with those in Blake’s social and religious context: “in setting individual 
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illumination as the desideratum of True Religion over the control of priests, Swedenborg 
unwittingly gave confidence to those in English society who felt disempowered under the 
traditional ecclesiastical institutions.” Thus, though Blake’s ironic twists and narrative 
upending of the biblical account is in many ways at odds with Swedenborg’s reverent 
commentaries, his message of awakening and freedom from structures of authority and 
religious coercion were indebted, to some degree, to a Swedenborgian hermeneutic.  
As in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, we find in The Everlasting Gospel, 
Blake’s two Bibles and two heavens: one used to oppress and one to liberate. “The Vision 
of Christ that thou dost see / Is my Vision’s Greatest Enemy.”581 “Thy Heaven’s doors 
are my Hell’s Gates.”582 “Both read the Bible day & night / But thou read’st black where 
I read white.”583 Here, and elsewhere in Blake’s work, Judaism is associated with the 
oppressive potential of religion. Judaism becomes an unfortunate symbol for everything 
he loathes in his own religious tradition: legalism, moral superiority, hypocrisy, and the 
abuse of religious authority. Blake’s discursive use of the figure of the Jew stands on the 
shoulders of countless Christians before him, including Swedenborg, but nevertheless 
stands out against the backdrop of his liberalism.  Karen Shabetai, who considers “The 
Question of Blake’s Hostility Toward the Jews” points to Blake’s failure to live up to his 
own humanitarian standards. Examples from publications of his day, which critique 
hostile depictions of Jews and Judaism, demonstrate alternatives available to Blake, and 
as Shabetai concludes, his anti-Jewish rhetoric exceeds what is “necessary to make his 
                                                          
581 William Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, in Erdman, ed., The Complete Poetry, [e]:1-2, 80. 
582 Ibid., [e]:8, 524. 
583 Ibid., [e]:13-14, 524. 
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more positive argument.”584 As Harold Bloom laments of his otherwise beloved poet: 
“Though he caught the prophetic spirit of Amos and Isaiah so precisely in most respects, 
he was incapable of freeing himself from the traditional Christian misinterpretations of 
Pharisaic religion, and adopted the absurd and simplistic dialectic which opposes the 
supposed legalism of the Jews to the presumably greater spirituality of their offspring and 
rivals.”585  
 Like Swedenborg, Blake’s anti-Judaism intermingles with similarities in content 
with some forms of Kabbalah. His knowledge of Kabbalah is evident from his Jerusalem 
the Emanation of the Giant Albion, in which we find the line referencing Adam kadmon 
addressed “To the Jews:” “You have a tradition, that Man anciently contain’d in his 
mighty limbs all things in Heaven & Earth.”586 Readers of Blake find plenty to compare 
with Kabbalah in the cosmic themes of his mythic poetry and prose, though it is difficult 
to prove definitively when his sources are kabbalistic in nature. Spector, for instance, 
elaborates an intricate kabbalism in Blake’s work, not only in his choice of words, 
symbols, and narratives, but in the very structuring principle of his modality. She argues 
that Blake mapped four levels of consciousness in his major prophecies, corresponding to 
the four kinds of soul and the four worlds of Kabbalah.587 She traces his own 
development as an artist through four phases of awakening that likewise correspond. Her 
analysis is itself poetic, but contributes little to what we know about Blake’s engagement 
                                                          
584 Karen Shabetai, “The Question of Blake’s Hostility Toward the Jews,” in English Literary History 63.1 
(1996), 139. 
585 Harold Bloom, Blake’s Apocalypse (New York: Anchor Books), 1965, 433-434. 
586 William Blake, Jeruselam, Plate 27, in Keynes, ed. Complete Writings, 649. 
587 Spector, Wonders Divine, 19-21. 
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with kabbalism, Christian or Jewish. The most we can say from his work, such as in 
Jerusalem, is that he marries concepts that are useful to him from Kabbalah with satirical 
attacks on the people who produced it: a move entirely consistent with his use of biblical 
and Swedenborgian themes as we have seen.588  
 One last point is relevant to our study, and that is Blake’s view of science. His 
condemnation of the oppressive structures of religion did not come with the heralding of 
scientific reasoning, as it did for the English Deists—quite the opposite. He addresses a 
segment of his Jerusalem “To the Deists,” which begins: “He never can be a Friend to the 
Human Race who is the preacher of Natural Morality or Natural Religion.”589 Blake 
associates Deism and natural religion with the Biblical figures of Rahab, Babylon, and 
the Synagogue of Satan.590 And the great Albion is kept from his awakening by the spirits 
of science: “For Bacon & Newton sheathed in dismal steel their terrors hang / Like iron 
scourges over Albion.”591 The problematic elements of religion are not, for Blake, the 
irrational or the mythical, but the rational and the oppressive: the remote and mechanical 
God of Deism. Therefore we see in Blake a similar caution to Swedenborg’s, against the 
pitfalls of intellectualism. Unlike Swedenborg, however, who attempted to systematize 
his doctrine of correspondences according to the principles of logic and mathematics, 
Blake’s symbolism was consciously unsystematic. As we read from the Proverbs of Hell: 
“Improvement makes straight roads, but the crooked roads without Improvement, are 
                                                          
588 For more on Blake’s esoteric sources, see Raine, Blake and the New Age. E. P. Thompson argues, in 
Witness Against the Beast, against his reliance on Neoplatonism, hermeticism and Kabbalah, and points 
instead to his participation in the radical, dissenting sects of the English Reformation. 
589 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 52, in Keynes, ed., Complete Writings 681 
590 Ibid., 682. 
591 Ibid., Plate 15, ln. 11, 635. 
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roads of Genius.”592 While Swedenborg’s disciples were promoting the “science of 
correspondences,” Blake promoted his own unscientific version. The frustration with 
Swedenborg’s adherence to logic and method over artistic expression, as well as the 
attraction to Swedenborg’s mystical insights into biblical symbols, was a combination 
shared by our next poet. 
The Symbolism of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
And all should cry, Beware! Beware!  
His flashing eyes, his floating hair!  
Weave a circle round him thrice,  
And close your eyes with holy dread  
For he on honey-dew hath fed,  
And drunk the milk of Paradise.593 
 
These lines, which conclude the poem Kubla Khan by Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
(1772-1834), describe a dreadful creature: an anti-Christ who drinks up the Holy Land’s 
milk and honey. Isaiah 7:14-16 describes an omen in the form of a child, who will eat 
butter and honey and who will signal the devastation of two neighboring kingdoms. The 
verses have long been interpreted by Christians as a prediction of the Christ child, and it 
is precisely these verses that Coleridge cites in his notebook as an example of biblical 
images with an inner sense. The notebook entry in question, written in 1827, considers 
the relationship between the Old and New Testaments, and posits an inner sense tradition 
that links these otherwise disparate texts. He writes, that if he could uncover such an 
inner sense in the Prophets, for instance, he would embrace certain labels others find 
                                                          
592 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 10, Line 6-7, in Keynes, ed., Complete Writings, 152. 
593 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Kubla Khan, in The Complete Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. 
Ernest Hartley Coleridge (Oxford: The Clarendon press, 1912), Vol. 1, 298. 
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detestable: “the invidious epithets of Swedenborgian and Cabalistic, would not frighten 
me."594 Whether or not Coleridge was able to discern an inner sense of the sort he 
attributed to Swedenborg and to Kabbalah, he clearly was able to successfully harness the 
poetic potential of biblical themes, as we see in Kubla Khan.  
The notebook entry reveals Coleridge’s awareness, on the one hand, of a 
hermeneutical point of connection between Swedenborg and Kabbalah, and on the other, 
the ambivalence that both Swedenborg and Kabbalah provoked among his 
contemporaries and the potential danger of associating with them too hastily. Both 
Swedenborg and Kabbalah, however, played key roles in Coleridge’s religious thought 
and its translation into his poetry. His knowledge and interpretation of them each will be 
taken up here in turn. 
                                                          
594 Coleridge’s notebook entry from November 1827 reads: “I am desirous to understand the Old 
Testament, especially the Psalms and Prophets, on the especial motive of the passage in the Gospels, in 
which our Lord is said to have opened out the sense of the prophecies to the Apostles after his 
Resurrection and to have shewn them how they all applied to him. It is certainly an overwhelming Proof 
of the perishable nature of all unwritten truth, that Tradition has not preserved an Item of this 
momentous Exposition! And yet the apparent literal Sense, taking text and context, seems so remote 
from the Events, to which they are by orthodox divines referred / or and the Sense itself is often so 
obscure, that I grope like a blind Man—for instance, Butter and honey shall he eat, that he may know to 
choose the good &c--& how this could be a sign to think of the approaching downfall of the Kings of Syria 
& Israel /  --I dare not say, nay, I do not think, that the truth is divided between the Protestants and the 
Romans (i.e. decatholicized) Catholics; but I think that on several momentous points there is a Truth, from 
which both are nearly equal distances—and if (we) amre bound to believe the relation above-mentioned 
of the three first Gospels, and other similar declarations attributed to our Savior respecting the intention 
of the Prophecies; and it can, of course, be only in to a very limited extent, too limited to be of any 
efficacy in the removal of difficulties, that the hypothesis of accommodation can be rationally applied to 
the Interpretationve References of the Apostolic Writers; then, I confess, that the Opinion of an interior & 
spiritual sense, in the mind of the Prophets themselves, preserved for a time in the old Schools of the 
Prophets, and still discoverable by a spiritual Light would be full of comfort to me, & remove difficulties 
which I at present see no other means of overcoming or even of escaping—if only I could be sure, it was 
more than an opinion./ The invidious epithets of Swedenborgian and Cabbalistic, would not frighten me.” 
From The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, vol. 5, 1827-1834, Text, ed. Kathleen Coburn and 
Anthony John Harding, (Princeton University Press, 2002), entry 5667. 
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 Coleridge’s interest in Kabbalah was due in part to his adherence to the common 
misattribution of the texts associated with Jewish mysticism to an ancient wisdom 
predating the New Testament and validating a Trinitarian perspective. He read such 
Trinitarian references, for instance, into the Sefer Yetzirah, which describes the grouping 
of the three “mother letters” associated with the three highest sefirot, "a doctrine which 
must have been very early indeed in the Church, because we find a clear reference to it in 
the beginning of the Apocalypse” according to Coleridge.595 This reading of Sefer 
Yetzirah as informing the content of the book of Revelation, is confirmed by 
Christianized translations and commentaries on the Zohar available to Coleridge in the 
Kabbalah denudata. As Tim Fulford demonstrates, Coleridge’s dating and interpretation 
of kabbalistic texts was also informed by his relationships to a number of influential 
movements and figures in his life, including the Cambridge Platonists, the German 
biblical scholar J. G. Eichhorn and the French historian Basnage de Beauval, whose work 
incorporated Targumic and rabbinic studies.596 Coleridge had Jewish interlocutors as 
well, the most important of which was his friend and teacher Hyman Hurwitz. Kabbalah 
was therefore not a fleeting interest of his, but a sustained object of study, and it was one 
that informed his poetic interpretations of the biblical themes. 
                                                          
595 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed Kathleen Coburn 
(London: Pilot Press, 1949), 299.  
596 Tim Fulford, "Apocalyptic and Reactionary?: Coleridge as Hermeneutist," in The Modern Language 
Review 87.1 (1992), 24-25. 
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Fulford argues that Coleridge’s interpretation of the Bible, while presenting an 
alternative to both biblical literalism and to historical criticism, should not be viewed as 
reactionary.  
Coleridge's extensive knowledge of the Kabbalah was developed as he 
struggled to find a new status for scripture. In making this struggle, he was at 
the forefront of contemporary scholarship, and was certainly not a reactionary 
in his intellectual interests. Aware of German biblical criticism, as most of 
his contemporaries were not, Coleridge knew that scripture was not directly 
dictated or inspired by God. In accepting, after Eichhorn, its historical and 
local nature, its bias and flaws, Coleridge also accepted that a new 
understanding of its truth was necessary.597 
 
 This new understanding was informed by the latest in biblical scholarship, but 
required a poet’s hermeneutic. For Coleridge, the Bible was “the most perfect specimen 
of symbolic poetry.” “The Apocalypse is a poem,” he wrote, “and a poem composed by a 
Hebrew poet after the particular type of Hebrew poetry.”598 According to Coleridge’s 
reading, the poetic soul of Kabbalah inspired the biblical authors, who encoded their 
message in rich images and narratives and also initiated a tradition of exploring the sense 
within. With such an understanding of the nature of the biblical tradition as his base, 
Coleridge made a point of seeking out other thinkers and traditions that he saw as allied 
with this position, Swedenborg being a particularly fascinating case.  
Coleridge was a student in residence at Christ’s Hospital in London the same 
years that Robert Hindmarsh was organizing the first Swedenborgian meetings in nearby 
locations, and was associated with Tulk, as discussed above. Circumstances of time and 
                                                          
597 Ibid., 26 
598 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, On the Constitution of the Church and State, ed. John Colmer (London: 
Routledge, 1976), 139. Quoted in Fulford, “Apocalyptic and Reactionary?” 26-27. 
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place therefore brought him in contact with Swedenborg’s writings, but in them he found 
both resonance and discord with ideas about language and biblical interpretation that 
occupied him from a young age. Coleridge wrote about Swedenborg and annotated 
several of Swedenborg’s books, some of which were published in the an 1841 volume of 
the Monthly Magazine, and many more of which we have recorded in his private 
notebooks and most recently compiled in a 1954 dissertation by Leonard Martin 
Edmisten.599  
Coleridge’s commentary on Swedenborg includes some of his scientific and 
philosophical writings. His notes on Regnum Animale, for instance, show admiration for 
Swedenborg’s more sublime insights, but also frustration at the spoiling of these insights 
with the language of naturalism and logic. 
De Anima Humana—How near to—yea in actual contact, only that he 
touches it with the back of the hand,-- is this great mind with the very truth. 
At one moment he has his hand on it; he pauses a moment and feels a fruition 
of the truth. This is to be brought forward from the center to van, and spread 
out in the light of conscious and communicable distinctness. This he seems to 
effect by conceptions, and by the mechanism of conceptual logic—and the 
truth is gone!600 
 
 Coleridge voices similar viewpoints on Swedenborg’s biblical exegesis: support 
for the general principle, but disappointment with the results. For instance, he comments 
on Arcana coelestia no. 7933, in which Swedenborg writes of the biblical text that “not a 
single expression, nor even a single iota, in its original language, can be taken from the 
literal sense of the Word, without an interruption in the internal sense.” Coleridge is put 
                                                          
599 Leonard Martin Edminston, “Coleridge’s Commentary on Swedenborg.” PhD diss., University of 
Missouri, 1954. 
600 Ibid., 225. 
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off by such hyperbole: “In Heaven, perhaps; but on Earth? And which Edition, for even 
the printed Bibles differ according to the different MSS. from which they were printed? 
That there is some grand Arcanum in this Intuition of Sw. I am inclined to think: because 
a similar Sense is every where recurring in Behmen . . . But neither B. nor Sw. appear to 
me to have mastered it.”601 Both Bohme and Swedenborg were rightly guided by the 
intention to read into biblical symbols, in his view, but neither produced the kinds of 
interpretations that captured the poetic spirit of the text. Elsewhere in his comments on 
Arcana, Coleridge encourages Swedenborgians to mine the truth from Swedenborg’s 
work and put aside the rest: “Swedenborg’s Meaning is the truth—and the duty of his 
followers is, to secure this meaning to the Readers of his works by collecting from his 
numerous Volumes those passages, in which this meaning is conveyed in terms so plain 
as not to be misconceived.”602 Coleridge here seems to be suggesting an inner sense to 
Swedenborg himself, or at least that his work requires a creative reinterpretation by his 
readers. Indeed, elsewhere Coleridge is inspired by the vivid imagery of Swedenborg’s 
descriptions of heaven and hell, not for their presentation of the facts of the afterlife, but 
for their symbolic potential. In Swedenborg’s concept of the Maximus Homo, he writes, 
there is a confusion between the active principle of an idea and the shape it produces in 
the world of senses.603 Such figures as the “gastric devils” Swedenborg finds in hell, 
strike Coleridge as filled with poetic potency, but fail when taken literally.604 Rather, 
                                                          
601 Ibid., 232. 
602 Ibid., 249 
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readers would do better to understand his accounts of travels through the spirit world “as 
the Account of a Series of allegorical in part & in part symbolical Visions, some of which 
the gifted Seer had misinterpreted.”605 Coleridge scholar Heather Jackson writes: “It may 
be some mitigation of Coleridge’s presumptuousness (maintaining that Swedenborg did 
not know what he was saying while he, Coleridge, did) to remember that he would have 
said the same of the prophets of the Old Testament and the Evangelists of the New, and 
would expect to have said it of himself by more advanced thinkers in the course of 
time.”606 
 Coleridge’s criticism of Swedenborg extended beyond the realm of hermeneutics. 
Theologically, it was Swedenborg’s challenge to the doctrine of justification by faith and 
the doctrine of the Trinity, which invited Coleridge’s harshest attacks. In this, he shared 
the concern expressed by Wesley and Oetinger, discussed in the last chapter, though 
unlike Wesley and Oetinger, Coleridge didn’t associate these heresies with a rejection of 
the literal sense of scripture on Swedenborg’s part. Coleridge was also alarmed by 
Swedenborg’s rhetoric regarding various categories of non-Christians. In one place he 
briefly corrects Swedenborg’s assertion that the Jews worship Abraham, Moses and 
David, though he does not otherwise seem to be bothered by Swedenborg’s discourse 
about the Jews. Coleridge himself gave voice to many of the stereotypes about Jews from 
his environment and spoke of the necessity of their conversion, even though he also 
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spoke out against their persecution.607 On the topic of other peoples, Coleridge was 
particularly offended by Swedenborg’s more positive report of “heathens” in the afterlife, 
that they often enter heaven more easily than Christians.608 Coleridge believed 
polytheism, or the “atrocities of Hindustan and China” automatically classified them as 
morally inferior (a view that reinforces the anti-Christ interpretation of Kubla Khan), and 
he concluded that Swedenborg’s descriptions of heathens in heaven “speaks volumes in 
proof of the entire Subjectivity of these Sights and conversations.”609 As satire, he writes, 
Swedenborg’s descriptions would have been effective, but they simply cannot stand as 
literal travel accounts of an explorer to heaven’s shores. In Coleridge’s assessment, 
Swedenborg’s search for the inner sense of scripture might have been more productive if 
he had understood the poetic quality of his own visions and experiences. 
Like Blake, Coleridge was no stranger to the symbolic potential of language and 
to the potential of biblical language in particular to evoke powerful responses. Fulford 
writes: “The symbolism of Coleridge's inner sense can, I suggest, be read as an 
endorsement of a liberating linguistic practice, in which men and women are encouraged 
to realize that they make the world through words.”610 And like Blake, this celebration of 
the creative and liberating power of language was a point that drew him to the work of 
Swedenborg. In the Bible-inspired visions / delusions of this mystical scientist, both poets 
                                                          
607 See Chris Rubenstein, “Coleridge and Jews.” Published online:  
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found material that spoke to their Christian faith, but also their penchant for the playful 
exploitation of traditional symbols.  Coleridge found in Swedenborg a productive 
madness: “Oh thrice happy should we be if the learned and the teachers of the present age 
were gifted with a similar madness. A madness indeed celestial, and flowing from a 
divine mind.”611 Ironically, Swedenborg made more sense to Coleridge as a madman. But 
to take Swedenborg at his own word, in his view, or to take him literally is a mistake 
leading to folly of an unproductive sort.  
Honoré de Balzac and the Swedish Castle 
 Finally, our study of Swedenborg’s early reception in the arts and literature 
requires an investigation into the work of the French novelist Honoré de Balzac (1799-
1850) whose lengthy and explicit references to Swedenborg’s thought system inform his 
handling of scripture, language, science, and mysticism. Balzac’s references to 
Swedenborg, primarily in his two novels Louis Lambert and Séraphîta, depict the 
“Swedish prophet” as one who sees with the two eyes of science and spirit, and as one 
who understands the hidden truth of scripture and religion. Unlike Blake and Coleridge, 
whose romanticism countered enlightenment era confidence in human reason and 
scientific inquiry, Balzac integrated a more positive view of the sciences, even in his 
“Swedenborgian novels” whose fanciful characters and settings stand out against the 
realism of his other work. In this, Balzac reflects his context, as we will see. 
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Lynn Wilkinson argues in her work on Swedenborg and French literary culture 
that the intermarriage of esoteric and scientific explanations was relatively 
uncontroversial in French contexts, and that Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences, 
which exemplified this pairing, allowed for “complex interactions between popular and 
elite culture.”612 Swedenborg’s thought comingled, in many cases, with the ideas of 
mesmerism and freemasonry in a context in which the all wisdom of the ages, scientific, 
religious, or otherwise, was applied to the longing for political and social 
transformation.613 Wilkinson demonstrates that Swedenborg’s influence in France, while 
still marginal, was not limited to figures or movements that stressed mystical 
explanations over scientific ones, but it was precisely the rationalist underpinnings of 
Swedenborg’s work, his reliance on Descartes and Leibniz, that French authors were 
attracted to.  
 Wilkinson’s work responds to Foucault’s assertion that the language system of 
correspondences was an episteme that died in the seventeenth century, with the 
disentanglement of language from nature.614 Rather, she argues, belief in, or hope for, a 
                                                          
612 Wilkinson, The Dream, ix. 
613 Wilkinson points to “a widespread perception of certain broadly based similarities” between 
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See Wilkinson, The Dream, 6-14.  
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universal language of nature with representational potency persisted into the nineteenth 
century, and Swedenborg’s name often accompanied it. Wilkinson writes that in France, 
this universal language of nature took on a uniquely ahistorical character, pointing to the 
unchanging and stable relationships between words and their referents, especially in 
nature, while in England and Germany the study of languages tended to emphasize 
historical and national contexts.615 This ahistorical quality was applied variously with 
differing outcomes, but resulted in a shared attentiveness to utopian potential of language 
and symbols. Swedenborg’s system, in which innate, organic corresponding relationships 
exist between nature and spirit, and between the words of scripture and divine wisdom, 
suited this utopianism.  “Successive interpretations of Swedenborgianism, especially the 
theory of language known as the doctrine of correspondences, provide a red thread 
through a complicated context.” This “red thread” can be detected, for instance, in the 
poem “Correspondences” by Charles Baudelaire, in which the natural world 
communicates through the language of symbols. 
Nature is a temple whose living colonnades 
Breathe forth a mystic speech in fitful sighs; 
Man wanders among the symbols in those glades 
Where all things watch him with familiar eyes.616 
                                                          
615 Ibid., 3. 
616 Charles Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, ed. Marthiel and Jackson Mathews, trans. Richard Wilbur (New 
York. New Directions, 1989), 12. Much has been written on Baudelaire’s use of Swedenborg, though there 
is little consensus concerning the nature of the influence. See Wilkinson, The Dream, 217-248; Anna 
Balakian, The Symbolist Movement (New York: Random Houe, 1967), 12-52; Gary Lachman, “The Spiritual 
Detective: How Baudelaire Invented Symbolism, by way of Swedenborg, ETA Hoffman and Edgar Allan 
Poe,” in Philosophy, Literature, Mysticism: An Anthology of Essays on the Thought and Influence of 
Emanuel Swedenborg, ed. Stephen McNeilly (West Chester, PA: Swedenborg Foundation Publishers, 2013), 
Kindle Edition. Wilkinson cites: Anne-Marie Amiot, Baudelaire et I’lluminisme; Paul Arnold, Estoerisme de 
Baudelaire; Marc Eigeldinger, Le platonisme de Baudelaire and Lloyd James Austin, L’univers poetique de 
Baudeliare. 
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There is some debate among scholars regarding the extent of Balzac’s knowledge 
of and loyalty to Swedenborg’s works. In  her articles on Swedenborg and Balzac, 
Margaret Hayward minimizes Balzac’s reliance on Swedenborg, citing the fact that 
Swedenborgians have tended not to count him as one of their own as well as his own 
denial of, as Hayward puts it, “the most important articles of New Church faith,” namely 
the divinity of Christ and the inerrancy of the Bible.617 However, to designate Balzac’s 
relationship to Swedenborgian thought this way fundamentally misunderstands his 
context. While there were a small handful of Swedenborgians gathering regularly by the 
1820s and 1830s, the presence of Swedenborgianism in France was far less an organized 
church movement with declared articles of faith, than it was the circulation of certain 
visionary ideas.618 As in England, where Swedenborg’s writings were influential in non-
sectarian contexts they were incorporated as one part of a multifaceted and eclectic set of 
ideas on any number of subjects. This was explored in chapter 6, with the example of the 
Swedenborgians based in Manchester who, unlike their counterparts in London, 
experimented with communication with angels and animal magnetism. For Balzac in 
particular, Swedenborg, creatively interpreted and without concern for a non-existent 
New Church orthodoxy, represented a utopian vision for the unifying of all religions. In 
an 1837 letter to Madame Honska, his future wife, he wrote: “Swedenborgianism, which 
                                                          
617 Margaret Hayward, "The Myth of Balzac's Mysticism: His Father's Mesmerist Ideals," in History of 
European Ideas 27 (2001): 275. See also Margaret Hayward, “Plagiarism and the Problem of Influence: 
Pauline Bernheim, "Balzac und Swedenborg," in Australian Journal of French Studies 29 (1992): 41-51. 
618 See Wilkinson, The Dream, Introduction; and Block, The New Church, 58-61. 
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is but a repetition of ancient ideas in a Christian sense, is my religion, lifted by the 
incomprehensibility of God.”619 Swedenborg, the enlightenment allegorist, had himself 
become an emblem for some grand and universal theory. For Balzac, the theory that 
Swedenborg embodied was the realization of the fundamental harmony between science 
and religion, as we will see. 
We know that Balzac owned at least eight volumes of Swedenborg from his book-
binder’s bill, and his writing either directly quotes or paraphrases books by Swedenborg 
that were available to him in translations by Jean-Pierre Moet, royal librarian to 
Versailles. These include: Du Ciel et de ses merveilles, et de l’Enfer (Heaven and its 
Marvels and Hell); La Sagesse angélique sur le divin amour et sur la divine sagesse 
(Angelic Wisdom Concerning the Divine Love and the Divine Wisdom); L’Apocalypse 
révélée (The Apocalypse Revealed); De la Nouvelle Jérusalem et de sa doctrine celeste 
(The New Jerusalem and its Heavenly Doctrines); and La Vraie Religion chrétienne (The 
True Christian Religion).620  And while some of his quotations were likely taken from an 
abridgement of Swedenborg’s writings by Daillant de La Touche, especially his 
quotations from Arcana, which was not yet translated into French,621 there is sufficient 
evidence to show that he had immersed himself directly in Swedenborg’s writings during 
the 1830s.  Wilkinson’s assertion that Balzac was both influenced by and contributed to a 
“literary myth of Swedenborg” may be true, but it was a myth backed by something of an 
                                                          
619 As translated by Saori Osuga, “Balzac and Swedenborg,” in Philosophy, Literature, Mysticism: An 
Anthology of Essays on the Thought and Influence of Emanuel Swedenborg, ed. Stephen McNeilly (West 
Chester, PA: Swedenborg Foundation Publishers, 2013). Kindle edition. 
620 For a full discussion of Balzac’s Swedenborg sources, see Osuga, “Balzac and Swedenborg.” 
621 As originally demonstrated by Pauline Bernheim in Balzac und Swedenborg: Einfluss der mystik 
Swedenborgs und Saint-Martins auf die romandichtung Balzacs 16. (Kraus Reprint, 1967). 
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immersion in Swedenborg’s published works, resulting in a relatively faithful 
presentation of Swedenborg in his novels, though not without significant interpretive 
liberties.  
In a letter written to his sister while he was working on Louis Lambert (published 
in 1832), Balzac confessed that he believed the concepts he was formulating for the novel 
would someday contribute to  the advancement of science. He believed it necessary to put 
these concepts into the format of a novel, as scientists of his day were not yet ready to 
receive them: “Some day perhaps it will direct science into new channels. If I had made 
of it a purely scientific work it would have attracted the attention of thinkers, who now 
will not cast their eyes over it.” 622 The fictional setting of the book therefore belies a 
serious message, and also an autobiographical one. Balzac is himself the narrator, telling 
the story of a childhood friend from boarding school, Louis Lambert. The story mirrors 
Balzac’s own childhood in many respects, though the events of Lambert’s life, and 
especially his tragic end, are fictional.623  
The book revolves around several related themes, including: the sometimes 
harmonious but often discordant relationship between one’s body and one’s mind; the 
discovery that spiritualism and materialism are two sides of the same thing; the two 
“generating agents” of all human activity in will and thought; the nature of heaven and 
angels; and the secret meaning of scripture. Swedenborg’s writings are themselves a kind 
of character in the novel, and a major focus of Lambert’s obsessive study of the true 
                                                          
622 As quoted in the introduction by George Frederic Parsons, Honoré de Balzac, Louis Lambert (Boston: 
Roberts Brothers, 1890), vii. 
623 Ibid., Introduction. 
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nature of things. Lambert records his findings from Swedenborg and others in his 
“Treatise of the Will” which is confiscated by a school headmaster, sending Lambert into 
a downward spiral of depression that he never fully recovers from. Swedenborg figures 
centrally in each of these themes, and is heralded at one point by Lambert as the “Buddha 
of the North” who “gathers to him all religions, or rather one religion of Humanity.”624 A 
longer study would draw out the many Swedenborgian elements in Louis Lambert, but it 
is the theme of scripture’s hidden meaning and its relationship to science that will 
concern us here. 
Lambert is described as a child genius who read and digested whole libraries of 
books in his youth, and read the Old and New Testaments before the age of 5. This fact 
sets the stage in the book’s first paragraph, which asks:  
Did his infantine imagination comprehend the deep mysteries of Scripture? 
Could it already follow the Holy Spirit in its path through the universe? Or, 
was it merely fascinated by the romantic charms which abound in those 
poems of the Orient? Did the child’s soul in its finest innocence sympathize 
with the sublime piety which hands divine have shed within the book? To 
some readers the following narrative will answer these questions.625  
 
One book in particular changes the course of Lambert’s life. His future prospects 
are limited by his family’s poverty, but one day he is discovered by the infamous 
Madame de Staël reading Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell, and she is so taken by the boy 
in conversation about the book that she promises to underwrite his education.  
                                                          
624 Ibid., 97. 
625 Ibid., 1. 
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Lambert’s early intimacy with books is presented as a testament to that 
advancement of his soul. An extended digression on the cosmic potential of words 
occupies the book’s first pages. We read that every word has a body, a motion, and a 
soul, echoing Swedenborg’s natural, spiritual and celestial senses. Aside from its 
immediate meaning, each word carries with it a history that spans the ages, bearing traces 
of its use in various places by various peoples. And in addition to this historical character, 
human speech also has hidden within it a “mysterious spirit.” “All [words] are instinct 
with a living power derived from the soul which they send back to its source the 
mysterious force of a marvelous action and reaction between word and thought,--like, as 
it were, a lover drawing from the lips of his mistress as much love as he presses into 
them.”626 Furthermore, Lambert’s character is especially interested in the traceability of 
words, or thoughts, through physical phenomenon. He is ever in search of the pulse of 
either electricity or fluid that accompanies the action and reaction of ideas and volitions 
in humans, as expressed through words.627 Inspired by mesmerism, the electric 
component of ideas and volitions goes against Swedenborg in one sense, whose 
abandonment of the search for the soul’s material effects was replaced by a 
correspondential relationship that didn’t require physical evidence. In another sense 
though, Balzac’s understanding of language is in line with Swedenborg’s, in that the 
physical and metaphysical realms are connected by words, or the Word, la Parole, the 
externalized expression of internal processes.  
                                                          
626 Ibid., 5. 
627 Ibid., 55-56. 
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And while it is human speech that bears this depth, rather than divine speech, 
scripture represents a kind of apex, or perfected sample of such mystery-laden words. 
The Apocalypse, for instance, “is ecstasy written down.”628 Further, in Louis Lambert we 
find a view of scripture that is not limited to the Bible, but consists of a “trilogy of 
literature” including the Bible, Greek mythology and Hindu scriptures. Each has a unique 
tone and message, but together they contain all the thoughts of man, and carry “the secret 
of the untold grandeur of their languages and their myths.”629 Scripture is described as 
poetry: as magic making with words. Swedenborg’s writings themselves take on an 
almost scripture-like quality, being “full of poetry,”630 and “drunk with the essence of the 
divine”631 despite the diffuse and obscure language. “He alone enables man to touch 
God.”632 
All of this is, of course, set within the narrative of the life of Lambert’s character, 
who is eventually driven to a state of oblivion by his search for celestial realities through 
books and ideas. In a fit, he attempts to castrate himself the night before his wedding, and 
enters an almost catatonic state for the remaining years of his life, attended to by his 
beloved Pauline, despite their having not consummated the relationship. Pauline’s 
character is an allegory in itself. She is the granddaughter of a Jew, who was left 
matchless despite her beauty and inherited wealth because of her mixed heritage. She is 
described as having “scriptural innocence” and “Jewish beauty in its utmost purity.” Her 
                                                          
628 Ibid., 75. 
629 Ibid., 77. 
630 Ibid., 40. 
631 Ibid., 57. 
632 Ibid., 98-99. 
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skin is white, like the robes of the Levites.633 A perpetual virgin, Pauline embodies a 
romanticized Hebrew innocence, like a sacred text not yet unveiled. Her narrative role is 
to remain loyal to Lambert, believing in his sanity to the end, despite the obvious 
appearance of madness. The novel’s narrator agrees with her, seeing his as a bewildered 
ecstasy resulting from his awareness of, and presence among, higher realities. His mind 
simply advanced before his body. Of the many major themes that resonate with 
Swedenborgian thought in Louis Lambert, therefore, several stand in contrast, including 
the elevation of virginity and the neglect of the body in service of spiritual advancement, 
as well as a strictly positive (if overly romantic) Jewish character. We will see many of 
the same themes, both those in line with Swedenborg and those that differ, in Balzac’s 
Séraphîta, published two years later. 
 Swedenborg shows up as a fictionalized character in the book Séraphîta, the 
cousin of the main character’s father. Séraphîta’s parents were able to cultivate a state of 
near spiritual perfection through their study of Swedenborg, and consequently gave birth 
to an angel. Séraphîta appears male to some and female to others, but keeps all would-be 
lovers at bay, meeting their desirous pleas only with extended orations on the quality and 
purpose of natural and spiritual realities. The novel’s third chapter includes over thirty 
pages describing the life and theology of Swedenborg, including many quotes from his 
theological writings, all by way of explaining the life of the angel Séraphîta: “to 
 explain the birth of that being it is absolutely necessary that I disperse the clouds which 
envelop the most obscure of Christian doctrines. It is not easy to make myself clear when 
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speaking of that incomprehensible revelation,--the last effulgence of faith that has shone 
upon our lump of mud. Do you know Swedenborg?” Part of this lengthy summary of 
Swedenborg’s life and theology includes a discussion of the difference between the 
natural sciences of men and the divine science of correspondences. The following 
precedes quotations and summaries from Arcana coelestia: 
The man of science as the world goes is purely external like his knowledge; 
his inner being is only used to preserve his aptitude for the perception of 
external truths. The Angelic Spirit goes far beyond that; his knowledge is the 
thought of which human science is but the utterance; he derives that 
knowledge from the Logos, and learns the law of Correspondences, and 
covers an esoteric or spiritual meaning, which according to the science of 
Correspondences, cannot be understood.634 
 
The novel’s most explicit summaries of Swedenborg’s life and thought, such as 
this quotation, come from the character Monsieur Becker, a pastor who, while well 
acquainted with Swedenborg’s writings, is nevertheless skeptical. Swedenborg’s presence 
in the book extends well beyond the digressions of the bookish pastor, however, and we 
find many variations on Swedenborg’s ideas throughout the novel, both symbolic and 
explicit, especially regarding heaven and angels and the nature of true scientific inquiry. 
We will conclude, however, with two examples in which Swedenborg figures as part of 
an expression of the power of allegorical or symbolic representation.   
In the novel’s opening pages we read an expansive and enchanted description of 
the Norwegian coastline. Its cliffs and fiords are described as a kind of hieroglyphics, 
their jagged and jarring edges etching figures, such as the spine of a fish, that tell 
something about the soul of the place. The reader is directed to an isolated valley along 
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the coast with some two hundred houses, cut off from its neighbors by the fiords, rivers 
and cliffs that surround it. Balzac introduces Swedenborg’s character briefly in pondering 
what kind of genius it would have taken to connect the town to the world around it: “The 
village of Jarvis might perhaps have communicated with the interior of Norway and 
Sweden by the river Sieg; but to do this and to be thus brought into contact with 
civilization, the Strom-fiord needed the presence of a man of genius. Such a man did 
actually appear there,--a poet, a Swede of great religious ferver, who died admiring, even 
reverencing this region as one of the noblest works of the Creator.”635 While it is not true 
that Swedenborg died in Norway, it is true that he had been involved in engineering a 
system to transport boats and galleys over a piece of land that connected Sweden and 
Norway, from Stromstadt to Iderfjol. Swedenborg’s role as connector of peoples across 
difficult topographies is used by Balzac to prefigure his role as connector of people 
between heaven and earth. 
Swedenborg’s presence in the novel is also represented by the “Swedish castle” in 
which Séraphîta and her caretaker live. The abode is no castle, but derives its name from 
the fact that it is made from stone, while every other house in the village is made from 
wood.636 At one point the allegory of the Swedish castle is openly analyzed, and through 
it Balzac expresses a connection between poetry and mysticism. The characters all stand 
outside the castle, each experiencing his or her own moment of epiphany after having 
                                                          
635 Honoré de Balzac, Séraphîta, trans. Katherine Prescott Wormeley (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries 
Press, 1970), 6.  
636 According to Swedenborg’s correspondences, stone corresponds to truth and wood to goodness. The 
joining of truth and goodness is the joining of the two divine faculties of wisdom and love. 
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realized something of Séraphîta’s true nature. “To them, in their several ways, the 
Swedish castle had grown to mean some gigantic representation, some spectacle like 
those whose colors and masses are skillfully and harmoniously marshalled by the poets, 
and whose personages, imaginary actors to men, are real to those who begin to penetrate 
the Spiritual World.”637 By encountering the castle as a representation of some greater 
reality, the characters each enter into a mystical/poetic trance and are transported to 
heaven. The castle becomes not only a means of interpretation or knowing, but the very 
act of interpreting it becomes a mystical experience. It is in this mode that Swedenborg is 
elsewhere characterized as an exegete with supernatural abilities: “Dante’s poem seems 
but a speck to the reader submerged in the almost Biblical verses with which Swedenborg 
renders palpable the Celestial Worlds, as Beethoven built his palaces of harmony with 
thousands of notes, as architects have reared cathedrals with millions of stones.”638 
Stones feature again, as the building blocks of a heavenly structure, recalling perhaps 
Swedenborg’s interpretation of biblical symbols in which stone corresponds to truth.639 
The castle and the cathedral, heavy with stone and fixed on the earth, are nevertheless 
vehicles for journeying to the spiritual world, when understood in the poetic sense.  
Balzac does not voice the same semantic distancing from “allegory” that we find 
in Blake and Coleridge. Though he does employ the language of symbol, representation, 
and vision, these and related terms are not in contradistinction to allegory. His 
                                                          
637 Balzac, Séraphîta, 116. 
638 Ibid., 85. 
639 Examples are numerous. See Swedenborg, Arcana caelestia 1298, 3720, 3773, 6426, 9494, and many 
others. 
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appreciation of allegory is not only evident in the way he uses allegory in his novels, such 
as the Swedish castle, as a mechanism for mystical enlightenment, but in his allusions to 
Dante Alighieri, the self-identified allegorist, who interpreted his own poetry in the 
fourfold-manner of the medievalists in his Convivio. Balzac’s mystical novels come in a 
collection titled La Comédie humaine, a clear reference to Dante’s Divina Commedia. 
Dante also appears as a character in another novel in the collection, Balzac’s Les 
Proscrits. In the following passage from Les Proscrits, spoken by Dante’s teacher, we 
hear of different Words, or scriptures, that correspond on six different levels.  
According to him, the divine Word nourished the spiritual Word, the spiritual 
Word nourished the living Word, the living Word nourished the animal 
Word, the animal Word nourished the vegetable Word, and the vegetable 
Word expressed the life of the sterile Word. These successive transformations 
of the chrysalis which God imposes upon our souls, and this species of 
infusorial life which from one zone to another is communicated with ever 
increasing life, spirituality, and perception, explained confusedly, but perhaps 
marvelously enough for his inexperienced auditors, the movement impressed 
by the Most High upon Nature. Supporting himself by numerous passages 
from Scripture, which he used as a commentary upon himself, to express by 
actual images the abstract arguments he was unable to produce, he waved the 
Spirit of God like a torch through the depths of creation . . .640 
 
We recognize the concept of six corresponding levels of reality from 
Swedenborg’s work on series and degrees, discussed in chapter 2. Elsewhere, 
Swedenborg describes three Words: the Word of the Celestial kingdom, the Word of the 
Spiritual kingdom, and the Word of the natural world, which is the Bible, which interact 
by means of influx.641 We have in Les Proscrits, therefore, a variation on the 
                                                          
640 Honoré de Balzac, The Exiles, in Seraphita, trans. Katharine Prescott Wormeley, (Freeport, NY: Books 
for Libraries Press, 1970), 253-254. 
641 Emanuel Swedenborg, De verbo, 36-40. 
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Swedenborgian concepts of series and degrees, correspondences and scripture, all beheld 
by Dante, “the Father of Poetry.”642 We find in the above passage something akin to 
allegory, according to Coleridge’s definition of the term, where concrete images are used 
to express abstract concepts. We also find something of an immediate, organic, non-
linguistic process akin to Coleridge’s understanding of symbol. Balzac makes no 
distinction: it is all poetry.  Balzac has much in common with the English Romantics, 
especially in his creative exploitation of the ideas of Swedenborg and of the symbols of 
the biblical tradition, for the sake of his art. La Comédie humaine is a bridge between 
Realism and Romanticism, where his efforts to reach into realms beyond the mundane 
requires the unreserved engagement with language’s symbolic potential. 
Conclusion: Swedenborg’s Future in Art and Poetry 
Similar to Blake and Coleridge, Swedenborg was one of many influences on 
Balzac’s writing. And like Blake and Coleridge, it would be a mistake to credit 
Swedenborg as the sole inspiration for Balzac’s use of biblical symbols or his reliance on 
concepts and methods similar to Swedenborg’s correspondences. Swedenborgian ideas 
intermingled with those of Mesmer and Bohme, with Neoplatonism and Kabbalah as we 
have seen. These threads are nearly impossible to separate, especially in the work of 
artists who celebrate nonconformist and unsystematic ways of articulating their views. 
However, Swedenborg’s acknowledged presence in the work of these men, as well as 
their evident and ongoing wrestling with his work, highlights the continued relevance of 
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Swedenborg’s interpretive methods in post-enlightenment thought. His was a form of 
allegory that made its way successfully into the consciousness of these culturally notable 
figures, even if it sustained a fair amount of criticism along the way.    
 As we see in the work of Blake, Coleridge, and Balzac, Swedenborg’s concept of 
correspondences, coupled with his descriptions of dreams and visions in all their fantastic 
detail, found future life in the world of art and poetry, where language and imagination 
were celebrated without abandon. One common element in the treatment of Swedenborg 
found in Blake, Coleridge and Balzac is the insistence that his work also be read non-
literally. The poetic soul of Swedenborg’s interpretations would be annulled, according to 
this reading, if his visions were interpreted to be concrete descriptions rather than literary, 
or even allegorical, perceptions. Swedenborg is mocked and derided for taking himself 
too seriously, especially by Blake and Coleridge, but their own work nevertheless 
involved his thought systems and experiences in significant ways. By interpreting 
Swedenborg forward, by initiating variations on his theological and symbolic systems, by 
misreading him, these artists in fact paved a way for the continued relevance of his 
visionary theology. As Robert Rix writes of those influenced by Swedenborg in this way: 
“his visions are reclaimed as literary iconography whose teleology is personal 
transformation.”643 It was Swedenborg’s visions and their application to the interpretation 
of the Bible that put off Kant and his followers in philosophy, but artists and novelists 
                                                          
643 Robert Rix, "Emanuel Swedenborg, Transpersonal Psychology and the Literary Text" 
http://www.psyartjournal.com/article/show/rix-emanuel_swedenborg_transpersonal_psychol accessed 
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were able to carry forward Swedenborg’s correspondences in new terms. As Devin Zuber 
recently articulated:  
Kant’s 1766 Dreams bears witness to a mid-eighteenth century hermeneutic 
crisis that Swedenborg’s esoteric interpretation of the Bible helped to 
catalyze in the exegetical work of Johann Ernesti, Johann Bengal, and 
Friedrich Oetinger; the appearance of William Blake’s Marriage twenty-
seven years later after the so-called ‘hermeneutic turn’ in Protestant theology 
shows how Swedenborg’s allegorical exegesis, built on esoteric theories of 
correspondence, could slip and slide into modes of artistic productivity after 
being banished by the academy.644  
 
It is precisely those areas that Kant excised from academic discourse that Blake 
and Coleridge find especially powerful: the other worldly visions and experiences. 
However, as with Kant, the anxieties associated with both Swedenborg and with allegory 
persist in the arts, and as with Kant these anxieties betray a level of influence. The 
ambivalence we find concerning the work of Swedenborg in Blake and Coleridge does 
not preclude significant areas of positive overlap. Therefore, we find that semantic 
distancing from allegory rides side by side with the heralding of language’s symbolic 
potency, especially sacred language. 
  
                                                          
644 Devin Zuber, “Visionary Discontent: Swedenborg and the Problem of Romantic Esotericism,” a paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the North American Society for the Study of Romanticism, 2016, 
Berkeley, CA,  3-4. 
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CONCLUSION 
In a 1970 essay on Swedenborg, the Argentinian poet Jorge Luis Borges largely 
praises the rigorous and intellectual form of mysticism found in his work, and includes a 
poem in Swedenborg’s honor.  
He would see 
That which earthly eyes do not see: 
The fierce geometry, the crystal 
Labyrinth of God and the sordid 
Milling of infernal delights.645  
 
Borges is unimpressed, however, with Swedenborg’s biblical commentary and compares 
it to Kabbalah: 
 [Swedenborg], like Spinoza or Francis Bacon, was a thinker in his own right 
who made an awkward mistake when he decided to adapt his ideas to the 
framework of the two Testaments. This happened to the Hebrew Cabalists, 
who were essentially neoplatonists when they invoked the authority of the 
verses, words, and even letters and transpositions of the letters in Genesis to 
justify their system.646 
 
Borges makes the connection here between Swedenborg and the great 
philosophical thinkers of early modernity but faults Swedenborg for applying his ideas to 
the interpretation of the Bible. Like the kabbalists, he seems to be saying, Swedenborg’s 
interpretations became allegorical and arbitrary, tarnishing his philosophical genius. 
Borges was an admitted admirer of Jewish mysticism, and borrowed kabbalistic motifs 
for his own writing, so the connection to Kabbalah is not itself deprecating.647 His 
criticism is in regard to the “awkward mistake” shared by Swedenborg and Kabbalah of 
                                                          
645 Borges, “Testimony to the Invisible,” 16 
646 Ibid., 8-9 
647 See Elliot Wolfson, "In the Mirror of the Dream: Borges and the Poetics of Kabbalah," in The Jewish 
Quarterly Review 104, No. 3 (Summer 2014): 362–379. 
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insisting on an alternate meaning embedded in the very grammar of Scripture, a meaning 
that is precise and fixed, or “The disturbing suspicion that we are ciphers and symbols in 
a divine cryptography whose true meaning we do not know . . .”648 Borges’ comparison is 
fair, given the assertion in Swedenborg’s commentaries that even the shape of the 
individual Hebrew letters of scripture contain arcana, or divine secrets, a theme common 
in Kabbalah. Nevertheless, Borges’ disapproval of biblical allegory is curious given his 
own deeply symbolic writing style, and his own indebtedness to biblical themes.649 
Borges calls allegory “an aesthetic error,” yet, as one critic put it, “he surely remains one 
of the most allegorical of contemporary writers.”650  In some sense, then, Borges shares 
an ambivalence toward allegory that we find expressed at times throughout the history of 
biblical interpretation, as we have seen.  
The example from Borges demonstrates, on one hand, the success of allegory in 
literary contexts despite this ambivalence towards allegorical interpretations of the Bible. 
It also demonstrates that eighteenth century notions about allegory, specifically its 
negative relationship to scientific reasonableness and its association with Jewish 
mysticism, endured well into modernity.  Indeed, the success of allegory in the arts and 
literature, relative to more formally theological or philosophical settings, is a turn 
characteristic of the long eighteenth century, as we have seen. Swedenborg’s own biblical 
allegory was most impactful, outside sectarian Swedenborgianism, when expressed 
through poetry and art. 
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As articulated in the introduction, this dissertation argues, via the example of 
Emanuel Swedenborg, for the persistence of biblical allegory in eighteenth century 
Christian thought, and its entanglement with both the developments of the scientific 
revolution and the figured discourse of Jewish and Christian religious identity. My 
argument is not that Swedenborg is somehow responsible for allegory’s survival into 
modernity, but that his is an example of biblical allegory noteworthy for the way it 
responds to contextual factors that others point to as the cause of allegory’s demise, such 
as naturalism, science, and the Protestant Reformation,651 and for the attention it garnered 
among leading figures in thought and culture. Swedenborg also serves as an example of a 
broader Christian anxiety regarding Jewish sources and the Jewish heritage of Christian 
texts. In line with Nirenberg’s findings, anti-Judaism more often serves as a constitutive 
idea in Christian thought, rather than a commentary on relations with actual Jews. The 
anti-Judaism woven into Swedenborg’s commentaries is, on the one hand, familiar to us 
from centuries of Christian Hebraism, echoing the work of Jerome, Augustine, Nicholas 
of Lyra and countless others. On the other hand, his trope of the carnal/literalist Jew 
stands in contrast to the appearance of kabbalistic ideas and hermeneutical techniques in 
his work, in an era when Kabbalah, and with it Judaism, was increasingly associated with 
allegory or non-literal interpretation.  This aspect of Swedenborg’s approach to biblical 
interpretation rises to the surface once we understand something of the nature of biblical 
studies and Jewish and Christian identity in the eighteenth century. 
Part one of this dissertation explored eighteenth century ideas about the function 
                                                          
651 See the discussion of Peter Harrison’s argument in the introduction, and Harrison, The Bible as well as 
Frei, The Eclipse. 
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of language and interpretation through four biblical commentaries, two Jewish and two 
Christian, in order set the stage for a reading of Swedenborg’s own commentary, Arcana 
coelestia. We looked at examples of biblical allegory contemporaneous with 
Swedenborg’s, such as that of Johan Kemper and Menahẹm Nachum, both heavily 
indebted to Kabbalah while drawing very different conclusions regarding the ability of 
Jews to access the secrets buried in the text of the Bible. We also investigated a 
commentary singularly aimed at producing a non-allegorical reading in the work William 
Whiston, who believed the new sciences could help investigate the corruption of biblical 
manuscripts by allegorizing Jews. Moses Mendelssohn’s reliance on medieval rabbinic 
exegesis for his commentaries came with a philosophical articulation of a theory of 
language, to justify reading multiple levels of meaning into biblical texts. These 
commentaries are radically different in content, form, and intention, and highlight a 
variety of approaches to allegory in the eighteenth century. However, together they 
illuminate allegory’s multifaceted relationship to enlightenment era hermeneutics as well 
as the assimilation and antagonism between Jews and Christians that accompanied those 
approaches. 
Part two surveyed Swedenborg’s biblical commentary in light of the themes 
analyzed in part one: enlightenment epistemologies, Christian, Jewish, and kabbalistic 
hermeneutics, and the Christian discourse of the Jew. The interpretations of Genesis and 
Exodus found in Arcana coelestia demonstrate an affinity with ideas Swedenborg 
developed in his scientific and philosophical career, concerning the corresponding 
relationships that exist between levels of reality. As such, his commentary demonstrates 
that a coherence between allegorical interpretations of scripture and nature was possible 
314 
 
 
post-Reformation. We also explored Swedenborg’s persistent reference to Jewish 
literalism in Arcana coelestia, and to his descriptions of the spiritual darkness of the 
“Jewish Church,” against his striking similarities to Kabbalah and against a history of 
Christian exegetical reliance on the supposed carnality and externality of Jews.  
I do not align myself with those scholars who believe Swedenborg borrowed 
heavily from Kabbalah, nor with those who have argued for his independence from 
Kabbalah. Indeed, the similarities, summarized in chapter three, are hard to dismiss, but 
the sources of Swedenborg’s influences, kabbalistic, Neoplatonic or otherwise, are 
overdetermined. My argument is that Swedenborg was influenced by Kabbalah in 
Bloom’s sense of the term – that on some level he was troubled by Kabbalah. Given the 
philosemitic environment of his University days and his close relationship, both familial 
and intellectual, to Kabbalah enthusiasts, he certainly would have been aware of the 
potential connection his readers would make. Bloom’s theory of the anxiety of influence 
helps us to understand defensive strategies at play in Swedenborg’s treatment of Jews and 
Judaism. Swedenborg exploits well-worn anti-Jewish tropes from those in his religious 
genealogy, such as Augustine and Luther, despite, or rather because of, significant 
positive overlap with Jewish sources. Elliot Wolfson makes a similar argument when he 
writes concerning examples of incarnation in Jewish and Christian sources: “This is not 
to deny the adverse portrayal of Christians by Jews and Jews by Christians. However, the 
rejection of the ‘other’ does not mean the other has no impact on the formation of one’s 
own sense of self; on the contrary, condemnation of the other bespeaks contiguity with 
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the other.”652 Indeed, in the example of Swedenborg, condemnation of the other bespeaks 
contiguity rather than severance. One only builds a fence with a neighbor.  
Swedenborg’s reception, explored in part three, was decidedly mixed.  His 
confessional followers were small in number, and the rebuke from centers of learning and 
centers of ecclesiastical power was clear and steady. He was, however, studied deeply by 
poets, novelists, philosophers, and theologians, many of whom also exploited biblical 
symbols in ways that would be culturally significant and have lasting influence. We have 
seen that difficulty in assessing the nature of Swedenborg’s influence, philosophically, 
theologically or otherwise, is due to the fact that the transmission of his ideas was 
accomplished by his critics as often as his followers. We find, therefore, that the anxiety 
of influence that Swedenborg exhibits in his treatment of Jews and Judaism is present 
again in Swedenborg’s reception. His critics include Blake, Oetinger, Coleridge and even 
Kant. Each of these men were influenced by Swedenborg, again, to the extent that they 
were troubled by Swedenborg, and they each in their own way align with and even 
disseminate Swedenborgian concepts while also openly denouncing Swedenborg’s 
hermeneutics.  
In addition to exploring the fate of allegory in the eighteenth century, therefore, 
this has been a study of the nature of influence. The transmission of ideas, and in this 
case of hermeneutics, is accomplished by both friendly and hostile subjects. Bloom 
writes: “Meaning swerves, enlarges oppositely, vacates, drives down so as to rise up 
                                                          
652 Elliot Wolfson, “Textual Flesh, Incarnation, and the Imaginal Body: Abraham Abulafia’s Polemic with 
Christianity,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish Intellectual and Social History, ed. David Engel, Lawrence H. 
Schiffman and Elliot R. Wolfson, 189–226 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 190. 
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again, goes outside in the wan hope of getting itself more on the inside. . .”653 
Swedenborg denied borrowing his interpretations from allegorists before him, both 
Jewish and Christian. Yet this denial comes amidst evidence of erasure, such as the 
omitted lines about Jewish figuration in his notebook, or the sudden reversal of his 
opinion on the “mystical sense” of scripture, which he had embraced in earlier 
publications, but rejected in Arcana coelestia in favor of the safer “internal sense.” If 
Bloom’s description of influence is to be trusted, these moments of erasure are precisely 
what allow Swedenborg to articulate allegorical interpretations that at once echo the 
wisdom of the ancients and herald a new age and a New Church.  
We opened this dissertation with a description of the supposed demise of allegory 
in the eighteenth century found in the work of Peter Harrison and Hans Frei. Such a view 
of the plight of allegorical interpretation aligns with Foucault’s sketch of epistemic 
rupture in the seventeenth century, wherein Western thought and culture are no longer 
organized around the study of resemblance. Foucault writes:  
Up to the end of the sixteenth century, resemblance played a constructive role 
in the knowledge of Western culture. It was resemblance that largely guided 
exegesis and the interpretation of texts; it was resemblance that organized the 
play of symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible and invisible, 
and controlled the art of representing them. The universe was folded in upon 
itself: the earth echoing the sky, faces seeing themselves reflected in the stars, 
and plants holding within their stems the secrets that were of use to man.654  
 
Foucault goes on to describe a fundamental reorganization in the seventeenth 
century, whereby resemblance disappears from the “sphere of cognition.”655 Comparison 
                                                          
653 Bloom, Kabbalah and Criticism, 46. 
654 Michael Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1970), 17. 
655 Ibid. 
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shifts to a study of differences rather than similitudes. Using Don Quixote as a case study, 
Foucault posits the undermining of signs from this moment on; traditional symbols come 
to be viewed as vehicles for deception and fantasy rather than ordering principles.  
How might we situate Swedenborg and his doctrine of correspondences into 
Foucault’s epistemes? Foucault’s description above of the old, classical era ordering of 
knowledge aligns in many ways with Swedenborg’s correspondences. Furthermore, 
Foucault’s use of Kant as a key moment in the rupture of classical epistemology is 
backed by a study of Kant’s break with Swedenborg during his turn to critical 
metaphysics.656 The overturning of biblical and Swedenborgian symbols in Blake’s 
poetry compares with the irreverence in Don Quixote and reveals a similar playful 
rejection of classical signs and systems of thought. Is Swedenborg to be understood, then, 
as simply a hold-over from an earlier era, a late comer to the scene, not yet informed of 
the critical turn witnessed and embraced by his contemporaries?  
Lynn Wilkinson uses Swedenborg and his reception to critique Foucault’s 
rendering of history, noting that “Swedenborgianism was intimately linked to a theory of 
language, the theoretical underpinnings of which were worked out in the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, but which came to exercise widespread fascination over many 
aspects of French culture in the nineteenth.”657 Wilkinson’s is just one of many 
perspectives presented in this dissertation that point to continuities between pre-modern 
and early modern theories of language and interpretation. The Age of the Enlightenment 
certainly brought challenges to existing epistemologies and resulting shifts in the use of 
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symbols, biblical or otherwise. But the logic of representation and correspondences did 
not disappear. It persisted, for instance, in Neoplatonic and kabbalistic explanations of 
nature and texts, where the echoes between worlds above and below still reverberated. 
The ironic rendering of classical symbols, such as we find in Don Quixote, may tell of an 
epistemic disruption, as Foucault would have it, but this is only part of the story. The 
example of Swedenborg and his reception in theology, philosophy and the arts, 
demonstrates that the thread of biblical allegory wove its way through the diverse range 
of interpretive modalities found in the eighteenth century. 
This dissertation has attempted to provide evidence for the persistence of allegory 
as a mode of biblical exegesis in the eighteenth century, but also to explain this 
persistence. Unprecedented challenges were lodged against biblical religion at this time. 
The scientific veracity of the Genesis accounts of creation as well as the logic of typology 
relating Old Testament prophecies to New Testament accounts, were met with a new 
skepticism. The preference for literalism that arose with religious reform movements left 
Christian exegetes unprepared to address these challenges. William Whiston’s attempt to 
produce an original and uncorrupted biblical manuscript that would testify, without 
recourse to allegory, to a scientifically reasonable creation story and prophetic tradition 
was a failure, and exposed what to some was a fundamental weakness of the Christian 
tradition. The ironic application of Kabbalah to Whiston’s predicament by Anthony 
Collins is just one example of how the traditional discourse of Jewish literalism was 
turned on its head, and how Kabbalah provided an inroad to allegory for Christians still 
intent on uncovering the Bible’s hidden secrets.  
The commentaries of Emanuel Swedenborg exhibit an eighteenth-century 
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response to and engagement with scientific advancements, and also something of 
Christian appropriation of and hostility towards Jewish hermeneutics. Swedenborg 
serves, therefore, as a case study in allegory’s persistence at a time when ambivalence 
towards allegory was especially high, and in a way that demonstrates the complexities of 
a Christian discourse concerning Jewish interpretive abilities. Swedenborg’s anxiety of 
influence stems from his uneasy relationships both to the sciences and to Jewish textual 
traditions. It is precisely this anxiety that fuels his allegorical interpretations at key 
moments in his commentary, grounding his insistence that the Bible is saying something 
else. As Bloom writes: “We are nourished by distortion, and not by apostolic 
succession.”658 
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